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x I Introduction 
than 50 percent in the period 1945-60 (going from 10.4 million to 16.6 
million). Ways had to be found, in a society wherein the concept of 
extended family was not well developed, to provide for these elder citi­
zens. The floor of security provided by the New Deal, as well as the 
public commitment to providing that security, were put to severe test by 
these developments. 
Much of the expansion in numbers was taking place in urban settings, 
particularly in the newly labeled Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas, 168 of which were identified for the first time in the 1950 census. 
By 1960 the census listed 212 such areas, with a total population of more 
than 112 million—or over 60 percent of all Americans. This metropoli­
tan population included the burgeoning suburbs in addition to central 
cities. Racial polarization was a notable feature of the postwar growth 
pattern, which saw whites flee to the new suburban neighborhoods, leav­
ing blacks and other minority groups behind in the inner cities. Again, 
broad social forces raised grave political challenges. The other half of 
this story was the continuing decline of rural America, more precipitous 
than ever after the close of World War II. The nation's rural population, 
estimated at 24.4 million (17.5 percent of the population) in 1945, de­
clined to 15.6 million (8.7 percent) by 1960. Despite this shrinkage and a 
corresponding decrease of 30 percent in the number of farms in the 
United States, the amount of land in cultivation and value of farm prop­
erty increased during the period—a clear reflection of the trend toward 
large-scale business operations in postwar American agriculture. 
The economy as a whole underwent sweeping transformations. Over­
all, the postwar era was very prosperous, with output per worker in­
creasing almost 50 percent and average annual earnings for all workers 
more than doubling. Moreover, inflation—except for the months im­
mediately after World War II—was not a serious problem, perhaps be­
cause of the steadily increasing output of the economy. In such circum­
stances workers could and did compete successfully for a larger share of 
the economic pie, even while corporations piled up high profits; corpo­
rate receipts, which stood at $255 billion in 1945, rose to $849 billion by 
1960. Encouraged by such trends, more and more Americans went into 
business: the number of American business enterprises nearly doubled 
in the fifteen-year period. Much of this business expansion occurred at 
great long-range cost (though it was unremarked at the time); natural 
resources were gobbled up at a fearsome rate, and American depen­
dence on imported energy sources—particularly petroleum—increased 
significantly. Crude petroleum imports, which stood at 74.3 million bar­
rels in 1945, totaled 371.5 million barrels fifteen years later—even while 
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domestic crude oil production increased by nearly half. By 1960 Ameri­
cans were not yet ready to confront the problems this misuse of re­
sources would bring on, though the day of reckoning was bound to 
come. 
The same was true in other areas of American life. Despite the gener­
ally upbeat spirit in the country and an image of an ever-widening, com­
fortable middle class, certain inequalities deepened. While the percent­
age of families earning under $3,000 per year declined from 49.4 percent 
after the war (1947) to only 21.7 percent in 1960, the figures for non­
whites were starkly worse: 81.1 percent and 46.5 percent, respectively. 
Women, entering and remaining in the work force in greater numbers, 
continued to experience job frustrations and extensive discrimination 
by employers. Yet civil rights activism and feminist agitation remained 
relatively undeveloped, and much of the American public seemed obliv­
ious to the impending problems. 
The decade and a half after World War II was important not only for 
what happened but for what did not. Demographic changes such as the 
baby boom, increased longevity for Americans, higher levels of educa­
tion and literacy, increasing wealth, greater women's employment, wide­
spread migration of blacks, and the "metropolitanization" of the popu­
lation received a great deal of attention. But there was also much 
continuity in American life. Some potential explosions did not occur, 
and a number of needed changes did not come about—particularly in 
the shape and scope of American institutions. The years 1945 to 1960, 
after all, were dominated by the cold war, a state of perpetual nervous­
ness about war with the Soviet Union. That war, of course, did not break 
out in the period. Nor did American politics change much in these years. 
In general, political developments failed to keep pace with social 
change; social reform measures spawned by the New Deal in the 1930s 
were generally maintained and a few were even slightly strengthened 
(Social Security, for instance), but no new programs were developed to 
meet emerging new realities. Certainly it can be said that political and 
institutional changes in the period were greatly overshadowed by demo­
graphic changes. 
The essays in this volume are intended to illuminate both the changes 
and the continuities marking American life in this important decade and 
a half. Together they expand upon four basic themes of the postwar 
period: the pervasiveness of the cold war, the accelerating struggle of 
minorities to achieve equality, problems of dealing with affluence, and 
the spread of a new kind of urbanization. The impact of the cold war is a 
major theme in the essays on education (by Ronald Lora), government­
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science relations (Kenneth M. Jones), congressional-executive relations 
(Gary W. Reichard), party politics (Bernard Sternsher), and popular 
culture (Roland Marchand). The second theme underlies essays in the 
collection on civil rights (William H. Chafe) and feminism and the status 
of women (Leila J. Rupp). Several of the essays, including those treating 
poverty and welfare (James T. Patterson), the family (Robert H. 
Bremner), workers and unionization (John Barnard), and developments 
in American business (Arthur M. Johnson) deal with the problems of 
affluence. Finally, the essays on cities and suburbs (Mark I. Gelfand), 
crime and law enforcement (Eugene J. Watts), and rural America 
(Thomas E. Williams) relate to the spread of a new kind of urbaniza­
tion—rapid growth of suburbs directly contiguous to city cores becom­
ing increasingly nonwhite, together with urbanization of the whole 
country through the rise of a mass culture fostered by television and 
other social and technological developments. 
The essays in this volume, although presenting a broad panorama of 
American life and institutions in the period 1945-60, do not cover every 
subject. For various reasons plans to include separate studies on consti­
tutional developments, ethnicity, and religion did not materialize. And 
since a future volume in this series will focus exclusively on cultural 
developments in the United States during the twentieth century, the es­
says do not deal with American art and literature in the postwar era. 
But if the present volume does not cover all possible topics, we hope it 
effectively describes much of what was going on in postwar American 
life. In any event, we believe that the fourteen essays which follow sup­
port the argument implicit in the title of this volume: that, even though 
certain anticipated changes failed to occur and much continued to be in 
flux after 1960, the fifteen-year period beginning in 1945 truly witnessed 
a reshaping of American life and institutions, giving to the United States 
a character that differed significantly from that which it possessed at the 
close of World War II. 
ROBERT H. BREMNER 
GARY W. REICHARD 
PART ONE

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE
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the husband supported the family, and the wife kept house and raised 
the children. In 1947 Reuben Hill, a leading student of the family, ac­
knowledged that such a division of responsibility was constantly being 
challenged "by insurgent mothers who rebel against the confining role of 
wife-and-mother and by a few fathers who feel strongly that it takes two 
to make a home," but concluded that for the time being the semipatriar­
chal family seemed to be accepted as the norm.3 
Margaret Mead saw the American family following an urban, middle-
class pattern. "Upper-class patterns occur, and lower-class practice de­
viates sharply from middle-class standards, and rural family life still 
retains the stamp of an earlier historical period," she wrote in 1948, but 
"films, comic strips, radio, and magazines presuppose a middle-class 
family."4 Like Hill, Mead noted the general acceptance of the delegation 
of earning to the husband, "management of consumption" to the wife. 
In a paper presented at the 1947 National Conference of Social Work, 
she observed, "I do not at all think that most married women do not 
want to stay at home, but I do think that most married women would 
like not to have it taken quite so for granted that they should stay home." 
Speaking as an anthropologist, however, Mead maintained that in the 
few instances in which society had done away with the family, "all that 
was done was to substitute the mother's brother and the mother's father 
[for the husband] as the men that looked after the children. One of 
the really human things about our humanity is the universality with 
which men have looked after women and children."5 
Diagnosis of the state of American families in the late 1940s ranged 
from Carle Zimmerman's contention that the modern family was in de­
cay and tending rapidly toward a climactic break up, to Ruth Cavan's 
characterization of the Middle Western family as "independent, conser­
vative, and self-satisfied."6 Although Reuben Hill was willing to raise 
the question of whether the American family had become more fre­
quently a source of problems than of solutions to them, a conference on 
family life sponsored by 124 national organizations in Washington, 
D.C., in 1948 took as its theme "The Family—America's Greatest 
Asset."7 Mead, although confident of the family's ability to survive 
enormous strains, described the postwar American family as "fragile'' 
because of the heavy demands placed on inexperienced, unsupported, 
isolated couples, the meager assistance provided them, and acceptance 
of the idea that marriage was terminable. "There is no security even for 
the mother of young children," Mead said in 1947. "She too is faced 
every day, according to the advertisements, with the possibility that if 
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she lets herself go, if she gains two more pounds, if she does not keep her 
stocking seams straight, she will lose her husband."8 
Nearly all observers in the postwar era agreed with the point made by 
William F. Ogburn in Recent Social Trends (1933) that because of ma­
jor social changes such as urbanism, industrialism, and mobility the in­
stitutional functions of the family had declined, the personality func­
tions become more important. Institutional functions had included 
production of food and clothing, education, and introduction of chil­
dren to the world of work and adult responsibilities. Personality func­
tions, as defined by Ogburn, were "those which provide for the mutual 
adjustments among husbands, wives, parents and children and adapta­
tion of each member of the family to the outside world ."9 The Family, a 
highly praised and widely used college textbook by Ernest W. Burgess 
and Harvey J. Locke first published in 1945, retained From Institution 
to Companionship as its subtitle in its 1950, 1953, and 1960 editions. In 
the 1971 edition, the word "Traditional" was substituted for "Institu­
tion," but the central thesis remained constant through the four editions: 
the family's principal function is to provide "intimate, affectional asso­
ciation"; it is held together not by external pressure or internal authority 
but by "mutual affection, sympathetic understanding, and com­
radeship."10 
Despite the shift in functions, the family continued to bear heavy re­
sponsibilities. Lawrence K. Frank, who had written the essay on child­
hood and youth for Recent Social Trends, spelled out family obligations 
in a 1948 article, "What Families Do for the Nation1': 
The family is the only socially recognized relation for childbearing and the 
essential agency for child rearing, socialization, and introducing the child to 
the culture of the society, thereby shaping the basic character structure of our 
culture and forming the child's personality. The family is the primary agency 
for protecting physical and mental health. Moreover, the family must pro­
vide what adult men and women need for their fulfillment as personalities." 
Most of the young people who, wittingly or unwittingly, assumed the 
awesome responsibilities of raising families in the postwar years were 
themselves born in the 1920s, grew up in the thirties, and were adoles­
cents or young adults during World War II. They had all been affected, 
although in different ways, by how their families fared in the Great De­
pression and whether, in their own cases, the war brought hardship, 
opportunity, or something of both. Their parents had been born a few 
years before or shortly after 1900, their children would live well into the 
twenty-first century. As a group they had had more years in school and 
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college than earlier generations and the advantage of lifelong familiarity 
with movies, radios, automobiles, airplanes, electrical appliances, and 
inside plumbing. 
In 1950 men and women entering marriage for the first time were, on 
the average, more than a year younger than in 1940 and several years 
younger than in 1890.12 One reason why earlier marriages were feasible 
was that, contrary to postwar assumptions, it was not uncommon for 
women to continue working after marriage. Between 1948 and 1958 the 
number of employed women with children under eighteen rose from 4.1 
million in 1948 to 7.5 million, an increase of 80 percent, a decade later. 
"The working mother, even the one who has young children, is here to 
stay,'' declared a speaker at the 1955 National Conference of Social 
Work. "So much of the way we live today invites women to seek em­
ployment outside the home," observed Mrs. Randolph Guggenheimer 
at a day-care conference held in 1960. The item to which she called par­
ticular attention was "the stress on prestige and status related to material 
possession." She might also have cited preference and opportunity for 
employment as an alternative to full-time homemaking and mother­
hood, and economic necessity in cases where the husband's earnings 
alone could not support the family. Some wives worked to help put the 
husband, and later the children, through college.13 
For women, holding a job and contributing to family income was not 
a new phenomenon but a revival, in modern dress, of women's tradi­
tional function of helping produce food, clothing, and other household 
needs. Looked at from another perspective, increasing employment of 
mothers—including those with young children—outside the home 
meant acceptance by broader segments of the population of a practice 
familiar both to poor women and to those wealthy enough to hire 
nursemaids and housekeepers. 
I n the 1930s and 1940s critics noted and often deplored the American 
tendency to make women responsible for nearly all aspects of home life 
and parenthood while men concentrated on work and matters outside 
the home. Taking a job in store, factory, or office did not automatically 
release wives from housekeeping and child-rearing tasks or guarantee 
that husbands would assume a greater share of in-home responsibil­
ities—but it was a good reason for, and a strong argument in favor of, 
their doing so. In the postwar years, whether or not their wives worked, 
husbands were constantly admonished to devote more time to home and 
family. In 1947 Margaret Mead, who regarded Americans' heavy de­
mands on wives as unfair to women and hard on children, offered a 
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suggestion—more practical before than after the advent of television— 
for getting fathers involved with their children: 
As we move into the five-day week, free Saturday mornings are appearing 
all over the country, unpre-empted by church or state or golf club. Here is a 
situation that should interest every person who is concerned with changing 
the tone or pattern of our culture. Nobody knows what a man ought to do on 
Saturday morning. Saturday morning is one fourteenth of the week; if every 
American father spent one fourteenth of the week with his children, the 
American family would present a very different picture from what we have 
now. We have the opportunity before a pattern freezes, before some com­
mercialized interest gets hold of Saturday morning, to set Saturday morning 
up as father's morning.14 
Ed Richtscheidt, McCall's idea of "a modern American husband and 
father," devoted much more than Saturday morning to helping his wife 
Carol make a home for their three children. "He and Carol have cen­
tered their lives almost completely around their children and home,'' 
McCall's reported approvingly in 1954. The Richtscheidts' domesticity, 
according to the magazine, was typical of that of millions of other Amer­
ican couples in the 1950s. McCall's rejoiced that the old fashioned fa­
ther, "disciplinarian and bogeyman," had been "pretty well replaced by 
the father who's pal and participator." But even that was not enough. 
Fathers, according to McCall's, "should wield more authority in their 
families than they are currently doing. They are just as responsible as 
their wives for the way children are going to turn out. For the sake of 
every member of the family, the family needs a head. This means Father, 
not Mother."15 
Some notion of how mothers and fathers viewed parenthood and 
judged their performance as parents may be obtained from an interview 
survey conducted in 1957 by The Survey Research Center of the Univer­
sity of Michigan for the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and 
Health. The survey team selected interviewees to represent the total 
population of the United States in age, sex, education, income, occupa­
tion, and place of residence. Those interviewed, therefore, presumably 
expressed the point of view of "the 'normal', stable, adult population of 
the United States." Children ranked with money (defined as "material 
comforts, adequacy of living, and the security it can buy") as considera­
tions most often cited by interviewees as central to their happiness. On 
the other hand, while interviewees identified lack of money as a major 
cause of unhappiness, few spontaneously mentioned family relation­
ships as a source of distress. "All in all," the survey stated, "it is clear that 
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well over half the population finds its greatest happiness in the home, a 
state that is conditioned strongly by feelings of economic security." A 
higher percentage of women (78 percent) than of men (70 percent) re­
ported having encountered problems in raising children and more 
women (51 percent) than men (41 percent) acknowledged having some­
times felt inadequate as parents. Men were more inclined than women to 
worry about failing to make adequate material provision for children, 
and both men and women—but for different reasons—were concerned 
about "the parent-child affiliative relationship": 
Women, spending a lot of time with children, get concerned and guilty not 
over lack of an affiliative relationship but over their exasperation and loss of 
temper from too much interaction. Men, not spending much time with their 
children, are guilty over the lack of a warm relationship ("I don't spend 
enough time with them").16 
The survey team, like McCall's, interpreted fathers' guilt feelings over 
emotional neglect of children as a reflection of "an important cultural 
change, now in process, where affiliation is becoming a central part of 
the fathers' role."17 This change was part of the general upgrading of 
American social and economic conditions in the first half of the twen­
tieth century that allowed ordinary people to adopt attitudes and feel 
concerns once the prerogatives of the well-to-do. 
Anthropologist Ruth Benedict's contribution to the anthology TTie 
Family: Its Function and Destiny (1949), emphasized the extraordinary 
freedom of choice that characterized American, as opposed to other 
countries', family life. She viewed the lack of authoritarianism in Amer­
ican families as a source of strength and stability rather than as cause for 
alarm: 
No strong father image is compatible with our politics or our economics. We 
seek the opportunity to prove that we are as good as the next person, and we 
do not find comfort in following an authoritarian voice—in the state or in the 
home which will issue a command from on high. We learn as children 
to measure ourselves against Johnny next door, or against Mildred whose 
mother our mother knows in church, and this prepares us for living in a 
society with strongly egalitarian ideals. We do not learn the necessity of sub­
mitting to unquestioned commands as the children of many countries do. 
The family in the United States has become democratic. 
In Benedict's opinion the free choice and nonauthoritarian aspects of 
the American family were consistent with, and appropriate to, the major 
emphases of national life.18 
In at least one important family matter—birth control—freedom of 
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choice, although probably more widely exercised than ever before, was 
still limited by authoritarian religious and legal constraints. In 1948 
Pope Pius XII advised the International College of Surgeons that steril­
ization, birth control, and childbirth operations in which the mother's 
life was saved at the expense of the child's were not permissible for Ro­
man Catholics; organizations such as Catholic War Veterans took a 
leading part in defeating efforts to lift Connecticut's ban on contracep­
tive materials and information; and church authorities, even where the 
practice was legal, opposed provision of birth control devices in public 
hospitals.19 At the end of the 1950s thirty states, including Connecticut 
and Massachusetts where the prohibitions were most complete, had leg­
islation of varying stringency restricting the sale, advertisement, or dis­
pensation of information about contraceptives. Federal laws imposing 
penalties for importing, mailing, or transporting contraceptives or dis­
seminating information about their use remained on the statute books 
but after 1930 had been greatly modified by a series of Supreme Court 
decisions. By 1960, as a result of judicial interpretation, federal laws 
allowed contraceptives intended for medical use, for treatment or pre­
vention of disease, and contraceptive literature not written in obscene 
language to be freely imported, transported, and mailed. "In practice," 
commented a legal scholar in 1960, "this means that contraceptives must 
be going to or coming from doctors or other professional persons, or 
anyone acting at their direction or under their supervision. . Private 
persons, importing, mailing, or transporting contraceptives purely for 
the purpose of preventing conception, with no medical indication for 
their employment, would still, at least theoretically, be caught by the 
statutes."2" 
Despite religious objections and legislative curbs, contraceptives— 
sometimes labeled and sold "for prevention of disease" or "for feminine 
hygiene"—were obtainable even in states like Connecticut and Massa­
chusetts. In 1938 Fortune called the traffic in contraceptives "a 
$250,000,000 business, slightly bigger than the barbershop business and 
very slightly smaller than the jewelry business." Users complained not so 
much of unavailability as unreliability of the products. Margaret Sanger 
and Katharine Dexter McCormick's search for a " 'foolproof female 
birth control method" led in the 1950s to McCormick's subsidizing Greg­
ory Pincus's work on the birth control pill, first put on sale in 1960. 
Meanwhile, numerous surveys in the late 1940s showed overwhelming 
support among women polled for making birth control information 
readily available to all married women; 83 percent of the fecund couples 
interviewed in 1955 in a national sample reported they had adopted 
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some means of birth control, and 7 percent said they planned to do so 
after they had had the one or more children they wanted. In 1960 as in 
1945, the chief sufferers from restrictive legislation were women too 
poor to be able to afford private consultation with a doctor, and those 
who because of poverty, inexperience, lack or denial of information, 
neglected precautions against pregnancy or relied on the less efficient 
methods of contraception.21 
"Trust yourself was the advice Benjamin Spock, M.D., gave readers 
at the start of The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care (1945). 
"Don't take too seriously all that the neighbors say. Don't be afraid to 
trust your own common sense. Bringing up your child won't be a com­
plicated job if you take it easy, trust your own instincts, and follow the 
directions that your doctor gives you." Of his own book Spock said "It's 
not infallible.' All the book attempted to do was offer "sensible present-
day ideas of the care of a child, taking into account his physical and 
emotional needs."22 
The basis of Spock's easy-going nonauthoritarianism was confidence 
both in the natural ability of parents ("the more people have studied 
different methods of bringing up children the more they have come to 
the conclusion that what good mothers and fathers instinctively feel like 
doing for their babies is usually best after all") and in the equally natural 
willingness of infants to adjust and adapt in due time and in accordance 
with individual development patterns to socially acceptable behavior. 
Instead of compiling what David Reisman called "tricks of the child-
rearing trade: feeding and toilet training schedules," Spock advised that 
babies did not have to be sternly trained: "In the first place, you can't get 
a baby regulated beyond a certain point, no matter how hard you try. In 
the second place you are more apt, in the long run, to make him balky 
and disagreeable when you go at his training too hard." 
. . You don't have to be grimly determined [Spock continued], in order to 
bring up a healthy, agreeable, successful child. It's the parents who have a 
natural self-confidence in themselves and a comfortable, affectionate atti­
tude toward their children who get the best results—and with the least effort. 
Whether parents trusted themselves or not, a great many of them trusted 
Doctor Spock. Looking back from the vantage point of 1960, a writer in 
Ladies Home Journal recalled the warm reception accorded Spock's 
book: " There has probably never been such overwhelming trust 
placed in an author. The postwar baby boom was on, and young parents 
were ready for a new, non-rigid technique of bringing up baby."23 
Young parents of the baby-boom era may themselves have been 
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brought up under a more rigorous regimen. The government publica­
tion Infant Care, used as a guide by many mothers since its original 
publication in 1914, advocated a no-nonsense approach to baby care 
with strict adherence to tight schedules for feeding, sleeping, and toilet 
training. A revised edition issued in 1929, prepared under the direction 
of Martha M. Eliot, M.D., warned at the outset: 
Parents must remember that the character building of their child is closely 
tied up with the way his physical needs are met. His future mental health, as 
well as physical health, will depend largely on the habits he builds during the 
first year of life, especially the early months. Some of these habits can be 
started as soon as the baby is born. 
Dr. Eliot maintained that the new baby received his first lessons in 
character-building through training in regularity of feeding, sleeping, 
and elimination: 
He should learn that hunger will be satisfied only so often, that when he is put 
into his bed he must go to sleep, that crying will not result in his being picked 
up or played with whenever he likes. He will begin to learn that he is part of a 
world bigger than that of his own desires.24 
The 1945 edition of Infant Care, much revised since 1929, continued 
to emphasize the desirability of establishing regular habits but in a much 
milder tone than in earlier editions and with more concern for physical 
and mental well-being than for character-building: "Most babies can get 
used at an early age to eating and sleeping at regular times, and they are 
usually happier and eat and sleep better if habits of regularity are estab­
lished. Babies thrive on doing the same thing at the same time, day 
after day." The 1951 and 1955 editions took a middle course between 
baby's gratification and mother's convenience. Infant Care (1951) ac­
knowledged "a newborn baby can't immediately fit into our ways, so at 
first we have to adjust to him." Letting a baby have a chance to establish 
a feeding rhythm of his own admittedly required more judgment on the 
part of a parent than feeding him at set intervals, "but it's much easier 
than having an unhappy baby." The 1950s versions of Infant Care, how­
ever, saw no harm in modifying the baby's schedule to help the mother 
meet her other obligations. "To let him dictate exactly when he must be 
fed leaves your needs completely out of account. A baby's needs won't 
be met if his mother's needs are forgotten."25 
Geoffrey Gorer, an English anthropologist residing in the United 
States, was amused by the notion of a government bureau issuing "pam­
phlets distributed by the million to tell young mothers how to bring up 
their offspring." Noting periodic revisions in Infant Care, Gorer com­
mented that a comparison of the different editions provided "an interest­
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ing synopsis of the vagaries of the most accepted theories of child rear­
ing." The "vagaries," however, represented not the whim of bureaucrats 
but change in professional knowledge in areas such as child develop­
ment, nutrition, and mental health. Each edition of Infant Care, al­
though compiled in the U.S. Children's Bureau, was reviewed by special­
ists in many fields before publication. The 1951 edition, for example, 
utilized the advice of seventy persons outside the bureau, including gen­
eral practitioners, pediatricians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social 
workers as well as parents and expectant parents.26 
One of the pediatricians who advised both Spock and the Children's 
Bureau was C. Andrews Aldrich, professor of pediatrics of the Univer­
sity of Minnesota and recipient of the 1948 Lasker Award in mental hy­
giene. His works, especially Babies Are Human Beings: An Interpreta­
tion of Growth (1938), written in collaboration with his wife, Mary M. 
Aldrich, exercised a strong influence on mid-century thought about the 
nature and needs of children. The quality of his influence is best illus­
trated by Aldrich's dissent from the advice often given parents (as, for 
example, by Martha Eliot in the 1929 edition of Infant Care) that they 
must exert firmness and discipline so that the baby would learn that he 
could not have whatever he wanted. "This process of parental thwarting 
can never lead to a happy family relationship," wrote Aldrich. "Fur­
thermore, such an attitude is superfluous since the world does not lack 
for opportunities in which he can learn to adjust to antagonistic and 
unpleasant requirements." On the subject of "spoiled children,'' Aldrich 
observed: 
Every doctor has the opportunity of knowing many such youngsters, but I 
have never seen one who was spoiled because his parents consistently 
planned his life to meet his basic needs. In my experience most spoiled chil­
dren are those who, as babies, have been denied essential gratifications in a 
mistaken attempt to fit them into a rigid regime. Warmth, cuddling, freedom 
of action and pleasant associations with food and sleep have been pushed out 
of the way to make room for a technique. The lack of these things is so keenly 
felt that by the time babyhood is past, such children have learned their own 
efficient technique of whining and tantrums as a means of getting their de­
sires. In this way is fostered the belligerent, fussy, unpleasant personality of 
the typical "spoiled child," who insists on undue attention because he has 
missed this fundamental experience. A satisfied baby does not need to de­
velop these methods of wresting his comforts from an unresponsive world. It 
is axiomatic that satisfied people never start a revolution.27 
Children born in the postwar era were bound to leave their mark on 
American history when they reached maturity in the last three decades 
of the twentieth century. Because of their extraordinary number, how­
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ever, the sixty million children born between 1945 and 1961 made their 
presence felt almost from birth. "There are so many of them and they are 
so dictatorical in effect that a term like filiarchy would not be entirely 
facetious," wrote William H. Whyte in The Organization Man (1956). 
By 1960, when the oldest were still in their teens and words and phrases 
like "counterculture'' and "me generation" had not yet been invented, 
the needs and tastes of the baby-boom children had already exerted a 
significant influence on the nation's economic and social life. "They 
forced our economy to feed, clothe, educate, and house them," asserted 
Landon Y. Jones (b. 1943), viewing the impact of the baby-boomers 
from the standpoint of 1980. "Their collective buying power made fads 
overnight and built entire industries."2* 
Even before the advent of the baby-boom generation, students like 
Margaret Mead recognized the importance of age-grouping and the ex­
tent to which peer pressure superseded family standards at adolescence. 
Prior to the 1950s, however, younger children were thought to receive 
the vast majority of their experience in their homes and neighborhoods 
and to carry the behavior patterns and conceptions of right and wrong 
learned there into school and community life. Thus August B. Hollings-
head, in Elmtown's Youth, a work published in 1949 but based on re­
search conducted in 1941 and 1942, maintained that upper-, middle-, 
and lower-middle-class parents in the study were remarkably successful 
in guiding their children into conformity with, and along lines approved 
by, their respective class cultures.29 Later commentators on children and 
families, although not indifferent to the influence on children of social 
class, home, and neighborhood whether suburb or ghetto tended to 
place more emphasis than Hollingshead on character-forming agents 
other than parents and outside the home. Peer group and mass media, 
particularly television, were recognized as factors of critical significance 
in shaping values and behavior even in young children. Mead, in 1970, 
believed that as early as 1920 the media had begun to set styles "in the 
name of each successive adolescent group"; by the 1960s parents, 
whether willingly or not, "expected to accede to the urgent demands 
their children were taught to make, not by the school or by other, more 
acculturated children, but by the mass media."'" 
In the 1950s, as before and since, conservatives deplored diminution 
or relaxation of parental influence as bad for children and society. The 
trend toward autonomy, however, was seemingly irreversible. "Our so­
ciety is changing at an ever increasing rate,'' wrote James S. Coleman in 
The Adolescent Society (1961); "adults cannot afford to shape their 
children in their own image." In similar vein Talcott Parsons and Wins­
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ton White argued that greater permissiveness toward children and 
treatment of them as persons were not an abdication of parental respon­
sibility but a way of preparing children for adulthood. " . As a so­
cializing agent the family cannot do its job unless it emancipates its chil­
dren from dependence on the parents, an emancipation that precludes 
parents from being too definite role-models for the child's own life 
course."31 At the start of a decade that would be greatly concerned with 
the achievement of equality, Coleman recognized that "weakening of 
family power" promoted equality of opportunity. What worried Cole­
man (b. 1926) and many of his contemporaries was the waning of any 
adult influence on young people who, from nursery school through col­
lege, were set apart from the rest of society and allowed to associate 
mainly with each other. "To put it simply," said Coleman, "these young 
people speak a different language."32 
Generalizations about American families based on an urban middle-
class model—or any other model—are subject to numerous qualifica­
tions. So, too, to call the post-World War II generation "the biggest, 
richest, best-educated generation America has ever produced" and to 
say that "the boom babies were born to be the best and brightest" may be 
valid, as generalizations go, but leave out of consideration many persons 
whose life experience has been different from that of the more fortunate 
members of the group.33 One way to get them back into the picture is to 
examine the family, not as a private institution, but as a subject of public 
concern. 
What the state should do to help families was a question with as many 
answers as there were different kinds of families. In 1945 middle-aged 
and elderly Americans could remember what had happened to families 
in the not-too-distant past when there was no public relief for the poor in 
their own homes, no workmen's compensation when the father was in­
jured or killed at work, no unemployment or old age insurance, and 
when asylums and poorhouses were the best society could offer orphans 
and needy old people. As far as families were concerned, "the results 
were disastrous," recalled Bailey B. Burritt of the Community Service 
Society of New York. The social awakening, social legislation, and so­
cial changes that had transformed America since 1900 had completely 
altered the situation. "No longer do we see family life in any significant 
amount broken up through the disaster of death, sickness, accident, un­
employment, and other misfortunes to the stability of family life," Bur­
ritt exulted in 1948. The problem of the postwar era, he said was "how 
far and how rapidly is it wise to go in extending present welfare ser­
Families, Children, and the State \ 15 
vices. How far can the State go in extending welfare work and the 
so-called security to all families without weakening human efforts to 
better themselves?"34 
President Harry Truman championed his administration's Fair Deal 
Policies on the grounds that the nation should go farther than it had yet 
ventured in the direction of extending security to all families. "Govern­
ments are formed for the purpose of being of service to the family," he 
told the delegates to the 1948 Conference on Family Life. "The welfare 
and security of the family is vital to every government in the world." 
Truman devoted most of his welcoming address to a plea for passage of 
the Taft-Ellender-Wagner housing bill then pending in Congress. One of 
the cases he cited to illustrate the need for public housing involved a 
young man and his wife, their baby and dog, who had been ejected from 
a campsite on a parking lot in Washington, D.C. 
And they had no place to go [he said]. They couldn't find a place in this great 
city of Washington that would let a baby and a dog come and live. 
How are you going to raise a family under that condition? 
Children and dogs are as necessary to the welfare of this country as Wall 
Street and the railroads—or any part of the country! 
Truman advised the delegates to tell their congressmen to pass the hous­
ing bill. "They will probably listen to you better than they will to me," he 
said. "Some of them are running for reelection next fall."35 
A year later, after the Democrats had regained control of Congress 
but when it appeared that members of the House might still be more 
ready to listen to "the real estate lobby" opposing the housing bill than 
to veterans, municipal, labor, church, and social welfare organizations 
supporting it, Truman issued another strong appeal for its adoption. 
"The real issue," he declared on 17 June 1949, "is whether the Federal 
Government should provide practical, workable and carefully limited 
assistance in improving the standard of housing of the American people 
and relieving the conditions of slum housing in which too many of our 
families are now forced to live." He scoffed at the charge that providing 
public housing for low-income families would have an adverse affect on 
their morale: 
The plain fact is that thrift, industry, and initiative are encouraged, not dis­
couraged, by clean and decent housing. It is among people who are forced to 
live in firetraps, in crowded tenements, in alley dwellings, that are found the 
highest rates of poor health, poor education, juvenile delinquency and the 
other disabilities that sap energy and initiative, and result in heavy costs to 
the community. The provision of adequate housing for the people to be aided 
by this bill will be a long step forward toward a happier, more thrifty and 
industrious people in our Nation.'6 
The president's vigorous support was an important factor in the pas­
sage, on 15 July 1949, of the long-delayed Housing Act of 1949. 
The act went beyond earlier federal legislation to declare "the general 
welfare and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of 
its people" demanded housing production to overcome the existing 
shortage, eliminating of substandard housing, and achievement as soon 
as feasible of "the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environ­
ment for every American family." Its most controversial provision 
authorized completion of 810,000 low-rent public housing units within 
six years.37 
The "prospect of decent homes in wholesome surroundings for low-
income families now living in the squalor of the slums" President Tru­
man envisaged when he signed the Housing Act of 1949 was not to be re­
alized. Scarcely a year later, at the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman 
asked agency heads to restrict credit for residential building and to limit 
construction of public housing in order to reduce demand for material 
required for national defense purposes. Besides cutting the number of 
public housing units to be built in the last half of 1950 from 67,500 to 
30,000, Truman directed reexamination of the public housing program 
"in terms of the developing international situation."38 For the rest of the 
1950s, determined and skillful lobbying by private housing organiza­
tions, hostility to the program on the part of many congressmen, opposi­
tion to the establishment of public housing projects in a number of cities, 
and lack of support from the White House kept public housing con­
struction on a modest scale. Only 200,000 of the 810,000 public housing 
units projected in 1949 had been built by 1956 and fewer than 300,000 by 
I960.39 
In contrast to public housing's indifferent record, private residential 
construction, fostered by various governmental programs, made enor­
mous progress in the 1950s. The sixteen million new units (including 
mobile homes) built between 1950 and 1959 ended the housing shortage 
for most American families. No longer was it necessary, as immediately 
after the war, for married couples to share living quarters with others. 
Both public and private financing plans made it possible for a larger 
number of Americans than ever before to achieve the dream of owning 
their homes. Increasingly the homes were in the suburbs, and, wherever 
located, the number of dwelling units equipped with hot and cold run­
ning water, a private bathroom, and classified as "not dilapidated" in­
creased from 63 percent of the total in 1950 to 76 percent toward the end 
of the decade. Critics, using the same figures, might exclaim, "As late as 
1960 one out of four housing units in the United States was dilapidated, 
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deteriorated, and or lacking in complete plumbing!" In 1940, however, 
the figure had been close to 50 percent. At least some of the change could 
be attributed to billions of dollars made available by federal loans and 
grants for home improvement, remodeling, and rehabilitation.40 
The quantity and quality of housing available is bound to have an 
impact, for good or ill or both, on the circumstances and quality of 
family life. In the United States rapid expansion of urban and suburban 
housing in the 1950s meant that millions of new families were able to 
raise children in more commodious and healthful surroundings than the 
parents had known in their childhood. "This relatively favorable envir­
onment for family life," declares Anthony Downs, "was one of the fac­
tors that generated record levels of new babies in the late fifties and early 
sixties, when the number of births exceeded 4 million per year." Easing 
the housing shortage, the prime target of government housing policy, 
allowed Americans to indulge their preference for living in nuclear as 
opposed to extended families. In 1948 Margaret Mead contrasted "a 
three-generation family with many collateral lines'' with "the tiny bio­
logical family of the modern three-room apartment dwellers.' A decade 
later the more fortunate of the apartment dwellers might live—still 
without relatives nearby—but, like McCaU's Ed and Carol Richt­
scheidt, "in a gray shingle split-level house with three bedrooms, one 
bath and an unfinished basement room that will one day be the game 
room." Less fortunate families whose mobility was restricted by income 
or race might still obtain better living quarters by moving from slums to 
surrounding lower-density and better-quality housing areas. The least 
fortunate, confined to the slums by race and poverty, continued to oc­
cupy districts that were deemed worst in physical condition of housing 
and that became worse in every other way because of the concentration 
of misery and helplessness within them.41 
INFANT AND MATERNAL MORTALITY RATES, 194O-6O42 
NUMHER OF MATERNAL DEATHS FROM 
DFI.IVF.RIFS AMI COMPLICATIONS OF 
NUMHER OF INFAM DEATHS I \DtR ONE YEAR PREGNANCY, CHILDHIRTH. AND THE 
(EXCLUSIVE oh FETAL DEATHS) PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS PUERPERIUM PER 10,000 I.IVE BLRTHS 
Year Total While Nonwhite Total White Nonwhite 
1940 47.0 43.2 73.8 37.6 32.0 77.4 
1945 38.3 35.6 57.0 20.7 17.2 45.5 
1950 29.2 26.8 44.5 8.3 6.1 22.2 
1955 26.4 23.6 42.8 4.7 3.3 13.0 
1960 26.0 22.9 43.2 3.7 2.6 9.8 
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Rates of infant and maternal mortality are among the basic indices of 
family health and welfare. As indicated in the table below, both infant 
and maternal death rates dropped sharply in the 1940s, less markedly in 
the 1950s. Reduction in the rates in the forties is attributable to progress 
in the control of infectious diseases, improved care for prematurely born 
infants, and expanded child and maternal health programs at the state 
and local levels made possible by federal grants in aid under Title V of 
the Social Security Act. Between 1943 and 1949 the Emergency Mater­
nal and Infant Care (EMIC) program operated by state health depart­
ments with funds supplied through the U.S. Children's Bureau gave free 
medical, nursing, and hospital, maternity and infant care to wives and 
babies (up to one year of age) of enlisted men in the four lowest pay 
grades—about three-fourths of the armed forces. EMIC, the largest 
public medical care program the United States had yet attempted, 
served a total of approximately one and a half million maternity and 
infant cases. At its peak it covered one out of seven of all births in the 
country. Although EMIC's justification was improvement in service­
men's morale, its result was to improve standards and raise levels of 
maternal and child care. In evaluating the program in 1949, the Ameri­
can Journal of Public Health stated: "Many mothers whose husbands 
were not in service learned from EMIC patients what to expect in the 
way of good medical care throughout pregnancy, at delivery, and after 
the baby's birth. They learned for the first time what good health super­
vision and medical care for an infant really is.43 
In a message to Congress in November 1945 recommending adoption 
of the Wagner-Murray-Dingell national health bill, President Truman 
cited EMIC along with wartime programs for industrial hygiene and 
control of venereal disease, malaria, and tuberculosis as precedents for 
continued and expanded cooperation between federal and state gov­
ernments in public health services and maternal and child health care. 
"The health of American children, like their education," declared the 
president, ''should be recognized as a definite public responsibility. 
We should see to it that our health programs are pushed 
most vigorously with the youngest section of the population."44 
Both the president's message and a study conducted by the American 
Academy of Pediatrics in 1946 and 1947 noted recent gains in protecting 
children's health. The death rate for preschool children (ages one to five) 
had dropped from 10 deaths per 1,000 population in 1920 to 1 per 1,000 
in 1945; for preschool children the death rate from all causes was lower 
in 1945 than from pneumonia, influenza, and other communicable dis­
eases in 1935. While giving due attention to progress achieved in health 
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services for children, the Academy study noted disparities in care be­
tween rural and urban areas. Thus, within a single state (Virginia) infant 
mortality rates ranged from 25 per 1,000 live births in a metropolitan 
county to 59 per 1,000 in isolated rural counties. Infant mortality tables 
also made clear the inferior status of children of racial minorities in 
terms of medical care: in 1946 in the nation as a whole, the infant mortal­
ity rate was 32 per 1,000 live births for whites, 50 for nonwhites; among 
Indians in New Mexico it was 152. Children of migrant families, 
whether black or white, faced special problems. "They belong to the 
low-income group," the report said of migrant children, "thus often be­
ing excluded from private practice," but "the hospitals and clinics to 
which they would be eligible on the basis of their economic status are 
frequently closed to them because of admission policies based on resi­
dence or race."45 
The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, first introduced in 1943 and re­
submitted with Truman's endorsement in 1945 and 1947, proposed to 
deal with the high cost of medical care—which Truman identified as the 
principal reason people failed to receive the care they needed—by a 
compulsory health insurance program financed by a Social Security-
type payroll tax. The bill also authorized (without specifying a dollar 
figure) an expansion of federal grants to the states for maternal and 
child health and crippled children's services. Another measure intro­
duced in 1945, the maternal and child welfare bill sponsored by Senator 
Claude Pepper with strong backing by the U.S. Children's Bureau, 
authorized grants of approximately $100 million a year to states to pro­
vide maternity care, medical care for children, services for crippled 
children, and child welfare services. A significant provision in the 
Pepper bill required states to make services and facilities available to all 
mothers and children who elected to participate in the programs without 
discrimination "because of race, creed, color, or national origin,1' and 
without a means test or residence requirement.46 
Neither the Wagner-Murray-Dingell nor Pepper bills won congres­
sional approval, but through the efforts of Senators Pepper and Robert 
Taft, the Social Security Amendments of 1946 nearly doubled authori­
zations and appropriations for the three Title V programs (maternal and 
child health, crippled children, and child welfare services). Congress 
raised the authorizations again in 1950, 1958, and 1960, but during the 
1950s appropriations seldom matched authorization. In the decade 
1951-61 there was only one year—1958—in which appropriations for 
maternal and child health equaled the modest amount ($16.5 million) 
authorized to be spent. Very little progress was made in the 1950s in 
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reducing infant mortality rates; for nonwhites the rate was slightly 
higher in 1960 than in 1955. This stagnation, in the words of William M. 
Schmidt, M.D., of the Harvard School of Public Health, "reflected both 
inadequacy of city and state response to deteriorating urban situations 
and lack of essential federal help."47 
Child welfare services, the smallest of the Title V programs in 1945, 
underwent the most extensive changes in the 1950s. The Social Security 
Act authorized the Children's Bureau to make grants to states for "es­
tablishing, extending, and strengthening, especially in predominantly 
rural areas," child welfare services for the protection and care of "home­
less, dependent, and neglected children and children in danger of becom­
ing delinquent." Before 1960 the federal grants did not have to be 
matched by state funds, and they were necessarily small because annual 
appropriations for the program—$3.5 million in the late 1940s, $7.2 
million in the mid-50s, and $ 13 million in 1960—were even lower than 
for maternal and child health or crippled children's services. Small 
though the grants were, they allowed states to finance professional train­
ing of child welfare workers and encouraged state and local agencies to 
establish adoption, foster care, licensing, and counseling services in 
areas previously without them. The Social Security Amendments of 
1950 authorized use of federal funds for the return of runaway children 
across state lines to their own communities and provided for the utiliza­
tion of the facilities and services of voluntary agencies in development of 
state programs; the amendments of 1958 removed the "predominantly 
rural areas" restriction; and those of 1962 required each state to make 
provisions for extending child welfare services to all areas of the state by 
1 July 1975. In 1960 Katherine B. Oettinger, chief of the Children's Bu­
reau, observed that in the twenty-five years since passage of the Social 
Security Act the focus of child welfare services had shifted from concern 
about care of children in institutions for the dependent, neglected, and 
delinquent to efforts to preserve and strengthen families and to prevent 
break-up of homes. No one—least of all officers of the Children's 
Bureau—pretended that the services were adequate or available to all 
children and families in need of them; but by 1960 the foundations had 
been laid in every state for assistance to troubled children and children 
in incapacitated, neglectful, and abusive families. Where the services 
were available, they were for the most part free of the means and resi­
dence tests imposed in other state welfare programs.4" 
"Every effort should be made to preserve for the young child his right 
to have care from his mother, since the normal development of the 
young child depends upon an affectional relationship with her." This 
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statement, published in 1945, reaffirmed the Children's Bureau's tradi­
tional view that the first duty of a mother, especially one with young 
children, was in the home. The conviction had been sorely tried during 
World War II but never entirely abandoned. Between 1942 and 1946 
federal grants under the Lanham Act helped finance day-care centers 
serving an estimated 600,000 children in communities with concentra­
tions of war-production activities. By the last year of the war, the Chil­
dren's Bureau recognized that "pressures of personal problems and the 
burden of full responsibility for their children" caused many mothers 
who might wish to care for their babies to go to work. Citing the findings 
of authorities in psychiatry, child welfare, child health, and child devel­
opment, the Bureau concluded negatively, "Group care is not a satisfac­
tory method of caring for children under 2 years of age," and positively, 
"Decisions as to the care of young children should be made in the light of 
the child's needs, which should be given primary emphasis."49 
The end of the war did not result in the expected or hoped-for exodus 
of mothers from employment. As already noted, the era of the baby 
boom was a time of continued and widening involvement of women in 
the work force. Increased employment of women in the late 1940s and 
1950s occurred without any significant public expenditure for, or in­
vestment in, day-care services. Early in the 1950s a publication of the 
Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor credited the federally as­
sisted child-care programs of World War II with having won general 
understanding of "the working mothers' problems and the community's 
responsibilities in assisting with them." In fact, when federal grants 
under the Lanham Act ceased in 1946, most state and local support for 
day care also ended. By 1953 only a few cities and three states— 
Massachusetts, California, and New York (the last only for children of 
migrant workers)—provided financial aid for day care. The Defense 
Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act of 1951, a Korean 
War measure, authorized federal grants for day-care centers, but Con­
gress appropriated no funds for that purpose.50 A 1958 Census Bureau 
survey of child-care arrangements of mothers who had children under 
12 disclosed that 80 percent of the 5 million children under review re­
ceived care at home by fathers, other relatives, including brothers and 
sisters, neighbors, or other nonrelatives. Relatives or neighbors also 
looked after most of the children receiving care away from home. Only 
about 121,000 of the 5 million children went to day nurseries, day-care 
centers, nursery schools, or after-school centers. About 1 in 13 of the 
children was without supervision from the end of school until a parent 
returned from work. Whether more use would have been made of 
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group-care facilities if they had been more numerous and less expensive 
is not known. "Many parents cannot pay the full cost of good care," 
asserted Judith Cauman, a day-care advocate. "Good care is not even 
available to those who can pay."51 
Dr. Spock, who included a section on "The Working Mother" in his 
guide to baby and child care, said, "It would save money in the end if the 
government paid comfortable allowance to all mothers (of young child­
ren) who would otherwise be compelled to work. 
You can think of it this way [he continued]: Useful, well-adjusted citizens 
are the most valuable possessions a country has, and good mothers' care 
during early childhood is the surest way to produce them. It doesn't make 
sense to let mothers go to work . . and have them pay other people to do a 
poorer job of bringing up their children.52 
In 1945 the Aid to Dependent Children program established under 
Title IV of the Social Security Act was nearly ten years old. It offered 
grants-in-aid to states to enable them to assist needy dependent children 
under sixteen who were deprived of parental support because of the 
"death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental inca­
pacity" of a parent and who lived with a mother or some other close 
relative. The act laid down general guidelines that had to be complied 
with by all states participating in the program, but the rules were not 
stringent and left major decisions regarding implementation and admin­
istration to the states. From the beginning, quality of administration, 
eligibility standards, and benefit levels varied from state to state. ADC 
thus exemplified the states' rights philosophy that Gilbert Steiner asserts 
dominated American welfare policy prior to 1962, "'a policy tailored to 
the interests of the individual states with an absolute minimum of insist­
ence upon uniformity."53 
In the 1940s the staff of the Bureau of Public Assistance, the federal 
agency charged with administering ADC, although unable to establish 
uniformity between states, sought to obtain more equitable administra­
tion within states and to promote aceptance of definitions of "continued 
absence" and "incapacity" that would permit more children to be 
brought under the program. The number of children receiving ADC 
declined during the war (944,000 in 1941, 639,000 in 1944) but began to 
rise in 1945 and by 1950 reached a postwar peak of 1,661,000, more than 
twice as many as at the end of the war. Congress, alarmed by the in­
crease, which some members attributed to mounting desertion rates, 
considered the pros and cons of making abandonment of dependents a 
federal crime. Instead, the NOLEO provision of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1950 required public assistance workers to give prompt 
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"notice to appropriate law enforcement officers" when ADC was fur­
nished to children deserted or abandoned by a parent. NOLEO, which 
went into effect 1 July 1952, left determination of the amount of effort 
and expense to be devoted to pursuing and prosecuting deserting fathers 
to local authorities, but subjected mothers who failed to cooperate with 
them to harassment and possible loss of eligibility.54 
The Social Security Amendments of 1950 corrected one of the over­
sights of the original act by permitting payments not only to dependent 
children but also (as in military pensions) to their mothers or other adult 
caretakers. ADC was further liberalized in 1956 by allowing assistance 
to children living with cousins and even nieces and nephews. Although 
the 1956 amendments declared the goal of ADC was "to help maintain 
and strengthen family life,'' children fortunate or unfortunate enough to 
have able-bodied fathers at home continued to be excluded from the 
program. The conviction that fathers should support their children was 
so deeply ingrained in the American consciousness that even after Con­
gress, in 1961, authorized extension of ADC to families in which the 
father was present and able-bodied but unemployed, only half the states 
took advantage of the option.55 
In the 1950s, while the federal government relaxed restrictions on who 
might receive ADC, states maintained or tightened eligibility standards 
and administrative procedures intended to enforce paternal responsibil­
ity and to avoid countenancing illicit sexual relationships. "Man in the 
house" rules, midnight searches, and "suitable home" provisions 
adopted by numerous states, often attributed to official penury and offi­
cious bureaucracy, reflected deeply held and widely shared popular 
convictions about proper—or improper—family conduct. 
From 1951 to 1955 the number of families, children, and caretakers 
aided by A DC was lower than in 1950. The same was true of recipients of 
Old Age Assistance (OAA), but whereas the latter continued to decline 
through the decade, ADC caseloads began to increase about the mid-
fifties; and by 1957, in terms of numbers of persons aided, ADC had 
replaced OAA as the country's largest public assistance program. In 
1960 a total of 3,080,000 people—850,000 more than in 1950—received 
ADC; but the number of children receiving ADC per 1,000 of popula­
tion under eighteen was the same—35—as in 1950. Meanwhile, the 
number of children per 1,000 of population under eighteen receiving 
social security under Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
(OASDI) had nearly doubled, rising from 14 per 1,000 in 1950 to 27 in 
1960. Even more than in 1950, the ADC family was likely to be one in 
which the father had divorced, deserted, or never married the mother.56 
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A quarter of a century after adoption, ADC was both praised for its 
role in strengthening family life by preventing separation of children 
from their homes and criticized for encouraging unstable family rela­
tions and unmarried parenthood. Kathryn D. Goodwin, director of the 
Bureau of Public Assistance, acknowledged grave shortcomings—for 
example, average monthly payments to ADC recipients were less than 
half those received by beneficiaries of old age assistance, aid to the blind, 
and aid to the permanently and totally disabled—but defended ADC's 
contributions to both children and motherhood: 
The program of aid to dependent children has enabled the needy parent 
and child to remain together in their home, and has given the children an 
opportunity to grow up within their own family setting and to continue their 
schooling. The mother or other relative caring for the children has been 
enabled to continue the rearing of the children and in other ways to carry the 
usual parental role in the family and community. 
The Advisory Council on Public Welfare, appointed by Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare Arthur Flemming in accordance with a 
provision of the Social Security Amendments of 1958, took note of cur­
rent criticisms of ADC but concentrated on its basic flaw: denial of as­
sistance to children living with two able-bodied parents. "A hungry ill-
clothed child is as hungry and ill-clothed in an unbroken home as if he 
were orphaned," the council declared, and recommended that ADC be 
expanded "so that all needy children outside foster homes and institu­
tions, whether they be legitimate or illegitimate, orphaned or half-
orphaned, victims of a deserting parent or members of a stable healthy 
family, qualify under the category."57 
Neither the Advisory Council nor the Bureau of Public Assistance, in 
a study ordered by the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1959, 
found evidence to support the notion, prevalent in legislative chambers, 
that women bore illegitimate children in order to obtain the meager 
support (less than $20 per month in a generous state) offered by ADC. 
The problem of illegitimacy, declared the Bureau of Public Assistance 
study, "long preceded the establishment of public assistance programs, 
and its problems are deeper than merely the availability of financial 
aid." Illegitimate births, numbering slightly more than 200,000 in 1957, 
had increased from about 4 per 100 live births in the late 1930s to 5 per 
100 in 1957. At the time of the report, 16 percent (around 380,000) of the 
2.37 million children receiving ADC had been born out of wedlock, and 
their families comprised 20 percent (600,000) of the total ADC caseload. 
Their support consumed $600 million of the $2 billion appropriated for 
ADC in 1960. More important in the long run, as events in the 1960s 
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demonstrated, was the fact that only a fraction (one-eighth) of all the 
children under eighteen born out of wedlock received ADC in 1960. 
Many of the rest were also poor, and potential clients of ADC, or AFDC 
(Aid for Families of Dependent Children), as the program was renamed 
in 1962.58 
If law and public opinion had permitted, public officials might have 
dealt with illegitimacy by providing welfare recipients with birth control 
information and materials. In 1960 use of public funds for contraceptive 
purposes—especially for unmarried women—was as controversial as 
use of public funds for abortions twenty years later. In lieu of birth con­
trol, states particularly adverse to supporting illegitimate children relied 
on the time-honored methods of social pressure and intimidation. 
In 1960 nearly half (twenty-four) of the states required as a condition 
of eligibility for ADC that the dependent child be living in a "suitable 
home." Most states having such a provision used it as a means of bring­
ing about more wholesome living conditions, continued assistance to 
the family while efforts were made to improve the home, or made other 
arrangements (for instance, foster care) for the children if improvement 
was impossible. A few states used the suitable home provision as a way 
of denying assistance to unwed mothers and their children. In the latter 
case, as federal officials and other critics pointed out, states punished 
children for their parents' behavior and protected them by denying them 
subsistence. In the summer of 1960, the state of Louisiana cut off aid to 
23,000 children, without making any other provision for them, on the 
grounds that their mothers' sexual promiscuity rendered their homes 
unsuitable. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare might 
have withheld the federal share of ADC funds from the state, thus im­
periling still more children. Instead, after long negotiation, the depart­
ment obtained assurances that Louisiana would modify its program to 
comply with federal standards. In 1961, as a result of the controversy, 
Secretary Flemming issued a policy statement forbidding states to im­
pose suitable home qualifications without making adequate provision 
for the support of children affected by the denial of aid. The "Flemming 
rule," incorporated in the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, was the 
most significant advance since 1945 in the protection of children's rights 
in the ADC program.59 
The adult categories of public assistance—state-administered but 
federally aided programs for the needy aged, blind, and disabled—were 
less controversial than ADC. Payments were larger than under ADC, 
involved fewer restrictions, and carried less of a stigma than welfare. For 
many old people who had never worked outside the home or in jobs 
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covered by Social Security, old age assistance provided maintenance 
and a measure of dignity in their own homes, in proprietary rest homes, 
or (after 1950) in public institutions. People receiving aid to the blind 
could be contributing members of their families rather than financial 
burdens on parents or children. Average monthly payments under aid to 
the blind doubled in dollar amounts between 1946 and 1960, and those 
for old age assistance increased 94 percent in the period. Aid to workers 
who became disabled before reaching retirement age, and hence, prior 
to eligibility for Social Security, was inaugurated by the Social Security 
Amendments of 1950. It was the fastest-growing of the adult public as­
sistance programs, the number of recipients increasing 500 percent be­
tween 1950 and 1960, with average monthly payments at about the same 
level as those in old age assistance.60 
Eligibility for old age assistance (but not for Social Security or vet­
erans' or servicemen's benefits) was complicated and adversely affected 
by filial responsibility laws, under which twenty-one states required 
adult children to contribute to a needy parent's support and fourteen 
others withheld or reduced old age assistance to parents with adult chil­
dren on the theory that the children, regardless of the needs of their own 
families, could and should support parents. Such laws were hard to en­
force, difficult to administer, resisted by parents, and resented by child­
ren. In a comprehensive study of the problem published in 1960, Alvin 
Schorr called the application of filial responsibility to old age assistance 
an example of the conflict between poor-law principles and American 
ethics, the latter treating an adult's responsibility for nuture of his/her 
children as a more pressing obligation than the care of parents. His 
study showed that in the 1950s money contributions were relatively un­
important in extended families. "Helping each other with chores, visit­
ing, and showing concern, which cannot be compelled," was the domi­
nant pattern.61 
Old Age and Survivors Insurance—after 1956 Old Age, Survivors, 
and Disability Insurance—was not only the broadest and most impor­
tant of the social security programs but the one most consistent with the 
values of self-help and responsibility of the head of the family for sup­
port of legal dependents. Beginning in 1939 a series of amendments ex­
tended coverage to more and more workers and improved benefits to 
insured workers and their dependents. Despite liberalization of the re­
tirement test (the amount of money a beneficiary could earn and still be 
considered to have retired) and reduction in the retirement age from 65 
to 62 for widows and (with reduced benefits) for wives and working 
women, the basic principles of the program remained constant. Social 
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Security was not a general annuity system or pension program but a 
form of insurance intended to protect workers and their families against 
loss of earning caused by retirement in old age, death, or disability. It 
was based on work, financed by contributions of workers (including the 
self-employed) and employers, and benefits were determined not by 
need but by the individual worker's earnings and contributions. As a 
result of amendments adopted in 1939 and during the 1950s, OASDI 
was strongly family-oriented, that is, directed toward protecting those 
members of the family—children, wives or husbands, widows or widow­
ers, and in a few instances parents—dependent on the workers.62 
Even before 1960, largely because of amendments adopted in the 
1950s, coverage under OASDI was nearly universal. Nine out of ten 
persons working in 1958 were earning credits for retirement, and nine 
out of ten mothers and young children had survivorship protection in 
the event the husband/father died. The number of children receiving 
survivors' benefits increased from 163,000 in the 1940s to 1,160,000 in 
the late 1950s. In 1959 OASDI supported approximately two-thirds of 
the nation's fatherless children. 
In 1959 OASDI provided income for 10 million (64 percent) of the 
15.7 million Americans aged 65 or older; another 1 million aged workers 
were fully insured under the program and could receive benefits when 
they retired. The total number of OASDI recipients rose from less than 1 
million in 1944 to almost 14 million in 1959 and, because of increases 
approved in 1950, 1952, and 1954, average monthly benefit payments 
were substantially larger in 1960 than in 1945. Economic conditions in 
the 1950s made it possible for the majority of all old people to maintain 
independent living arrangements, but the rate of increase in independent 
living was larger for OASDI recipients than for the aged population as a 
whole. 
In spite of improvements in benefits and extensions of coverage dur­
ing the 1950s—the latter for the first time bringing significant numbers 
of blacks into the social security system—2.8 million old people (18 per­
cent of the total aged population) were without income from earnings or 
social insurance in 1959, dependent on public assistance or relatives, and 
living with children, other relatives, or in public institutions. Even this 
situation represented a considerable change over conditions twenty-five 
years earlier when half the aged population was estimated to be depen­
dent on friends and relatives.64 
Expansion and liberalization of the social insurance and public as­
sistance programs inaugurated by the Social Security Act, particularly 
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extension of the protction and benefits of OASDI to the great majority 
of American workers, was about as far as postwar America was pre­
pared to go in public action to promote family welfare and security. The 
period was characterized not by the development of new approaches to 
those problems but by realization of the prewar goal of preventing fam­
ily breakup resulting from the death, retirement, disability, unemploy­
ment, or absence from the home of the primary breadwinner, ordinarily 
the father. Americans continued to assume that the normal family con­
sisted of a working father and home-making mother, and neither voters 
nor legislators were disposed to interfere in family life, even under the 
guise of providing needed assistance. Even recommendations (by the 
Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth and a Sen­
ate Resolution in 1955) proposing simply study of the system of family 
allowance in effect in Canada and most Western industrialized nations 
went unheeded.65 
The social consequences of family instability compounded by poverty 
began to be noted before the end of the 1950s.66 The failure of Americans 
to deal more effectively with the problem during a familistic decade was 
not entirely the result of indifference or complacency. In the 1950s, as 
before and since, reverence for the ideal family and concern for its auton­
omy limited the scope of public efforts to help real families meet their 
responsibilities. 
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The Survival of American Feminism:

The Women's Movement in the Postwar Period

Leila J. Rupp 
Domesticity, motherhood, suburbia: the image we hold of Ameri­
can women's lives in the 1950s is a powerful one, little examined but 
widely accepted. * Betty Friedan's coining of the term "the feminine mys­
tique" in 1963 catapulted her to fame and solidified the image of the 
1950s as a period of super-domesticity for American women.1 Feminism 
has no place in the image: in terms of women's movement activity, these 
are reputed to have been "the bleak and lonely years."2 And yet out of 
these years of baby boom, flight to the suburbs, cold war, and McCarthy-
ism emerged a new women's movement composed of groups and organ­
izations stretching from the respectably liberal to the solidly radical, a 
social movement about whose origins we know very little. The radical 
feminist branch of the movement grew in the late 1960s from its roots in 
civil rights and the New Left, but the liberal feminist branch flowered 
first, and this has been little studied.3 
The contemporary women's movement did not emerge in the 1960s 
out of barren ground, despite the traditional assumption that the 
movement died in 1920 with the winning of the vote. Although it is true 
* The research for this essay was made possible by a 1978-79 research grant and a 
1979-80 research leave from the Ohio State University, and a 1979-80 fellowship from the 
Radcliffe Research Scholars Program. I would like to thank the following individuals for 
reading and commenting on drafts of this paper Ami Bar-On, Carl Brauer, George Cot-
kin, Cynthia Harrison, Susan Hartmann, Rebecca Klatch, Frances Kolb, Donna Lenhoff, 
Beth Litwak, Tahi Mottl, Gary Reichard, and Warren Van Tine. I am especially grateful 
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that the large organized suffrage movement splintered after the suffrage 
victory, movement activity continued throughout the post-1920 de­
cades. Historians have begun to explore feminism and the women's 
movement in the interwar period, but the assumption that the post-
World War II period was devoid of feminist activity has held.4 In fact, 
the women's movement continued to exist in the years after 1945, al­
though not as a powerful mass movement, and an analysis of feminism 
and the women's movement in this period is essential to an understand­
ing of the resurgence of the movement in the 1960s. 
This essay explores some roots of the contemporary movement by 
examining, first, the societal context of middle-class women's lives, and, 
second, the characteristics of the women's movement in the postwar 
period. It briefly describes the heightened conflict between the tradi­
tional ideology of "woman's place" and the reality of the ever increas­
ing employment outside the home of married middle-class women with 
children, as well as the conflict between work and family roles so famil­
iar to poor women and women of color, but newly experienced by large 
numbers of white middle-class women in the postwar years. It then con­
siders why discontent did not lead to mass feminist protest by exploring 
the antifeminist backlash and the nature of the women's movement, 
focusing especially on the feminist group culture created within the Na­
tional Woman's Party, an elite organization that served as the core of the 
women's movement. Feminism in the 1950s remained primarily a white 
middle-class matter, so, although issues of class and race are crucial to 
an analysis of the women's movement, the focus here is on white middle-
class women. Although this essay attempts neither an overview of Amer­
ican women's history nor a comprehensive explanation for the rise of the 
contemporary women's movement, its exploraiton of feminism and the 
women's movement suggests some new perspectives on women's history 
in the period 1945 to 1960. 
THE PARADOX OF"WOMAN'S PLACE" 
World War II brought millions of women into the labor force for the 
first time, moved millions from their old jobs into ones previously re­
served for men, and opened up the military to women. The end of the 
war brought a concerted effort to push women out of their new jobs to 
make room for returning veterans.5 One of the weapons—less direct 
than the immediate postwar layoffs of women in industry—in the battle 
to return to prewar ways was the intensification of propaganda designed 
to sell women their "place." The "Happy Housewife'' of the 1950s is 
an image so familiar it can only be belabored: the smiling, pretty, subur­
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ban matron, devoted mother of three, loyal wife, good housekeeper, 
excellent cook.6 Like all American social imagery, especially in the con­
formist 1950s, it is an image determinedly white and middle-class, in 
total disregard of the diversity of American women, and thus a typical 
product of the "snow blindness" and middle-class myopia of American 
society.7 
Betty Friedan presented the feminine mystique as a new phenomenon 
created in the postwar period, when in fact it was simply the postwar 
version of the traditional ideal, a successor to nineteenth-century "True 
Womanhood."8 The assumptions behind the traditional image of 
women are fairly simple: women and men differ in fundamental ways, 
since biological differences have profound social and psychological con­
sequences; therefore, "woman's place" in society centers on the home 
and family and the complementary roles of wifehood and motherhood. 
Women's magazines, along with television, commercial films, and ad­
vertising, sold the ideology of "woman's place," and thus provide a clear 
picture of the cultural ideal set up for women.9 A 1948 Good Housekeep­
ing article, "Most Likely to Succeed," summed up the message in typical 
fashion: success for women meant marriage and family, not brilliance, 
so that the college woman with a C-average was in fact "more likely to 
succeed" than the extraordinarily intelligent woman so voted by her 
classmates.l0 Put another way in Ladies Home Journal, a woman loved 
and needed by a man would become "the fragile, feminine, dependent, 
but priceless creature every man wants his wife to be." Using revealing 
commercial metaphors, the author noted that there is "actual cash 
value" in being kind to women, since a happy wife is an "asset" and the 
proper actions will pay "immediate and lasting dividends."1' Numerous 
articles lauded traditional domesticity in an attempt to glorify the 
housewife's role. From "I'd Hate to Be a Man" to "I'm Lucky! Lucky!," 
the magazines told women that, despite what their own experience 
might tell them about life in patriarchal society, it was better to be a 
12 woman.
The concept of "woman's place" found legitimacy not only through its 
long tradition but also, in the 1950s, in the developing intellectual school 
of functionalism, which gave added and scholarly weight to the tradi­
tional division of labor. The functionalist perspective, which grew out of 
the attempt to apply the "objectivity" of the natural sciences to the social 
sciences, seeks to analyze social behavior or institutions in terms of the 
consequences or functions they have for maintaining the larger society 
or social system in which they exist. But functionalism rapidly devel­
oped into a conservative school of thought that scholars used to pro­
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nounce the status quo the best possible arrangement. For functionalists 
American society required the traditional division of labor between 
women and men; society functioned best with women in the home caring 
for the children while men brought home the bread.13 
The feminine mystique, then, was simply the traditional ideal dressed 
up in 1950s garb. The irony was that conformance to the ideal, which 
had never been possible for women in the labor force, was out of the 
question for increasingly large numbers of middle-class women as the 
decade progressed. 
The postwar period saw a continuation and acceleration of the long-
term trend of increased employment of women outside the home. The 
labor force participation rate—the percentage of all women fourteen 
years and older in the labor force—grew from 25.4 percent in 1940 to 
29.0 percent in 1950 to 34.5 percent in I960.14 But even more impor­
tantly, the composition of the female labor force changed in the postwar 
period from predominantly young and single to older and married. This 
too represented a long-term trend toward the employment of older mar­
ried women, but the postwar period saw the firm establishment of the 
new pattern. What these changes meant, translated into the lives of indi­
vidual women, was that more and more women returned to work after, 
or remained at work while, raising families. Even married middle-class 
women worked outside the home. In fact, the improved standard of 
living for the middle class depended on the employment of women, and 
many families attained middle-class status only through the earnings of 
the woman.15 As employment outside the home increasingly became 
commonplace for middle-class women, as it had been for poorer women 
and women of color, the justification tended to be financial need—need 
not for bread alone but for a second car, a house in the suburbs, a college 
education for the children. 
Just because more and more women went to work outside the home 
and contributed their earnings to the family income does not mean that 
public attitudes had changed. Although the public had rather readily 
accepted the need for women's labor during the war emergency, postwar 
opinion continued to disapprove of the employment of married women. 
In 1945 only 18 percent of a Gallup poll sample approved of a married 
woman working if she had a husband capable of supporting her. Atti­
tudes did begin to change—by 1967, 44 percent approved when asked 
the same question—but it is clear that no wholesale reversal of tradi­
tional notions had occurred as a result of the war.16 
The increased labor force participation of middle-class women came at 
a time when these women's reproductive roles also expanded. The post­
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war baby boom resulted from women marrying younger and bearing 
more children. Fewer married women remained childless—only 6.8 per­
cent in the 1950s compared with 14 percent in the 1900s—and the 
number of women bearing second and third children increased enough 
to raise the birthrate from 86 offspring per 1,000 women of childbearing 
age in 1945 to 123 in 1957.'7 Women began their childbearing earlier and 
lived an increasing number of years after their children had grown. 
Many women returned to work after completing their child-rearing re­
sponsibilities, but even mothers of young children were moving into the 
labor force. In 1950 twelve percent of women with children under six 
years were employed, and this figure increased to nineteen percent by 
1960. In 1955 thirty-five percent of women with children six years and 
older worked.18 Employed mothers of young children still tended to 
come more frequently from lower-income families, but clearly the do­
mestic ideal fit with the daily reality of ever fewer women. Although the 
traditional picture of middle-class women isolated in the home while 
their children were young is not wholly inaccurate, more and more 
women began to work during the years of their children's growth. No 
wonder that a Ladies' Home Journal survey showed that twice as many 
adults believed that women's lives were harder than men's than vice 
19 versa.
Accompanying the baby boom was a renewed emphasis on family life. 
Suburbanization underscored the existence of the nuclear family as a 
discrete unit by eliminating old family and neighborhood ties, often 
leading to isolation for women who did not work outside the home.20 
Women's magazines pushed "togetherness'' for the suburban family, 
and a "do-it-yourself craze encouraged leisure-time pursuits within the 
four walls of home. Critics denounced suburbia as a "matriarchy," but 
despite a daytime world of women and children, the family, husband in 
command, remained the essential unit. Child care, ever the woman's 
responsibility, became more difficult for the employed woman with a 
large family. Women juggled their roles with little or no help from the 
government, which quickly scrapped the meager day care programs that 
had been set up during the war. In addition the 1950s brought a new 
emphasis on the quality of child-rearing, including the encouragement 
of breast feeding, a popularized Freudian notion of the crucial impor­
tance of a child's first years, and the emergence of a new corps of child-
rearing experts, including Dr. Spock, who warned of the dire conse­
quences of anything less than full time attention from a mother for her 
children's well-being.21 All of this came at least partly in response to 
factors that limited the time spent in child care, such as the development 
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of commercially prepared infant food, the increase in kindergarten at­
tendance, and, despite the propaganda for breast-feeding, the massive 
shift to bottle-feeding (from 35 percent of mothers in 1946 to 63 percent 
in 1956).22 
Even the sex object of the 1950s, the full-breasted Marilyn Monroe 
type, emphasized the physical attributes of motherhood. Although the 
Kinsey report on female sexuality that appeared in 1953 amid a flurry of 
publicity in the women's magazines dealt with women's sexual fulfill­
ment, the sexual ideology of the 1950s continued to subordinate 
women's sexuality to reproduction.23 
The contradictions between the ideal and reality for even white mid­
dle-class women, as well as the conflicts between work and family roles 
created by increasing labor force participation and the rising birth­
rate, gave rise to an atmosphere of dissatisfaction among American 
women. Marilyn French's contemporary novel The Women's Room 
explores the discontent of middle-class suburban women in the 1950s; 
judging by the popularity of the book and its rapid transformation into a 
television movie, it struck a responsive chord among American 
women.24 Even at the time, the media assumed that American women 
had a problem. In 1947 Life defined the American woman's dilemma in 
terms of her decision whether or not to work, assuming that housewifery 
alone could not keep a woman abreast of her husband's interests, al­
though admitting that full-time work combined with motherhood could 
prove exhausting.25 In 1949 Life proclaimed that "suddenly and for no 
plain reason the women of the United States were seized with an eerie 
restlessness," and went on to picture women filing for divorce, beating 
their husbands, appearing in public in scanty clothing, and swimming 
the English Channel.26 A special issue of Life in 1956 focused on the 
problems of American women. The introduction suggested that those 
problems might be the consequence of a preoccupation with rights, since 
women no longer seemed to cherish their "privileges," which Life de­
fined as femininity, childbearing, and devotion to beauty. "Historians of 
the future may speak of the 20th Century as 'the era of the feminist 
revolution,' " Life proclaimed.27 
The culmination of the scattered reports of dissatisfaction came when 
Betty Friedan discovered in 1956 and 1957 that her Smith College alum­
nae classmates were often discontented, troubled, perhaps even 
wretched. These highly educated women found housework and child-
rearing insufficient outlets for their energy. Fearing just such an out­
come from higher education for women, Mills College president Lynn 
White, Jr., in his 1950 book Educating Our Daughters, had urged a 
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college education for women that would prepare them for marriage and 
motherhood.28 Advertisers—the "captains of consciousness" who 
sought to expand markets by manipulating consumers—urged women 
to find fulfillment through buying. Television, the powerful new me­
dium of the 1950s, depended on advertising revenues, and thus the ad­
vertisers' attempt to sell products by capitalizing on personal discontent 
not only reached an unprecedented mass audience but also controlled 
the programming itself.29 Not coincidentally, television images of 
women reinforced the traditional stereotypes. Consumerism assigned 
American women the weighty task of buying and eased the crisis of 
overproduction that beset the American economic system, but did not 
solve women's problems.30 
Why, then, did women not rise up in the 1950s to demand changes 
that would ease their burdens? Heightened conflict between work and 
family roles, as well as the contradiction between social imagery and 
reality, made middle-class women likely prospects for discontent and 
rebellion. American women were not content and complacent in the 
1950s, but discontent alone is not sufficient to generate a revolt.31 We 
need to look at other factors that may have kept a mass women's move­
ment from forming. One of these was a powerful and pervasive antifem­
inist backlash, the existence of which suggests that the potential for re­
volt was real and that feminism had survived the demise of the mass 
suffrage movement in the 1920s. 
ANTIFEMINISM, FEMINISM, ANDTHE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 
Feminism is an ideology with a long history and broad scope. With 
roots in the eighteenth-century application of Enlightenment ideas to 
women and current development in the direction of socialist feminism, 
cultural feminism, and lesbian feminism, the ideology covers a vast terri­
tory. For the purposes of this essay, feminism can be defined as a world 
view that ranks gender as a primary, if not necessarily exclusive, explan­
atory factor and/or category of analysis for understanding the unequal 
distribution of power and resources in society; integral to this world 
view is a commitment to changing that unequal distribution. Feminists 
may hold differing views of the origins of inequality that lead to entirely 
different solutions, but their feminism provides them with elements of a 
common conceptual framework and a basic perception of women as a 
32group.
Feminism originated and developed in the Western world as a middle-
class ideology that, in its early form, asserted the equality of middle-
class women with middle-class men. That is, it originated as an exten­
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sion of the ideology of liberalism and individualism to women, and 
historically its appeal was to middle-class women, although some upper-
class and working-class women also embraced feminism and joined fem­
inist movements. In the United States, feminism gained adherents in the 
mid-nineteenth century as a consequence of the tensions created by the 
growth of industrial capitalism. The suffrage movement, which es­
poused a feminist ideology in its early years, grew away from that ideol­
ogy as it increased in size and effectiveness. The much-lamented "death 
of feminism" in the post-suffrage period was in reality the splintering of 
a mass women's movement that had already shed much of its feminist 
ideology by 1920.33 
By 1945 the mass women's movement of the suffrage struggle had 
long since disintegrated because the goal so intently focused upon had 
finally been achieved and because the fundamental disagreement be­
tween feminists and reformers broke open over the Equal Rights 
Amendment.34 The National Woman's Party, the militant suffragist 
group that demonstrated in front of the White House during World War 
I, first introduced the ERA in 1923. Throughout the first decades of its 
existence, the ERA provoked strong opposition from women and 
women's organizations, particularly those associated with labor, that 
believed in equality for women but did not agree that a constitutional 
amendment was the method by which it should be obtained. They be­
lieved that the ERA would hurt women by eliminating protective legis­
lation, including the hard-won minimum wage and maximum hours 
laws, whereas the amendment's supporters believed that such laws dis­
criminated against women. The conflict centered on the best way for 
women to win equal rights and involved a dispute over the fundamental 
meaning of equality. 
World War II encouraged leaders of women's organizations and 
women prominent in government and public life to expect major im­
provements in women's status in American society. The ERA, for ex­
ample, began to receive national publicity during the war, leading its 
backers to believe that it would pass Congress by 1944 and win ratifica­
tion by 1948. But the cold war atmosphere of the postwar years did not 
create an environment hospitable to social protest in any form. 
The end of the war brought, instead of gains for women, a vicious 
antifeminist backlash. Even before the fighting ended, a Life editorial 
attacked the wartime performance of American women and accused too 
many of being helpless and hopeless, lazy, apathetic, and ill-informed.35 
Returning GIs, in a manner reminiscent of the post-World War I pe­
riod, lamented their return to American women after their experiences 
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with the more "womanly" European women who sought to please their 
men.36 In the tradition of Philip Wylie, author of the venomous attack 
on American mothers, Generation of Vipers, a psychiatric consultant to 
the secretary of war blamed women for the shockingly high number of 
men rejected for military service on psychological grounds.37 Both femi­
nists and antifeminists seized upon the poor mental health of American 
boys to prove their points. The feminists argued that women frustrated 
by the limitations of their traditional roles produced overprotected and 
neurotic sons, and the antifeminists countered that the problem lay pre­
cisely in women's rejection of traditional roles: if only women would 
renounce feminist goals and devote themselves to wifehood and moth­
erhood, all would be well in American society. 
The most influential attack on feminism came from Ferdinand Lund-
berg and Marynia Farnham, authors of Modern Woman: The Lost 
Sex.n From a Freudian perspective Lundberg and Farnham analyzed 
feminists as severe neurotics responsible for the problems of American 
society and urged federally subsidized psychoanalysis, cash subsidies for 
motherhood, and other measures to restore American women, and thus 
the American family, to health. The impact of Modern Woman was 
far-reaching. A 1950 study of the feminist movement described Marynia 
Farnham as "possibly the most frequently quoted writer on the modern 
woman."39 A Ladies' Home Journal article noted the increasing attacks 
on women and cited Wylie's "Momism" and Modern Woman.*0 Femi­
nists viewed the Farnham book with alarm. The National Woman's 
Party called a special meeting to decide on strategy for countering the 
threat, and one party member believes that the book set the movement 
back a decade.41 Mary Beard, author of Woman as Force in History, 
wrote to the president of Radcliffe College out of concern for the impact 
of the book on Harvard men.42 
Lundberg and Farnham were by no means alone in their denuncia­
tions of feminism. A "noted figure in criminal psychopathology," for 
example, explained in Collier's why women's progress toward emanci­
pation was dangerous and why women did not want full equality under 
the law.43 This Week, the magazine distributed nationwide in Sunday 
newspapers, carried an article by a Barnard College sociologist who 
argued the need for women to give up their jobs, bear children for the 
good of the race, and submit to the personal ascendancy of men.44 
The antifeminist backlash had wide-ranging ramifications in the me­
dia. One woman, in a Good Housekeeping article, condemned women 
for treating each other so badly. In a classic blame-the-victim analysis, 
she attributed sex discrimination to "feminine malice and pettiness."45 
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Ladies' Home Journal carried an article entitled "Should Women 
Vote?," thereby questioning the only major advance women had made 
in the twentieth century.46 An angry letter to the editor of the Washing­
ton Star complained about a feature on Anna Lord Strauss, president of 
the League of Women Voters: "Whenever I see these smug pictures of 
women who have abdicated their normal functions and entered the field 
of politics and the like I instinctively say failure and slacker. Such 
women have flunked at their own jobs and yet pretend to tell men what 
they should do in their normal field."47 In the same vein a syndicated 
newspaper article attacked Sally Butler, president of the National Fed­
eration of Business and Professional Women's Clubs (BPW), as the 
"boss-lady of the National Federation," noting that "this rebellion has 
been growing since the war. One of these days the ladies are going 
to have to decide between the kitchen or the council chamber."48 
Even women who had once identified as feminists jumped on the anti­
feminist bandwagon. In a manner reminiscent of the confessions of 
former feminists that had appeared in the media after World War I and 
the suffrage victory, they declared that feminism was dead.49 Dorothy 
Thompson, journalist and radio commentator, herself full of contradic­
tions, proclaimed her belief in the superiority of men.50 Writer Cornelia 
Otis Skinner lashed out at "those "what-women-are-doing' enthusiasts 
who still go under the outdated term of feminists."51 Doris Fleischman, 
a successful public relations counsel who had kept her own name while 
married for twenty-six years, explained in "Notes of a Retiring Femi­
nist" why she decided to give it up.52 
As a consequence of the antifeminist backlash, the label "feminist" 
took on a pejorative cast and was assiduously avoided by most women, 
even those working toward equality, with some significant exceptions. 
The negative connotations were by no means entirely new in the postwar 
period. Already in the 1920s feminism had come to evoke militance, 
prudishness in sexual matters, and a seriousness out of tune with the 
Roaring Twenties. During World War II prominent women believed 
that equality would be won without the agitation of "a militant sister­
hood," or, as Margaret Hickey, president of the BPW put it, that "the 
days of the old, selfish, strident feminism are over."53 In the public eye 
feminism had become "as quaint as linen dusters and high button 
shoes."54 
It is not surprising, then, that few individuals or organizations openly 
identified as feminist. The League of Women Voters, for example, ex­
plicitly disavowed feminism and even denied any particular concern 
with women's issues. Anna Lord Strauss, president of the league from 
The Survival of American Feminism \ 43 
1944 to 1950, complained to her office staff, for example, "If I hear much 
more about women's rights I am going to turn into a violent anti­
feminist."55 Throughout the 1950s the league asserted that it was a citi­
zen's group rather than a women's organization, and even considered 
changing its name to the "League of Active Voters."56 The league with­
drew in 1951 from the International Alliance of Women, an organiza­
tion with roots in the nineteenth-century women's movement, because it 
was too feminist; left the Women's Joint Congressional Committee, a 
coalition lobbying group that opposed the ERA, because it did not want 
to be affiliated solely with women's organizations; and even dropped 
opposition to the ERA from its program in 1954 because it did not seem 
important and the membership knew little about it. The league was a 
solidly liberal organization that, like the country's most prominent lib­
eral woman, Eleanor Roosevelt, rejected a feminist identification while 
serving as an example of what women could do in leadership roles. 
Although the backlash threatened feminism, it did not destroy it. A 
number of diverse groups and individuals working for feminist reforms 
continued to constitute a movement, although it was not a monolithic, 
unified, mass movement with a common ideology and leadership. Re­
cent social movement theory suggests that movements are often com­
prised of a number of relatively independent movement organizations 
that differ in ideology, goals, and tactics; are characterized by a decen­
tralized leadership; and are loosely connected by multiple and overlap­
ping membership, friendship networks, and cooperation in working for 
a common goal.57 The women's movement in the postwar period fits this 
pattern, with the National Woman's Party (NWP) serving as a kind of 
core of the movement. An analysis of the characteristics of the women's 
movement, and particularly of the NWP. helps to explain why the 
movement did not mobilize masses of women in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Founded by Alice Paul as a militant suffrage organization, the NWP 
was a small elite organization with 4,000 to 5,500 members on paper in 
the period between 1945 and 1960, 600 to 800 of these listed as active 
(active membership meant that a woman paid yearly dues of ten dol­
lars). By constitutional provision, only women could join. The member­
ship was composed of a high proportion of professional women, espe­
cially lawyers, some leisured upper-class women, and a few workers. 
The party consisted almost entirely of white women, although Mary 
Church Terrell, founder of the National Association of Colored 
Women, did belong. The NWP was a single-issue organization on an 
unswerving course toward its goal of legal equality. Year after year, it 
worked to have the ERA introduced in Congress, questioned candidates 
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on their position on the ERA, built the list of congressional sponsors, 
fought to keep the ERA in all major party platforms (the Republican 
platform first included it in 1940, the Democratic platform in 1944), 
lobbied senators and representatives, sought the endorsements of other 
organizations, pressured the appropriate subcommittees, pressured the 
full committees, lobbied again—always, until 1972, to no avail, but al­
ways without losing hope. 
It was an elite group that dwindled over the years as the older 
members died. Some of the members were socially and politically con­
servative, as well as anti-Semitic and racist. While the League of Women 
Voters and the American Association of University Women struggled in 
the 1950s with the question of integration within local branches, the 
issue rarely arose for the NWP. and the party steadfastly refused to 
connect its struggle in any positive way with the burgeoning civil rights 
movement. Party members, some of whom applauded McCarthy's 
witch hunt, used the Communist Party's opposition to the ERA to try to 
win support for the amendment from anti-Communist groups and indi­
viduals.58 Not all NWP members shared a racist and conservative 
attitude—the major fact about the party was that the only common 
bond was commitment to feminism and the ERA—but the party gained 
a reputation based on the most unsavory attitudes of its members. 
The NWP was small, but it had an influence out of all proportion to 
its numbers. This was not because it was well liked; to the contrary, most 
of the other women's organizations detested the party (especially if they 
opposed the ERA) or at best mistrusted it, either because of the conser­
vative politics of its members (and especially Alice Paul) or because they 
disliked its proprietary attitude toward the ERA and feared that it 
would rather see the amendment go down to defeat than relinquish lead­
ership of the struggle. But no individual or group concerned with 
women's issues could ignore it because of its persistence and per­
severance. 
A variety of groups fought the party because they opposed the ERA. 
The American Association of University Women, for example, worked 
to win opportunities for women in education and employment and 
sought to win policy-making positions for women, but opposed the 
ERA and the NWP. The Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor 
spearheaded the opposition to the ERA and the National Woman's 
Party, but sought to improve the lives of working women through other 
means. 
Some of the groups that supported the ERA attempted to cooperate 
with the National Woman's Party. The BPW worked actively, lobbying 
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and trying to win the support of other organizations, throughout the 
postwar period.59 It launched a special top-priority lobbying campaign 
in 1953-54, "Operation Buttonhole," aimed at getting the ERA through 
Congress. Representatives from the BPW and the NWP met occasion­
ally to plan strategy, although party members who belonged to the BPW 
sometimes complained that the business and professional women were 
not devoted enough to the ERA, and BPW officials often blamed NWP 
jealousy and ineffectiveness for the lack of progress.60 The General 
Federation of Women's Clubs, the largest women's organization in the 
country, also supported the ERA, if not as actively as the BPW. The 
party set up and dominated the Women's Joint Legislative Committee 
for Equal Rights (the counterpart of the anti-ERA Women's Joint Con­
gressional Committee), supposedly a coalition of women's organiza­
tions that supported the ERA. Such tactics led to charges that the NWP 
jealously guarded its leadership of the ERA forces and refused to coop­
erate with other organizations—which was, to some extent, true, and is 
typical of exclusive and highly committed groups.61 
Other backers of the ERA refused ties with the NWP, sometimes 
breaking off from the party, but found themselves relying on the party 
for information and even, at times, guidance. Florence L. C. Kitchelt, a 
liberal and League of Women Voters founder, converted in 1943 from 
opposition to support of the ERA and promptly joined the NWP. She 
rather quickly found herself embroiled in a major conflict within the 
group and soon resigned, devoting her efforts to her own organization, 
the Connecticut Committee for the Equal Rights Amendment. Al­
though she consistently and publicly denied that the Connecticut Com­
mittee had any ties to the NWP, she kept in contact and relied on the 
party publications for information. She tried to encourage the forma­
tion of similar state committees throughout the country—successfully in 
the case of Massachusetts—as an alternative to the NWP; but, despite 
her distaste for the party, she occasionally considered rejoining and 
never broke off entirely. She kept in touch with former party members, 
forming a network of pro-ER A individuals who felt that they could not 
work within any of the existing organizations.62 
A last category of groups and individuals in the women's movement 
was composed of those involved primarily in work for other feminist 
issues and only secondarily in work for the ERA. One network of indi­
viduals focused on winning recognition for the pioneers of the women's 
movement and kept in contact with a NWP committee set up for that 
purpose.63 Other individuals—for example, historian Mary Beard— 
concentrated on writing and teaching women's history. Most of the 
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women devoted to such issues supported the ERA and kept informed 
about NWP activity. It is significant, however, that the women involved 
in this women's movement network were not involved with issues such 
as birth control or even, to any great extent, equal pay. (The NWP sup­
ported equal pay, as did other middle-class women's organizations, but 
much of the work for an equal pay bill went on within the Women's 
Bureau. The NWP kept silent on the issue of birth control.) 
The women's movement as described here, with the NWP as its core, 
did not take in all women's organizations, even all those working for 
social change. Black women, for example, organized in the National 
Council of Negro Women, which opposed the ERA but in any case did 
not identify as part of the women's movement. One black women's 
group did support the ERA and established some contact with the 
NWP. The National Association of Colored Women regularly sent rep­
resentatives to the party-dominated Joint Legislative Committee for 
Equal Rights, and its founder, Mary Church Terrell, belonged to the 
NWP and worked with Alice Paul on occasion. But racism in the 
women's movement as well as in the larger society kept the movement 
predominantly white. In the 1950s black women played leading roles in 
civil rights movement organizations, and by the early 1960s began to 
speak out about the sexism they encountered within the movement.64 
Working-class women organized within the union movement, some­
times in separate groups, as in the case of the Women's Bureau of the 
United Auto Workers, but union opposition to the ERA was so strong 
that there was little contact between union women and pro-ERA femi­
nists until the resurgence of the liberal branch of the women's movement 
in the 1960s, when UAW women played a major role in the founding of 
the National Organization for Women.65 The Communist Party, headed 
in this period by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, expressed support for the goal 
of women's emancipation on occasion, but fiercely opposed the ERA 
and denounced the activities of bourgeois feminists, particularly Alice 
Paul and the NWP.66 
Although organized black women, union women, and women in the 
Communist Party worked with and for other women, they would not for 
the most part have identified themselves as part of the women's move­
ment. The movement consisted of a loose network of groups and indi­
viduals devoted to improving the status of women in society. The 
various movement organizations acted independently, but often coop­
erated to try to pass the ERA, the major feminist goal of the period. 
Many women belonged to more than one organization, and this helped 
create ties among the different groups. 
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The remainder of this essay will focus on the feminist group culture 
created within the NWP An examination of this group culture helps 
explain both how feminists managed to survive and work in a period 
especially hostile to feminism and, returning to the question raised 
above, why the women's movement remained relatively small and weak, 
unable to mobilize the masses of women suffering from the intensified 
contradictions of the period. 
THE FEMINIST GROUP CULTURE OF THE 
NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY 
The Equal Rights Amendment was the raison d'etre of the National 
Woman's Party, but the party also played a significant role for its 
members by creating a feminist group culture.67 Four aspects of that 
group culture suggest its contours: the importance of suffrage history, 
explicit feminist identification, intense commitment to the feminist 
cause, and the centrality of friendship and intimacy among the 
members. 
Suffrage history played a major role in the NWP, affecting the organ­
ization in a number of ways. Most obviously, many of the most active 
members, and especially the officers, had joined the party during the 
suffrage struggle and carried their memories and experiences into later 
party work. By the postwar period they were no longer young women, 
and they often reminisced about the good old days of the suffrage 
movement." I felt as I read your letter the warm glow that always 
comes when old suffrage ties are renewed,*' one member wrote in typical 
fashion.68 Others commented on their vivid recollections of a first suf­
frage meeting or parade. Having been a suffragist, and especially having 
been jailed, gave one status within the NWP. One member wrote that 
people in her city flocked to see and hear a party speaker because she had 
been in prison: " The work for suffrage is now far enough in the 
past to cast glamor and appeal on those who worked for it. "69 
Women running for party office who had served a jail term for suffrage 
activities listed this proudly as a prized accomplishment. Members too 
young to have been in the suffrage movement adopted a humble attitude 
toward the pioneers; one wrote, for example, "I was too young to enter 
the brilliant and successful campaign but you must admit I tried 
to make up for it after I became a member of the National Woman's 
Party."70 
What publicity the party attracted inevitably mentioned the suffrage 
past. There is irony in the fact that the media tended to describe the 
NWP as militant, although the organization had employed militance for 
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only a brief period in its history. The leadership apparently never consi­
dered engaging in militant actions on behalf of the ERA and even op­
posed them once the National Organization for Women, in the early 
1970s, took over leadership of the ERA fight.71 Party members often, 
however, applied lessons learned in the suffrage past to work for the 
ERA. The decision to draft and pass a constitutional amendment came 
naturally to women who had fought for the suffrage amendment. And in 
more minor ways as well as in this major one, the suffrage struggle influ­
enced what feminists in later years did, and even how they did it.72 The 
many similarities between the suffrage and the ERA fights—especially 
the nature of the opposition and the arguments raised against the 
amendments—were evident to NWP members. Although one can easily 
imagine the opposite effect, they took courage from the long years of the 
suffrage struggle, rarely losing hope over the years. Perhaps the expe­
rience of the suffragists with the victorious culmination of the seventy-
two-year fight gave them a unique and optimistic perspective. In any 
case, they often hoped that they would not have to work as long for the 
passage of the ERA.73 
The party used suffrage history quite consciously to further its current 
program. The Committee on Woman Pioneers kept contact with 
women throughout the country working to win recognition for suffrage 
leaders Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Lucretia Mott. 
The NWP regularly celebrated birthdays of suffragists and anniversa­
ries of historic events such as the Seneca Falls convention. Party 
members like Anita Pollitzer, who reported to a friend the wonderful 
experience of reading for two hours in her six-volume History of 
Woman Suffrage, believed that suffrage history had shaped their per­
ceptions, could teach them useful lessons, and would inspire women all 
over the country to join the ERA fight.74 
A second characteristic of the feminist group culture was the explicit 
feminist identification of most of the members. The NWP was the only 
national self-proclaimed feminist organization in this period. In the con­
text of the antifeminist backlash and the ensuing labeling of feminists as 
neurotics suffering from penis envy, it required a great deal of courage to 
identify publicly as a feminist. Yet party members continued to wear the 
label proudly, and publicity on the party consistently identified it as a 
feminist organization. The party journal, Equal Rights, carried a col­
umn entitled "A Feminist Thinks It Over" and reported information as 
"Feminist Firsts" and "Feminist Milestones." Nora Stanton Barney, 
granddaughter of pioneer suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton and daugh­
ter of militant suffragist Harriot Stanton Blatch, sought to define femi­
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nism in a letter published in Equal Rights and submitted to Collier's. 
For her "a feminist is one who thinks that women are primarily human 
beings with the same minds, ambitions, ability and skill, consciences, 
and power for evil and good, as men."75 
Over and over, in private correspondence, members complimented 
other members and friends by describing them as "good feminists," "ac­
tive feminists," "staunch feminists," "strong articulate feminists," or 
proudly claimed the label for themselves.76 Alice Paul, herself with a 
reputation as a "super-feminist," described women as "born femi­
nists."77 Party members were fully aware of society's hostility. One 
woman, in response to Barney's definition of feminism, noted that she 
avoided the term because it was so widely misunderstood.78 Another, 
one of the party's rare working-class members, repeatedly condemned 
the term for its unfavorable effect, especially on men.79 But these were 
the exceptions. Despite the prevailing societal conviction that feminists 
were "kooks," "freaks,'' or "eccentrics," party members remained true to 
their feminist identity.80 It is significant, however, that two women ac­
tive in feminist causes but only peripherally involved with the NWP 
remember total avoidance of the label "feminist" and even assert that 
Alice Paul would not have used the term/1 One of these women dis­
cussed how carefully sympathetic women used the word "feminist" 
among themselves in the early 1960s—she described it as an in-house 
term—which suggests that this may have increasingly become a label 
used only within the group culture as the 1950s wore on. 
Feminism, of course, meant different things to different members. 
NWP members often expressed the view that inequality pervaded Amer­
ican society—they believed, that is, that discrimination on the basis of 
sex influenced their lives in many ways. Sometimes they erupted in out­
bursts against male arrogance and destructiveness, blaming men for the 
calamitous world situation. Some women asserted the superiority of 
women and female values in the nineteenth-century tradition of belief in 
women's moral superiority. Members sometimes deplored the indiffer­
ence of the majority of women, but usually cited structural, rather than 
biological or psychological, causes for this situation. One longtime 
member wrote to another complaining about women and lamented: 
"Oh dear—sometimes I run and hide to keep up my faith in them, but I'll 
never tell one man that—and you are the only woman."*12 
Although the general indifference of the large majority of women 
sometimes discouraged members, they seemed to maintain confidence 
that women united would attain equality. Although some women 
wanted to bring men into a more central role in the party's work, most 
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members hoped to build strength for the amendment by working to get 
support from other women's organizations. Many party members be­
longed to other organizations—the National Federation of Business 
and Professional Women's Clubs, the American Association of Univer­
sity Women, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the General 
Federation of Women's Clubs, even the arch-rival, the League of 
Women Voters—and worked from within those organizations to gain 
support for the ERA. Most of the NWP efforts aimed at winning 
endorsements from the League of Women Voters and the American 
Association of University Women (AAUW). One party member, for 
example, joined her local league in order to obtain the mailing list so she 
could send out pro-ER A material.83 Others attended league meetings to 
talk about the ERA or participated in formal debates with league 
members on the issue.84 The American Association of University 
Women seemed a more likely prospect so the NWP supported both 
formal and informal efforts to win its endorsement of the ERA, estab­
lishing a Committee on College Women in 1945 to educate college 
women on the amendment and obtain endorsements from local AAUW 
branches.85 Party members also sought endorsements from a variety of 
other organizations including conservative women's organizations (the 
Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Daughters of the Amer­
ican Revolution), liberal organizations (the American Civil Liberties 
Union), and labor (the AFL-CIO). The party set up a pro-ERA organi­
zation of working-class women, the Industrial Women's League for 
Equality, in order to counter charges that ERA supporters were only 
rich women who did not care about the welfare of working-class women. 
Although the NWP made some attempt to win over the AFL-CIO, the 
most powerful opponent of the ERA by the postwar period, the focus 
remained on elite women's organizations, in part because the party be­
lieved that the male-dominated labor unions benefited from discrimina­
tion against women and therefore had no incentive to eliminate it; in 
part because party members' natural contacts and orientation led them 
to organizations such as the AAUW and the League of Women Voters; 
and in part because party members maintained the belief that one 
member attributed to Alice Paul in relation to the vote: that it was more 
dignified to ask it of other women than to beg it of men.86 
Another great hope for building collective strength lay in winning 
young women to the party. The most active members, who tended to be 
women who had joined during the suffrage struggle, were no longer 
young by the postwar period. Yet the party's correspondence often rang 
with optimism, as in the case of one member who wrote: "But new 
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blood—in the form of the younger women, many of whom are coming 
to the rescue of we older crusaders—makes me feel sure that eventually 
the men who hold the power will succumb."87 Although the party's at­
tempt to organize young women into special "junior" groups failed and 
members sometimes expressed disgust with the younger generation as a 
"hopeless" group "not interested in anything but cosmetics, T.V. and 
modern amusements," hope, as one member put it, sprung eternal: "If a 
thing is right, it is bound to come to pass eventually!"88 
The NWP was unique in this period in its identification as feminist. 
For party members to express the views they did and embrace the label 
"feminist" suggests the strength of their convictions and the extent of 
their "deviance" in relation to the other larger and more socially accept­
able women's groups of the time, such as the Business and Professional 
Women and the League of Women Voters. By the 1950s the NWP was 
an organization of predominantly older women, many with suffrage 
pasts, who fiercely defended a label and the ideology it represented in a 
hostile society that brushed them aside as fanatics and anachronisms. 
A third important characteristic of the feminist group culture was the 
central role that commitment to the feminist cause played in the 
members' lives. In the NWP feminism could be one's life work. The 
model for intense commitment to what the members referred to as "the 
Cause" was Alice Paul, founder and leading light of the party. By 1945 
Paul had already established a reputation, almost legendary, as a dedi­
cated, iron-willed "super-feminist," a fanatic and a martyr.89 She con­
tinued to devote herself to the ERA, sometimes seemingly running the 
campaign single-handedly, into the 1970s. Not all members dedicated 
their lives to the Cause in this way. Sometimes family responsibilities 
intervened and prevented members from attending meetings or doing 
party work, and often the elaborate apologies revealed guilt at having to 
put something else first.90 One long-time member, for example, apolo­
gized to Paul for failing to get to Washington and remarked: "How you 
must dislike the interference of personal matters. It is the price 
one pays for children, I guess."91 For other women work responsibilities 
prevented greater commitment to the party. The advanced age of many 
members sometimes interfered, although many women remained active 
in their eighties and nineties—Emma Guffey Miller, for example, a 
powerful figure in the Democratic party, became national chairman at 
the age of eighty-six. 
Other members approached the level of Paul's commitment. Fannie 
Ackley, a retired linotype operator in Spokane, Washington, and one of 
the few active working-class members, wrote and published booklets of 
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pro-ERA doggerel that she sent to senators and representatives, once 
spending $350 of her own money—an enormous sum for a retired 
worker, if miniscule for a powerful lobby—on a single session of Con­
gress. A "zealot," as one friend and coworker described her, she kept at it 
until her death. Her twin sister wrote to Alice Paul, commenting that 
"EQUAL RIGHTS was Fannie's life work."92 Elsie Wood, who lived 
with party member Mabel Griswold, commented after a serious auto 
accident that eventually killed Griswold that Griswold "could bear the 
broken bones but the breaking up of her life's work was far harder to 
take."93 
Party work periodically demanded that members come to Washing­
ton for extended visits of lobbying or office work, and many members 
responded to a summons to Washington despite the required sacrifices. 
Despite the pressure and the occasional collapse into inactivity, the ded­
ication of members was evident to those without, as well as within, the 
party. One new member commented that the secret of the party's ability 
to do so much in the face of enormous odds lay in its ability to attract 
devotion and loyalty.94 A woman who stayed briefly at the party's head­
quarters in Washington wrote: "It was something of a revelation to my 
friends and myself to meet women who are working with such dedica­
tion to achieve benefits for all women."95 
People who devote themselves to a cause, as Alice Paul and other 
members did, generally receive personal rewards in return for their sac­
rifices, and this was undoubtedly true of many NWP members. One 
woman stated this explicitly in writing of Fannie Ackley: "It seems such 
a pity to take money from her, yet I firmly believe that in that giving she 
is benefitted beyond what we can realize."96 The same was true of the 
giving of time and energy. This may seem odd, given the lack of concrete 
results from the party's work for the ERA, but the rewards of the work 
itself were great enough to lead to accusations from the outside that the 
members did not want the ERA to pass, since it constituted their life 
work.97 Such charges no doubt stung party members, but it is clear that, 
without work for the amendment, many would have considered their 
lives empty. 
The fulfillment that fighting for a cause brought to women in the 
NWP relates directly to the fourth aspect of the group culture, the cen­
trality of friendship and intimacy among members. Women's historians 
have recently begun to explore female friendship and women's support 
networks, long overlooked or trivialized, as a key issue in women's 
past.98 Within the NWP women's relationships grew out of, and in turn 
supported, the work for the ERA. Correspondence among members— 
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and there was little separation between "official" and personal concerns, 
a manifestation of the intensely personal nature of the party's political 
work—rang with expressions of friendship. A few examples provide an 
idea of the warmth that pervades the letters. One member wrote to Alice 
Paul: "You are so thoughtful and understanding. I cannot tell you how 
much it means to have a friend who is just that."99 Another longtime 
member wrote of her cousin and coworker who had just died: "We were 
'best friends' for seventy-five years & her nobility of character & her love 
were a sustaining joy & influence through all the years."100 On the death 
of another member, her sister-in-law wrote: "I know what a sense of loss 
you feel in your organization, just as we feel here in the family circle. 
You, personally, loved her too, I know, just as she loved you."101 
Often these ties were of long duration, especially for women who had 
been active together in the NWP during the suffrage struggle. Nina Al-
lender, the cartoonist of the suffrage movement, wrote an emotion-filled 
letter to Alice Paul in which she recalled the first time they had met and 
the impact that meeting had on her life.102 Betty Gram Swing, also a 
suffragist, wrote to Paul: "My, what a long and wonderful association 
we have had. "103 
The intimacy of the NWP letters often seems to have grown out of the 
female world in which some party members lived. Many of the most 
active members lived in couple relationships with other women or 
seemed to function in a world populated primarily by women. 
Members, in their letters, accepted these relationships as primary com­
mitments. For example, few letters to Jeannette Marks, chairman of the 
New York branch of the party in the 1940s and professor of English at 
Mount Holyoke College, failed to inquire about Mary Woolley, former 
president of Mount Holyoke and the woman with whom Marks lived, 
whose serious illness clouded Mark's life and work.104 Alma Lutz, femi­
nist biographer and author of the column "A Feminist Thinks It Over," 
shared a Boston apartment and a country home for forty-one years with 
her Vassar College roommate, Marguerite Smith. They lived together, 
worked together in the party, vacationed together, and when Smith died 
in 1959, Lutz struggled with her grief and pain while friends wrote sym­
pathetic and consoling letters.105 Agnes Wells, an Indiana University 
dean and chairman of the party in the 1950s, wrote of the death of her 
"friend of forty one years and house-companion for 28 years." "I cannot 
yet realize the finality of it all," she wrote, and she could not continue 
living in the house they had shared together.106 The existence of such 
couple relationships between women, whatever their nature—and I 
think that it is important that we recognize both the common bonds and 
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the real differences between women who lived together and loved each 
other as these women did and women who were part of the lesbian cul­
ture of the 1950s—had an impact on the party's culture. Party members 
saw the centrality of such relationships and affirmed the importance of 
women's relationships with other women. 
Certainly not all NWP members lived in primary relationships with 
other women, but, even for the married women, the party created a 
female world on occasion. One important resource for this was the Alva 
Belmont House, party headquarters in Washington. The Belmont 
House, a historic mansion on Capitol Hill, served (and continues to 
serve) not only as an office but as a clubhouse and a feminist hotel for 
visitors coming to Washington. A number of women lived at Belmont 
House and in two other party-owned houses, and others stayed there for 
periods ranging from days to months while engaged in lobbying. Al­
though some rooms were rented to non-party individuals, even men, 
Belmont House played an important role in maintaining the culture of 
the party. One member even wondered if being married would prevent 
one's acceptance there.107 Another member who traveled to Washington 
to serve as house manager emphasized the importance of the house: "It 
seems so natural to again be a part of Headquarters—this house has so 
much [sic] as a basis for a big contribution to the national and world 
woman-movement."108 Some of the members made their home there; 
one woman wrote that she was "looking forward with joy to my re­
turn home, and Home to me now, means the dear Alva Belmont 
House. "109 
Just as the Belmont House served as home for some members, the 
organization became for some the "Woman's Party family."110 In fulfil­
ling its function as a family, the NWP provided support of various kinds 
to its members. For example, Alice Paul, concerned about her old friend 
Nina Allender's loneliness, encouraged her to come to Washington to 
live: "I think we could make you comfortable. You would be surrounded 
by loving friends and by people who know and appreciate the very great 
gift that you have made to our movement.""1 The daughter of another 
recently deceased member wrote to thank the party members at head­
quarters whose kindness and consideration had made it possible for her 
mother to continue her work as long as she did."2 Members sometimes 
tried to provide financial support for other members in need: one 
woman collected a fund to provide another with dentures."3 Often 
members offered emotional support in times of stress, proffering sym­
pathy, for example, on the illness or deaths of friends and family. 
Members worried about Paul's health in particular, urging her to rest, 
telling her what to eat, encouraging each other to take care of her."4 
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Although the Belmont House served as a center of the female world of 
the NWP, many members were married and some included their hus­
bands in their party work. Members sometimes sent greetings from their 
husbands in their letters, and the party sent some much-appreciated 
messages of concern to husbands who were ill. Anita Pollitzer, during 
her term as national chairman, brought her husband Elie Edson (several 
members did not change their names when they married) to headquar­
ters for weekends. One letter from a member whose husband had just 
died describes an easy relationship between one man and the party: 
"Byron and I have always felt so much a part of the Woman's Party 
family. As you know Byron and I spent four happy years there, 
and I am sure he worked about as hard for our cause as I did, and 
certainly he was heart and soul in it."115 For married women active par­
ticipation was probably only possible with supportive husbands.116 
The importance of women's relationships within the party did not 
mean that this was a conflict-free world. Bitter disputes almost tore the 
party apart on several occasions, most seriously in 1947 when one fac­
tion took the officers to court in a dispute over the name, property, and 
resources of the party. Like a similar but less serious split in the mid­
1930s, the 1947 lawsuit revolved around the issues of Alice Paul's leader­
ship and the structure of the party.117 Although the personnel of the 
rebellion changed in the decade between these two conflicts—some of 
those supporting Paul in the 1930s led the insurgency in the 1940s—the 
charges against Paul and the party remained the same. Paul, the accusa­
tions ran, controlled the party in a dictatorial, even fascistic, manner, 
causing the organization to remain small and elite. The conflict grew to 
such proportions that the Paul faction locked the insurgents out of party 
headquarters and, suspecting sinister forces at work, alerted the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities to the doings of the rebels.118 
The party survived both the 1935 schism and the 1947 lawsuit, but the 
conflicts remained unresolved, erupting again in 1953 with the resigna­
tion of the national chairman over the issue of expansion of member­
ship. Throughout the NWP papers is evidence of conflict, often but not 
always centered on Paul's leadership. The bitterness of the disputes was 
in part a result of the intermingling of personal and political ties for 
many NWP members. Even those directly involved in these crises some­
times returned to work with the party—and those who broke off entirely 
usually continued to work for the ERA individually or in other organi­
zations, and they usually kept in contact with other former party 
members. 
Personal ties both survived and helped fan the flames of the disputes 
that tore through the party, but they also provided inspiration for many 
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of the members. The personal support that participation in the party 
offered seemed sometimes to be the key to the NWP's perseverance in 
the face of societal indifference or hostility. Members wrote to each 
other expressing the satisfaction derived from working together. Betty 
Gram Swing wrote that she hoped to be able to get to a party convention 
"if for no other reason [than] to see you all again. What a bond our 
crusade is!"119 Another member described a speaking tour she had un­
dertaken for the party as the happiest vacation trip she had ever spent.12° 
Inez Haynes Irwin, author of the party history, wrote to Paul to thank 
her for her praise of the history and added: "I enjoyed writing it. How I 
enjoyed writing it! How I enjoyed every moment that I spent at Head­
quarters."121 All of this supports the notion that the feminist group cul­
ture of the NWP gave women a great deal as they devoted their energy 
and time to the cause of the ERA. 
The feminist group culture of the NWP helped make it possible for 
women in the postwar period to work for a feminist cause in a society 
either indifferent or hostile to feminist concepts and values. It provided 
a supportive environment anchored in the suffrage past that valued fem­
inism, gave meaning to one's life through commitment to a cause, and 
facilitated and nurtured warm friendships. But some of the very 
strengths of that culture outlined here—suffrage bonds, the level of 
commitment, the intensity of relationships—worked to further the elit­
ism and exclusivity of the party. Limited participation was difficult in 
this world, and this fact, combined with both the class and racial compo­
sition of the party and the unsavory social and political views of some of 
its members, ensured that the party would remain small and elite. Not 
surprisingly, as a more mass-based women's movement began to grow in 
the 1960s, the NWP faded into insignificance. Nevertheless, the party's 
persistence played a role in the establishment of the President's Com­
mission on the Status of Women in 1961, which contributed to the 
growth of the women's movement, and in the fight to include the word 
"sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited dis­
crimination in employment and served as the focus for the early efforts 
of the National Organization for Women (NOW) after its founding in 
1966.122 The National Woman's Party remained aloof from NOW but 
pressed for support of the ERA, which came in 1967. By the late 1960s 
the program of the NWP had been swept up by a surging new move­
ment. Although the party still works for ratification of the ERA, leader­
ship of the fight has long since passed to NOW. Although NOW in its 
early days had little use for the party, it has come to revere Alice Paul 
and the NWP, if only as symbols of feminist survival.123 
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CONCLUSION 
The late 1940s and 1950s saw middle-class women faced with increas­
ing conflict between the cultural ideals of domesticity and femininity, on 
the one hand, and the realities of their lives, on the other, as well as 
between their expanding work and family roles. The paradox of "wom­
an's place" in the 1950s provides the context for understanding the re­
surgence of the women's movement in the 1960s, but it does not explain 
why the movement grew in the 1960s rather than the 1950s. The postwar 
antifeminist backlash certainly played a role; although feminism has 
never been a part of the American societal ideal, the postwar period saw 
an especially vigorous denunciation of feminism. The avoidance of fem­
inist identification by groups such as the Business and Professional 
Women and the American Association of University Women, and the 
antifeminism of the League of Women Voters—all groups with feminist 
origins or with some commitment to feminist goals—suggests the effec­
tiveness of the antifeminist campaign. In the 1950s, with the threat of 
McCarthyism darkening the political skies, the danger of deviance was 
all too clear. Only a group as exclusive and committed as the National 
Woman's Party dared to call itself feminist, and the Woman's Party was 
hardly the sort of organization to attract large numbers of women. An 
exclusive single-issue group that demanded a high level of commitment, 
it did not offer the "average" middle- or working-class woman a solution 
to her problems, although it did provide essential support for women 
already committed to feminism. Dedicated women kept alive a women's 
movement working for an improvement of women's status in American 
society, but it was not the sort of movement to win large numbers of 
adherents. The central role of the National Woman's Party ensured that 
liberals and labor would not move to support the ERA, at least in part 
because of long-standing animosity. 
In the 1960s, in the context of the flowering of social protest move­
ments in the United States and throughout the world, a number of fac­
tors helped spark the formation of a more mass-based movement among 
dissatisfied women. These included the establishment of the president's 
commission, the publication of Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, and 
the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII. When the liberal branch of the 
women's movement began to coalesce, it brought together women newly 
interested in feminist issues with women from the women's movement of 
the postwar period. That link is important in understanding the history 
of the movement. 
This study does not pretend to provide definitive answers to all the 
questions it raises. We need to know a great deal more about women in 
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the postwar period before we will know why the 1960s witnessed the 
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1950s, but the lessons of the past are important. Jo Freeman, a major 
scholar of the contemporary women's movement, has suggested that the 
American political system responds less to those who protest loudest 
than to those who protest longest.124 If this is indeed the case, the mod­
ern movement cannot afford to overlook the history of feminist 
survivors. 
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The Civil Rights Revolution, 1945-1960:

The Gods Bring Threads to Webs Begun

William H. Chafe 
"Do you want to get killed?" he asked me. 
"Hell, no!" 
"Then, for God's sake, learn how to live in the south! . . Look, you're 
black, black, black, see? Can't you understand that?" . "You act 
around white people as if you didn't know that they were white. And they 
see it." 
"Oh, Christ, I can't be a slave," I said hopelessly. 
"But you've got to eat. When you're in front of white people think 
before you act, think before you speak; your way of doing things is alright 
among our people, but not for white people. They won't stand for it." (Rich­
ard Wright, Black Boy) 
No black person growing up in the American south during the 
1930s could avoid the pervasive reality of race. It shaped one's life, dic­
tated one's ambitions, determined where and how one would speak, 
what kind of job one would hold—sometimes even whether one would 
survive. White people were in control. They could fire you from your 
job, evict you from your land, slap you for having the wrong "look" in 
your eye. 
Sometimes their terrorism knew no bounds. In 1934 Claude Raines, a 
black man in Georgia, was arrested for allegedly molesting a white 
woman. Seized by a lynch mob, he was carried through town after town 
in southern Georgia and then across the border into Florida, with leaf­
lets left in each place advertising the lynching that was about to happen. 
By the time the mob reached its final destination, thousands had ga­
thered to witness the mutilation of Raines's body. No law enforcement 
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agent acted to prevent the murder.' In such a context open rebellion was 
not an option because destruction of life and possessions was the almost 
certain response. 
Yet the absence of mass protest did not signify passive acceptance of 
the status quo. If whites controlled the outer reality, they could not con­
trol the inner spirit. Throughout the years of Jim Crow, when America's 
laws said that blacks could not vote, share restaurant facilities, or go to 
school with whites, the black struggle to overcome oppression gathered 
strength. At times, of necessity, it took the form of playing the role of 
Uncle Tom in order to secure funds for a new school, a better play­
ground, or a decent college. At other times it consisted of teaching pride 
in black institutions, churches, and businesses, preparing for the day 
when those institutions would serve as a base from which to attack the 
oppressor. And at still other times the struggle meant pushing back the 
boundaries of control and beginning to challenge segregation itself. 
During the late 1930s and 1940s, more and more black Americans took 
this third course. 
Ella Baker was born and reared in Warren County, North Carolina, 
on a farm owned by her family since the 1870s. After graduating from 
Shaw University, a black school started during Reconstruction, she 
moved to New York City to work for the YWCA. Then, in the middle 
1930s, she accepted the position of field secretary for the NAACP. The 
South was her territory. Traveling from town to town, she recruited 
blacks to join the NAACP—an act which at that time represented the 
equivalent of joining the Black Panthers in the late 1960s. In 1943 she 
went to Greensboro, North Carolina. There she so impressed Randolph 
Blackwell, a young high school student, that he organized an NAACP 
youth chapter. Blackwell subsequently initiated voter registration cam­
paigns in Greensboro, ran for the state legislature, and helped form the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Ella Baker, Randolph 
Blackwell, and the NAACP youth group that they formed together, 
would help reshape history in the 1950s and 1960s.2 
Two hundred miles to the south and east, in Clarendon County, 
South Carolina, J. A. DeLaine pastored an A.M.E. church and taught 
school. ("If you set out to find the place in America where life 
among black folk had changed least since the end of slavery," Richard 
Kluger wrote in 1974, "Clarendon County is where you might have 
come.") With a decent job and an honored position in the community. 
DeLaine might have been expected to act with caution. But he had a fire 
within him. As a youngster he had been sentenced to twenty-five lashes 
for pushing back a white boy who had shoved his sister off the sidewalk. 
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In the church he pastored—as in most black churches—he drew con­
stant parallels between the liberation promised in Scripture and the real­
ity of contemporary life. It was not surprising, then, that when DeLaine 
heard an NAACP lecturer in the summer of 1947 at a black college in 
Columbia, South Carolina, he decided to lead the struggle to equalize 
education in Clarendon County. It was, after all, an area that in 1949 
spent $179 per white child in public schools and $43 per black child. 
Shortly thereafter, DeLaine met Thurgood Marshall, general counsel of 
the NAACP and a graduate of Howard University Law School, whose 
imagination, courage, and sheer energy were now directed toward de­
molishing the legal fortress of segregation. DeLaine and Marshall, too, 
would be heard from again.3 
Throughout the South such acts of assertion were growing. Overt 
protest was never easy, but the challenge was beginning. Based on the 
achievements of their forefathers in a segregated world, people like Bak­
er and Blackwell and DeLaine were launching an assault that would 
eventually undermine segregation itself. At a time when all too often we 
assume that change comes from above, it is important to remember 
where the civil rights movement began, who started it, and what price 
was paid before anyone in authority even noticed. 
The new challenge grew out of the changes wrought by World War II. 
By causing a massive dislocation of population and forcing millions of 
people into new experiences, the war created a context in which many 
blacks—and some whites—perceived the possibility of racial activism in 
a new way. The vicious cycle of social control that had compelled obe­
dience to the status quo as a price for survival was at least partially 
broken by the massive jolt of full-scale war. Although little was accom­
plished in the way of permanent progress toward equality, the changes 
that did occur laid the foundation for subsequent mass protest. 
The war generated an accelerated migration of blacks from the South, 
and within the South from farm to city. Whether lured by a specific job 
in a munitions plant, ordered by a directive from the selective service, or 
simply beckoned by the hope of a better life elsewhere, hundreds of 
thousands of black southerners boarded trains and buses and headed 
north and west. When they arrived at their destination, they found living 
situations often less attractive than they had expected. The urban ghet­
to, with its overcrowded housing, hard-pressed social facilities, and op­
pressive discrimination, was not much better than what they had left 
behind. Yet there was also a difference. A northern urban political ma­
chine sought votes and offered some political recognition in return. 
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There was more psychological space, more opportunity to talk freely. 
The community was new, the imminent tyranny of small-town authority 
was removed, and different ground rules applied. The very act of physi­
cal mobility brought independence from the overwhelming social con­
straints that had been enforced in small southern communities. If the 
controls existed in different forms, there was at least now the possibility 
of a different response as well as a heightened sense of what might be 
done to achieve a better life. 
World War IPs second major impact came in the area of the economy. 
Some two million blacks were employed in defense plants during the 
war, and another two hundred thousand joined the federal civil service. 
Most of these jobs were at low levels. Indeed, when attempts were made 
to upgrade black employees, whites frequently rebelled, as when twenty 
thousand white workers in Mobile walked off their jobs and rioted when 
efforts were made to hire twelve blacks as welders in a shipyard. A war­
time Fair Employment Practices Committee, established by President 
Roosevelt after A. Philip Randolph threatened to bring 50,000 blacks to 
march on Washington in protest against discrimination in defense in­
dustries, offered little in the way of substantive help because it lacked 
enforcement power. For the most part, blacks continued to be hired as 
janitors or scrubwomen, not as technicians, secretaries, or skilled 
craftsmen. 
Nevertheless, the war had some positive impact. In 1940 the number 
of blacks employed in professional, white-collar, and skilled or semi­
skilled jobs had been less than 20 percent. A decade later the figure had 
climbed to 33 percent, largely as a result of wartime changes. Black 
members of labor unions doubled to 1,250,000 during the war years. The 
end result was thus another contradiction: some upward mobility— 
enough to spur hope—yet pervasive discrimination as well to remind 
one constantly of the depths of racism to be overcome. 
A third impact came in the armed forces. There, the struggle was in 
some ways the hardest. When blacks in Tennessee demanded that the 
governor appoint Negroes to the state's draft board, he responded: 
"This is a white man's country. The Negro had nothing to do with 
the settling of America." The army set a quota for the number of blacks 
to be inducted, the navy restricted Negroes to the position of mess boys, 
Red Cross workers segregated blood supplies into "white" and "col­
ored" bottles, and training camps, especially in the South, became in­
famous for their persecution of blacks. A Negro private at Fort Benning, 
Georgia, was lynched; military officials refused to act when a black army 
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nurse was brutally beaten for defying Jim Crow seating on a Montgom­
ery, Alabama, bus; and religious services were segregated, the sign at 
one base proclaiming separate worship for "Catholics, Jews, Protes­
tants, and Negroes." But even in the armed services, some positive 
changes occurred: more and more blacks were trained for combat posi­
tions; some integration took place on an experimental basis; and above 
all, thousands upon thousands of soldiers experienced some taste of life 
without prejudice in places like France and Hawaii.4 
Significantly, each of these changes exhibited a common theme: the 
interaction of some improvement together with daily reminders of ongo­
ing oppression. The chemistry of the process was crucial. Simultaneous 
with new exposure to travel, the prospect of better jobs, and higher ex­
pectations, came the reality of daily contact with Jim Crow in the armed 
forces, housing, and on the job. The juxtaposition could not help but 
spawn anger and frustration. The possibility of some improvement gen­
erated the expectations for still more, and when those expectations were 
dashed, a rising tide of protest resulted. 
World War II thus provided the forge within which anger and out­
rage, long suppressed, were shaped into new expressions of protest. 
Searing contradictions between the rhetoric of fighting a war against 
racism abroad while racism continued unabated at home galvanized 
anger and transformed it into political and social activism. "Our war is 
not against Hitler and Europe,'' one black columnist proclaimed, "but 
against the Hitlers in America." Epitomizing the ideological irony at the 
heart of America's war effort was the slogan among black draftees: 
"Here lies a black man killed fighting a yellow man for the glory of a 
white man." 
To fight against such absurdity, blacks rushed to join protest organi­
zations like the NAACP Local chapters tripled in number while na­
tional membership increased 900 percent to over 500,000 people. As 
black newspapers took up the cry for the "double V" campaign—victory 
at home as well as victory abroad—their circulation increased by 40 
percent. Negroes had their "own war" at home, declared the Pittsburgh 
Courier, a war "against oppression and exploitation from without and 
against disorganization and lack of confidence within." As if to illustrate 
the changes that were occurring, southern black leaders meeting in Dur­
ham, North Carolina, in October 1942 demanded complete equality for 
the Negro in American life "[We are] fundamentally opposed to the 
principle and practice of compulsory segregation in our American socie­
ty," the Durham meeting declared. Ten years earlier such a statement 
would have been inconceivable.5 
72 | Reshaping America 
As the war against Hitler drew to a close, this sense of ferment and 
protest grew. Something had changed. Whether in northern cities or 
southern towns, black Americans exhibited a powerful determination to 
build on the energies of the war years, to secure a permanent FEPC, to 
abolish the poll tax, to achieve the basic right of citizenship involved in 
voter registration, to outlaw forever the terrorism of lynching. Over a 
million black soldiers had fought in a war to preserve democracy and 
eliminate racism. Hundreds of thousands more had achieved a glimmer 
of hope of what their society might become. They were not about to 
return quietly to the status quo of racism as usual. It was a moment of 
possiblity. 
The veterans led the way. Sometimes even before they took off their 
uniforms they headed for the voter registration office at the county 
courthouse. In the heart of Mississippi, Medgar Evers went to cast his 
ballot even though whites warned that they would shoot him if he tried. 
In Terrell County, Georgia (long known as "Terrible Terrell"), soldiers 
came back intent on challenging the most oppressive structure of power 
in the country. In Columbia, Tennessee, black veterans made it clear 
that things were not going to be "business as usual" and that there would 
have to be a "new deal" in the jobs that blacks held, the way they were 
treated, the rights of manhood they insisted upon. Some places, like 
Winston-Salem or Greensboro or Atlanta, even witnessed the building 
of black political machines to choose candidates to run for city-wide 
office. 
There were some successes. More than 18,000 blacks registered to 
vote in Atlanta in 1946 in response to a massive registration drive. In 
Winston-Salem 3,000 new voters were responsible in 1947 for choosing 
the first black alderman in that city. A few miles away in Greensboro, 
voter registration drives resulted in doubling the number of blacks on 
the rolls, and Randolph Blackwell, now a young veteran, helped lead a 
campaign against the traditional political chicanery where whites 
bought black votes and ignored black interests. Across the South be­
tween 1940 and 1947, the number of blacks registered to vote increased 
from 2 to 12 percent. 
But by far the most visible response was one of terror, pure and sim­
ple. When Medgar Evers and four other veterans went to the courthouse 
to vote, white men with pistols drove them away. In Georgia, Eugene 
Talmadge won the gubernatorial nomination in a campaign where he 
proclaimed that "no Negro will vote in Georgia for the next four years." 
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Afterward, the only black man who had voted in one district was killed 
in his front yard by four white men. Nearby, in Walton County, whites 
shot and killed two other blacks; and when one of their wives recognized 
a member of the gang, the two women were murdered also. As Isaac 
Woodward got off the bus in South Carolina, still wearing his uniform, 
policemen blinded him with billy clubs. And in Columbia, Tennessee, 
where "uppity" blacks were insisting upon their rights, whites rioted in 
protest, seventy Negroes were arrested, and a mob broke into the jail to 
murder two of the prisoners. All of this occurred in the first eight months 
of 1946.6 
Behind the terror lay a hundred other ways of quelling dissent. As one 
black story had it, whenever the registrar asked a Negro the meaning of 
"habeas corpus," the real message was, "habeas corpus—that means 
that this black man ain't going to register today." Ninety-five percent of 
all blacks in the South were employed by whites, the head of the white 
Citizens Council in Mississippi pointed out, and anyone who dared to 
register to vote could simply be told to "take a vacation." In Greenwood, 
Mississippi, a white insurance agent informed a black client that if he 
wished to retain his policy, he had better not register to vote. Elsewhere, 
as in Alabama, a black voter applicant was required to get two whites to 
vouch for his citizenship. The chances of doing so were summed up by a 
former president of the Alabama Bar Association: "No Negro is good 
enough and no Negro will ever be good enough to participate in making 
the law under which the white people in Alabama have to live." The 
bottom line was delivered by Senator Theodore Bilbo. Campaigning in 
1946 for reelection as Mississippi's senator, he declared: "If there is a 
single man or woman serving [as a registrar] who can not think up ques­
tions enough to disqualify undesirables, then write Bilbo or any good 
lawyer and there are a hundred good questions which can be furnished. 
But you know and I know what is the best way to keep the nigger 
from voting. You do it the night before the election. I don't have to tell 
you any more than that. Red-blooded men know what I mean." Bilbo 
winked and left the stage.7 
Clearly, the commitment to protest meant nothing if those seeking 
their citizenship rights were not permitted to survive. The basic rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution—to assemble peacefully, to speak free­
ly, to engage in political action—none of these could exist without the 
minimum guarantee of physical security. Yet those whites appointed 
and elected to enforce the law were among its most militant violators. 
Only if the federal government was willing to intervene, only if the Con­
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gress took steps, only if the president was willing to act could the mo­
ment of possibility become a time of achieving democracy. 
The man with the most power in the federal government had a mixed 
record on civil rights. As a product of the Pendergrast machine in Mis­
souri, Harry S. Truman understood the importance of paying attention 
to the 130,000 black voters in his constituency. Not surprisingly, his 
Senate record reflected these political realities. Truman supported legis­
lation to abolish the poll tax, appropriations for the FEPC, passage of 
antilynching legislation, and an end to the filibuster on an anti-poll tax 
bill. But political astuteness did not necessarily represent personal 
commitment. Truman was reported to have told one southern col­
league: "You know I am against this [anti-lynching bill], but if it comes 
to a vote, I have to vote for it. My sympathies are with you but the Negro 
vote in Kansas City and St. Louis is too important." On another occa­
sion Truman held hearings on racial discrimination in the defense indus­
try that appeared to offer sympathy and support to blacks. Yet a Tru­
man aide told friends: "If anybody [thinks] the committee is going to 
help black bastards into a hundred dollar a week job, they [are] sadly 
mistaken/ The Pittsburgh Courier viewed Truman's nomination as 
vice-president in 1944 over Henry Wallace as "an appeasement of the 
South,' and evidently some southerners agreed. On the funeral train 
bringing President Roosevelt's body back to Washington, one southern 
senator observed: "Everything is going to be alright—the new president 
knows how to handle the niggers."8 
Truman's record on the controversial FEPC issue highlighted the 
ambiguity of his position. In a remarkable departure from his predeces­
sor, he intervened openly with Congress on behalf of legislation to create 
a permanent FEPC. To abandon the principle on which the FEPC had 
been built, Truman wrote the chairman of the House Rules Committee, 
was "unthinkable." Yet after saying this, the president appeared reluc­
tant to do much else. "There is yet no evidence," the Pittsburgh Courier 
editorialized in September 1945, "that he has tried to use any of his great 
power to bring pressure on the recalcitrant Southern senators." Indeed, 
on the other side, Truman refused to permit the wartime FEPC to order 
Washington's transit system to hire black operators. The act so outraged 
black lawyer Charles Houston that he resigned from the FEPC, protest­
ing the government's failure to "enforce democratic practices and pro­
tect minorities in its own capital. " Such data caused one observer 
to wonder whether Truman's statements on behalf of civil rights were 
"perhaps an attempt to curry favor with liberal groups in and out of 
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Congress while at the same time not antagonizing those who opposed 
the FEPC?"9 
Now, in the face of the brutal repression of black efforts to secure their 
citizenship, the president came under renewed pressure to act. All dur­
ing the spring and summer of 1946, black protest groups and their white 
allies demanded action. "SPEAK, SPEAK, MR. PRESIDENT," 
pickets outside the White House demanded. Fifteen thousand people 
marched to the Lincoln Memorial demanding an outlawing of the Ku 
Klux Klan after violence in Georgia, Tennessee, and South Carolina. 
Eleanor Roosevelt and Channing Tobias (of the Phelps-Stokes Fund) 
created a National Committee for Justice in Columbia, Tennessee, and 
more than forty religious and civil rights organizations joined the 
NAACP in a National Emergency Committee against Violence. When 
the president met a delegation of the committee in 1946 to discuss their 
demands for antilynching legislation, he told the group: "My God, I had 
no idea it was as terrible as that. We have to do something. " 
The president's response was to create a Committee on Civil Rights in 
December 1946. The idea was introduced at the meeting with National 
Emergency Committee leaders by Truman's aide, David K. Niles, as 
though a spontaneous response to the protests of the delegation. In fact, 
it had already been decided upon prior to the meeting. The idea had a 
long history. During the racial violence of 1943, two southerners, How­
ard Odum and Jonathan Daniels, had suggested the creation of such a 
commission to FDR, only to be rebuffed because the president consid­
ered other issues more pressing. Three years later the same basic concept 
was revived, as a means both of satisfying black demands and of provid­
ing an authoritative sounding board for recommendations on civil 
rights.10 
The committee performed its work effectively. Comprised of such dis­
tinguished individuals as Charles Wilson of General Electric, Frank 
Porter Graham of the University of North Carolina, Franklin Roose­
velt, Jr., and Channing Tobias, it surveyed the entire spectrum of race 
relations in America and concluded that something was desperately 
wrong. "TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS," the committee's report, re­
commended a series of actions to correct racial inequality, including 
establishment of a civil rights division in the Justice Department, the 
creation of a permanent commission on civil rights, enactment of anti­
lynching legislation, abolition of the poll tax, passage of laws to protect 
the rights of qualified voters, desegregation of the armed forces, elimina­
tion of grants-in-aid from the federal government to segregated institu­
tions, enactment of a permament FEPC, home rule for the District of 
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Columbia, and support for the legal attack on segregated housing. Al­
most immediately, Truman endorsed the report, and the day after its 
release, ordered the Justice Department to intervene on behalf of plain­
tiffs seeking to invalidate restrictive covenants in the housing segrega­
tion case then going to the Supreme Court. As a further indication of his 
support, on 2 February 1948, the president submitted to Congress his 
message on civil rights, enthusiastically endorsing most of the major 
recommendations of his civil rights committee." 
All this took place in a sharply changing political climate. As early as 
1947, Clark Clifford, Truman's leading political adviser, had concluded 
that the 1948 election would hinge upon winning the support of "labor 
and the urban minorities.1' Over the preceding eight years, the black 
population in leading northern cities had grown by almost two million. 
In states such as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, 
and Illinois, the black vote consituted a potential balance of power; and 
Truman could not take this vote for granted. The more liberal wing of 
the New Deal coalition never fully trusted Truman, viewing him as a 
temporizer on social reform, a man of limited vision and stature. Henry 
Wallace, Roosevelt's vice-president before Truman, was now attempt­
ing to forge a new liberal coalition built around opposition to Truman's 
cold war policies and support for far-reaching domestic reform. As the 
chief spokesman for the new Progressive party, Wallace championed 
civil rights as one of his maj or issues, refusing to appear before segregat­
ed audiences, and threatening to win away from the Democratic party 
the black support it had become accustomed to during the previous 
decade. 
To deflect this assault from the left, Truman pursued a two-pronged 
strategy. First, he depicted Wallace as a "fellow traveler" of the Com­
munist party, naive about Russian imperalism at best, a witting or un­
witting ally at worst. Second, he depicted himself as the true heir of 
FDR, running on a platform fully as liberal as any domestic program yet 
advocated. By early 1948 Truman had announced his support for com­
prehensive health insurance, improved old-age benefits, and federal aid 
to education and housing. A strong civil rights program was pivotal to 
this second approach. Through such a program, Truman could prove 
his liberal credentials to former New Dealers, prevent the black vote 
from being lost to Wallace's camp, and secure the critical margin of 
victory in a close election. Truman even managed to join the civil rights 
issue to his attack on Wallace's international position, arguing that the 
only way to oppose the advance of Communism in the world was to 
show that America practiced democracy at home.12 
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Thus, for the first time in more than seventy-five years, the politics of 
race became critical in a presidential election. Truman himself played a 
dual role. After his bold civil rights message of February, the president 
retreated quickly. Southern governors and senators had threatened to 
bolt the party in protest, and white southern newspapers accused the 
president of "stabbing the south in the back." Hoping to appease the 
white South while holding on to his liberal image with blacks, Truman 
refrained from any action, substantive or rhetorical, on behalf of civil 
rights for the next five months. He even urged the democratic platform 
committee to stand by its ineffectual 1944 plank on "racial minorities." 
But that strategy would not succeed with the labor, liberal, and civil 
rights coalition of the Democratic party's northern wing. "To those who 
say the civil rights program is an infringement of state's rights," Hubert 
Humphrey told the Democratic convention in July, "I say this, that the 
time has come for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of 
state's rights and to walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of human 
rights." Instead of Truman's plank, the convention endorsed a minority 
report, calling for the guarantee of an equal right to vote, equal em­
ployment opportunity, and equal treatment in the armed services.13 
Not to be outdone, Truman interpreted this defeat as a victory for his 
own convictions, boldly announcing to the convention that he stood a 
hundred percent behind his civil rights program. With the most reaction­
ary southerners already bolting to the State's Rights party candidacy of 
Strom Thurmond, Truman had nothing to lose. Indeed, by September, 
he returned to the full civil rights enthusiasm of February, becoming the 
first president to campaign in Harlem and trumpeting his commitment 
to civil rights reform. His strategy was successful. To the surprise of 
nearly everyone, Truman achieved victory on election day, with black 
support proving decisive in the states of California, Illinois, and Ohio.14 
The question was,' What would that mean for those blacks still seeking 
their citizenship rights? 
In a substantive sense the answer was clear: very little. Of all the major 
issues that existed in the spring of 1946—FEPC, desegregation of the 
armed forces, abolition of the poll tax, the right to register to vote— 
action occurred only in the armed forces, and then primarily for political 
reasons. On 26 July 1948 Truman issued two executive orders, one cal­
ling for an end to segregation in the armed forces, the other for creation 
of a fair employment board to eliminate discrimination in the civil ser­
vice. But, Truman's timing had been dictated by a new threat from A. 
Philip Randolph to engage in civil disobedience and draft resistance if 
the armed forces remained segregated. Even then, little happened as a 
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result of the executive order. It was not until after the Korean War that 
the army was integrated. 
On other issues even less happened. Although Truman vigorously 
supported FEPC each year in policy statements, his tactics in following 
through were less than effective, causing some to wonder whether or not 
the entire process was simply a charade. When Truman had the oppor­
tunity to create a wartime FEPC by executive order during the Korean 
conflict, he refused to do so. Moreover, emphasis on the FEPC—by all 
estimates the most difficult civil rights measure to achieve—may have 
injured the possibility of securing legislative action on more attainable 
measures such as abolition of the poll tax and enactment of antilynching 
legislation. Senators Hubert Humphrey and Kenneth Wherry, among 
others, believed that less rhetoric and more action in the areas of lynch­
ing and voting could have produced results. Indeed, there seems little 
basis for disagreeing with historian Steven Lawson that "whether by 
temperament or design [Truman] often staked out a bold position and 
quickly retreated."15 
Perhaps the most accurate verdict on Truman's civil rights record is to 
recognize him as a consummate practitioner of the "politics of gesture." 
He was the first president ever to address the NAACP (1947), the first 
president to identify civil rights as a moral issue, the first president to 
create a national commission to study racial injustice, and the first pres­
ident to denounce racial discrimination as intolerable. These words were 
sufficient to outrage many southerners. Yet as the historian William 
Berman has observed, such southerners "failed to understand that Tru­
man was engaged in symbolic action, with rhetoric as a substitute for a 
genuine legislative commitment." Thus, "a speech here and a letter there 
would assure him of some liberal support and gratitude for these ef­
forts,'' while making unnecessary any further action.16 
An argument could be made that Truman's position represented sub­
stantial progress. It was important that the president of the United 
States made gestures toward the rights of black Americans and helped 
legitimate racial justice as an issue of concern. But for those who looked 
from the perspective of black Americans and shared the sense of possi­
bility that existed in the immediate postwar months, there could only be 
disappointment. Even the good words had come primarily in response 
to the political necessity of winning black votes and the international 
necessity of deflecting Communist propaganda. Although it was de­
monstrably true that southern power in Congress and the institutional 
barriers of the Senate filibuster made difficult the enactment of civil 
rights legislation, black spokesmen were correct when they said that 
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much more could have been done, particularly in all the areas of execu­
tive action: rapid desegregation of the armed forces, using Justice De­
partment attorneys to prosecute violators of civil rights in the South, 
seeking more vigorous action on antilynching and poll tax legislation. 
Political scientist Samuel Lubell has written that during the Truman 
administration the president ran as hard as he could in order to stand 
still. Lubell's words describe the politics of civil rights as well. Despite all 
the fine gestures, all the political speeches about the priority of civil 
rights, not very much had been done for the average black man seeking 
to become a full-fledged citizen. 
On 8 September 1948 Isaac Nixon was warned not to cast his ballot in 
Wrightsville, Georgia. The army veteran disregarded the advice. He was 
murdered before the sun had set. A few days later another band of 
whites drove the president of the local NAACP branch from his home 
and forced him to flee to Atlanta for safety. In November an all-white 
jury acquitted the men accused of Nixon's murder. For these black 
Americans, the politics of gesture was not enough.17 
The failure of Congress and the president to improve dramatically the 
citizenship status of black Americans placed an increasingly heavy 
burden on the judicial system as the sole source of help for civil rights 
advocates. From its founding in 1909, the NAACP had recognized the 
importance of waging legal war against the consequences of segregation 
and racism. One area of emphasis was voting rights. There, blacks had 
scored major victories in the cases of U.S. v. Classic (1942) and especial­
ly Smith v. Allwright (1944). The latter invalidated the "white primary," 
which excluded black voters from the only election that counted in the 
one-party South. Although neither Roosevelt nor Truman followed up 
on these victories through prosecution of violators, some major judicial 
battles had been won. Now, attention shifted more and more to the issue 
of segregation itself, initially through the demand that separate facilities 
in fact be made equal, and then through challenging frontally the consti­
tutionality of Jim Crow itself. The battle was long, the courage it re­
quired enormous. 
With skill and foresight, black attorneys focused initially on graduate 
education, the most vulnerable area of the separate but equal doctrine. 
No one could argue that a state provided equal law school opportunities 
for its black residents if Negroes were segregated in a one-room school­
house without adequate library resources, or sent out of state to another 
institution. Brilliantly, Charles Houston, the Harvard-educated 
NAACP counselor who would train a generation of civil rights attor­
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neys at Howard University Law School, argued before the Supreme 
Court that Missouri could not train someone to practice law in Missouri 
by sending them elsewhere. In Missouri ex rel. Games (1939), the court 
agreed, mandating the creation of a fully equal law school for blacks in 
Missouri. But if that ruling was to hold, should not the same doctrine of 
full equality apply to high school facilities as well? And might not new 
definitions of equality eventually require the eradication of so many Jim 
Crow institutions that segregation itself would be threatened?18 
The student of Charles Houston who would carry these questions to 
the Supreme Court was Thurgood Marshall, a combination preacher, 
community organizer, legal strategist, bon vivant, and political wizard. 
During the 1940s he traveled throughout the South, organizing teachers 
to fight for equal pay, parents to insist upon equal bus transportation, 
and lawyers to risk their practices by standing up for equality. Wherever 
he went he built coalitions, networks of people who would "travel the 
river" with him. "Everybody loved Thurgood," one NAACP staff of­
ficer said, "Marshall had the common touch." Whereas previous 
NAACP leaders spoke down to the people, another black observed, 
"Thurgood Marshall was of the people. He knew how to get through to 
them. Out in Texas or Oklahoma or down the street here in Washington 
at the Baptist church, he would make these rousing speeches that would 
have them all jumping out of their seats." Because Marshall was willing 
to put his own life on the line, others were willing to follow. As Herbert 
Hill of the NAACP observed, "He was a very courageous figure. He 
would travel to the court houses of the South, and folks would come 
from miles, some of them on muleback or horseback, to see 'the nigger 
lawyer' who stood up in white men's courtrooms."19 
It was not surprising, then, that someone like J. A. DeLaine was will­
ing to take a chance on Marshall. The black minister from Clarendon 
County, South Carolina, saw in the NAACP's chief counsel an ally 
worth suffering for. The cost was high. "Before it was over,'' Richard 
Kluger notes, 
they fired him from the schoolhouse at which he had taught devotedly for ten 
years. And they fired his wife and two of his sisters and a niece. And they 
threatened him with bodily harm. And they sued him on trumped up charges 
and convicted him in a kangaroo court and left him with a judgment that 
denied him credit from any bank. And they burned his house to the ground 
while the fire department stood around watching the flames consume the 
night. And they stoned the church at which he pastored. And fired shotguns 
at him out of the dark. . . All of this . because he was black and 
brave. And because others followed when he had decided the time had come 
to lead. 
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But DeLaine and Marshall had a cause. They believed in it, and because 
they did, Clarendon County became one of the five cases that would 
eventually be called Brown v. Board of Education.20 
The legal struggle did not go easily. In 1950 Marshall pushed the court 
further than ever on the issue of "separate but equal," arguing in Sweatt 
v. Painter and in McLaurin v. Board of Regents that equality could not 
be measured by dollars or physical plant alone. The reputation of the 
faculty, the companionship of peers, the stimulation of interchange with 
the best minds—all had to be considered as well. Hence, even Oklaho­
ma's decision to accept George McLaurin as a student at the state law 
school "on a segregated basis" was not adequate because being required 
to eat in a separate alcove in the cafeteria, or sit in a roped-off area of the 
classroom, or be assigned a dingy segregated desk in the library could 
not constitute equality. Rather, Marshall insisted, such regulations 
created "a badge of inferiority which effects [McLaurin's] relationship, 
both to his fellow students and to his professors." When the Supreme 
Court agreed, it had gone far toward including psychological, social, 
and spiritual considerations in its definition of equality. 
But that was not the same thing as overturning segregation, or asking 
the court to reverse its own precedent in the historic 1896 case Plessy v. 
Ferguson. The NAACP had brilliantly used the enemy's own words to 
erode the substance of his legal position. Now it had to take the offensive 
and persuade the court to arrive at a radically new legal position over­
turning fifty years of law. The doubts that beseiged NAACP lawyers 
were reflected in a memo written at the time by Associate Justice Robert 
Jackson of the Supreme Court: 
Since the close of the Civil War the United States has been "hesitating be­
tween two worlds—one dead, the other powerless to be born.' War brought 
an old order to an end, but proved unequal to founding a new one. 
Neither north nor south has been willing really to adopt its racial practices to 
its professions. 
Troubled, Jackson wondered whether the Court was the proper instru­
ment to eradicate "these fears, prides and prejudices on which segrega­
tion rests," whether the judiciary could reverse half a century of law, and 
chart a new course for America.21 
Both inside the courtroom and in the judicial chambers, the battle was 
dramatic. Marshall cited evidence accumulated by psychologist Ken­
neth Clark that black children educated in segregated schools responded 
more positively to white dolls than to black dolls, thereby arguing that 
segregation helped create low self-esteem and "a badge of inferiority" in 
black children. His adversary, in turn, argued the irrelevance of socio­
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logical tests and the importance of upholding legal precedent. If the 
judges had taken a vote immediately, they would have been divided— 
perhaps five to four or six to three, but with no unanimity on the necessi­
ty of reversing segregation. 
Then Earl Warren joined the Court. He was chosen by Dwight Eisen­
hower in 1953 to be the new chief justice after Fred Vinson died sudden­
ly, and he brought to his position the leadership, compassion, sensitivi­
ty, and simplicity required to forge union out of division. A politician by 
training and experience, he understood the need to woo potential foes 
such as Justices Stanley Reed and Robert Jackson. A man of morality 
and vision, he understood also the importance of unanimity on behalf of 
principle. Hence, the decision he wrote for the Court was neither com­
plicated nor contentious. Rather, it emphasized the simple fact that edu­
cation represents a central experience in life, that what children learn in 
school stays with them the rest of their time on earth, and consequently 
that "to separate [those children] from others of similar age and qualifi­
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a 
way unlikely ever to be undone." For that reason, Warren concluded, 
segregation was inherently unconstitutional and unequal. "Any lan­
guage in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to these findings is rejected."22 
Fifteen years after the Games decision in Missouri, seven years after 
J. A. DeLaine agreed to challenge the Clarendon County School Board, 
and more than sixty years after Jim Crow was legally born, segregated 
schools were acknowledged to be an abomination. "We have won,'' 
blacks exulted. It appeared that the courts had done what politicians 
had refused to do. 
Initially, the response to Brown was one of hope and optimism. Black 
newspapers hailed the Court's action, confident that the structure of 
segregation now would quickly be dismantled. Thurgood Marshall pre­
dicted the beginning of integration within six months and completion of 
the process within five years. Even the white South initially reacted to 
the Brown decision more with resignation than with rebellion. Only 
James Byrnes in South Carolina, Herman Talmadge in Georgia, and 
Hugh White in Mississippi indulged in the rhetoric of outraged resist­
ance. More representative were comments that regretted the Brown de­
cision, but called for calm acceptance of its consequences. Thus, Gover­
nor Francis Cherry of Arkansas declared: "Arkansas will obey the law. 
It always has." And "Big" Jim Folsom of Alabama stated: "When the 
Supreme Court speaks, that's the law." "The end of the world has not 
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come for the South or for the nation," the Louisville Courier Journal 
editorialized. "The Supreme Court's ruling is not itself a revolution. It is 
rather an acceptance of a process that has been going on a long time." 
Cities like Louisville, Kentucky, Little Rock, Arkansas, and Greens­
boro, North Carolina, indicated that they were ready to begin the pro­
cess of compliance.23 
Yet the Brown decision by itself existed in a vacuum. It required 
commitment, leadership, and tangible action if it was to become more 
than an empty letter. As one legal scholar said at the time: 
The law is a landing force [of change]. It makes the beachhead. But the break­
through, if it is to be significant, is broadened by forces from behind which 
take advantage of the opening to go the rest of the way. Where these forces 
are present, significant alteration of social practice is a result. Where they do 
not exist, the law has been unable to hold its beachhead and the legal action 
becomes a kind of military monument on which is only recorded, "we were 
here." 
Despite initial positive signs, it quickly became clear that the "forces 
from behind" were unwilling to act. The Court itself, as one price for 
securing unanimity, delayed for a year its own decision on how to im­
plement desegregation. When that decision was handed down, it called 
for remanding cases to the district courts, implementation procedures to 
begin "with all deliberate speed," but with no deadline set. In the South 
itself, meanwhile, those willing to act decisively in support of integra­
tion found themselves suddenly alone, without reinforcement from 
either economic or political leaders, or from the courts. With no tangible 
encouragement to proceed, they withdrew from the battle, forsaking the 
beachhead that had been won to defenders of the old order.24 
No one deserved more censure for the failure to follow through than 
the president himself. In 1954 Dwight Eisenhower enjoyed more moral 
authority and political strength than any president since Franklin 
Roosevelt at the beginning of the New Deal. His position, in some ways, 
was analagous to that of Andrew Johnson at the end of the Civil War. 
The South had been defeated, overwhelmingly. White southerners felt 
resigned, helpless, waiting for cues as to how to respond. Decisive, im­
mediate leadership in such a situation held the promise of transforming 
the social and political landscape. 
Yet Eisenhower, like Andrew Johnson ninety years before, refused 
the opportunity. Had he moved forcefully into the vacuum and de­
clared, "The Supreme Court has spoken, integration is now the law of 
the land. The courts' decision will be enforced by me with all the energy 
at my command. No resistance will be tolerated," it is likely that school 
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districts across the South would have commenced desegregation. Their 
action would not have been without resistance, but there would have 
been no choice except compliance. Instead, Eisenhower waffled. Asked 
repeatedly whether he endorsed the Supreme Court's decision, he said 
that he would not comment on the merits of the decision. In fact, he 
disapproved of it vigorously, commenting to some that the appointment 
of Earl Warren was the biggest mistake he had ever made, and to others 
that "the Supreme Court decision set back progress in the South at least 
fifteen years.'' 
Central to Eisenhower's posture was his conviction that the federal 
government had no right to intervene in affairs of local government. 
Although he implemented desegregation in federal installations and 
worked effectively to bring about integration of schools and public ac­
commodations in the nation's capital, he did virtually nothing to sup­
port those seeking change in the southern states. After Governor Price 
Daniel called out the Texas Rangers to prevent the integration of a high 
school in Mansfield that had been ordered desegregated by a federal 
court, Eisenhower refused to intervene. Surely, he explained, no one 
would want to see a federal police force take over local police matters. 
When the University of Alabama expelled its first black pupil, Autherine 
Lucey, in direct violation of a federal district court order, the president's 
only response was to say, "I would certainly hope that we could avoid 
any interference." Even after the murder of a black seeking to register to 
vote in Mississippi, and dynamite explosions in Tennessee and Ala­
bama, Eisenhower refused to speak out against violence or the wide­
spread use of economic reprisals. 
Perhaps most disturbing was the fact that those in the White House 
who urged a bolder response to the civil rights crisis encountered only 
puzzlement and indifference. When the only Negro staff member at the 
White House expressed concern at the president's silence in the after­
math of the lynching of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till in Mississippi, he 
incurred the wrath of a colleague otherwise considered to be sympathet­
ic. Blacks had not demonstrated sufficient gratitude for all that had been 
done for them, the colleague said, and instead were being too "'aggres­
sive" in their demands for justice, showing an "ugliness and surliness" 
that was alienating white allies. Because blacks were being so "intem­
perate," the president had no political basis for speaking out. Ever since 
the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt, William E. Leuchtenburg has noted, 
the White House had been known as a "bully pulpit." But when Eisen­
hower was president, "it was an empty pulpit. It is not too much to say 
that a great deal of the violence as well as the fearfully slow rate of 
compliance after 1954 may be laid at Eisenhower's door."25 
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Even those events that might be construed as favorable to blacks sug­
gested little positive about the administration's attitudes. When Attor­
ney General Herbert Brownell presented a four-part civil rights bill to 
the Cabinet for consideration in 1956, only two of his colleagues sup­
ported him. The president, partly concerned with securing black votes in 
the election, endorsed creation of a permanent civil rights commission, 
but denied approval to a section of the bill that would sanction Justice 
Department intervention on behalf of desegregation. Although Brown­
ell boldly (and inaccurately) presented the entire package as having ad­
ministration backing, he was ultimately sabotaged. After Senator Rich­
ard Russell of Georgia described section three of the legislation as an 
effort "to bring to bear the whole might of the Federal Government 
to force almagamation of white and Negro children in the state 
supported schools of the South and to create another reconstruc­
tion at bayonet point," Eisenhower retreated, declaring that his only 
objective was to assist the right to vote. Indeed, the president said, he 
had read the bill that morning and found "certain phrases that I didn't 
completely understand." As if to settle the question, the president told a 
reporter that "No," he did not believe the attorney general should be 
empowered to bring school desegregation suits. 
When an emasculated version of the civil rights bill was finally passed 
in 1957, southerners viewed it as a great victory for themselves. By 1959 
the legislation had not added a single southern black to the voting rolls. 
Nor did Eisenhower's Justice Department prosecute any of the com­
plaints of outrageous discrimination against voting in states such as 
Mississippi. Three years later, another act was passed to safeguard vot­
ing rights, yet this too lacked any real substance. Senator Harry Byrd, 
leader of "the massive resistance" forces, boasted that the bill was "in the 
main a victory for the South," and Democrat Joseph Clark, a civil 
rights supporter, called the legislation "a crushing defeat." "Surely," he 
added, "in this battle on the Senate floor the roles of Grant and Lee at 
Appomattox have been reversed. "26 
Eisenhower's silence, ambiguity, and abdication of leadership en­
couraged segregationists to believe that nothing stood in the way of their 
circumventing the Supreme Court. Within a year the resignation that 
had prevailed after the first Brown decision had gradually changed into 
optimism about preserving the status quo, and finally into outright and 
systematic resistance to desegregation. Those who might have support­
ed compliance if the president had given them no other option now 
found themselves competing with the rabid right for control of the polit­
ical spectrum, attempting to become even more segregationist. "In this 
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atmosphere," the historian C. Vann Woodward has observed, "where 
the NAACP was virtually driven underground in some states, words 
began to change their meanings so that the moderate became a man who 
dared to open his mouth, and an extremist someone who favored even­
tual compliance with the law, and compliance was something which was 
equated with treason."27 
Resistance mushroomed in direct correlation to the growing evidence 
that the federal government would do nothing to counteract it. After the 
Supreme Court indicated in the second Brown decision that immediate 
compliance would not be necessary, state governors shifted their atten­
tion from how to comply to how to circumvent. As Eisenhower offered 
tacit sanction to segregationists in Texas and at the University of Ala­
bama, state legislatures began to pass resolutions calling for massive 
resistance, with Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia claiming 
the right to "interpose" themselves against the federal government, and 
declaring the Supreme Court's decision "null, void, and of no effect." 
Nearly all states passed "pupil assignment laws" that transferred author­
ity over schools to local school boards in order to avoid statewide suits 
by the NAACP, and then used phrases like "the general welfare" as 
criteria under which students could be assigned to schools, thereby elim­
inating race as a basis for placement even while maintaining segregation. 
By the spring of 1956,101 of 128 congressmen from the former Confed­
erate states had signed "the Southern manifesto," throwing down the 
gauntlet of resistance to the federal government. 
The crisis at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, drama­
tized the political forces at work. Under court order to desegregate, Lit­
tle Rock school officials were prepared to comply. But Governor Orville 
Faubus determined to intervene. Caught in a tight reelection battle, he 
chose the strategy of "outniggering" his opponents, using the black 
school children of Little Rock as his foil. After creating a crisis by an­
nouncing that it would not be possible to maintain order in the face of 
integration (no such threat existed), he instructed National Guard 
troops to block the entry of black school children into Central High. 
Rallied by Faubus's words, a crowd of angry whites attacked the black 
children seeking admission to the school. Eisenhower refused to inter­
vene, instead agreeing to meet with Faubus in an effort to find a com­
promise. Faubus gave his word that he would create no further prob­
lems, but then, unashamedly breaking his promise, the governor 
withdrew state troops from the high school, left the capitol, and did 
nothing to prevent a shrieking crowd from barring the black children. 
Stunned and embarrassed, Eisenhower finally federalized the Arkan­
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sas National Guard and dispatched a thousand paratroopers to Little 
Rock. To have done otherwise, he recognized, would have been to "ac­
quiesce in anarchy and the dissolution of the union." Yet his action was 
too little and too late. The time for the use of moral authority to prevent 
resistance was now past. Indeed, when Eisenhower was finally moved to 
act, it was because his own sense of the military code had been breached: 
a lieutenant (the governor) had been guilty of insubordination. The 
principle of integration was quite secondary. Nor was it possible, in the 
long run, to call the Little Rock episode a victory for desegregation. 
Despite a Supreme Court order, Governor Faubus closed the schools in 
Little Rock for the entire next year. Virginia cities did the same to pre­
vent integration in that state. During the last three years of the Eisen­
hower administration, the number of school districts engaging even in 
token desegregation fell to 49—in stark contrast to the total of 712 dur­
ing the first three years after Brown.2* 
Tragically, the problem was not limited to "massive resistance" 
states like Virginia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Indeed, the process of 
circumvention reached its highest form of sophistication in the more 
"moderate" or "progressive" states. North Carolina, for example, 
known for its fine universities and intellectual leaders like Frank Porter 
Graham, had long been viewed as "an inspiring exception to Southern 
racism." Yet in reality, it was simply more clever at accomplishing the 
task. When the Brown decision was first handed down, as many as seven 
cities across the state, including Charlotte, Winston-Salem, Raleigh, 
and Greensboro, indicated a readiness to comply, and local school 
boards met to reconsider issues such as transportation patterns and con­
struction of new buildings in light of the Brown decision. For the first 
few months, a similar mood prevailed among state educational leaders. 
But in North Carolina, as in the nation, the "forces from behind" 
failed to advance the beachhead established by law. Governor Luther 
Hodges was to North Carolina what Dwight Eisenhower was to the 
nation—except that instead of simply sanctioning the forces of resist­
ance by inaction, Hodges marshalled them himself, all under the guise of 
the "politics of moderation." Initially, the governor simply used tactics 
like the 1955 Pupil Assignment Act. But as the gubernatorial election of 
1956 approached, Hodges moved to a plan that would provide state 
money to enable any white student threatened with integration to attend 
a private school. The proposal would also permit any school district to 
close its schools if integration occurred against the wishes of the com­
munity. As Hodges presented the issue, voluntary segregation offered 
the only possibility of avoiding what he chose to describe as the equally 
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untenable extremes of integration or shutting down the public school 
system. Although a Hodges staff member had reported that whites in 
North Carolina were remarkably indifferent to the issue of desegrega­
tion, the governor chose to inflame racial hostility. Unabashedly invok­
ing the imagery of miscegenation, Hodges accused the NAACP of seek­
ing to destroy "our interracial friendship," and of attempting the 
destruction of their own race by "burying it in the development of the 
white race." It was blacks who were responsible for the crisis, Hodges 
insisted. "Only the person who feels he is inferior must resort to demon­
strations to prove that he is not. The person convinced of his own equali­
ty of his own race respect, needs no demonstrations to bolster his 
convictions." By Hodges's definition, there were two extreme groups in 
the state—the KKK and the NAACP. Only those who followed him 
could achieve the "middle way." 
To achieve his goals, Hodges went to the voters with his plan the same 
summer he was waging his own reelection campaign. To liberals he of­
fered the assurance that his proposals did not defy the Supreme Court 
and only provided "safety valves" for those who wished to avoid deseg­
regation. To conservative whites he provided the guarantee that there 
would be virtually no integration in North Carolina under his leader­
ship. To blacks he offered nothing, ignoring the fact that they comprised 
25 percent of the state's population. Indeed, he appeared incredulous 
that Negroes would dare challenge him, urging his staff to seek out 
blacks who had signed integration petitions in order to "ascertain their 
reasons" and find out "if they are in earnest.'' Hodges's allies in North 
Carolina—like Eisenhower's staff in Washington—were upset by the 
"intemperance rudeness and complete self confidence" of those 
blacks who insisted on their citizenship rights. 
Through tactics of "moderate'' white supremacy, the initial possibili­
ties of compliance with the Brown decision in North Carolina were shat­
tered. Hodges successfully portrayed his plan as the only "enlightened" 
solution to the school crisis. As a consequence the real issues were totally 
distorted. Black citizens were viewed as the cause of the crisis, white 
citizens as the victims. In an ultimate irony the only people with the law 
on their side were defined as extremists threatening law and order. 
It need not have been that way. The editor of the Winston-Salem 
Journal Sentinel concluded in 1956 that "a large number of intelligent, 
influential North Carolinians believe that the best way is to com­
ply." Public opinion polls showed that the vast majority of whites in the 
state were in the middle, between active resistance and active support for 
integration, and could have been led either way. But Hodges chose the 
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path of resistance and in the process postponed meaningful desegrega­
tion in North Carolina for more than a decade—far longer than in some 
states where massive resistance was practiced. The genius of Hodges's 
plan, the Shelby Star declared, was that it would "maintain separate 
school systems," but with "a tone of moderation." Recognizing what 
was really going on, one Little Rock school official wrote, "You North 
Carolinians have devised one of the cleverest techniques for perpetuat­
ing segregation that we have seen."29 
In none of this were black Americans either resigned bystanders or 
passive victims. The NAACP filed suit in more than 117 cities in 1955 
calling for desegregation. Thousands of black parents submitted appli­
cations for their children to attend previously all-white schools, willing 
to take the risk of having their credit shut down or their jobs taken away 
in order to assert their citizenship rights. In Greensboro, over a period of 
eighteen months after the Brown decision, black parents appeared at all 
but two school board meetings to demand either better black facilities or 
substantive action on desegregation. Nor were these people members of 
a wealthy elite. They were milkmen, barbers, maids, workers in local 
stock rooms. "[White people] couldn't charge it up and say [only] the 
smart niggers applied," one parent noted. All these people were willing 
to withstand the threat of social ostracism and economic reprisal in 
order to seek a better life for their children.30 
But no people, however brave and resilient, could accept the bitter 
disappointments of the postwar years. Every victory seemed hollow. 
The words of politicians were contradicted by the inaction of govern­
ment agencies. Court decisions were vitiated by legalistic manipulation. 
"Nothing would be worse,' Justice Felix Frankfurter had said before 
Brown, "than for this court to make an abstract declaration that segre­
gation is bad and then have it evaded by tricks."31 Yet that is what hap­
pened. Black civil rights had been defined out of existence, with basic 
guarantees of citizenship made playthings for shrewd politicians. More 
than any other Americans, blacks believed in the political process, in the 
sanctity of the judiciary, in the rule of law. If they were victimized by the 
very processes they believed in, if those in charge would not listen to 
peaceful petition within the system they themselves had established, 
then it would be necessary for blacks to take action on their own terms 
and to express their convictions in ways that could no longer be ignored 
or misunderstood. If America was to change its ways, blacks would have 
to start the process. 
The decision to act began with the people. On a cold fall afternoon in 
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1955 in Montgomery, Rosa Parks, a black seamstress, boarded a city 
bus after a long day at the sewing machine. She sat in the first row of the 
"colored" section on the bus, but Montgomery's Jim Crow rules pro­
vided that whenever enough white people boarded a public carrier to 
take up all the "white'' seats, blacks must move back and give up their 
positions until the whites were seated. As more and more whites 
boarded the bus that day, Mrs. Parks stared out the window. The atmo­
sphere around her filled with tension. One black got up to give his seat, 
but she remained. Finally the bus driver demanded that she move. No, 
she said, I will stay. "I felt it was just something I had to do," she later 
recalled. Word of her arrest spread like wildfire through the community, 
and within hours, black leaders had decided the time was right to strike a 
blow for freedom: they would boycott the city bus system the next Mon­
day in protest. 
The city's black leaders were ready. E. D. Nixon, president of the 
Alabama NAACP and head of the local chapter of the Brotherhood of 
Sleeping Car Porters, had long been looking for a cause around which to 
build a mass protest. Joanne Robinson, leader of the Local Women's 
Political Council (parallel to the segregated League of Women Voters), 
was ready too. She had worked hard for the desegregation of drinking 
fountains and the hiring of black police in the city. The idea of a bus 
boycott was not a new one: earlier, when other arrests had happened 
under similar circumstances, there had been talk of action. But the occa­
sion had not been right because the other defendants were not as well 
known or as well respected in the community. Now the time was right. 
Rosa Parks was one of the most revered women in Montgomery. A 
churchgoer, secretary of the NAACP, beloved by everyone, she was a 
person who could unify the community. As E. D. Nixon later recalled: 
She was decent. And she was committed. First off, nobody could point no 
dirt at her. You had to respect her as a lady. And second, if she said she would 
be at a certain place at a certain time, that's when she got there . . so when 
she stood up to talk, people'd shut up and listen. And when she did something 
people just figured it was the right thing to do. 
Because she was who she was and did what she did, Rosa Parks became 
the key rallying point for expressing the accumulated indignation of 
black Montgomery. 
That night and all the next day, E. D. Nixon set in motion the 
groundwork for protest. More than fifty community representatives 
gathered at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church to plan the bus boycott, 
to rally church congregations on Sunday, and to create a transportation 
network among Negro taxi companies to take the place of the buses. By 
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M onday every black in Montgomery had received a message not to ride 
the city buses that day. Fearful that the boycott might not succeed, yet 
committed as never before to action, Montgomery's black leaders rose 
early to watch the buses go by. As dawn turned into morning and mid­
day, the verdict was clear: virtually no one who was black rode the bus in 
Montgomery that day. 
The Montgomery bus boycott would last for 381 days. It provided the 
organizing basis for a mass movement that fought back against every 
legal, economic, and psychological effort to destroy it. When city lead­
ers threatened to arrest taxi drivers for violating their chauffeur licenses, 
blacks created car pools instead. If whites attempted to sow seeds of 
division between leaders of the movement, the black community came 
together to affirm its support for the mass protest. And when white 
violence threatened to provoke black counterviolence and provide a ba­
sis for police action, the Negro community responded with discipline 
and devotion to the philosophy of nonviolence. No incident told better 
the story of what happened in Montgomery than the day when a white 
reporter, driving a car, stopped beside an elderly black woman walking 
to her work as a domestic. Asked if she wished a ride, she replied, "No, 
my feets is tired, but my soul is rested."32 
The Montgomery bus boycott was important for four reasons. First, 
it demonstrated dramatically and conclusively that black Americans 
were not content with the status quo and that they would sacrifice their 
comfort and risk their jobs in order to stand up for their dignity. For 
years whites interested in appeasing their own conscience had insisted 
that "their black people" were happy, and that any trouble came from 
outside agitators. For 381 days well over 90 percent of the black citizens 
of Montgomery expressed with their feet, every day, their vivid rejection 
of that white illusion. 
Second, the boycott exhibited how a movement, once begun, gener­
ates its own momentum, encouraging and enhancing its participants 
and creating the basis for an ever-widening belief in, and ability to 
achieve, social change. Ironically, the boycott did not begin with the 
demand that the buses be integrated. Rather, community leaders ad­
vanced only a modest three-point agenda: (a) greater courtesy toward 
black passengers; (b) the hiring of Negro drivers for routes predomi­
nantly black; and (c) creation of a flexible line separating the black and 
white sections of the bus, so that where blacks comprised the majority of 
passengers, they would not be forced to move when additional whites 
boarded the bus. Yet Montgomery's white leadership refused to respond 
to those demands, and as the daily sacrifice of energy created a mass 
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sense of self-confidence and determination, the movement decided that 
nothing short of complete integration would satisfy its demands. Over 
and over again, through the next fifteen years, the same experience of 
working together for a common cause would generate a similar height­
ening of consciousness and refusal to accept anything else than full 
equality. 
Third, the boycott produced an articulate and persuasive leader. Mar­
tin Luther King, Jr., had been in Montgomery only six months when the 
boycott started. Still in his mid-twenties, he was neither a radical nor an 
activist. Indeed, he had turned down an invitation to become head of the 
local NAACP because he wished to build his congregation, to finish his 
doctorate, and to work his way slowly into the community. But his very 
newness made him the ideal leader to mediate between competing fac­
tions and to speak for the forces of change. Given the burden of leader­
ship, he rose mightily to the challenge, in the process demonstrating to 
America the transforming power of the message of Christian love. 
"There comes a time," King told more than five thousand blacks on the 
first night of the boycott, 
when people get tired. We are here this evening to say to those who have 
mistreated us so long that we are tired—tired of being segregated and humil­
iated, tired of being kicked about by the brutal feet of oppression. . For 
many years, we have shown amazing patience. But we've come here 
tonight to be saved from that patience that makes us patient with anything 
less than freedom and justice. . We're impatient for justice, but we still 
protest with love love must be our regulating ideal. If you will 
protest courageously and yet with dignity and Christian love, in the history 
books that are written in future generations, historians will have to pause and 
say "there lived a great people—a black people—who injected new meaning 
and dignity into the veins of civilization." This is our challenge and our over­
whelming responsibility. 
As thousands listened, they reaffirmed the commitment that King had 
galvanized. Rosa Parks had said "no" to segregation. Now, black Amer­
icans were saying "yes" to a new philosophy of mass protest.33 
Fourth, the Montgomery bus boycott laid the foundation for the civil 
rights movement for the 1960s. Thousands of people had come together. 
They had devised the logistical strategy to overcome the obstacles 
placed before them. By the time the Supreme Court ruled that Montgo­
mery's buses must integrate, they had demonstrated beyond doubt the 
power of a collective body to shape a new world. Out of the bus boycott 
came the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, headed by Dr. 
King, which united black ministers throughout the South in a common 
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determination to struggle. The church would be the central institution of 
the movement, and its ministers the primary spokesmen for the people. 
Yet even with these accomplishments, the bus boycott did not spark a 
national revolt. To a large extent it was a reactive strategy that depended 
on the right person being arrested, under the right circumstances, with 
the right leadership structure in place. The genius of the boycott was also 
its major weakness. People could refuse to ride the bus without directly 
and individually placing themselves at risk. The boycott was an act of 
omission, not commission. Hence, thousands could use it as a means of 
expressing their protest without incurring the danger of immediate ar­
rest or punishment. Ideal as a way of collective expression, it neverthe­
less was not a vehicle for individual assaults against the racial status quo. 
It did not, for example, lend itself to the goal of seeking black admit­
tance to previously all-white schools, hotels, lunch counters, theaters, 
churches, or government buildings. Boycotting a restaurant from which 
one was already excluded was not a viable option. 
Thus, a new form of expression was necessary—the sit-in—to create 
the primary organizing tool for the direct attack against Jim Crow. Sit-
ins had been tried in Chicago in 1942, in Oklahoma City in 1958, and 
elsewhere. But they had not made news or caught on. Now, suddenly, all 
that changed. On 1 February 1960, four young black freshmen at North 
Carolina A&T College in Greensboro, set forth on a historic journey 
that would ignite a decade of civil rights protests. Walking into down­
town Greensboro, they entered the local Woolworth store, purchased 
toothpaste and other small items, and then sat at the lunch counter and 
demanded equal service with white persons. "We do not serve Negroes,'' 
they were told; but instead of leaving, the students remained. The next 
day they returned, with twenty-three of their classmates. The day after 
that it was sixty-six. The next day more than one hundred. By the end of 
the week, a thousand students joined them in downtown Greensboro. 
The student phase of the civil rights revolution had begun. 
The story of the Greensboro sit-in movement is a microcosm of the 
frustration, anger, and determination that surged through the black 
community in the years after the Brown decision. Three of the four 
young men who journeyed to Woolworth's that day had been raised in 
Greensboro, a city that prided itself on its progressivism, its enlighten­
ment, its "good" race relations. They had come of age, intellectually and 
politically, in the years since the Brown decision. Their parents were 
activists; some of them belonged to the NAACP, others to churches that 
were in the forefront of efforts to build a stronger and better political 
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and educational life for blacks. The young men attended school at Dud­
ley High School, the pride of the black community, a place where 
teachers taught you to aspire to be the best that was in you. "We were 
always talking about the issues," one English teacher recalled. "We 
might read [a poem or a novel] as a kind of pivot," but the words of John 
Dunne or Thomas Hardy were always related to the inalienable right of 
human beings to respect, freedom, and dignity. "I had to tell young­
sters," the English teacher said, "that the way you find things need not 
happen. I don't care if they push and shove you, you must not 
accept [discrimination] you are who you are." 
The message the young men heard at school was reinforced at home 
and in the church. Some went to Shiloh Baptist, whose minister had led 
civil rights protests at Shaw University in Raleigh, and who always pro­
vided support and encouragement to activists. Some also belonged to 
the NAACP youth group, started by Randolph Blackwell in 1943 after 
Ella Baker had visited town. At the weekly meetings of the youth group, 
students would talk about issues such as the Montgomery bus boycott, 
the slow pace of school desegregation, the need to "do something" to 
change things. And when Martin Luther King, Jr., came to Greensboro, 
to deliver his sermon about Christ's message for America, things began 
to fall into place. Dr. King's sermon was "so strong," one demonstrator 
recalled, "that I could feel my heart palpitating. It brought tears to my 
eyes." 
The situation in Greensboro provided a classic example of sophisti­
cated American racism. Although the school board had said it would 
desegregate schools after the Brown decision, it did nothing for three 
years, and then admitted only six blacks to previously all-white schools 
in an effort to make it impossible for the NAACP to launch a class 
action suit against the entire state. Thereafter, nothing happened, no 
matter how many black parents applied for transfer of their children to 
previously all-white schools. Typical of the school board's approach was 
its response to a 1959 suit by black parents. Faced with the prospect of 
losing in court, the school board finally admitted four black applicants 
to a previously all-white school to which they had applied. Then, three 
months later, it transferred every single white child and every single 
white faculty member out of that school and replaced them with blacks. 
It then argued in court that the legal action of the black parents was 
"moot" because the students were in the school to which they had origi­
nally sought entry. As one black minister declared, "These folks were 
primarily interested in evading, and they weren't even embarrassed." 
Elsewhere, the same duplicity prevailed. When blacks attempted to 
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integrate the local golf course, they were arrested. Then mysteriously, 
the club house burned down and the golf course was closed. Black col­
lege graduates from A&T and Bennett College were told by employers 
that they could apply for jobs as janitors and maids, but not as sales 
clerks or receptionists. In all this, good manners prevailed. As one black 
leader said, "no one ever called me nigger here," yet the underlying struc­
ture of racism remained. Greensboro, another black leader observed, 
was "a nice-nasty town." 
As they discussed these conditions in their dormitory room at night, 
the four black freshmen resolved to act. Fourteen years old when the 
Brown decision was handed down, they had grown to political con­
sciousness in the succeeding years. They were now about to become 
citizens, with none of the rights of citizenship. No longer were they will­
ing to tolerate the perpetuation of injustice that they saw all around 
them, particularly when the highest court in the land had condemned 
such practices to the junk pile of history. If whites had not been able to 
hear the peaceful protests and petitions offered by the older generation, 
perhaps they would listen to the voice of a new generation, as it recorded 
its vocal dissent by sitting silently at a lunch counter. 
The four young men drew from each other the resolve to act. On a 
Sunday night at the end of January, Ezell Blair, Jr., came home and 
asked his parents if they would be embarrassed if he got into trouble. 
"Why?" his parents wondered. "Because," he said, "tomorrow we're go­
ing to do something that will shake up this town." Nervous and fearful, 
afraid that someone might "get chicken," the four friends shored up each 
other's confidence until the next afternoon. "All of us were afraid," 
another demonstrator recalled. "But we went and did it." The result 
became history. "I probably felt better that day than I had ever felt in my 
life," Franklin McCain noted. "I felt as though I had gained my 
manhood. "34 
The sit-in movement spread through the South like a flash fire. With­
in two months demonstrations had broken out in fifty-four cities in nine 
states. It was as if an entire generation was ready to act, waiting for a 
catalyst. Greensboro provided the spark, but young blacks throughout 
the South provided the tinder for the response that followed. The sit-in 
movement was not a radical departure from the past; rather, it grew out 
of a tradition of protest. But the sit-ins helped reinforce and extend that 
tradition, and to change the form through which old as well as young 
would now express their demands for dignity and equality. Building on 
the lessons of the older generation, the young were forging a new meth­
od for carrying on the struggle. In that sense the students represented a 
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new stage of black insurgency, reflecting the lessons as well as the frus­
trations of past experiences with protest. If the courts and the politicians 
would not listen to traditional forms of expression, then new ones would 
be found. After 1960 the forms of communication between white and 
black would never again be the same. 
It is impossible in this brief summary to do justice to the multiplicity 
of people and social forces involved in the movement for civil rights. 
Nevertheless, several important themes stand out as a basis from which 
to understand this critical period in our history. 
First, despite dramatic changes and departures, there was remarkable 
continuity within the black protest movement between 1945 and 1960. 
The veterans who came back from World War II to demand their citi­
zenship rights helped provide the model and inspiration for those who 
would carry forward the struggle during the 1950s, those who refused to 
ride the buses in Montgomery and who helped make the sit-in move­
ment possible in 1960. Events like World War II or the Brown decision 
were important. They created new contexts, new possibilities. But the 
continuing momentum that linked these contexts to each other was the 
willingness of blacks to seek change, to struggle for freedom, to act for 
justice. It was Ella Baker in 1943 who sparked the NAACP youth group 
that would give birth to the sit-in movement. And it was Ella Baker in 
1960 who convened the conference of student demonstrators in Raleigh, 
and more than any other individual, was responsible for the creation of 
the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee—perhaps the most 
important civil rights organization of the 1960s. It was E. D. Nixon who 
started the NAACP in Montgomery during the 1940s and organized the 
bus boycott in the 1950s. It was Medgar Evers who went to cast his vote 
as a returning veteran in 1946, and who led the struggle for voting rights 
and racial justice in Mississippi until his assassination in 1963. Such 
continuity was not incidental. It was inherent in the protest struggle. 
Second, in ways not yet fully appreciated, this struggle grew out of, 
and depended upon, the strength of black institutions. The foundation 
for E. D. Nixon's activism was the all-black Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters. The NAACP meeting that inspired J. A. DeLaine to attack 
segregation in Clarendon County took place at Allen University, a black 
college. Ella Baker went to Shaw, an all-black school founded during 
Reconstruction, and it was at Shaw that the first meeting of SNCC took 
place. Black high schools generated the pride and aspiration that moti­
vated the sit-in demonstrators, and black colleges provided the primary 
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base of recruitment for the movement. Ironically, many of these all-
black institutions, which did so much to make possible the fight against 
segregation, would themselves suffer as a consequence. Yet their central­
ity testifies to the absolute necessity in the struggle for social change of 
retaining a strong home base, even as one seeks integration in the wider 
society. 
Third, the response of white political and economic leaders during 
these years can only be described as more revealing than they would 
have cared to discover. With just a few exceptions, whites in positions of 
power refused to support the cause of civil rights unless it was directly in 
their self-interest to do so. Even then, the response was more often ver­
bal than substantive. Although Dwight Eisenhower's abdication of 
leadership made the rhetoric of Harry Truman seem almost courageous 
by comparison, Truman's own record was essentially one of routine po­
litical expediency. 
Finally, the refusal of whites in power to do anything voluntarily 
created a constant necessity for blacks to devise new strategems of pro­
test. As events constantly proved, simply to demand one's rights was not 
enough. Even if lynching was the consequence, white officials did noth­
ing in response. Building coalitions with white liberals also proved in­
adequate because once the coalitions had served their purpose, they 
were ignored. The law itself—even through court decisions—proved 
more an invitation to subtle circumvention than an instrument for secur­
ing change. It seemed that only striking at the white man's pocketbook, 
or creating discomfort in his life, would prompt any response. Hence, 
each generation of blacks, even while drawing on the traditions of the 
past, had to forge new tactics of protest in an unending quest for some­
thing that would work. 
In the spring and summer of 1960, many hoped that this situation was 
finally changing. Throughout black America a spirit of idealism, hope, 
and confidence infused young and old alike. In white America as well, it 
appeared that a new seed of social activism might take root. John 
Kennedy spoke of carrying forward the American revolution, and elim­
inating social injustice. He called the governor of Alabama to ask that 
Martin Luther King, Jr., be released from jail, and promised to sign an 
executive order that would eliminate discrimination in federally fi­
nanced housing. 
Yet the lessons of the previous fifteen years suggested that such words 
were only one more moment in an ongoing drama, and that the battle 
between black protest and white indifference would not soon come to an 
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end. It had been a hundred years since Frederick Douglass had said, 
"Power concedes nothing without a demand, it never has and it never 
will." Little has happened since to alter the truth of his observation. 
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American Business in the Postwar Era 
Arthur M. Johnson 
The decade and a half from the end of World War 11 to the election 
of John F Kennedy as president in 1960 was one of prosperity and 
progress for the American economy and its business sector. Although 
the developing cold war with the Soviet Union overshadowed many of 
the developments of that period, its effect was stimulative of the domes­
tic economy. Pent-up consumer demand from the World War II years, 
the availability of cheap energy, the application of government-financed 
wartime innovations to peacetime commercial uses, and liberal pro­
grams of foreign economic and military aid all encouraged private in­
vestment and created expanding employment opportunities. Increased 
productivity and the application of new tools of monetary and fiscal 
management helped keep the economy growing and minimized the po­
tential for inflation and excessive swings of the business cycle. Despite 
the increased role of government intervention in the economy, Ameri­
can business enjoyed an era of market-directed growth that created an 
affluent society without parallel in the world. The businessman, who 
had been the discredited villain of the depressed 1930s and the behind-
the-scenes hero of World War II, emerged again as a respected figure in 
American life. At the same time society's emphasis on material progress, 
the demands that it made on our nonrenewable natural resources, and 
the contrasts that it created with developing nations abroad and be­
tween the haves and have-nots at home set the stage for the troubled 
1960s. But for a time American business was the dominant institution in 
American life. 
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As America faced the post-World War II era, memories of the brief 
depression shortly after World War I and of the Great Depression of the 
1930s were still strong. But the transition from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy was in fact accomplished without a major economic contrac­
tion. As far as business was concerned, reconversion called first for the 
rapid termination of the Office of Price Administration (OPA), which 
had administered a program of wartime price controls and rationing 
since 1942. The initial effort to continue these controls into the postwar 
era was so weak that the legislation was vetoed by President Harry S. 
Truman. Although the rapid escalation of prices in the summer of 1946 
led to another attempt, the resulting law was also weak, and price con­
trols ended that November. 
Wartime production peaked in early 1945, but a new uptrend began in 
October of that year and continued until late 1948. Encouraged by the 
expiration of price ceilings, prices rose rapidly. Retail distributors like 
Sears Roebuck expressed their confidence in an expanding postwar 
economy by aggressive investment. Others, like Montgomery Ward, an­
ticipating a repeat of the experience after World War I, conserved their 
capital and fell behind in the race for postwar markets. 
The disposition of war-built, government-financed plants and 
equipment affected competition in basic industries. For example, before 
World War II the Aluminum Company of America had been the sole 
domestic producer of virgin aluminum. With government support Rey­
nolds Aluminum and Kaiser Aluminum were encouraged to produce 
the metal for the war effort, and both remained in the field after the end 
of hostilities. The wartime "Big Inch" pipelines that had moved crude oil 
from the Southwest to midwestern refineries and petroleum products to 
East Coast markets were sold for use as natural gas carriers. A large part 
of the government's fleet of wartime oil tankers and cargo vessels was 
likewise sold to private parties on favorable terms. In most instances the 
companies that had been operating government-financed war plants 
and equipment were able to acquire them at minimal cost, thus benefit­
ing in the postwar era from public investment to meet wartime needs.1 
Through the Defense Plant Corporation, the government had in­
vested some $7 billion in war plants; most of them became available to 
their wartime operators on very favorable terms. Also, favorable "tax 
carry-forward" provisions of the tax laws enabled manufacturers to re­
cover taxes paid on high wartime profits and absorb losses experienced 
in converting to peacetime production. Accordingly, there was an incen­
tive to take risks in the early postwar period that otherwise would not 
have been present. 
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Wartime technological inventions, financed by the government for 
military purposes, provided the basis for important postwar growth in­
dustries. Radar, which had played a key role in the electronic detection 
of enemy aircraft and warships, had peacetime commercial applications 
and made significant contributions to the postwar development of 
commercial television. The jet military aircraft, in its early stages of de­
velopment at the end of the war, came into its own during the 1950s and 
provided the manufacturers with indispensable experience needed for 
the introduction of commercial jet airliners at the end of the decade. 
Synthetic rubber, produced in volume during the war to replace the 
natural material, became standard for most postwar uses, including tires 
for the family motor car. Although utilization of atomic energy for 
commercial purposes was not encouraged until the mid-1950s, this awe­
some product of government-financed research and technology during 
the war gave the cooperating companies, universities, and their staffs 
valuable experience in working with radioactive materials, provided 
some by-products for use in medicine, and laid the basis for production 
of nuclear-generated electric power after the mid-1950s. Computers, 
which revolutionized many business operations during the latter part of 
the period, were developed with government encouragement and as­
sistance to meet wartime needs.2 
The close wartime cooperation of American business and government 
and the very high cost of pioneering in new areas, like atomic energy, 
brought about new peacetime relationships between the public and pri­
vate sectors. Government became the sponsor and financier of research 
projects that business executed or administered. Access to government 
agencies and departments, as well as the more traditional lobbying ef­
forts in Congress, became increasingly important for many firms and a 
growing number of industries. 
Some of the scientists who participated in wartime research activities 
left academe after the war to found their own high-technology compa­
nies, usually in close proximity to university research centers. Such, for 
example, was the case with Route 128, the highway encircling Metropol­
itan Boston and the home of major electronics firms, which used their 
expertise first for defense contracts and then for commercial applica­
tions. Some universities expanded or developed research facilities to 
which business turned for assistance, and private consultants aided bus­
iness in matters ranging from product development to problems of cor­
porate strategy and management compensation. 
These developments took place in an economy where new tools for 
macroeconomic management dampened swings of the business cycle. 
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The deep economic depression in the 1930s had resisted the many and 
varied approaches of the New Deal. However, new tools and concepts 
for managing the national economy, influenced especially by the work 
of the English economist John Maynard Keynes, had been developed 
and at least partially tested. After the war the Employment Act of 1946 
expressed a national determination to use these tools to avoid a repeti­
tion of the 1930s experience. It called for an annual economic report to 
the nation from the president, the creation of a Council of Economic 
Advisers to assist him in this area, and the formation of a Joint Eco­
nomic Committee of the Congress. Most important, the legislation as­
signed to the federal government responsibility for the maintenance of 
employment and economic growth consistent with continued reliance 
on private enterprise as the prime mover of the economy. Throughout 
most of the period, however, the implementation of the act was modest, 
and its importance was more symbolic than substantive. From the end 
of World War II through 1951, there were four short-lived recessions; 
only that of 1953-54, at the end of the Korean War, lasted more than a 
3year.
During the 1930s the federal government had put its weight behind 
collective bargaining, but labor strife characterized the latter part of the 
decade as basic American industries were organized for the first time. 
During the war, however, organized labor cooperated fully with man­
agement and the government in meeting wartime demands. Labor skills 
were upgraded as an increasing amount of production was performed 
on automatic machinery; tens of thousands of women entered the work 
force to replace the men called to the nation's military service. 
A wave of strikes soon after World War II ended, however, cost or­
ganized labor the public's sympathy. After the 1946 elections Congress 
was controlled by Republicans for the first time in over a decade and a 
half, and legislation favoring business management was virtually a cer­
tainty. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 restored a balance to labor-
management relations by its frank emphasis on the prerogatives of 
management, which had been largely ignored or constrained by the 
Wagner Act of 1935 as interpreted by the National Labor Relations 
Board. Taft-Hartley banned the closed shop and specified unfair union 
labor practices to balance the proscriptions on management contained 
in the Wagner Act. In addition, there was a provision for a "cooling-off' 
period in strikes threatening the national health or welfare. Although 
vetoed by President Truman and condemned by organized labor as a 
"slave labor act," the Taft-Hartley Act became law and survived numer­
ous efforts to repeal it. In the succeeding decade of prosperity, there 
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were few major strikes crippling to the economy. Militant unionism de­
clined in favor of cooperation with business, which passed along to con­
sumers the higher costs of labor under union contracts.4 When a strike 
threatened the steel industry, President Truman seized the mills but was 
sharply rebuffed by the Supreme Court, which held his action to be 
unconstitutional.5 
Gross hourly earnings in unionized industries were typically higher 
than in the nonunionized; furthermore, they climbed steadily in the 
postwar period. In the durable goods field, for example, gross hourly 
earnings rose from $1.11 in 1945 to $1.54 in 1950, and to $2.38 by 1959. 
In 1948 General Motors'contract with the United Automobile Workers 
contained an "escalation clause" that provided for wage shifts keyed to 
changes in the cost of living; most of the resulting pressure was predict­
ably upward. In addition, fringe benefits, such as health insurance, 
became an increasingly important element in labor-management bar­
gaining negotiations. Meanwhile, in December 1955, the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
started the process of merging after a long period of strife resulting from 
different concepts of labor organization and membership. 
Pent-up consumer demand and deferred investment powered the 
economy over the post-1945 conversion back to peacetime activities. 
Enforced savings during the war, supplemented by liberal financial as­
sistance to veterans, contributed to a demand for consumer items that 
ranged from safety pins for the booming baby population to cars and 
appliances, which had been unavailable since 1942. The construction 
industry, especially residential construction, was a key component of 
private investment in the early postwar period. More than 80 percent of 
these new homes were stand-alone, stand-apart, single-family dwellings. 
Movement to the suburbs became increasingly popular, contributing to 
and reflecting mounting problems in the cities. Many suburban com­
munities catered to rising young executives who measured their success 
in terms of the price of their cars and housing, but entire new communi­
ties, like Levittown, Long Island, were mass-produced for a broader 
market. The demand for consumer durables continued to hold up well 
during the 1950s, to the point that more than 90 percent of American 
homes wired for electricity in 1959 had radios, televisions, refrigerators, 
and electric washers. However, by the latter half of the decade, services 
were expanding as a percentage of total consumer expenditures at the 
expense of durables.6 
The rapid run-up in prices after the removal of price controls in 1946 
continued until mid-1948, with an annual rate of increase in excess of 16 
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percent. From that time until the early 1960s, the economy was stabil­
ized at this higher price level but at the cost of unemployment that ran 
from 5 percent at the end of the Korean conflict in 1953 to 7 percent at 
the end of the decade. 
The availability of sources of cheap energy, notably petroleum, was 
basic to many elements of the postwar economy. Among other things, it 
encouraged a switch to oil burners for heating homes, which had pre­
viously depended on coal. Natural gas for both residential and industrial 
use became a growth industry, though federal controls on the price of 
interstate gas were a source of irritation to gas producers and pipeline 
companies after 1954. In the early 1950s the petrochemical industry be­
gan to develop rapidly, turning out petroleum-based products of great 
variety. The availability of man-made films, fibers, and plastics changed 
American life, from the packaging of the products that consumers 
bought, to the clothes that they wore, to the containers in which they 
sent the waste by-products of an affluent society to the municipal 
dump.7 
From the country's earliest days, Americans had taken cheap natural 
resources for granted. There was little effort to conserve them since there 
were more for the taking just over the horizon, or so most Americans 
thought. The concept of waste was celebrated early in this century by 
economist-sociologist Thorstein Veblen, who noted the American ad­
diction to "conspicuous consumption." Only an economy that believed 
itself rich beyond measure would deliberately engineer obsolescence 
into its products, yet that became a standard procedure in more than one 
American industry. There was scarcely an article used by Americans 
that was not available in a variety of forms, colors, and, in some cases, 
prices, sufficient to differentiate it from others competing for the same 
customer. Americans expected to live well and believed that their chil­
dren would live better than they had. Accordingly they consumed natu­
ral resources of the world out of all proportion to their numbers. As a 
result an increasing amount of strategic resources had to be imported 
from overseas, underlining the country's vulnerability to developments 
beyond its control.8 
The American emphasis on mobility and on cars as material symbols 
of success resulted in a more than doubling of the number of registered 
automobiles between 1945 and 1955. In the latter year alone, 8,000,000 
passenger cars were produced. Auto-makers stressed size, style, power, 
and model obsolescence. The automobile was essential to the develop­
ment of the suburbs of America's large cities, and with that development 
came suburban shopping centers, which could be reached only by auto­
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mobile. To cope with parking problems, women drivers increasingly 
asked for smaller, more compact vehicles than Detroit offered. Begin­
ning in the mid-1950s, compact foreign cars started to make significant 
inroads on Detroit's markets. Although the American auto-makers re­
sponded by importing small cars manufactured by their foreign subsi­
diaries, the German-built Volkswagen outstripped them and resisted the 
drop-off in auto sales at the end of the decade. Japanese imports also 
began to climb. By that time the Big Three (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) 
were experimenting with their own domestic small cars, in the belief that 
the earlier emphasis on large, gas-hungry, status-symbol cars was 
vulnerable to the public's mounting demand for low-priced transporta­
tion both in terms of original cost and operating expense. Meanwhile, 
recognition of the automobile as the primary mode of personal trans­
portation was reflected in the passage of the Interstate Highway Act of 
1956, which provided federal funds in a 90:10 ratio to construct super­
highways across the nation. 
At the start of the 1950s, there were nine firms producing cars, includ­
ing the well-known Hudson, Studebaker, Packard, and Willys-Over­
land companies. However, the independents' days were numbered. 
A significant exception was Nash-Kelvinator, which merged with Hud­
son in 1954 to form American Motors. AMC's compact Nash Rambler 
proved surprisingly competitive with the products of the Big Three as 
the nation began to pay more attention to economical transportation. 
Rambler sales rose from some 100,000 in 1956 to five times that number 
in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, the denovo effort of Kaiser-Fraser 
to enter the automobile market ended in failure. And even an estab­
lished company like Ford, despite heavy promotion, could not induce 
the public to buy the Edsel car.9 
Labor-management relations were a major concern of the postwar 
automobile industry. A settlement between the United Auto Workers 
and one of the Big Three typically set the pattern for the outcome of 
negotiations with the other two. In 1955 a guaranteed annual wage, in­
suring some 65 percent of normal compensation in the event of unem­
ployment, was negotiated for the first time in this key industry. The very 
concept of a "guaranteed" annual wage reflected the high level of confi­
dence in the performance of the private sector. 
The increased interdependence between government and business, 
recognized during World War II and confirmed by requirements of the 
cold war and the Korean conflict (1950-53), led to an exchange of high-
ranking personnel between the public and private sectors. Paul Hoff­
man of Studebaker, for example, was a key figure in administering the 
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nation's foreign aid program of the late 1940s. The Department of De­
fense, created in 1947, was perceived as the ultimate big business. Sym­
bolically, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Charles E. "En­
gine Charley" Wilson, the head of General Motors, as his first secretary 
of defense. "Cost engineering" was encouraged at the operating level of 
the armed services, and Secretary Wilson publicly—and innocently— 
equated the welfare of GM with that of the nation. At lower levels re­
tired generals and admirals regularly appeared in executive positions or 
on the boards of major companies doing business with the government; 
former government regulators and congressmen defeated at the polls 
found eager clients and good jobs with firms concerned about their in­
fluence or image in Washington.10 
Graduate education for business provided a plethora of programs for 
those aspiring to a career in big business and, in some cases, big govern­
ment or big labor. With the expansion of American firms overseas, for­
eign nationals appointed to major management posts were brought to 
the United States to be trained in the same classrooms with their Ameri­
can counterparts. As the 1950s wore on, leading American business 
schools also staffed and directed management institutes in various parts 
of the world. Unlike the situation that developed in the 1960s, in the 
1950s a career in big business was perceived by many able young men, 
and even some young women, as the most rewarding way to share in 
shaping a business civilization and reaping its fruits.11 
The general approbation of business was reflected in academic circles, 
where it had been fashionable during the depressed 1930s to condemn 
business and businessmen as the source of the nation's troubles. An en­
trepreneurial history center was established at Harvard University in 
1947 and operated for a decade, probing this critical area from many 
different points of view. Historians like Allan Nevins, who wrote for a 
wider audience than most of his academic peers, complemented his 1940 
study John D. Rockefeller: The Heroic Age of American Enterprise 
with a sympathetic study of Rockefeller as industrialist and philanthro­
pist, published in 1953. The Rockefellers' major business interest, Stan­
dard Oil Company (New Jersey), itself sponsored a scholarly reevalua­
tion of its history; other scholars found new meaning in the alleged and 
actual behavior of nineteenth-century business leaders like Jay Gould. 
Edward C. Kirkland, in the October 1960 issue of the American Histori­
cal Review, summed up the case for business revisionism in his article 
significantly entitled, "The Robber Barons Revisited." 
In the light of such developments, businessmen paid increased atten­
tion to the "social responsibility'' of corporate enterprise. For the most 
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part this consisted of explicit recognition that a modern big business had 
multiple responsibilities—to its employees, customers, and suppliers, as 
well as to its stockholders. These perceptions were reflected in more-
advanced companies in efforts to improve communication with various 
clienteles, systematic personnel development policies, and active parti­
cipation in community affairs. The demands of these activities led to 
significant increases in public relations and personnel departments; ex­
panded use of mushrooming academic programs for middle and senior 
managers; and, in some instances, the introduction of systematic long-
range planning where social and technological factors assumed major 
importance. However, the primary emphasis of American business re­
mained on producing profit, and most corporate activities were evalu­
ated strictly by that yardstick. In the absence of governmental regula­
tions on such matters as environmental pollution, the social costs of 
business activity were not typically included in the profit calculus.12 
The 1950s witnessed the beginning of a new merger movement in 
American business. This one was different from its predecessors because 
of its emphasis on diversification, producing the so-called "conglomer­
ate." Since the 1920s large, technology-based firms with major research 
facilities and available capital had diversified their product lines, pene­
trating new but related markets. Chemical companies like DuPont, elec­
trical companies like General Electric, automobile companies like Gen­
eral Motors, and electronics companies like Radio Corporation of 
America entered new growth markets by applying their expertise to the 
development of new products allied to their primary output. The new 
conglomerate strategy was to acquire companies with entirely different 
product lines, thus, among other things, diminishing the possibility of 
antitrust action for dominance in a single market. The effectiveness of 
this strategy was enhanced by increased acceptance of management 
concepts that centralized overall corporate planning and policy-making 
but decentralized operating decisions.13 
The result of these developments was increased overall concentration 
in American industry. In 1947 the nation's 200 largest corporations had 
accounted for about 30 percent of the value added by manufacturing; by 
1963 they were responsible for 41 percent. Defenders of the conglomer­
ate movement pointed out that large companies could bring to older 
firms that lacked comparable financial and managerial resources the 
means of competing more effectively. Indeed, the degree of concentra­
tion in such significant industries as electrical products, chemicals, in­
struments, and rubber, actually diminished during that period.14 
Although markets and product lines figured prominently in most 
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mergers, the opportunities for financial maneuvering were frequently of 
equal or greater importance. As the merger pace quickened in the 1960s, 
this potential became even more important. However, the weak finan­
cial underpinnings of the postwar merger movement were later revealed 
by the recession of 1969-70. Some of the most initially successful entre­
preneurs in promoting it, like James Ling of Ling-Tempco-Vought, 
came tumbling down as a result.15 
Direct investment abroad became significant for some American 
companies in the 1950s. In some instances the investment was to take 
advantage of labor costs that were substantially lower than those in the 
United States, as in the case of Korea and Taiwan; in other cases it was 
aimed at taking advantage of markets that could be served more cheaply 
from overseas locations than from those at home.16 A significant 
amount of overseas investment was in natural resources, like petroleum 
and other minerals, whose cost was very substantially less than in the 
United States. The resulting threat to domestic producers of petroleum, 
for example, was such that voluntary import controls were placed on 
foreign oil in 1955 and mandatory controls in 1959. 
As Western Europe and Japan recovered from World War II with 
United States financial assistance, they presented an increasing chal­
lenge to American companies in world markets, and even in some do­
mestic ones. The Japanese, for example, had a long history of copying 
Western consumer items and producing cheap and inferior quality ver­
sions of them. By the end of the 1950s, however, Japan was exporting 
manufactured goods ranging from cameras, radios, and televisions to 
automobiles and ships that matched or surpassed their American coun­
terparts in quality and undersold them in price. Ironically, many Ameri­
can companies in the older industries were producing with antiquated 
machinery while their foreign competitors were utilizing the newest 
equipment, much of it manufactured in the United States and financed 
by some of the $73 billion in foreign aid that flowed from this country 
between 1945 and 1959.17 
Automation and miniaturization made possible by such electronic 
advances as the transistor, which appeared in 1948, helped reduce pro­
duction costs and created new markets and spawned new companies. 
Companies like IBM in the computer field, Raytheon and Honeywell in 
electronics and automatic controls, and Polaroid and Xerox in the ap­
plication of technology to different forms of communication, were al­
ready identified as "growth" companies.18 The military equipment de­
mands of the Korean War and of continuing defense expenditures 
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afterwards were particularly significant for the new technology compa­
nies. The rapidly growing defense industry of the West Coast, especially 
in the Los Angeles area, attracted enterprise and investment. 
Although President Eisenhower inveighed against "creeping social­
ism" as represented by public power projects and warned against the 
military-industrial complex, he could not turn the clock back. In fact, 
the interdependence of government and business intensified, with gov­
ernment adopting the structure, managerial techniques, and even finan­
cial strategies of private enterprise to accomplish specific tasks. Business 
executives became increasingly concerned with political and bureau­
cratic decisions, which established the framework in which they had to 
operate. Thus, although the posture of government was predominantly 
neutral or positive toward business during most of the postwar era to 
1960, its potential to affect business decisions either directly or indirectly 
grew steadily. 
In most respects the era from 1945 to 1960 was one of the great epochs 
of American business. Overall growth was steady; inflation was min­
imal; and society's acceptance of private enterprise was not yet clouded 
by disenchantment with material measures of success, poisoned by wide­
spread fear of the military-industrial complex, or ruffled by anger at the 
rapid exhaustion of natural resources whose end-products polluted 
land, air, and water. Despite the continuing trend toward concentration 
in American industry, competition still commanded public allegiance as 
the primary regulator of the economy. But for those who would look 
closer, it was clear that a day of reckoning would have to come. 
America was a wealthy giant in a world of have-not developing na­
tions, and they controlled many of the natural resources on which the 
United States was becoming increasingly dependent. In the world of 
realpolitik, this country faced a formidable opponent in the Soviet 
Union, and the economic overtones, along with competition for markets 
from friendly nations, were unsettling. At home the very affluence that 
American business had created would undermine the achievement mo­
tivation of a new generation of Americans, who either took their afflu­
ence for granted or rejected it as socially and morally indefensible. These 
forces would come together in the 1960s to create unprecedented domes­
tic upheaval, aggravated by an undeclared war in Vietnam and by the 
belated recognition that widespread social and economic inequality per­
sisted in America and that one of the costs of reliance on private enter­
prise had been environmental degradation that demanded prompt 
remedial action. Nevertheless, faith in business, though shaken, was not 
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destroyed. The ultimate compliment, and also the ultimate example of 
misunderstanding of the role of business, was the demand that it assume 
responsibility for solving the nation's social problems. 
In important respects the launching of the Soviet Union's space-
penetrating Sputnik in 1957 marked the end of a business-dominated 
era in this country. Under private auspices the postwar American econ­
omy, though growing, had not grown as rapidly as the U.S.S.R.'s. Al­
though the United States had had a space program of sorts since the end 
of World War II, it was basically concerned with adapting German mis­
sile expertise to our defense needs. Sputnik took the American people by 
surprise and underlined the extent to which scientific and engineering 
education had been allowed to lag in this country." Their revitalization 
under government auspices had reverberations throughout American 
education, extending to the social sciences and even to the humanities. 
But in this process, as in the space and missile race of the 1960s, the 
partnership between government and business, forged during World 
War II and continued at a reduced level through the 1950s, tilted increas­
ingly toward government as the senior partner, making it a major source 
of demand and funding for private enterprise. 
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American Workers, the Labor Movement,

and the Cold War, 1945-1960

John Barnard 
The cold war brought important changes to the lives of American 
workers and to the American labor movement. A nation whose times of 
war and preparation for war had been infrequent though intense inter­
ruptions of the flow of public life adjusted to permanent military pre­
paredness. The cold war affected the kinds of jobs available to American 
workers and where their work was performed. The number of occupa­
tions linked to meeting the security needs of the United States increased. 
New jobs in the manufacture of military equipment, government agen­
cies, the armed forces, and the development and application of scientific 
knowledge stemmed from the cold war. Although most of the new man­
ufacturing and office jobs were little different in nature from those in the 
civilian economy, in the cases of scientific research and its application 
and in the armed forces some new occupations were created. 
The redistribution of jobs from civilian to security purposes seems to 
have had only a minor effect on the number of union members. Irving 
Bernstein has calculated that labor unions in 1945 had a membership of 
13,379,000, which was 24.8 percent of the civilian labor force. By 1960 
their membership had increased to 18,607,000, which represented 26.2 
percent of the civilian labor force. Since most of this growth occurred 
during the Korean War, the net effect of cold war conflict was to bring a 
few more workers, as a percentage of the labor force, into unions.1 
The cold war was fought as much on ideological as geographical bat­
tlegrounds. It was, in a contemporary phrase, a "war for men's minds." 
This ideological struggle generated powerful pressures to conform to a 
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national standard of opinion and behavior. The demand for conformity 
fell with great force on the leadership of organized labor. For the many 
labor leaders who were opposed to Communism, an affirmation of their 
national loyalty as defined by the government and public opinion posed 
no serious problem. However, other labor figures, some of them Com­
munists or accustomed to tolerating and accepting Communist support, 
or others who on principle refused to accede to pressure, faced difficult 
choices. The results were a schism in the CIO and a realignment of 
power within the labor movement as a whole. The need for ideological 
purity was also a major force behind a movement toward a more demo­
cratic system of racial relations within the United States, including ulti­
mately better employment opportunities for the black minority. 
The beginning of the cold war marked no sharp break in the relation­
ship between the federal government, the economy, and organized la­
bor. During the New Deal the Roosevelt administration and Congress 
redefined the role of the federal government with respect to work in two 
significant ways: henceforth, employment would in the last analysis be a 
responsibility of government, and labor union growth would be encour­
aged. The actions of the government in World War II confirmed the 
New Deal's policies on jobs and unions but failed to expand its social 
reforms.2 During wartime the work force increased by more than 7.5 
million workers, and for unions the government enforced a "'mainte­
nance of membership" formula, a modification of the union shop, that 
gave them adequate security. But if World War II demonstrated the 
depth of the government's commitment to jobs and organized labor, it 
also demonstrated the limits of labor's power and role in the commun­
ity. Business leadership and prestige, on the decline in the thirties, 
strongly revived.3 A hostile and outspoken segment of public opinion 
was directed against particular unions and leaders, especially John L. 
Lewis. The passage of the Smith-Connally Act in 1943 showed how far 
Congress was prepared to go in attacking strikes that threatened the 
national interest in wartime.4 
Organized labor was on the defensive when peace came. A bipartisan 
coalition of conservative congressmen proclaimed its intention to re­
duce labor's economic and political power. The passage of restrictive 
legislation became inevitable when the Republicans in the elections of 
1946 gained control of Congress. Just a few months earlier, a Gallup poll 
had shown that 66 percent of the respondents favored passage of "new 
laws to control labor unions," whereas only 22 percent were opposed 
and the rest were undecided.5 On the day the new Congress met, seven­
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teen labor bills were introduced. Following a tortuous legislative course, 
Congress produced the Taft-Hartley Act, passed by decisive majorities 
over President Truman's veto, a major revision of the legal framework 
for labor-management relations. The new law sought to balance the 
rights of employees as established in the Wagner Act with a list of inviol­
able employers' rights. Employers were guaranteed an opportunity to 
present their views on unions to workers, and they could petition for 
elections to determine bargaining units. Unions were prohibited from 
engaging in unfair labor practices such as secondary boycotts, jurisdic­
tional strikes, and refusal to bargain. In a complicated and largely un­
workable set of provisions, the act revived the power of the executive to 
ask the courts for injunctions against strikes in prescribed circumstances 
and provided for "cooling off periods when strikes threatened national 
interests. In provisions that proved partially unenforceable, the law 
banned the closed shop and direct political contributions by unions. 
Taft-Hartley was not the "slave labor act" that union leaders de­
nounced, yet it fulfilled some of their fears by replacing the Wagner 
Act's policy of facilitating labor organization nationally with a state by 
state autonomy that led to a regionalization of the labor movement. 
Under Section 14(b) of the law, state legislatures were empowered to 
eliminate all forms of union security including the union shop. "Right to 
work" campaigns, which presented the issue as one of individual liberty 
versus collective coercion, were launched in many states with the result 
that by 1954 fourteen of them, mostly in the South and the prairie and 
mountain West, had adopted restrictive legislation. Although the law 
did not directly damage strong unions, it hindered the spread of the 
labor movement from the industrialized into the industrializing areas of 
the country, freezing wage and other kinds of regional differentials. 
The war had confirmed the belief that military production would put 
people to work. In 1937, before rearmament began, a labor economist 
wrote that the "one hope" for reviving business activity was a war boom. 
"Between prolonged depression or a war boom with the risk of war," he 
prophetically stated, "America will choose the latter. And there 
will come prosperity. And along with it will come war."6 At the outset of 
rearmament in 1939, unemployment was still in excess of eight million 
workers, about 15 percent of the work force. As military spending 
worked its way through the economy, jobs and prosperity returned. In­
dustrial production rose 48 percent between 1939 and 1941, and by the 
fall of 1941 unemployment was negligible. By 1945 industrial produc­
tion had increased another 45 percent. Not only did unemployment dis­
appear but the work force expanded, drawing heavily on the ranks of the 
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elderly, women, and even children. During the war years half of total 
production and 80 percent of durable goods production went for war 
purposes.7 As the war's end approached, anticipations of the future were 
haunted by memories of the past. Economists of all persuasions pre­
dicted peacetime unemployment.8 CIO economists thought that after 
V-E day, when the government planned sharp reductions in military 
spending, unemployment would rise rapidly to between two and nine 
million. Everyone had the "victory jitters."9 
There was no recurrence of depression, although temporary disloca­
tions were painful. More than 300,000 Michigan war workers, for ex­
ample, lost their jobs immediately following V-J day.l0 The dammed-up 
purchasing power of wartime broke through to propel the economy 
forward. Per capita savings were at their highest level by the end of the 
war, aggregating more than $50 billion, and Americans, who had either 
gone without or made do with what they had during the depression and 
the war, poured into the market for durable goods, housing, and con­
sumer items. The expenditure of these savings compensated for the steep 
reduction in military spending and ensured full employment. By 1949, 
however, consumer spending was falling off, and unemployment had 
risen to more than 6 percent. A period of increased military spending 
was begun as the cold war hit its full stride and was about to turn into a 
hot war in Korea. The military budget more than doubled from $14 to 
$34 billion from 1950 to 1951, and the share of the Gross National Pro­
duct going to military expenditures went from 5 to over 10 percent. That 
share varied between 9 and 13 percent for the rest of the decade." The 
growth of the economy as a whole closely paralleled changes in the level 
of military spending. From 1950 to 1955, dominated by the Korean 
War, the GNP increased at an average annual rate of 4.7 percent, but it 
dropped to 2.25 percent for the remainder of the decade.12 
Increases in military spending were the result of an inextricable mix­
ing of cold war and domestic concerns. As Business Week observed in 
April 1950, when spending was increasing: 
Pressure for more government spending is mounting. And the prospect is 
that Congress will give in—a little more now, then more by next year. 
The reason is a combination of concern over tense Russian relations, 
and a growing fear of a rising level of unemployment here at home.13 
Military spending showed that "the scourge of cyclical mass unemploy­
ment could be dispelled by sufficient public spending of almost any 
kind."14 The effect of concentrated government expenditure was dra­
matically demonstrated during the Korean War. In October 1953 the 
unemployment rate reached its lowest point for the entire decade, 1.8 
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percent of the civilian labor force. Recessions in 1954 and 1958 pushed it 
up temporarily, in the latter instance to just over 7 percent.15 Average 
unemployment for the decade of the fifties was 4.6 percent of the civilian 
labor force. 
By 1960 the jobs of 7.5 million Americans, about one-tenth of the 
work force, directly depended on the military budget, and the indirect 
effects, extending to retail, government, and other goods and services, 
touched millions more. Eisenhower's secretary of defense, Charles E. 
Wilson, told a congressional committee in 1957 that "one of the serious 
things about this defense business is that so many Americans are getting 
a vested interest in it; properties, business, jobs, employment, votes, op­
portunities for promotion and advancement, bigger salaries for scien­
tists, and all of that. It is a troublesome business."16 Professional econ­
omists generally supported the use of military spending for keeping 
production and employment at high levels.l7 Only in the sixties did some 
begin to question its wisdom.18 
Military spending stimulated huge investments in many industries. As 
the Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production pointed out 
at the end of 1954, 
large expansions in basic industries have materially increased the country's 
capacity to produce both for war and for peace. Steel has increased from 100 
million tons to 124 since 1950. Aluminum capacity has doubled in 3 years. 
The chemical industry, committed to the largest expansion in its his­
tory, has invested approximately $5 billion since Korea." 
And so it went. Most industrial growth of the cold war era, and with it 
growth in employment, was the result of government military expendi­
ture. A study by the Midwest Research Institute completed in 1957 con­
cluded that "military demand has been the major and almost exclusive 
dynamic factor in recent years." The major growth industries of the fif­
ties such as utilities, electrical equipment and machinery, aircraft and 
related products, instruments, chemicals, and rubber and plastic prod­
ucts, depended on government buying. According to one economist, 
"the growth industries of the 1950's by and large could attribute to gov­
ernment orders the margin between a mediocre growth performance 
and their striking actual record. As examples of extreme cases, about 
80 percent of the business of the aircraft industry came from military 
agencies, and government accounted for at least two-thirds of the 
growth in electronics sales. The military sales of electronic firms rose 
about 100 percent during the last half of the decade, primarily the result 
of their participation in the development and manufacture of missiles.20 
Labor leaders and presumably many rank-and-file workers recog­
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nized the tie between military expenditures and jobs. Union publica­
tions and speakers at their conventions pointed out the connection and 
urged support of defense-minded politicians. Articles and photographs 
depicting union members at work on military projects such as the Nauti­
lus submarine, a "100 percent AFL operation,'' air force missiles, and 
aircraft frequently appeared in union periodicals.21 When a reduction in 
defense budgets threatened, a meeting of the International Association 
of Machinists, the union most involved in aircraft production, was 
plunged into gloom. 
The effect of disarmament on employment and the national prosperity cast a 
deep shadow on the sixth IAM aircraft and guided missile conference. 
. As the 165 delegates were reminded, about one out of every three jobs in 
the United States is directly or indirectly dependent on defense spending.22 
One of the most important effects of military spending and job crea­
tion was its regional distribution. The defense materials budget was 
spent in relatively few areas of the country, with about 70 percent of 
total contracts awarded in the top ten states. California led the way. By 
1960 the state's manufacturers held over $6,409 million in prime defense 
contracts, more than the next two states, New York and Texas, com­
bined. Almost 40 percent of all factory workers in the Los Angeles area 
were employed in the aircraft, missile, and electronics industries, mainly 
working on military equipment. In San Diego 82 percent of all manufac­
turing consisted of aircraft and missile production by the end of the 
decade. In the state as a whole, as much as 30 percent of manufacturing 
jobs were defense-related. In Texas employment in the transportation 
equipment industry, principally aircraft, grew from 21,000 in 1947 to 
65,000 in 1960. Other regions that benefited in employment from mil­
itary spending were central and southern New England, especially Mass­
achusetts with its growing electronics, defense equipment, and research 
and development operations, and Connecticut, where aircraft engines 
and parts and submarines were manufactured. With many of the older 
New England industries, such as textiles, in decline, the threat of unem­
ployment was offset by the growth in military production. In the South­
east, especially Georgia and Florida, production facilities and military 
training bases absorbed large amounts of funds. Although other consid­
erations played some part in the shift of jobs and population into these 
regions, the federal defense budget was the principal one.23 
The growth of military industries helped limit the area of collective 
bargaining. Serious labor disputes were rare in military industries. Gov­
ernment intervention in some form occurred when disputes threatened, 
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with the result that only a limited form of collective bargaining existed in 
these industries.24 
American workers by and large accepted the emergence of a cold war 
economy and their role in it. Jobs at good pay and often in attractive 
places were made available. One feature of military production em­
ployment was that a high proportion of the jobs were skilled, with im­
portant results for education, pay, and working conditions. There were 
more engineers, scientists, technicians, skilled craftsmen, and profes­
sional workers employed in military production than any other branch 
of large-scale manufacturing. The proportion of highly skilled workers 
increased rapidly as military equipment became more sophisticated. In 
1958 the proportion of "nonproductive workers," that is, skilled and 
professional, in five major defense-related industries was 36 percent. By 
1964 it had risen to 43 percent, compared with only 26 percent in all 
kinds of manufacturing, including defense-related.25 
Aside from meeting the nation's legitimate security needs, the appeal 
of defense spending was that its products did not compete in the mar­
ketplace with those of established civilian manufacturers. On the con­
trary, as the aircraft and electronics industries demonstrated, much of 
the research and development cost of new and improved civilian pro­
ducts could be financed out of the military budget. Although some labor 
leaders advocated government expenditures for civilian purposes to 
maintain employment and purchasing power, most of the spokesmen 
for organized labor followed the dictates of tradition in accepting jobs 
for workers whatever the source and purpose.26 
In the period of the cold war, while the shadow of atomic annihilation 
hung over the nation, the issue of personal security loomed large to 
American workers. In part, no doubt, this represented the lingering ef­
fects of the depression, but the threats and uncertainties of the postwar 
world contributed to a desire to create islands of stability and safety. 
Much of the energy of the union movement, including the unionization 
of mass-production industries in the thirties, had been spent in asserting 
the dignity of the worker and in seeking higher wages. In the postwar 
period emphasis shifted toward protection of the worker and his family 
against catastrophe. From the earliest days some unions had functioned 
as "friendly societies," using a portion of dues or other funds for death 
benefits, burial expenses, or the like. The government entered the pic­
ture during the New Deal with the contributory old age retirement ben­
efits and the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Se­
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curity Act, and the statutory overtime pay premium of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. World War II was a fruitful time for innovations in ben­
efits. The government imposed strict controls on wages but allowed new 
and improved insurance, health and hospitalization benefits, vacations 
and holidays with pay, and higher wages for night shifts. The War Labor 
Board ruled that the establishment of health and insurance funds was a 
legitimate objective of collective bargaining, a decision resented by 
many companies but upheld by the courts. 
A measure of the growing importance of fringe benefits as a part of 
total compensation can be seen in the increases in average annual sup­
plements to wages and salaries for full-time employees. These increased 
from $104 in 1945 to $388 in 1960. These aggregate figures conceal sig­
nificant variations that correlate in part with the extent of unionization 
in different industries. In manufacturing, for example, the correspond­
ing figures for 1945 and 1960 are $129 and $543, but in services the 
comparable figures are $37 and $166, and in agriculture and related 
industries only $5 and $47.27 By 1960 the average manufacturing estab­
lishment in the United States paid a sum equal to 21 percent of its pay­
roll for fringe benefits, and in some other industries such as mining with 
26 percent, and finance, insurance, and real estate with 23 percent, the 
proportion was higher. Fringe benefits were the most rapidly changing 
subject of bargaining. Collective bargaining contracts, once by and large 
confined to wages, working conditions, and union security provisions, 
expanded to cover disability and life insurance, supplemental unem­
ployment, health and medical, pension, and premium pay benefits.28 
Benefits were won both from union and nonunion firms, but most of 
the pioneering and the systems of benefits most favorable to workers 
were established in the unionized industries. By 1960 every major union 
had negotiated health, pension, and a variety of other kinds of welfare 
benefits. The large industrial unions took the lead, since they could af­
ford the services of the specialists needed to devise, negotiate, and moni­
tor complex benefit programs, and the risks of insurance schemes could 
be spread throughout their large memberships. The United Mine 
Workers, Steelworkers, Auto Workers, Rubber Workers, Amalgam­
ated Clothing Workers, and Ladies' Garment Workers were among the 
leaders in negotiating benefit programs for their members. Disability 
insurance to cover temporary losses from off-the-job accidents and ill­
nesses (with job-related disabilities covered under workmen's compen­
sation) was available to more than half of the workers in private non­
farm industry by 1960. Basic health and surgical benefits, a major 
objective between 1945 and 1960, were won by more than half of the 
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workers, with expansion to include major medical protection and den­
tal, optical, and even psychiatric care becoming available to some in the 
sixties. More common than costly health and hospitalization benefits 
were group life insurance programs. The median benefit was about one 
year's earnings, although the amount varied widely. Under most plans 
won through collective bargaining, the employer paid the entire cost, 
whereas under non-negotiated plans the employee contributed although 
the employer usually paid the larger portion. 
Pension plans supplemental to Social Security, although costly, were 
widely introduced, with the major breakthrough coming in the auto and 
steel industries in 1949. Increases in life expectancy and a trend toward 
earlier retirement were among the factors that gave supplemental pen­
sions a high priority. Under collectively bargained plans it was common 
for employers to pay most, and often all, of the costs. By 1967 private 
retirement plans covered more than 25 million workers, or about half of 
those in private nonfarm establishments, with about 11 million covered 
by collectively bargained contracts. Some plans were multi-employer, 
that is, they could be transported by the worker if he changed jobs, but 
most were not. 
Premium pay provisions built beyond the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
which required time and a half for work over forty hours per week. In 
many industries collective bargaining agreements provided for premium 
pay for work in excess of eight hours a day and for work on weekends 
and holidays regardless of the total worked during the week. Shift dif­
ferentials granting additional pay for night work were common, and 
premium pay for especially hazardous jobs existed in the construction, 
maritime, and other industries. One of the most dramatic changes was in 
paid holidays and vacations. Before World War II only about one-
fourth of union members were eligible for paid annual vacations, and 
most of those were for only one week. Major holidays were usually ob­
served, but holiday pay for wage earners was extremely rare. By 1960 
most workers covered by collective bargaining contracts were eligible 
for six paid holidays a year and for paid vacations, with many agree­
ments providing for four weeks for longer-service employees.29 
The most striking innovation in fringe benefits of the postwar era was 
the supplementary unemployment benefit (SUB) introduced in 1955 as a 
result of negotiations between the United Auto Workers and the Ford 
Motor Company. There were a few earlier instances of combinations of 
public and private unemployment insurance in England and in the 
United States, but the auto industry was the first to introduce the plan in 
a large, mass-production industry with a history of irregular employ­
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ment.30 In both the auto and steel industries, there had been an interest 
in a guaranteed annual wage since the thirties. With its membership 
subject to periodic layoffs of massive numbers owing to violent oscilla­
tions of demand and production scheduling complexities, the auto 
workers union had long been pursuing ways of ensuring continuous 
earnings. The establishment of the principle of a guaranteed wage fi­
nanced by the corporations would, many in the union believed, give 
management an incentive to schedule production throughout the year 
instead of concentrating it just before and during the peak sales seasons. 
Although the plans that were initially established fell short of a guaran­
teed annual wage, they offered many of its advantages, and they were 
capable of improvement. 
The UAW first approached General Motors with the proposal, but 
for tactical reasons turned to Ford following GM's rejection. Both sides 
intensively prepared for the negotiations, the union developing the gen­
eral principles and the company concentrating, as expected, on cost pro­
jections and administrative procedures. The basic principle was to take 
the benefit available from the state-administered unemployment com­
pensation insurance fund established under Social Security and add to it 
from a private insurance fund a sum sufficient to give an unemployed 
worker a total that approximated his regular wage. In the negotiations 
the union made important concessions on details in order to establish 
the principle. The plan, gained without a strike, required the company to 
put five cents an hour for each worker into the SUB fund. This fund 
could be tapped for benefits to supplement unemployment compensa­
tion up to 65 percent of take-home pay, or $25 a week, which ever was 
the lesser, for 26 weeks.31 The plan proved its worth during the 1958 
recession when car sales dried up and hundreds of thousands of auto-
workers were laid off as more than $ 13 million in S U B benefits was paid 
out. 
SUB plans expanded rapidly. As amended in the 1961 negotiations, 
the auto agreement provided up to 62 percent of gross pay plus $1.50 per 
dependent up to four, with an overall maximum of $40 per week for 52 
weeks; and after 1967 a laid-off worker could receive 95 percent of take-
home pay. In 1956 the steelworkers union gained 52-week coverage. By 
1962 more than 2.5 million workers were covered by SUB plans, with 
well over half of that total in auto and steel and the bulk of the remainder 
in the garment trades, cement, and rubber industries. About 95 percent 
of SUB-plan membership was in manufacturing industries.32 SUB 
plans, since they were based on a shared-risk insurance principle and 
were complex to administer with high overhead costs, required a large 
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number of participants in order to reduce the costs to an acceptable 
level. Their applicability therefore was limited.33 Considering all bene­
fits, however, there was no question that much had been done in a brief 
time to protect millions of American workers and their families from the 
worst effects of both ancient and modern hazards of working life. 
For most kinds of work, monetary wages more than doubled between 
1945 and 1960, and real wages (that is, the monetary wage adjusted for 
the inflationary spurts that occurred after World War II and during the 
Korean War) amounted to more than a 50 percent improvement. Aver­
age annual earnings for full-time employees in all industries rose from 
$2,189 in 1945 to $4,707 in 1960. To this must be added average annual 
supplements to wages and salaries to cover the cost of fringe benefits, 
which rose from only $104 in 1945 to $388 in 1960. This yields a total 
compensation of $2,293 in 1945 and $5,095 in I960.34 At the bottom of 
the scale, the national minimum wage, which had been initially set in 
1938 at 25 cents an hour and rose to 40 cents by war's end, advanced by 
stages to $1.15 an hour in 1961. In the same year minimum-wage cover­
age was extended for the first time in an important degree to include 
some trade and service as well as manufacturing workers. For a variety 
of reasons, the cold war years were generally prosperous, although 
pockets of poverty among particular racial, sexual, regional, and occu­
pational groups remained. 
The cold war had a maj or impact on the CIO's role as critic of capital­
ism and prophet of a new social order. The AFL, which once included 
many socialists within its affiliated unions, had largely shed or silenced 
them by the end of World War I, and the IWW had ceased to be a 
force.35 The CIO, born in the turbulent depression years, might have 
become a voice for workers' radicalism, leading to a collectivist polity. 
However, the argument goes, World War II slowed the CIO's progress 
toward that goal, and the cold war reversed its course, converting it into 
another pillar of the status quo. It ceased to offer a meaningful leftist 
alternative, allowing a rigid cold war consensus to dominate American 
policy through 1960 and beyond.36 
This analysis ignores some key facts of the Roosevelt years. Capital­
ism was not fatally ill, merely ailing for a season, and Roosevelt was its 
doctor, not the undertaker. The surge of labor was stimulated and insti­
tutionalized by government. The early organizing drives were sparked 
by the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act with its defective 
yet encouraging statement of a collective bargaining right.37 Although 
workers' victories were won through struggles in factories and streets, 
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the most important were initiated with a keen awareness of the balance 
of national and state political forces. The decisive strike in the CIO's 
growth, the sit-down at General Motors, was planned to follow the re­
election of Roosevelt and the selection of a Democratic liberal, Frank 
Murphy, as governor of Michigan.38 In the Wagner Act, despite continu­
ing employer opposition and lack of full implementation immediately 
after its passage, American labor gained a government-sanctioned pro­
cess for the initiation of collective bargaining and the protection of 
union rights that was unmatched in the industrial world. In short, labor 
in the large industries that were being organized during the New Deal 
was a ward of government, and it never transcended the relationship. 
The depression propelled labor into a new role and gave it new power 
but did not provide a warrant for it to transform society. During the war 
labor leaders, with the conspicuous exception of John L. Lewis, drew 
closer to government because of the national emergency, the promise of 
union security, and the gigantic expenditures that produced jobs and 
prosperity.39 
In the thirties, however, many workers were rebellious. Unions ap­
peared where none had been before. Sit-down and wildcat strikes, with 
workers scornful of property rights and authority, broke out for a time. 
These undisciplined upheavals contributed to the breakthrough in in­
dustrial unionism, but they failed to lead to social transformation. The 
new unions took up the problems of wages, working conditions, senior­
ity lists, and so on that unions had traditionally tackled. Most of the 
rank and file, including those who performed heroically during the 
trauma of the union's birth, expected and accepted this.40 
Communists and close sympathizers were active in several of the CIO 
unions and in the national CIO organization, but they rarely acted like 
revolutionaries and were often on the defensive.41 Until August 1939 
they supported Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies, returning to 
that position after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. 
During the war the Communists were superpatriots, advocating any­
thing that might increase military production. They urged universal 
adoption of a piece-rate wage system and favored coercive mobilization 
of labor for defense jobs, positions that put them sharply at odds with 
most labor leaders and with millions of workers. Furthermore, despite 
the necessary wartime alliance with the Soviets, the differences between 
the two nations were accentuated by the war's antitotalitarian thrust. If 
the war was a battle against the principles of totalitarianism, Russia 
and its American defenders could not escape unscathed.42 
Revelations of Soviet espionage operations beginning with the Gou­
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zenko disclosures in 1946 raised tension. Some antiunion employers and 
their political friends quickly showed their intention to exploit the rising 
anti-Communist and anti-Soviet feeling to discredit labor. In 1946 the 
chairman of the Republican National Committee, B. Carroll Reece, said 
that the coming congressional elections, in which his party would score 
tremendous gains, offered voters a choice between "Communism and 
Republicanism.'' As proof that the Communists had absorbed the Dem­
ocratic party, he noted that CIO-PAC, the CIO's political arm, was 
backing Democratic candidates. Richard Nixon, running for Congress, 
chimed in with "a vote for Nixon is a vote against the Communist-
dominated PAC with its gigantic slush fund."43 In the election only 75 of 
318 CIO-PAC-endorsed candidates won, and the number of Demo­
cratic members of the House of Representatives was reduced from 242 
to 188. Although many issues were involved in the election, the CIO 
discovered how vulnerable it was to the charge of Communist influence 
and how costly the result, a lesson soon reinforced by passage of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. 
The CIO's southern organizing drive, its major postwar project, also 
aroused opposition. Except in some of its stronger industrial unions, 
such as auto and steel, the CIO had made little headway in organizing 
locals in the South. Differentials in wages and working conditions were 
the nemesis of unions, since employers would be drawn to lower costs, 
causing areas of union strength to lose jobs. CIO strategists believed the 
unionization of southern industries, particularly textiles, was crucial to 
the organization's future. The drive, however, was sure to encounter 
resistance and not only for economic reasons. The CIO challenged 
deeply rooted southern customs by its official commitment to desegre­
gation. If Communists continued to play a role in the CIO, this burden 
would be added to those the organization had to carry. How many bat­
tles could it fight in the South and have any hope of success?44 
The first formal action against Communists in the labor movement 
came from Congress in the affidavit provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Under its terms union officers were required to file an affidavit declaring 
that they were not members of the Communist party or of organizations 
that supported it. Refusal meant the union could not participate in col­
lective bargaining elections held by the National Labor Relations 
Board, a penalty that did not expel noncomplying officers but threat­
ened the union's survival by laying it open to raids from rival organiza­
tions. The CIO took a hands-off position, leaving it to each union to 
decide whether to comply.45 Many union leaders resented being singled 
out and subjected to a loyalty test, but nearly all eventually complied. 
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Challenges on constitutional grounds were not sustained by the Su­
preme Court, and labor's campaign to secure repeal of the entire law 
utterly failed.46 By the early fifties compliance was general. 
Opposition to Communists within the CIO had appeared long before 
the cold war began, initially as a defense against a thrust from the AFL. 
In undocumented testimony before the Dies Committee in 1938, John 
P. Frey, an AFL official, listed more than three hundred CIO leaders 
and organizers who, he claimed, were Communists.47 The CIO took 
steps to blunt the charges. In 1939 John L. Lewis attacked Communist 
activity within CIO unions, telling the organization's executive board 
that Communist doctrines and policies would not be tolerated, and a 
resolution denouncing Communists and other subversives was adopted 
at the 1940 CIO convention.48 Similar general condemnations were 
adopted by some CIO affiliates. Communists and fellow travelers within 
the CIO often supported these resolutions, recognizing their negligible 
practical effect, although the wisdom of joining in one's own denuncia­
tion was doubtful. 
Potentially more serious were office-holding and membership restric­
tions. Lewis's mine workers' union had barred Communists from mem­
bership since 1927, and the Steel Workers kept Communists out of any 
official position.49 At the UAW's 1940 convention, a "subversive ele­
ments" constitutional clause was adopted, barring from elective or ap­
pointive office in the international a member of any organization de­
clared illegal by the United States government "through constitutional 
procedures."50 In the 1941 UAW convention, the most contentious issue 
was the "Red Resolution,'' a proposal to exclude members or supporters 
of organizations that approved of totalitarian forms of government 
from offices in the international. It was adopted by an almost two-to­
one vote with an amendment that specified communist, fascist, and Nazi 
organizations as the targets.51 Another CIO union, the International 
Woodworkers of America, under the leadership of a former Wobbly, 
adopted a constitutional amendment barring Communists from mem­
bership.52 Many CIO unions did not agree with a restrictive policy. In 
the United Electrical Workers convention of 1941, a proposal to bar 
Communists from office was defeated by a two-to-one margin. Never­
theless, the trend toward restrictions was well established. By 1954 a 
study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that 59 out of 100 un­
ions, AFL as well as CIO, with a membership of ten million, barred 
Communists from office in the international, and that 40 unions, with 
nearly six million members, barred them from membership.53 
With the end of the war, Philip Murray, president of both the CIO 
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and the United Steel Workers of America and a faithful organization 
man, occupied a key position. Although there was never any question of 
his personal abhorrence of communism, his deepest commitment was to 
maintain the strength and unity of the CIO.54 At that time about one-
fifth of the CIO's claimed six million members were in unions whose 
officers, whatever their formal status with regard to the party, consist­
ently supported the Communist political position. Although no count 
could be made, it has generally not been claimed that more than a hand­
ful of workers were themselves Communists. Still, some locals were def­
initely left wing, and many unionists were pragmatically prepared to 
accept capable union leadership whatever its political banner as long as 
no great price had to be paid. Murray tried to walk a narrow line. He did 
not want to antagonize the dozen or so CIO unions with significant 
Communist elements. They were mostly small but included such sub­
stantial organizations as the United Electrical Workers, third in size in 
the CIO, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the National Maritime 
Union, the Fur and Leather Workers, and the West Coast Longshore­
men's and Warehousemen's Union. Their secession could plunge the 
CIO into civil war, open it to incursions by the AFL, and bring about its 
demise. On the other hand, Murray believed he had to respond to the 
mounting anti-Communist tide of opinion within the CIO and the na­
tion at large or face disaffection and attacks. At first he tried to remain 
neutral, but the ground shifted beneath him. Over time and with the 
appearance of new issues involving the Truman administration's policy 
of economic recovery for Europe and support for Truman's reelection in 
1948, Murray moved into the anti-Communist group. In the meantime 
he fought a series of delaying actions in an effort to prevent an irrepara­
ble split.55 
The first of these maneuvers occurred at the tense though outwardly 
harmonious CIO convention of 1946. Murray prepared the way by ap­
pointing a special six-member committee, evenly divided between the 
pro- and anti-Communist factions, to draft a resolution. Its members 
were Ben Gold, president of the Fur and Leather Workers, an avowed 
Communist, Abram Flaxer, president of the United Public Workers, 
and Michael Quill, president of the Transport Workers Union, who 
were, at the time, sympathizers. The anti-Communist members were 
Walter P. Reuther, recently elected president of the UAW, Emil Rieve 
of the Textile Workers, and Milton Murray of the American Newspaper 
Guild. "We resent and reject," the statement said, "efforts of the 
Communist Party or other political parties and their adherents to inter­
fere in the affairs of the CIO. This convention serves notice that we will 
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not tolerate such interference." On the floor Murray rammed the resolu­
tion through without debate on a standing vote. So strong was his de­
mand for its passage that only two delegates, both from the National 
Maritime Union, dared vote against it, and they quickly withdrew their 
opposition to permit a unanimous vote to be recorded. A few, however, 
abstained.56 
Another issue had a more practical effect. In addition to international 
unions, the CIO contained hundreds of local and state industrial union 
councils, primarily lobbying and political organs. A large number were 
under left-wing control and had issued resolutions, often on national 
political questions, reflecting that interest. The convention ordered 
them to confine their statements to local and state issues and to ensure 
that all their positions conformed with national CIO policy. Although 
the councils were a minor part of the CIO, with little power in compari­
son with the affiliated international unions, the issuance of these guide­
lines showed Murray's intent to tighten the organization.57 
In the summer of 1947, shortly after the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, 
Murray moved decisively away from the Communist left. At a closed 
session of the CIO's executive board, he launched an attack on Commu­
nists within the labor movement, saying, "If Communism is an issue in 
any of your unions, throw it to hell out and throw its advocates 
out along with it. When a man accepts office to render service to 
workers, and then delivers service to outside interests, that man is noth­
ing but a damned traitor."58 The statement was widely used by anti-
Communist labor leaders in their campaigns. At the same time he fired 
Communist Len DeCaux, who had been on the CIO staff since 1936, as 
publicity director and editor of the CIO News. Lee Pressman, the CIO 
counsel, followed DeCaux out six months later.59 
The 1947 CIO convention marked another stage in the isolation of the 
Communist-led unions. The cold war had now gone beyond trading 
insults. In June, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed an eco­
nomic aid plan for Europe. The Soviet Union, followed by the East 
European countries, denounced the plan, refused to participate, and 
charged that the United States was preparing for the rearmament of an 
anti-Soviet Western bloc. The CIO's convention was dominated by for­
eign policy. Marshall, the first secretary of state to appear at a labor 
gathering, delivered a brief but strong address, asking for labor's sup­
port of the plan and warning against distortions of its intentions being 
spread by its enemies. The convention's foreign policy resolution was a 
subtle endorsement designed to allow the left wing to remain within the 
CIO, but little more. Although the Marshall Plan was not endorsed by 
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name, the foreign policy of the Democratic administration was praised, 
and it was implied that American policy posed no threat to the inde­
pendence of other nations, a position at odds with that of the Soviets 
and of the Communist-led American unions. In defense of the adminis­
tration's economic aid proposals, Reuther argued that Truman was no 
more guilty of warmongering in 1947 than Roosevelt had been in 1940. 
The accusers, he pointed out, were the same in both instances. The CIO 
must, he said, "stand four-square against all forms of totalitarianism 
because it matters very little what kind of trademark you have on the 
chains that bind you."60 No formal actions were taken at the convention 
against the left wing, but Murray had indicated his mounting dissatis­
faction with the situation. As one observer noted, the left wing "had 
been granted the right to exist, but no more."61 
Events moved quickly, propelled by the entry of Henry Wallace into 
the presidential campaign in December 1947. Murray and most CIO 
leaders resented Wallace's decision. Truman, for whom originally they 
had slight regard, had won labor's favor by his veto of the Taft-Hartley 
Act and his promise to support its repeal. As a political realist who, 
along with most in the CIO leadership, had long opposed a third party 
for practical reasons, Murray realized that Wallace's votes would be 
taken from Truman, thus improving the chances of Thomas Dewey, the 
likely Republican candidate. If Dewey was elected, there would be no 
chance of repealing Taft-Hartley. Furthermore, if Republicans and 
southern Democrats gained ground in Congress, Taft-Hartley would be 
entrenched and probably supplemented with even harsher measures.62 
The possibility of a sweeping antilabor reaction, comparable to that 
following World War I, was always a concern. The Wallace campaign 
threatened to sabotage labor's interests. A few union leaders who had 
previously been close to the Communists, such as "Red Mike" Quill of 
the New York Transport Workers Union, aligned themselves with Mur­
ray. "If being for Wallace will split the C.I.O.," he said, "the price is too 
great. I am a trade unionist first."63 
The issue came to a head at the January 1948 meeting of the CIO 
executive board shortly after Wallace had announced his candidacy. 
The previous convention had unanimously adopted a resolution pledg­
ing "full and unstinted support" to CIO-PAC and its political endorse­
ments. Before the meeting Murray warned all affiliated unions that this 
pledge was a binding obligation.64 His strong feelings, usually kept 
under control, broke out in resentful attacks. "I am referred to" in left-
wing publications, he cried, "as an imperialist and a God damned Wall 
Street war monger. "65 Reuther, whose position was vastly strength­
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ened by his recent reelection as president of the UAW, attacked the 
Wallace candidacy on political grounds, pointing out that with labor's 
votes divided it would be impossible to elect either friendly legislators or 
a president. A third party supported by some unions would confuse and 
demoralize potential working-class voters, compounding the apathy 
that was the CIO's most serious problem in mobilizing a labor vote. 
Although Reuther favored a political realignment into liberal and con­
servative parties, the impetus for such a realignment should come from 
within the labor movement. Support of CIO-PAC endorsements, he 
added, had been decided upon after a full and free debate. If the affil­
iated unions refused to support CIO positions, including its political 
decisions, the ineffectual organization would ultimately perish.66 
The board voted 33 to 11, with one abstention, to condemn the third-
party movement and the Wallace candidacy. Nearly all the negative 
votes were cast by officers of unions that had already decided to support 
Wallace and would ultimately be expelled from the CIO.67 In Sep­
tember, in due course, the executive board endorsed Truman, amid 
more charges and recriminations.68 Clearly, the CIO leadership in­
tended to ward off the worst evil. It was more fearful of the consequen­
ces of a Truman defeat than hopeful of positive results from his victory. 
Its praise of the president was restrained, but the Wallaceite Progressive 
party, the statement said, "offers nothing but division and defeat to 
really progressive Americans,"69 
Truman's victory might have provided the occasion for resolving dif­
ferences, since Wallace's poor showing discouraged his supporters and 
the campaign did not produce the catastrophe that Murray had feared. 
However, both sides were unyielding. As well as a presidential election 
could, the Truman victory showed that labor's rank and file preferred a 
place, even as a minority, within the Democratic party coalition to a 
separate, Communist-backed progressive party. The political weakness 
of the unions that had defied CIO policy was amply demonstrated. At 
the CIO's Portland convention, immediately after the election, neither 
side sought a compromise. Murray believed the Communists were pre­
pared to wreck the CIO if necessary in pursuit of their political beliefs.70 
Their actions in the election showed, he said, that "they did not care 
whether Dewey was elected or the devil was elected,' as long as they 
could defeat Truman, because of his anti-Soviet foreign policy.71 The 
left wing was no more conciliatory, provoking a showdown by personal 
challenges to Murray. The CIO president and his defenders responded 
with threats such as Reuther's: "I say to the brothers, make up your 
minds either to get clear in the CIO or clear out of the CIO."72 By the 
convention's end there was no doubt which it would be. 
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Over the next few months, preparations were made for the trial of the 
dissident unions. At the 1949 convention, the CIO constitution was 
amended to exclude Communists and those following Communist pol­
icy from CIO offices, including the executive board. The board was 
granted authority to investigate and expel by a two-thirds vote any affil­
iate "that consistently pursues policies and activities directed toward the 
achievement of the program or the purposes of the Communist Party 
rather than the objectives and policies set forth in the constitution 
of the CIO."7' The board's actions were subject to approval by the con­
vention. "There is enough room within the CIO movement to differ 
about many subjects, many ideas," Murray said, "but there is no room 
within the CIO for Communism."74 
The charges and evidence focused primarily on four accusations: that 
the union had supported the successive changes in the Communist posi­
tion during the Nazi-Soviet pact and the invasion of Russia; that it had 
endorsed work incentive plans in World War II; that it had refused to 
support the Marshall Plan; and that it had supported Wallace. These 
charges rested on the assumption that the political objectives and influ­
ence of the CIO were among its vital interests, and therefore as legiti­
mate and binding upon the affiliated unions as their commitment to 
trade unionism. Although the CIO had not always asserted this posi­
tion, political uniformity had been an important consideration at times 
in its brief history. John L. Lewis resigned the CIO presidency in 1940 
when he failed to sway the membership on a political issue. Further­
more, a strong case could be made that labor's precarious domestic sit­
uation and an honest fear of Soviet policy in Western Europe as a threat 
to labor's and the nation's interest compelled a united front. Division 
within a labor movement over politics or ideology was not unique: sep­
arate confederations of Communist and non-Communist unions existed 
in France, Italy, and several other countries. In France, primarily in 
response to the proposal of the Marshall Plan, membership in the Con­
federation Ge'ne'rale du Travail, controlled by Communists, 
dropped from six to three million in a few years, thanks to secessions of 
non-Communist unions.75 Many unionists in both Europe and America 
had become convinced that political or trade union association with the 
Soviets or those who regularly supported Soviet policies was fatally 
damaging to free unions. 
Following trials conducted by committees of CIO vice-presidents, 
eleven unions were expelled, representing about one-fifth of the CIO's 
membership. The committees adopted the rule that a union could be 
expelled if it were shown that it had publicly followed the Communist 
line through two or more of its changes. The decisions were approved by 
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the executive board and by unanimous vote at the convention in No­
vember 1950.76 Nearly all the membership of the expelled unions was 
concentrated in only a few of them, particularly the United Electrical 
Workers, the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, the Fur and Leather 
Workers, and the West Coast Longshoremen's Union.77 Most of the rest 
were small, a few hardly more than paper organizations with negligible 
numbers. Expulsion opened the way to competition for members in 
which some of the locals that were raided willingly cooperated. The raid­
ing unions included the UAW, the Steel Workers, and, from the AFL, 
the Machinists. To challenge the United Electrical Workers, the CIO 
chartered a major new affiliate, the International Union of Electrical 
Workers, under the former UEW president James B. Carey, which had 
substantial though by no means complete success in the fifties.78 
Expulsion cleared the way for labor to support Truman's foreign pol­
icy. Recognizing that totalitarian governments were always quick to 
suppress free trade unions or transform them into instruments of the 
state, American trade unionists were committed to support antitotali­
tarian initiatives. Since World War II the AFL had supported the activi­
ties of anti-Communist labor leaders and organizations in Europe and 
South America with encouragement and backing from the American 
government. AFL representatives received funds from the government 
that they funneled into overseas union activities along with some of their 
own and others' money, and a few CIO officials were similarly 
involved.79 
In general, CIO leaders took a more moderate approach than the 
AFL cold war hard line, favoring support for, and use of, the United 
Nations, greater American sympathy with the position of neutral na­
tions caught between the great power blocs, and greater reliance on eco­
nomic and technical aid to struggling nations instead of arms for dicta­
tors. In contrast, George Meany so abhorred any contaminating contact 
with Communist leaders that he refused to meet Khrushchev during the 
Soviet premier's visit to the United States in 1959, and he locked the 
door of the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington against Anastas Mi­
koyan, the Soviet deputy premier, who was left outside with his nose 
pressed against the glass trying to catch a glimpse of the leaders of the 
American working class within. Delineating the differences within the 
AFL-CIO over Russian contacts, Reuther, the organization's vice-
president, arranged and attended a dinner for labor leaders with 
Khrushchev but had a tumultuous and well-publicized argument with 
him over living conditions of workers in the United States and the Soviet 
Union.80 The expulsion of the nonconforming unions from the CIO re­
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duced the scope of political discussion and criticism within the labor 
movement and tied it more closely to the Democratic party. Neverthe­
less, in the consensus politics of the fifties, labor represented a broader 
range of alternatives on foreign policy than could be found within most 
major American institutions. 
Less directly than in foreign policy or jobs, but perhaps more signifi­
cant in the long run, the cold war affected some of the social and moral 
aspects of the lives of American workers. Although the results were not 
intended by those who constructed cold war policies, international ri­
valry helped create a climate favorable to ending racial discrimination 
and consequently led to improvements in the employment prospects of 
the largest American minority. 
Previous wars, beginning with the War for Independence, had moved 
in that direction, although the results were always limited and often 
merely temporary.81 Most recently, in World War II, the combination of 
a demand for labor and the antiracist ideological element in the struggle 
against Nazism created pressure for improving the job prospects for 
blacks. Although conflicts related to promotion of black employees and 
the opening up of previously closed occupations broke out in some war 
plants, black employees made significant gains. The government, cor­
porations engaged in arms production, and labor unions in the arms 
industries preached interracial cooperation and appealed to all races to 
support the war effort. Workers in Detroit war plants were exhorted "to 
abandon race prejudice because it directly aided the Axis."x: The na­
tional interest in wartime was repeatedly and directly linked with racial 
justice, perhaps the only combination that could persuade the majority 
of white Americans to yield in any significant degree to the claims of the 
latter. Wartime changes produced more industrial and occupational di­
versity and opportunity for blacks than they had ever known.83 
Although the particulars were somewhat different, the cold war con­
firmed and expanded the linkage between national interest and civil 
rights. The claim of the Soviet Union to represent a superior kind of 
democracy, its criticisms of the United States for failure to implement 
equal rights, and the necessity of securing support among the newly 
independent nations of Asia and Africa with their massive colored pop­
ulations forced the white American majority, in upholding the national 
interest, to make concessions to the black American minority.1*4 As 
might have been expected, the concessions were often halfhearted and 
superficial, yet the claim to equal treatment was acknowledged to be 
both just and necessary and some movement did occur. 
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President Truman subscribed to this motivation in his advocacy of 
civil rights. Although not slighting the argument that blacks as Ameri­
can citizens had equal constitutional status and deserved equal political 
rights, he pointed to the need to convince the people of other nations 
that the United States was democratic in fact as well as in its statements 
of principle. In June 1947 in his first major civil rights speech, and the 
first in the history of the presidency, Truman said: 
The support of desperate populations of battle ravaged countries must be 
won for the free way of life. We must have them as allies in our continuing 
struggle for the peaceful solution of the world's problems. They may sur­
render to the false security offered so temptingly by totalitarian regimes un­
less we can prove the superiority of democracy. Our case for democracy 
should be as strong as we can make it. It should rest on practical evidence that 
we have been able to put our own house in order.85 
The security and the future of the United States depended in part on 
establishing equal rights for all Americans. 
When the presidential Civil Rights Committee reported to Truman a 
few months later, it noted that "our civil rights record has growing inter­
national implications."86 The committee's proposals, which included 
enactment of a permanent fair employment practices law, were de­
fended on moral, economic, and international grounds. The report 
frankly acknowledged that the American "civil rights record has been an 
issue in world politics," with "our shortcomings" constantly portrayed 
and analyzed. Americans, it continued, must be more "concerned with 
the good opinion of the peoples of the world." In the final words of the 
body of the report, the committee pointed out: "The United States is not 
so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable, 
that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record."87 
This motivation transformed the curtailment of racial segregation 
and discrimination from a matter of morality and citizenship into one of 
self-interest. Although it obviously did not open up jobs to blacks im­
mediately, it gave to equal employment opportunity and civil rights 
questions in general a more favorable hearing within the white commun­
ity than they had previously enjoyed. Truman launched, and Eisen­
hower continued, a desegregation of the armed forces that would even­
tually improve job opportunities for blacks who were in the services. 
Although Congress declined to create the federal fair employment prac­
tices commission that Truman's Civil Rights Committee had recom­
mended, and President Eisenhower was opposed to a federal fair em­
ployment law, by 1961 nineteen states had adopted fair employment 
laws of some kind. As a cautious first step at the federal level, Eisen­
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hower appointed a committee headed by Vice-President Richard Nixon 
to consider ways to curb discrimination on work done under federal 
contracts. In fact, the committee accomplished little although it could 
take credit for eliminating the ban on black bus drivers in Washington, 
D.C. During the Kennedy administration, under the energetic Lyndon 
Johnson, it became more active.88 
In 1951, during the Korean War, the income of male Negro wage and 
salary earners averaged 62 percent of that of whites, the highest point yet 
reached, and the labor force participation rate of black males in their 
early twenties, another index of economic opportunity, reached a peak 
in 1953 at 92.3 percent.89 Although declines in these indices and a rise in 
black unemployment through the rest of the fifties was a reminder of the 
critical importance of the aggregate level of demand for labor in deter­
mining total black employment, pressures produced by the cold war had 
wrought some improvement. 
The union issue that loomed largest in the public mind in the postwar 
era was that of corruption. The CIO unions were virtually free of racke­
teering, gangster infiltration, and venal officials, but a few of the AFL 
unions had a history—in some cases a long one—of shady activities. 
One of the worst situations was in the New York City locals of the Inter­
national Longshoremen's Association, where a fight over a corrupt ad­
ministration raged in the early fifties. Under pressure from David Du­
binsky of the Ladies' Garment Workers Union and others, George 
Meany, the AFL's new president, intervened but without much imme­
diate success.90 
Stronger pressure to clean up the unions and throw out the gangsters 
was generated by the unification of the AFL and the CIO in 1955. 
Reuther, formerly president of the CIO and the leading vice-president of 
the united organization, insisted on a determined campaign against cor­
ruption as a condition of merger. Meany, a man of strong moral percep­
tions, abhorred corruption and was prepared to move against it al­
though somewhat restrained by the constitutional autonomy of the 
AFL's affiliates. In 1956 the authority of the Committee on Ethical 
Practices was enlarged and an impressive ethical code for union officials 
adopted. In a striking departure from tradition and a modification of 
the autonomy principle, the federation won the right to expel unions 
whose officers were corrupt. 
These self-policing efforts did not avert the storm. A mounting wave 
of public criticism led to an extensive congressional investigation of 
union corruption.91 Early in 1957 the Senate established a select com­
mittee under the chairmanship of Senator John McClellan (D., Arkan­
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sas), to "conduct an investigation and study of the extent to which crim­
inal or other improper practices or activities are engaged in the 
field of labor-management relations to the detriment of the inter­
ests of the public, employers or employees."92 
The McClellan committee's hearing concentrated on the Teamsters 
Union, the largest in the United States, and particularly on its president, 
Dave Beck, and some of the other officers. They were shown to have 
used union funds for their benefit through favorable loans and stock 
purchases with borrowed money. Beck, in fact, treated the union's 
treasury as a personal fund, buying gifts for friends, family, and self with 
reckless abandon. He received kickbacks from those having dealings 
with the Teamsters and with companies the union had under contract, 
carried on covert business relationships with trucking firms, and had 
numerous connections with gangsters and convicted felons. Sweetheart 
agreements in which contract concessions were made to a company in 
return for payments to the local officials were sometimes involved. The 
committee reported that many officers of the union by their corrupt 
activities showed "marked contempt for the welfare of the rank and 
file." Similar misdeeds by officials of the Baker and Confectionary 
Workers Union and a few other unions were also exposed. 
Altogether, charges of racketeering were made against local or inter­
national officers of ten unions affiliated with the AFL. Although rela­
tively few persons or unions were involved, the entire labor movement 
came under public suspicion. Strongly supported by Reuther and oth­
ers, Meany engineered the removal of Beck from the executive council 
of the AFL-CIOand, after James R. Hoffa succeeded Beck as president, 
the expulsion of the Teamsters, along with two other unions. The expul­
sions were a brave move. None of the Teamsters' officials at that time 
had been convicted in court of any misdeeds although Beck had taken 
the Fifth Amendment before the McClellan committee more than 
ninety times. The Teamsters were the largest union in the country, and 
they had close ties with many other unions, particularly those in the 
building and retail service trades. All-out warfare would be very costly. 
But the AFL-CIO council and convention acted forcefully and rapidly, 
possibly with more decisiveness than many businesses or government 
agencies, including Congress, would have acted where one of their own 
was concerned. Meany believed labor had acted honorably. As the 
"honest plumber" later remarked when rejecting a suggestion to readmit 
the Teamster's to the AFL-CIO, "We would never lower our standards 
to match the standards of the business community or the market­
place."94 
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Politics played a part in the McClellan committee investigation. This 
was most clearly shown in the Republicans' attack on Walter Reuther 
and the UAW. Senators Barry Goldwater, Karl E. Mundt, and Carl T. 
Curtis insisted on an investigation of the long and bitter strike against 
the Kohler Company, of Sheboygan, Wisconsin.95 Goldwater carried 
the ball. The tenor of his approach was indicated at a Republican dinner 
in Detroit in January 1958, preceding the opening of the inquiry, when 
he said: "Walter Reuther and the UAW-CIO are a more dangerous me­
nace than the Sputnick or anything Soviet Russia might do to Amer­
ica."96 Reuther quickly responded to this attack with the suggestion that 
each man choose three clergymen to judge the charge. If they found 
Goldwater correct, Reuther would resign as president of the UAW; if 
not, he said, Goldwater should resign from the Senate. For good mea­
sure, he added that Goldwater was the nation's "number one political 
fanatic, its number one anti-labor baiter, its number one peddler of class 
hatred."97 
When Reuther appeared before the committee, its questions revolved 
around violence in the strike. Although he conceded that two men sent 
to Wisconsin by a UAW local in Detroit had assaulted nonstrikers, he 
denied convincingly that the union had sought to shield them or that 
they had acted on union instructions. They were later tried and served 
sentences. The Republican senators, he charged, were trying to score 
political points by smearing the union. "Our union has had less violence 
than most. [But] the decison is: Reuther has got to be destroyed 
because his union is active in politics, and let's find some way. 
Let's fabricate this theory of violence."98 Eventually the UAW won the 
Kohler strike after the NLRB found the company guilty of unfair labor 
practices including refusal to bargain in good faith. 
The legislative result of the McClellan committee hearings was the 
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, adopted over the strong objections of the 
labor movement. It included a statement of the rights of union members, 
guarantees of democratic procedures in unions, and protection of union 
funds against pirating by union officials; it also made violent actions to 
deprive union members of their rights a federal crime, and prohibited 
those convicted of certain crimes as well as members of the Communist 
party from serving as union officials for five years after their release 
from prison or after termination of party membership. From labor's 
point of view, a collection of additional provisions was more disturbing. 
The Taft-Hartley ban on secondary boycotts was broadened to cover 
more cases, picketing rights were limited where a rival union was recog­
nized, and the jurisdiction of the NLRB was reduced. For the future of 
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organized labor, this final provision was especially threatening, since it 
protected states with "right to work" laws from the activities of union 
organizers. The McClellan committee uncovered a serious problem of 
corruption in only a few unions, but its findings prompted the passage 
of harsh legislation that went well beyond the original subject of the 
investigation." 
A foreign threat perceived as a challenge to the existence of a nation is 
bound to have a strong influence on domestic institutions and policies. 
The entire American polity bent under the unprecedented strains of the 
cold war. No earlier generation of Americans had lived under the shad­
ow of atomic annihilation or had to face a permanently hostile power of 
equal or potentially greater strength. American workers and their repre­
sentative institutions were in the direct path of forces generated by the 
cold war. They were, however, able to maintain the position they had 
gained during the New Deal and World War II and even to make some 
progress in achieving higher standards of living and greater personal 
and family security. Forced to make concessions to a fearful and suspi­
cious public in the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin acts and the ex­
pulsion of the nonconforming unions from the CIO, workers and orga­
nized labor were sufficiently strong to prevent a reaction comparable to 
the antilabor offensive following World War I and leading to the "lean 
years" of the twenties. 
The cold war was a period of consolidation for American labor. Its 
political allies were in disarray. Without strong political organization or 
leadership, there was no opportunity to relive, or go much beyond, the 
hopeful years of the New Deal. Nevertheless, the substance of what had 
been won in the past was preserved, and as the most severe pressures of 
the cold war abated toward the end of the fifties, organized labor and 
American workers were still a major force in shaping their own and the 
nation's future. 
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Rural America in an Urban Age, 1945-1960 
Thomas E. Williams 
In 1945 the term rural America carried with it a quantitative dimen­
sion of population and a qualitative dimension of culture. It defined the 
small towns and the sparsely settled countryside as well as a culture tied 
to tradition revolving around agriculture. Those Americans who resided 
in small towns and in the surrounding areas at the end of World War II 
lived on the threshold of vast changes. The increased use of technology 
in everyday life and work that was to play such an important role in 
postwar America was to have a profound influence on rural America 
during the Truman and Eisenhower years. At the war's end many of the 
primary forces that were to change rural life—new forms of mass cul­
ture, an agricultural revolution, and federal farm policy—were already 
taking on the characteristics that would so significantly alter its nature. 
What was difficult to foresee in 1945 was the rapid pace of change that 
the next decade and a half would bring. 
To some, rural America in 1945 seemed very much undisturbed by the 
technologically advanced, interdependent world of urban industrial 
America. The cover story of the 7 July 1945 issue of the Saturday Eve­
ning Post was "My Town," T. E. Murphy's description of small-town 
America in the year of Allied victories. In the article Murphy explored 
many of the traditional themes about rural life. He was an unabashed 
supporter of small-town superiority, contending that small towns ex­
emplified the traditional American values of independence and free­
dom. Murphy liked the look, feel, and the physical environment of life in 
the American small town, and he left little doubt that he considered it 
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superior to that in the cities. He ended with an appeal for Americans to 
come home to their true roots: 
Only when the major part of Americans declare their independence from 
the city, the machine and the treadmill of urban living can we ever again 
hope, as a people, to get back to the rugged but pleasant road that leads to the 
fulfillment of the dreams of those who founded America.1 
A rural culture strong enough to pose a genuine alternative to urban 
life undoubtedly existed in the United States in the 1920s. During that 
decade rural America was cohesive enough and confident enough to 
launch a series of conflicts with the new American culture emanating 
from the cities. It may well have had validity in the 1930s when the 
depression reversed the great population flow from the countryside into 
the cities that had been a marked feature of American life since the late 
nineteenth century. The depression also set off a national search for 
causes of the great debacle, leading to a rediscovery of America in litera­
ture and scholarship that championed the nation's past of rural values. 
World War II, however, pushed rural America into the background and 
revived the massive migration of people into the urban areas. Murphy's 
contention that a rural America of genuine distinctiveness existed in 
1945 was based more on nostalgia than reality, and his hope that Ameri­
cans would turn back to the small town for guidance in the postwar 
years was to remain unfulfilled. Instead, rural America in the Truman 
and Eisenhower years became more and more urban-like. By 1960 it had 
virtually disappeared except as a statistical entity meaning a sparsely 
settled region.2 
A more nearly accurate description of rural America in 1945 was 
presented to the readers of the same issue of the Saturday Evening Post 
in John Falter's cover illustration depicting a small town filled with peo­
ple celebrating Independence Day. The obligatory school band heads 
the marching column of the town parade, and a serviceman waving to 
the crowd from an open car follows close behind. A sailor walks down 
the sidewalk with a girl on each arm. A policeman arrests a drunk, and a 
woman, who is conscious that the disturbance is drawing the attention 
of her young daughter, looks on disapprovingly. Across the street a 
small boy waving an American flag eludes the desperate grasp of his 
mother and is joining the band on its march. A black family enjoys the 
spectacle under the awning of the J. C. Moyer Building, an impressive 
1895 red brick edifice that now houses the offices of the town's profes­
sional men. An extension of the crowd scene and an additional automo­
bile representing the Red Cross dominate the background. In the upper 
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left a train passes by the town center, and a telephone pole with its 
numerous connecting wires completes the scene. 
Faker's small town had not rejected the machine; the automobile was 
featured as a prominent part of small-town life, having been interwoven 
into one of its basic rituals.' Faker's town was well integrated into the 
national communications and transportation network. The people in 
the crowd wore clothing that was not identifiable as either urban or 
rural; they were clearly part of a consumption community stretching far 
beyond the borders of their town. The building that Falter chose to place 
at the center of town life was not the time-honored symbol of localism, 
the county courthouse, but a building quartering the town lawyers and 
other professionals. It was these same middle-class professionals that 
historian Robert Wiebe has identified as the group that, beginning in the 
late nineteenth century, played the key role in breaking down the isola­
tion of small-town life through their drive for professionalization and 
organization.4 The Fourth of July celebrants were citizens of a national 
community; they were citizens of the world community as well. The 
local-hero serviceman leading the parade represented the town's direct 
contribution to World War II, and the Red Cross automobile symbol­
ized support on the home front. Faker's small town appeared to be well 
integrated into the broader national and world community, and because 
of that his visual presentation went to the heart of rural life in the imme­
diate postwar years. 
Evidence that rural America was being absorbed into a broader na­
tional framework began appearing at the close of World War II. Home-
front activities had often cut across urban-rural boundaries as both 
groups encountered labor shortages, witnessed women assuming new 
roles, listened to the war news on the radio, and took part in scrap metal 
drives or Red Cross campaigns.5 A series of public opinion polls be­
tween 1945 and 1950 revealed only slight differences in rural and urban 
views on major issues.6 A 1945 survey even found that urban and rural 
residents shared a common satisfaction with radio programming.7 In 
1951 the New York Times took a look at rural America through a story 
about a small town in Kansas. The reporter concluded: 
These people aren't isolated or isolationist. They aren't hicks. The hick-
town went out with the horse-and-buggy days, and a sampling from Who's 
Who in America shows that more than half the entries were born in whistle-
stop towns. These people wear the same fashions, hear the same radio pro­
grams, read the same magazines and newspaper columns as the city folk. 
They live here by choice. And they know what is happening in the world. 
They know communism for what it is.K 
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The reporter had identified one of the most important ways in which 
rural America was being caught up in the complex web of modern life: it 
had begun consuming the same goods, services, and information as ur­
ban America. 
As the Times reporter indicated, rural America was caught up in 
common consumption patterns with urban America because of the 
penetration of modern technology into almost every geographical local­
ity in the nation. Since the 1930s rural electrification had been a much-
watched indicator of the arrival of modernity in rural America. In the 
United States as a whole, the proportion of homes with electricity in­
creased from 79 percent in 1940 to 94 percent in 1950, and most of that 
increase was in rural homes.9 Figures for the use of refrigeration closely 
followed those for electrification. In both cases they were almost univer­
sal in American homes by 1950, with the greatest increase in the previous 
decade in rural areas.10 In 1960 more than two-thirds of rural American 
homes had access to a telephone, and more than 90 percent had radios. 
Rural America trailed urban America in the availability of such features 
of modern life as radio, electrification, refrigeration, and telephones, 
but the disparity was not great." The countryside in the postwar years 
was not left out of modern technology or even seriously excluded from 
participation; it simply lagged slightly behind. The same was true for 
rural participation in the postwar period's most significant addition to 
America's mass-consumer society: television. 
In 1950 the approximately five million television sets in use in the 
United States were located almost exclusively in urban homes.12 Con­
finement of television to urban America continued through the Korean 
War when, because of the national emergency and a great backlog of 
station applications, the Federal Communications Commission discon­
tinued granting new station licenses. But the end of the Korean War 
marked the termination of the freeze period on station licenses, and a 
flood of new television stations from 1954 to 1960 brought the new me­
dium to rural America.l3 By 1960, 11.3 million rural homes had televi­
sion. The once great disparity between urban and rural access to televi­
sion had been reduced markedly: in 1960 82 percent of rural homes and 
88 percent of urban homes had at least one television set.14 
Television, when it came to rural America, had little rural character. 
There are of course solid reasons why early television was oriented to the 
urban resident: the original audience had been in the large urban centers 
and the freeze on granting of television licenses in the early 1950s locked 
the medium into programs that appealed to those cities. Furthermore, 
as a business that depended on reaching the largest audience possible, 
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television programming was drawn to situations and themes that ap­
pealed to the much larger urban audience. Contemporary rural Amer­
ica, even small-town America, was seldom seen on network television 
except as it existed in the West of the 1870s or 1880s. The small-town 
family of the mass popular culture of the 1930s epitomized in movies by 
the Hardys of Carvel was virtually nonexistent in network television of 
the 1950s. The Andersons of 607 South Maple Street, Springfield, in 
"Father Knows Best" were the Hardys' closest counterparts; but that 
small-town family was vastly outnumbered by the urban apartment 
dwellers—the Williamses of Apartment 542 in "Make Room for 
Daddy," the Ricardos in Apartment 3-B in "I Love Lucy," the Kram­
dons and Nortons of Brooklyn in the "Honeymooners"—and the sub­
urban families such as the Rileys of "The Life of Riley."15 Television in 
the 1950s, unlike much of American culture and mass culture of preced­
ing decades, projected urban America as the setting for the typical 
American family. In projecting such an image, television was accurately 
reflecting the true circumstances of most American families, but it also 
was denying rural America one of its last remaining strengths: the pow­
erful cultural myth that "true" American values lay in the small towns 
and countryside. 
Television was a mixed blessing for rural America in its effect on the 
availability of another aspect of mass culture: professional sports. In 
America in the Truman and Eisenhower years, professional sports 
meant baseball. The professional game of 1945 was made up of sixteen 
major league teams and a nationwide complex of minor leagues operat­
ing at various levels of play. In 1949 the minor-league component alone 
drew almost 42 million fans.16 It was not necessary for a rural resident to 
travel to a distant metropolis to attend a professional game; organized 
professional baseball was available in small- and medium-sized cities 
throughout the country. In 1947 the Class C Mid-Atlantic league 
brought the professional game to such Pennsylvania cities and towns as 
Johnstown, New Castle, Oil City, and Uniontown; a team in Vander­
grift won the league championship. By 1960 the number of minor 
leagues had fallen to 22, down from 58 only eleven years earlier, and 
attendance at minor league games had plummeted from a peak of 42 
million in 1949 to fewer than 11 million.17 The principal culprit in the 
decline of the minor leagues was television. Rural residents gave up their 
local baseball teams and came to share the teams of the major cities.18 
As rural America was penetrated by the mass culture stemming from 
the cities and made privy to the great outpouring of technology and 
consumer goods that characterized the postwar world, it is scarcely sur­
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prising that, as sociologist Carle C. Zimmerman found in 1949, the rural 
personality was becoming more urban-like. Rural values were changing 
so as to place more emphasis on obtaining income and less on family, 
land, and property.19 Tradition was losing its hold over rural America 
and being replaced by the more entrepreneurial and consumption-based 
orientation of the cities. Certainly, few Americans proved less tradition-
bound than American farmers. In agriculture, as in so many other areas 
of rural life, the hallmark of the 1945-60 period was the rapid adoption 
of complex techniques and technologies. The successful postwar farmer 
was open to innovation and new scientific discoveries; he continued pay­
ing homage to the Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer, a useful 
political image, but he relied on modern business techniques and the 
new herbicides, insecticides, and hybrids. 
Rural America's greatest industry, agriculture, the industry that had 
long provided the most important influence on the pace and style of 
rural life, underwent a sweeping series of technological and scientific 
changes in the years 1945-60. A biological revolution produced new 
hybrids and major advances in animal nutrition, sanitation, and plant 
and animal breeding. A chemical revolution of profound importance 
brought greatly increased use of fertilizer, insecticide, herbicide, and 
fungicide.20 The mechanical revolution, which was complete in most of 
United States agriculture prior to 1945, arrived in the South in the 1950s 
and brought mechanization to the cotton culture. Those who survived 
these successive revolutions were not cast in the mold of the self-reliant, 
individualistic, tradition-bound American farmer. They were expert in 
the science of their profession, adept at managing capital and skilled at 
marketing techniques. In the immediate postwar years, the American 
farmer had to be a sound businessman because his industry became 
more demanding of capital than manufacturing and his fellow farmers 
were increasing their productivity at a faster rate than any other major 
sector of the economy. This was accomplished despite millions of people 
leaving the farms and even though acreage under cultivation declined. 
One of the results of the economics of postwar agriculture was a rapid 
decline in the farm population. In 1945 almost 24.5 million Americans 
lived on farms; in 1960 that figure had fallen to 15.6 million.21 Whereas 
17.5 percent of all Americans had lived on farms at the close of World 
War II, only 8.7 percent did so in I960.22 As agriculture became increas­
ingly difficult for small operators, many farmers sought jobs in the non­
farm sector of the economy. In the 1950s the greatest source of income 
for most American farmers was income from nonfarm employment.23 In 
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1954 one-half of the farm operators in the United States reported some 
off-farm income, and in 28 percent of the cases the operator worked 
more than a hundred days in nonfarm employment.24 In some cases the 
nature of farming was divorced from commercial crop production alto­
gether since one of the most important trends of the 1950s was an in­
crease in the number of residential farms. In such cases the farm became 
the second residence of city dwellers or perhaps a retirement retreat.25 
Thus, not only did the number of farms and farmers decrease during the 
1945-60 period but the nature of the work done by farmers also 
changed. 
The changes in agriculture and farm life resulted from government 
policy as well as scientific and technological progress. Agriculture en­
joyed a particularly favored position in the political structure of the 
Truman and Eisenhower years. During those years Jeffersonian ideas 
about agrarian individualism, the supposed democratic propensities of 
farmers, and the wholesomeness of country life remained powerful parts 
of American culture. The farmer could, and did, mobilize sympathy and 
political action behind such favorable cultural symbols. In addition, 
there was a time lag between the decline of farmers to a statistically 
unimportant group and the inevitable diminution of their political 
power. State legislatures and thus congressional districts were weighted 
heavily in favor of rural areas, where farmers often wielded considerable 
political power. The congressional seniority system strengthened the 
hand of rural, particularly southern, congressmen who often saw it as 
their special duty to protect the interests of agriculture. With a positive 
public image and political representation greater than their numbers 
justified, American farmers used effective lobbying to exercise consid­
erable political clout during the Truman and Eisenhower years.26 
Interest group politics was an integral part of American agriculture in 
the postwar years. As the number of farmers shrank, the power of their 
special interest lobby increased. With the reduction in numbers came 
greater cohesion of opinion in various sectors of American agriculture. 
The most successful of the groups in the postwar era was the American 
Farm Bureau. It had been an important organization since the 1920s; in 
the postwar era its membership was much greater than any other single 
group, reaching 1,600,000 family memberships by I960.27 With its pri­
mary constituency in the Midwest and South, the Farm Bureau reflected 
a philosophy of support for policies that favored large farms. It gener­
ally opposed a social role for government in agriculture, preferring gov­
ernment intervention primarily to underwrite and support a free market 
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in agricultural products. Postwar federal policy, particularly after the 
Republican triumph of 1952, reflected the desires of the Farm Bureau to 
a greater extent than those of any other farm group.28 
The organization that most frequently clashed with the Farm Bureau 
for control over the direction of federal policy was the Farmers Union, 
which had 186,000 family members in I960.29 The Farmers Union con­
tinued a New Deal, even populist, legacy of militant defense of the fam­
ily farm amid the transformation of American agriculture. The organi­
zation was based in the Great Plains and also had a following among the 
diminishing number of small farmers of the South. Tied closely to the 
Democratic party, the Farmers Union was influential during the Tru­
man years but less so after 1952. Although it remained a respected and 
oft-consulted organization on federal policy throughout the 1945-60 
period, the direction of federal policy was clearly that favored by the 
Farm Bureau.30 
The Grange of the postwar era was less ideologically defined than 
either the Farmers Union or the Farm Bureau, although it most fre­
quently supported the latter. In 1960 the Grange had 586,000 family 
memberships and was thus exceeded numerically among farmer organi­
zations only by the Farm Bureau.31 Based primarily in the Northeast, 
this organization represented satisfied farmers and continued to place 
much of its emphasis on providing social functions for its members. In 
the critical aspect of defining federal farm policy, the Grange played 
neither the leadership role of the Farm Bureau nor the adversary role of 
the Farmers Union.32 
Under the primary influence of the Farm Bureau, agriculture in the 
postwar era did not use its political power to hold back the growing 
importance of specialization, complexity, and technology in rural life. 
Efforts to turn the political power of rural America to the purpose of 
shoring up the income of most farmers, who were ill-equipped to meet 
growing technological complexity and increased capital demands, were 
consistently defeated or at least poorly funded.33 Rather than helping to 
preserve traditional farmers and their lifestyle, federal farm policy pro­
moted the interests of large-scale, productive, efficient, and business-
oriented farmers. In doing so, federal farm policy contributed enor­
mously to the integration of rural America into a complex and 
technologically advanced national life. 
Postwar federal agricultural policy was set in the Great Depression 
when the federal government introduced price supports for basic com­
modities coupled with measures to reduce production. The latter feature 
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of New Deal policy sought to deal with the problem of overproduction 
that had plagued American agriculture since the early 1920s. Concerted 
efforts in the 1930s to reduce American farm output were largely ineffec­
tive. However, World War II generated an enormous new demand for 
American agricultural products and thus provided a temporary solution 
to America's chronic oversupply problem. 
In the long run, parity was the most important feature of New Deal 
farm policy. Under that system, which continued into the postwar era, 
the federal government guaranteed a price for basic commodities— 
cotton, corn, wheat, and several minor crops—sufficient to provide 
farmers with a fair share of the national income. Initially, this fair share 
was defined as an income enabling farmers to enjoy a standard of living 
comparable to their standard in the golden age of American agriculture, 
the immediate pre-World War I period. The complicated parity for­
mula varied over time, but its result was to ensure that efficient farmers 
had sound incomes from basic crops.34 Furthermore, since the system 
worked by government guarantee of prices, the myth that the farmer 
was still engaged in the free market retained some surface validity; thus, 
farmers could avoid the negative connotations of welfare or guaranteed 
income. 
Sheltered from low-prices by an umbrella of generous government 
guarantees, the large-scale and efficient farmers were able to adopt the 
new technology and scientific discoveries of the postwar period. 
Farmers were so productive in the 1950s that the federal government 
accumulated huge stocks of unwanted farm products. Foreign aid pro­
grams, domestic food commodity distribution to the needy, the Soil 
Bank program, and various schemes to stimulate foreign buying were all 
employed as means of disposing of or limiting America's agricultural 
abundance. Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, 
followed a policy of gradually reducing price supports and introducing 
more measures to reduce acreage; but commercial farmers had enough 
political strength to prevent any significant reduction of price supports, 
and their productivity was rising at such a rate that acreage reduction 
had little effect on total output. At the end of the Eisenhower years, the 
federal government held huge agricultural surpluses, and basic farm pol­
icy had not been altered.35 
Throughout the fifteen years following World War II, the average 
American farm grew larger. Federal farm policies and the great capital 
needs of highly mechanized and scientific agriculture rewarded large 
operators and penalized small ones. The result was a concentration of 
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most American agricultural production in a tiny minority of American 
farms. Edward Higbee has best summed up the situation using 1959 
statistics: 
"In other words if only 9 percent of the nation's farms were as productive as 
the top 3 percent there would be no need for crops from the other 91 percent. 
As it is, the top 3 percent produce more than the bottom 78 percent."36 
Postwar agricultural policy did little to alleviate the plight of the 
poorest farmers. In 1954, 500,000 individuals classified as full-time 
farmers earned less than $ 1,200.37 Federal farm policy, which was tied to 
price supports, had little effect on the income of these farmers at the 
bottom of the ladder because they tended to consume most of their pro­
duction. Lauren Soth commented in 1957 in Farm Trouble: "Price sup­
port guarantees could be 'doubled' without improving the incomes of 
these people much."38 
Such agricultural poverty tended to be located in specific geographic 
locations: the Ozarks, Appalachia, and the South in general. In 1950 
average farm family income in the Ozark area of Missouri and Arkansas 
was $900 per year. Of the 51 areas in the United States in 1949 where 
median farm income was less than $1,000, 49 were in the South.39 
The 1954 Rural Development Program, the federal government's 
answer to the plight of the poorest of American farmers, focused partic­
ularly on providing off-farm employment. Continued throughout the 
remainder of the 1950s, its funding was minuscule as part of the overall 
federal agricultural expenditure. In fiscal year 1961 the federal govern­
ment spent $2.7 million on the development program, whereas the price 
support program involved a cost one thousand times as great.40 In sum, 
postwar federal policy paid little heed to the plight of the bottom half-
million farm families. Instead, federal agricultural efforts tended to rein­
force the trends toward large farms and increased use of sophisticated 
technology. 
The cultural and technological changes that swept through rural 
America in the postwar era and the capacity of those forces to produce 
thoroughgoing change can best be seen in the South. The South entered 
the postwar era as the last major region of the United States that was 
predominantly rural. It had been one of the centers of the great rural 
cultural revolt in the 1920s and was the center of the New Deal's at­
tempts to bring modernization to rural America. More than any other 
region, it retained a distinctive social and cultural system that institu­
tionalized racism and resisted outside pressures for change. When the 
South entered the postwar period, it was still possible for Governor Eu­
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gene Talmadge of Georgia to boast that he need not campaign in coun­
ties that had streetcars; so great was the underrepresentation of urban 
Georgia in state governmental institutions that streetcar counties were a 
waste of campaign energy.41 Throughout the South, not just in Georgia, 
the rural population dominated the organs of state government. The 
society, culture, and governmental structure that had settled on the 
South in the aftermath of the Populist revolt of the 1890s appeared to be 
well entrenched. Nevertheless, this most rural region of America expe­
rienced a series of sweeping changes in the postwar period. The South 
occupied a position in rural America that was analogous to rural Ameri­
ca's relation to the nation as a whole; it tended to lag behind the rest of 
rural America in economic and social indexes, but its movement was 
well within the same outlines: it became more urban-like and was more 
and more swept up in the dominant national culture. 
The South's travail during the period 1945-60 can be described as one 
part of the assimilation of rural America into the dominant urban na­
tional culture. That change came more slowly to the South than to the 
rest of rural America was predictable because it was the last portion of 
rural America where a continued high rural population and a historical 
memory that gave substance to distinctiveness combined to create a so­
ciety capable of resistance to modernization. In the end, however, even 
the South proved incapable of turning back the rapid pace of the assimi­
lation of rural America into fuller participation in the national life. 
At the close of the Eisenhower years, the foundations were firmly in 
place for the end of southern peculiarity. In the 1960 census the South 
joined the other regions of the country as predominantly urban.42 The 
basic legal framework, leadership structure, and tactics that would bring 
an end to de jure segregation in the next few years was set. The agricultu­
ral revolution of the postwar years put an end to the economic viability 
of the labor-intensive plantation and sharecropping system.43 Nor was 
the South any better at resisting the ubiquitous popular culture than 
other regions of the country. Some southern television stations prac­
ticed racism by refusing to transmit programs featuring black per­
formers, but, by and large, the South was as thoroughly incorporated 
into the national network of television and its consumption patterns as 
other regions.44 Most importantly, the New South creed, which was now 
decades old, seemed to achieve final approval throughout the region. 
Even as some state officials held that integration would never occur, the 
thrust of southern state government policy was to industrialize as rap­
idly as possible. In the 1950s southern governments sought industrial 
development with an eagerness and devotion once confined only to the 
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preservation of white supremacy.45 Their success was not fully apparent 
in 1960, but the result would be the booming and balanced economies of 
the following two decades. The postwar period set in motion trends of 
urbanization, increasing influence of mass culture, more rapid commun­
ications, and a transformation of agriculture that brought rural Amer­
ica fully within the national life. For the South the impact of these trends 
had less rapid results, but in the long run they were more thoroughgoing 
in their implications. 
In 1960 the South had certainly not disappeared as a distinctive re­
gion. Nevertheless, the immediate postwar years had set the stage for a 
decade of chaos and conflict in which the old adversary of mainstream 
American life underwent a thorough reworking of its institutions and 
customs. It emerged from that decade with its segregation de facto 
rather than de jure; its politicians stressing efficient management rather 
than flamboyant personalities; and its metropolitan centers politically 
and culturally powerful. The changes that swept over most of rural 
America in the decade and a half that followed World War II triumphed 
in the South approximately a decade later. 
Rural America did not vanish in the 1945-60 period, but it became 
increasingly submerged in the larger, national culture. In the 1920s rural 
America possessed a confidence and combativeness that led it to defend 
vigorously—even to attempt to export through such measures as prohi­
bition and fundamentalism—its dominant values. The collective sense 
of self-worth and the willingness to assert it had clearly disappeared in 
the postwar era. Gone too was the 1930s national consciousness of rural 
life as one of the most important components of the national life. By 
1960 it had become almost completely an importer of culture, particu­
larly through the mass popular culture. At the same time rural life con­
tinued to be marked by special circumstances that new technology, 
however complex, could not completely wipe away: more isolation, 
greater distances, sparser population, and less variety. These factors, 
which had once created a distinct culture vying for control over the na­
tional life, operated in the postwar era more as handicaps to the rapid 
adoption of urban values than as creators of a valued separateness. 
Peter Bogdanovich's 1971 film The Last Picture Show presents a per­
ceptive critique of rural America in the period after World War 11. Set in 
the small Texas town of Anarene in 1951, the film evokes the mood of 
America's declining small-town communities. It is in identifying and 
portraying the mood of the town that the film becomes a perceptive 
historical commentary. The physical decay of the town center is symp­
tomatic of a much greater loss than mere buildings; what has been lost, 
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and in this film is mourned, is any sense that the small town is a distinc­
tive social institution with a set of values and ideas that are exclusive to 
its environment. Anarene is devoid of cultural confidence and vigor, and 
its best young people are leaving for the cities. 
By 1960 the ineradicable features of rural American life frequently 
caused that segment of society to lag behind urban dwellers in some 
statistical categories of affluence, but it was unmistakably clear that ru­
ral and urban America were moving along a common course, a course 
basically charted in the cities. Rural America's energy was being con­
sumed in trying to adapt the latest technological and scientific innova­
tions affecting its economy and culture, and in struggling to maintain 
enough of the trappings of a modern consumer society to hold its young. 
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Visions of Classlessness, Quests for Dominion: 
American Popular Culture, 1945-1960 
Roland Marchand 
The constraints and sacrifices of World War II did not prepare 
Americans to meet the realities of the postwar era with equanimity.* 
Expectations ran high, despite underlying anxieties about atomic perils 
and the possibility of a postwar depression. Wartime discourse reso­
nated with acclamations of equality and promises of the coming of a bet­
ter, technologically wondrous life for all. The common man, idealized in 
nostalgic imagery, would carve out a future of unobstructed indepen­
dence. Centralized controls, bureaucratic complexities, diminished au­
tonomy for the individual—these were largely dismissed as the tem­
porary conditions of war. Postwar popular culture reflected these 
expectations, expressing complacent satisfaction in the realization of 
some and providing vicarious compensations for the intense disappoint­
ment of others. 
World War II came closer than any other twentieth-century phe­
nomenon to enacting the drama of the melting pot in the United States, 
as disparate groups and values seemed to fuse into a composite national 
culture. Four years of war brought unprecedented national consolida­
tion. Vast wartime migrations—to the armed forces and to war indus­
tries and boomtowns—undermined regional loyalties and broadened 
provincial horizons. Class barriers, and even some of the outward iden­
tifying marks of class, seemed to disappear. The nation's dramatists of 
* I am indebted to the students in my fall 1979 undergraduate seminar, and to David 
Brody, Eckard Toy, and .lames Lapsley, for their criticism of ideas contained in an initial 
version of this essay. 
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popular culture, its persuaders and performers, enlisted in the task of 
uniting the nation behind common assumptions. 
The explicitly democratic themes of wartime popular culture pro­
moted unity. Morale-builders stressed the idea of equal sacrifices and 
personalized the war through such democratic figures as G. I. Joe, Rosie 
the Riveter, Norman Rockwell's everyman figure in the "Freedom of 
Speech" poster, and Rockwell's Willie Gillis (the common man as G.I.).' 
The war years also prolonged the modest redistribution of income from 
rich to poor that had begun during the 1930s. Although this process was 
to come to a standstill in the late 1940s, Americans emerged from the 
war confident of a snowballing trend toward economic democratization 
and a classless culture.2 
Meanwhile, in what Frank Fox has characterized as "World of To­
morrow" advertising, business interests painted stirring images of the 
technological future. Wartime research, when applied to consumer 
products, would bring new power and comfort to the common man in a 
"thermoplastic, aerodynamic, supersonic, electronic, gadgetonic" post­
war world. Popular anticipation of a precise watershed moment—when 
the war would end and the "future" begin—took on a millenial cast.3 In 
style these wartime visions paralleled themes of the General Motors 
Futurama at the 1939 World's Fair. The message was one of man's tech­
nological dominion over nature, of machines as social solutions. Yet 
another wartime message, infused in advertising and other forms of 
popular culture, promised that victory would restore a cherished version 
of the true American way of life, based on the small town, the corner 
drugstore, and the close-knit family—an image aptly described as 
"American Pastoral."4 
Instead, the postwar world brought bureaucratic complexity, cold 
war insecurity, and a shrunken sense of individual mastery. It produced 
a technology of atomic peril as well as material comfort. Inspired by the 
sweeping democratic promises of wartime ideology and a hunger for 
security and stability, Americans welcomed the notion of classless 
prosperity. Enticed by expectations of increased power and control, 
they reacted with dismay as they found themselves slipping into a condi­
tion of greater vulnerability and dependency. In response they embraced 
popular culture reveries that seemed to enhance their sense of personal 
dominion. 
The postwar period saw the emergence of a popular culture more 
homogeneous than Americans had previously known, as the cold war 
reinforced the trend toward consolidation. This greater homogeneity 
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also reflected changes in demography, increasingly centralized produc­
tion of popular culture images and artifacts, and more effective dissemi­
nation of popular culture by the media. 
One measure of increasing homogeneity was a decline in competition 
from ethnic cultures. By the time of World War II, unrestricted immi­
gration had been cut off for a full generation. Between 1940 and 1960 the 
percentage of foreign-born declined from 8.8 percent to 5.4 percent, and 
the percentage of Americans with at least one parent of foreign birth fell 
from 17 percent to 13.5 percent. A decline in carriers of ethnic culture 
such as foreign-language newspapers, theaters, musical organizations, 
and social halls reflected these demographic changes. Commercial en­
tertainment increasingly outrivaled the attractions of ethnic folk cul­
ture and filled the new increments of leisure time. Network radio ex­
panded its nationalizing and homogenizing influence, and radio sets in 
use increased right up to the advent of an even more powerful agent of 
common popular culture—television. Between 1940 and 1950 the "big 
four" popular periodicals, Life, Reader's Digest, Look, and Saturday 
Evening Post, increased their combined total circulation by 105 percent. 
Although some groups did maintain "taste subcultures," more and more 
Americans read, heard, and saw the same popular fare.5 
Another measure of homogeneity was the decline of class and re­
gional differences in clothing and recreation. During the late 1940s sales 
of traditional work clothes fell precipitously, with the production of 
men's casual pants and shirts rising almost as rapidly. More workers 
wore casual clothes on the job, and off work men of different classes 
seemed indistinguishable on the street. Life referred matter-of-factly in 
1949 to blue jeans as part of a national teenage "uniform." By the 1950s 
these classless, vaguely "western" progeny of democratic G.I. dungarees 
had come to symbolize the triumph of denim as an equalizing casual 
wear for virtually all Americans. Steady increases in the length of paid 
vacations for workers had also begun to equalize the distribution of 
formal leisure time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics even argued that by 
1950 the earlier, distinctively "working class" patterns of spare-time ac­
tivities and expenditures had almost disappeared among urban 
workers.6 
Signs of a national culture abounded. In the early 1950s, as journalist 
Russell Lynes remarked, Sears, Roebuck ceased publication of regional 
catalogs on the grounds that tastes in furniture had become identical 
throughout the country. Fortune reported that tastes in food were "flat­
tening" regionally. Merchandising consultants began to talk about a 
"standard middle-majority package," a laundry list of home furnishings 
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and other consumer goods that should be marketable to all families. 
One suburb looked pretty much like another; what Louise Huxtable has 
characterized as "Pop Architecture" dominated the landscape every­
where. Local bowling palaces, motels, and auto showrooms quickly 
copied the flash, glitter, and eccentric shapes of Las Vegas's "architec­
ture of the road." Even where franchised chains did not proliferate, the 
designers of shopping centers and the entrepreneurs of a thousand "mir­
acle miles" created uniform visual imagery.7 
The leveling of styles was in many ways a leveling down—a fact that 
did not escape the champions of high culture. In their search for the 
culprits of cultural debasement, they excoriated first the threats to liter­
acy, order, and good taste coming from the comic book industry, and 
then the affronts to high culture by the new monster, TV. No previous 
mass medium, not even radio, expanded its audience so explosively as 
television. Households with TV sets mounted from fewer than one mil­
lion in 1 949 to more than 46 million in 1960, at which point 90 percent of 
all American homes were consuming TV programming at an average 
rate of five hours per day. The convenience of TV and the national 
standards of performance it set were devastating to provincial commer­
cial entertainment and much of ethnic culture.8 
The 1950s would later seem a golden age of diversity and cultural 
quality on TV. But, fixing their gaze on Hopalong Cassidy, Milton 
Berle, wrestling matches, and formula westerns, contemporary critics 
denounced the new medium as an attack on culture and literacy. With 
the advance of TV, homogenized franchise operations, and organiza­
tional bureaucracy, a major debate erupted among intellectuals over the 
prospects and perils of mass culture. Even political concerns seemed to 
fade before the social menace of mass culture. Did a debased mass cul­
ture involve passivity, conformity, and a stifling of creativity in the au­
dience and a formulaic, manipulative, whatever-will-sell attitude by the 
producer? Then TV seemed to its critics to have unquestionably tri­
umphed as the mass culture medium.9 
Actually, TV probably served more to nationalize and homogenize 
than either to uplift or degrade. Television advertising embedded slo­
gans, brand names, and affective imagery into the national conscious­
ness with a new intensity, creating symbols for a more uniform national 
language. Television also helped promote the "common language" func­
tions of national sports spectatorship. Together with convenient air 
travel, TV made attractive the nationalizing of the professional sports 
leagues. Minor league baseball declined as did a multitude of more sig­
nificant local institutions—ethnic clubs, local union meetings, local pol­
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itical clubs—contributing, in Martin Mayer's view, to individual feel­
ings of anomie and powerlessness.10 
Manufacturers of TV sets fought this negative interpretation of the 
social impact of TV. Their ads nostalgically depicted warm family 
scenes in which the connective links of the old family circle were restored 
in the harmony of the family semicircle plus TV. However specious the 
implied claims that TV would keep the kids home and the generations 
together, TV did serve the momentarily unifying function of making 
children more frequent participants in (orcospectators of) their parents' 
entertainment." 
A critical component of the popular culture that TV helped dissemi­
nate was "California Culture." Even before the war California had be­
come the symbol of relaxed, prosperous outdoor living, linked to a "car 
culture." California led the nation in miles of highway and per capita 
ownership of cars. The supermarket and the "drive-in" flourished there. 
The Los Angeles area led the nation in new suburban developments, 
freeway construction, and experiments with outlying shopping com­
plexes. Smog and traffic notwithstanding, the Los Angeles suburban 
landscape seemed the landscape of the future.12 
The media readily promoted California culture as mobile, changing, 
comparatively "democratic." It had a "life-style." The ambience of that 
life-style was just about everything that media advertisers liked to asso­
ciate with their products—an image of the new, the enjoyable, the cas­
ual. California provided models of everything from sportswear to 
houses, and displayed an easy contempt for environmental limits. The 
Gallup Poll reported that it ranked number one among Americans as 
"best state" and "ideal place to live.*' Los Angeles scored first among 
cities for best-looking women and most-desired place to live. It ranked 
second in climate, beauty of setting, and gaiety of night life.13 
The imagery of California culture centered around the postwar fad in 
popular architecture—the California ranch house. A single-story, 
ground-hugging structure, it was adaptable to split-level form. Picture 
windows and other expanses of glass accentuated the idea of a free-
flowing continuity of space and mood between indoors and outdoors. 
Population pressure and high costs had imposed limitations on the 
postwar suburban search for spaciousness. In response the ranch house 
nurtured illusions of open continuous space and freedom. This was par­
ticularly necessary as the sprawling ranch house (invariably pictured 
alone with no adjacent neighbors) was pared down to 1,200-square-foot 
tract dimensions.14 
Inside, the quest for openness was linked with architectural expres­
168 | Reshaping America 
sions of democracy and "togetherness" (a word coined by McCall's in a 
moment of nostalgia and marketing acumen). In a servantless setting the 
dining room often disappeared, and the door segregating the kitchen 
gave way to a counter or open vista that allowed the wife to maintain 
contact with family and guests. A new room appeared—an amalgam of 
rumpus room and den. Introduced as "the room without a name," it 
quickly gained status as the "family room"—a casual, nurturing, and 
democratic gathering place for all. Naturally, the new room was where 
the TV was lodged, to be followed in due course by TV trays and TV 
dinners.15 
By 1954 Russell Lynes pronounced the California ranch house "ubiq­
uitous," a national symbol of the increasing unity of tastes of "the rela­
tively poor and the relatively well-to-do," and "the standard new subur­
ban dwelling in the suburbs of New York as of Boston, of Chicago as of 
Los Angeles." Another commentator explained how the outdoor 
joys of the patio could be retained in midwestern ranch houses through­
out spring and fall by the use of radiant heating coils in patio paving. 
Builders liked the construction efficiencies of the ranch style. Buyers saw 
in its casual informality, undecorated sense of impermanence, access to 
nature, and freedom from internal physical barriers an image of western 
openness and mobility.16 
The California ranch house seemed to epitomize the postwar dream 
of classlessness and dominion. Everybody, presumably, was moving to 
the suburbs. Everyone could belong to the modern, democratic version 
of the "landed gentry." Limitless energy would make possible heated 
patios, air-conditioners, and countless appliances. A prolonged do-it­
yourself craze suggested that husband as well as wife could make the 
suburban home a fulfilling last refuge for the exercise of competence and 
control. Here the common American might evade international tensions 
and organizational complexities and thus regain a reassuring sense of 
individual dominion. 
The dream of suburban comfort and microcosmic control was a strik­
ing instance of upper-middle-class myopia. "Everybody" was not mov­
ing to the suburbs, despite impressions conveyed by Sunday supple­
ments, TV advertisements, and popular sociology. Most housing 
developments were priced out of the range of those below the median 
income. The migration that inundated the suburbs came primarily from 
those among the top 40 percent in family income, especially those of the 
professional and technological elites who made impressive gains in in­
come after 1945. Moreover, the most highly publicized sociological 
studies of suburbia focused on areas that were even more affluent than 
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average—thus exaggerating "typical" suburban prosperity.17 Since writ­
ers, academics, and advertising executives came from the very segment 
of society making the most rapid gains, they found it easy to believe 
everyone was riding the same wave of prosperity. The idea of a con­
summated classlessness struck them with the force of a revelation. 
The celebration of this "classless prosperity" permeated the popular 
culture that other Americans of the era consumed. Russell Lynes helped 
popularize the new "obsolescence" of class with his essay "High-brow, 
Low-brow, Middle-brow" in 1949. Life magazine's version carried a 
striking two-page chart depicting the cultural tastes of Lynes's various 
"brows" in ten categories ranging from furniture to entertainment. Eco­
nomic classes were obsolete, Lynes insisted; people now chose their 
pleasures and consumer goods strictly on the basis of individual taste. 
Sociologist William Whyte noted the "displacement of the old class cri­
terion" by "the impulse to "culture' and 'good taste'." Values were "com­
ing together," he concluded, and the suburbs had become the "second 
great melting pot."18 
"The distinction between economic levels in the ownership of tangi­
bles is diminishing," the Bureau of Labor Statistics noted, thus "break­
ing down the barriers of community and class." Sportswriters celebrated 
the supposed democratization of golf: "Class lines are eliminated," they 
argued, "when the nation wears sports clothes." Producers of the big-
money TV quiz shows nurtured popular enthusiasm for illusions of 
equality by creating such folk heroes as the "cop who knew Shake­
speare." The sponsor of "The $64,000 Question" explained: "We're try­
ing to show the country that the little people are really very intelligent. 
" Winners were prototypes of the common man and woman, sym­
bols of democratized intelligence. Advertisers now cast affluent subur­
ban families not only as models of appropriate consumer styles but also 
as realistic portrayals of average Americans. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
Americans had known that they were seeing explicit models of high 
society "smartness" in many ads. Now they were encouraged to see the 
advertising models as mirrors of themselves.19 
Such images and perceptions of classlessness eventually found ex­
pression in the language itself. The 1961 Webster's International Dic­
tionary acknowledged the existence of a new word not recognized in 
earlier editions: life-style.20 This new term, which gradually replaced the 
older phrase "way of life," conveyed nuances of classlessness. The 
phrase "way of life" had been fully compatible with a recognition of 
important economic class distinctions. Although people might be des­
cribed as seeking to choose or achieve a certain "way of life," they could 
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also easily be thought of as having inherited a particular way of life 
along with their class standing. But a "life-style" was less likely to seem 
class-determined or inherited. The word style suggested free choice, the 
uninhibited search for what looked and felt right. It might also connote 
a particular consumer-consciousness, a notion of choosing among var­
ious ensembles or "packages" of goods that represented a style consis­
tency, i.e., that "went well together." Behind the rise of the word life­
style lay the assumption that increases in real income, the equalizing 
qualities of new synthetic fabrics and suburban amenities, and the ex­
pansion of automobile and appliance ownership had created a totally 
middle-class society in which all significant differences were simply free 
expressions of personal tastes. 
This vision reflected some real changes in American society. During 
the 1950s the average income of all families and individuals rose 26 per­
cent in real dollars, and increased installment buying allowed many fam­
ilies to raise their living standard at an even greater rate.21 Still, as Rich­
ard Parker has pointed out, "among those who called themselves middle 
class, perhaps a majority have always lacked the money to be in fact 
what they believe they are." It was those of high income, as ever, who 
consumed the bulk of popular culture products and services—whether 
sports event admissions, frozen foods, cars, or hi-fi components. And 
the gains that were achieved by median and marginal sectors of the so­
ciety did not represent gains in relative wealth or power. In fact, those 
below the top 40 percent remained stationary in their proportion of na­
tional income during the 1950s, and all but the wealthiest lost in relative 
power. Despite the National Advertising Council's puffery about "peo­
ple's capitalism," corporate assets were more narrowly held in 1960 than 
in 1945.22 
Americans appreciated their new material comforts, but many no 
doubt sensed an erosion of independence and control as large organiza­
tions in media, government, and business overshadowed or preempted 
their spheres of competence and power. It fell to popular culture to ex­
orcise these demons and provide compensating, vicarious adventures in 
potency and dominion. 
Enter the Shmoo and Mike Hammer! Best described as a "snow-white 
ham with legs," the Shmoo appeared in cartoonist Al Capp's 1948 para­
ble on the quandaries of prosperity. Lured musically into that consum­
er's paradise, the "Valley of the Shmoon," Capp's hero Li'l Abner rec­
ognized the Shmoo as Utopia incarnate. The accommodating little 
creature, so eager to please that it would die of sheer happiness from one 
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hungry look, provided for nearly all material needs. It laid eggs (in car­
tons) and gave milk (bottled). Broiled, it made the finest steak; roasted, 
it resembled pork; fried, it came out chicken. And Shmoos reproduced 
at a remarkable rate.23 
A national favorite, the Shmoo recapitulated wartime promises. It 
offered families in Capp's Dogpatch lifelong control over the necessities 
of life, just as Americans had been led to dream of a technological Uto­
pia. In another sense the Shmoo, endlessly and identically reproduced, 
conjured up intimations of conformity, of boring and emotionless sa­
tiety. So dull was this prospect that Capp eventually had his obliging 
and well-merchandised progeny commit "Shmooicide.'' Although the 
spirit of the Shmoo lived on in such tangible forms as the energy con­
sumption binge, the national credit card, and the Playboy bunny, Capp 
found its appropriate cartoon replacement in the Kigmy, who loved to 
be kicked. Americans of the era, Capp implied, sought a target for the 
release of aggression as keenly as they yearned for the security of the 
Shmoo.24 
Mike Hammer's phenomenal success as a popular culture hero 
seemed to confirm that notion. First appearing in 1947 in Mickey Spil­
lane's/, the Jury, detective Mike Hammer rewrote the history of Ameri­
can best-sellers with his escapades of vengeance. His self-righteous vig­
ilantism breathed contempt for established institutions and authorities. 
He worried that prosperity would make Americans soft and weak. And 
he banished the specters of impotence and conformity by acting remorse­
lessly and alone: 
I killed more people tonight than I have fingers on my hands. I shot 
them in cold blood and enjoyed every minute of it. . They were Com­
mies, Lee. They were red sons-of-bitches who should have died long ago. 
. . I just walked into that room with a tommy gun and shot their guts out. 
They never thought that there were people like me in this country. They 
figured us all to be soft as horse manure. .25 
For Americans beginning to suffer from a vague closed-in feeling, a 
restless frustration stemming from Russian threats abroad and the re­
straints and manipulations of large organizations at home, Mike 
Hammer represented recovery of a lost dominion. In postwar popular 
culture the defense of traditional masculinity was difficult to separate 
from this search for renewed dominion. John Cawelti aptly describes 
Spillane's "love" scenes as stripteases, many of them unconsummated 
sexual provocations that led ultimately to "fulfillment in violence." 
Contempt for women, expressed in frequent violence and sadism by 
Mike Hammer and in manipulative detachment by such mutant succes­
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sors as James Bond and the Hugh Hefner Playboy, may have expressed 
fears of feminine power that went beyond insecure resentments of fan­
cied sexual teasing. Modern society seemed to place "feminine" re­
straints on man's dominion. In large organizations the executive as well 
as the worker had to "subdue his personality to another's to act 
like a good old-fashioned wife." One response in the popular culture was 
to reassert a compensating image of masculinity that conceded nothing 
to feminine limitations.26 
Expressions of masculinity took a variety of forms. The Marlboro 
man, weathered and tattoed, evoked an aura of masculine adventure 
and the rugged, autonomous life. The free-spirited culture of the hot 
rodders canonized the car as a masculine symbol of untrammeled 
power, contemptuous of limits and triumphant over space and time. 
Men's sports and outdoor magazines surged in popularity. Professional 
football, built around aggressive contention for control of territory, en­
joyed increasing popularity. Combining a high "courage quotient" with 
a metaphorical evocation of the industrial patterns of synchronization 
and strategic planning, professional football increased its attendance at 
rates far surpassing those of professional baseball.27 In the rage for Little 
League baseball, fathers found ways to express and instill masculine 
traits. Since such sports participation was also part of socialization to 
adult society, it was not incongruous that Little League also taught les­
sons of control, teamwork, and subordination to the group. Even the 
Marlboro image barely disguised the subliminal message beneath its 
individualistic mystique: the tough, independent man, who thought for 
himself, exerted his masculine freedom by choosing the standardized 
product. The quest for a sense of dominion proved very susceptible to 
packaging.28 
As if in reaction to the blurring of sexual stereotypes during the war, 
popular culture accentuated women's strictly "feminine" roles. With the 
home symbolizing the security and stability recently thwarted by war 
and depression, the paramount role was homemaker. Pert, streamlined 
housewives dominated the ads. Although married women were em­
ployed outside the home in greater numbers than ever before, the popu­
lar media romanticized domesticity and elevated it to the status of a 
national purpose.29 
Less "feminine" roles for women were disparaged. "Woman driver" 
jokes reached a peak, and advertisements helped reassert masculine 
roles. Whereas automobile advertisements in the late 1920s and early 
1930s had portrayed nearly as many women as men behind the wheel, 
those of the mid-1950s depicted far more men than women drivers. The 
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occasional strong, independent female movie roles of the late 1930s dis­
appeared by the 1950s. The older film seductresses who had projected 
poise, self-assurance, and a sense of challenge were superseded, most 
strikingly, by Marilyn Monroe, queen of the sexual Shmoos. Her salient 
qualities were availability and vulnerability. In their contribution to 
popular psychology, Modern Woman: The Lost Sex, Ferdinand Lund-
berg and Marynia Farnham reinforced notions of the mutual exclusive­
ness of feminine and masculine qualities. Women's aspirations to mas­
culine achievement lay at the base of modern confusions and anxieties, 
they warned; only a return to total femininity could avert psychological 
disaster. In case children should fail to learn absolute gender distinc­
tions from other forms of socialization, Cliff May's Western Ranch 
Houses described how dark wood paneling could be used to give the 
son's room a "strongly masculine air" and the daughter's room would be 
designed with "built-in femininity."30 
The emphasis on traditional masculinity may have stemmed in part 
from the fear that increasing leisure would tempt Americans to become 
soft—perhaps to lose their competitive drive and their will to resist 
communism. Another part may have arisen from the loss of a sense of 
achievement and mastery within the workplace and from indignities ex­
perienced in lives constrained by the actions of faceless organizations. 
The increased collective power that had subdued nature with vast high­
ways and massive expenditures of electrical energy did not enhance the 
power of individuals in their increasingly complex interactions with 
other people. The traditional gender of the word mastery in American 
culture had been unequivocally male. Fears of powerlessness in the 
midst of mass society had unsurprisingly triggered ritual efforts to reaf­
firm the masculine. 
Americans of the postwar era also sought solace from anxieties and 
frustrations by turning their search for dominion inward. Both religion 
and popular psychology flourished in the postwar era, as did hybrids of 
the two. 
Church membership advanced steadily during the late 1940s and early 
1950s until it reached the unprecedented level of 63 percent of all Ameri­
cans. Works on religion, from the Revised Standard Bible to Catherine 
Marshall's A Man Called Peter, were nonfiction best-sellers. The reli­
gious novels of Lloyd Douglas and Sholem Asch gained a comparable 
place in popular fiction.31 Billy Graham, using every modern device 
from the card file to the television set, built upon his 1949 triumph in a 
Los Angeles evangelical crusade to gain a place among America's ten­
/ 74 | Reshaping America 
most-admired men by the mid-1950s. Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen 
adapted his theatrical style to the new media, and in 1953 was named 
television's man of the year. Church construction advanced at record 
rates, and the appearance of drive-in churches seemed to augur the as­
similation of religion to a car culture that had already produced the 
drive-in restaurant and the drive-in movie.32 
In the atmosphere of a cold war against "atheistic" communism, reli­
gion tended to merge with patriotism. In the mid-1950s Congress sought 
to formalize the union by adding "under God" to the pledge of allegiance 
and establishing a prayer room in the Capitol. The physical mobility of 
the 1940s also enhanced the church's role as social anchor in the midst of 
social disruption, a place where new residents in a community might 
make social contacts. Theologian Will Herberg concluded that the three 
major faiths, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, had come to 
serve as a new American "triple melting pot" for third-generation immi­
grants as ethnic subcultures declined. But Herberg and other religious 
leaders also worried about the quality of the new "religious awakening.'' 
What could one make of an enthusiasm for faith in which 86 percent of 
all Americans declared the Bible to be the word of God, yet 53 percent 
could not name a single one of the four Gospels? Perhaps the answer lay 
in a 1957 Gallup poll in which 81 percent affirmed their expectation that 
"religion can answer all or most of today's problems."33 
Postwar piety was paralleled by a surge of psychology. The prewar 
decades had witnessed a considerable popularization of the concepts of 
psychology and psychiatry, especially among the well-educated. World 
War II increased popular awareness of applied psychology and its con­
tributions to personnel selection and "'adjustment.'' Familiarity with 
psychological jargon—neurosis, inferiority complex, schizophrenia, 
maladjustment—was already widespread. But in the postwar years, psy­
chology became a popular mania. Publishers responded to a thirst for 
self-analysis quizzes, how-to-do-it manuals, and psychological advice. 
A typical issue of Reader's Digest contained at least two articles of the 
"What's Your Personality?" and "Do You Think like a Man or a 
Woman?" variety.34 
Among books and films one could almost predict that if it was "se­
rious," it was also psychological. Even the durable western tended to 
become a stage setting for the playing out of psychological dramas. Ad­
vertisers threw themselves headlong into motivation research and 
"depth interviews" in a search for those "deep-lying habits, feelings, aver­
sions, inner compulsions and complexes" that might inhibit the buying 
impulse. Artzybasheff included in his fanciful cartoon of "Improved 
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Design for Modern Man" for Life in 1951 a hole in the side of the mod­
ern woman's head labeled "Aperture for easy access to brain compart­
ment by psycho-analyst."35 When Lucy set up her "Psychiatric Help— 
5e" booth in Charles Schulz's popular "Peanuts" comic strip, it simply 
marked with mild satire a logical conclusion to the trend toward univer­
sal dissemination of popular psychology. 
The craze for the psychological explanation did not reflect unequivo­
cal acceptance of psychological techniques. True, psychologists were 
much in demand to provide explanations of juvenile delinquency, rock 
'n' roll music, marriage problems, personal aptitudes, and college panty 
raids. Even the Kinsey Reports on sexual practices were accepted as 
useful by a majority of Americans. But the frequency with which psy­
chology and psychoanalysis served as topics for humor attested to deep 
ambivalence about psychology's "contributions.*" Although psychology 
promised a kind of control, an opportunity to reshape one's personality 
or gain a form of dominion by understanding and manipulating others, 
it also awakened fears that one might be the object rather than the agent 
of manipulation.36 
In The Hidden Persuaders (1957), Vance Packard found a large au­
dience for his warnings about dangers embedded in motivation research 
and subliminal suggestion by advertisers. Americans might have been 
more alarmed if they had been fully aware of such new psychological 
"machines" and techniques as the "People Machine," Galvanic Skin Re­
sponse, "Simulmatics," and "aroma mood music," to which some ad 
agencies were giving curious, if skeptical, attention. William Whyte, in 
The Organization Man, described the pressures toward conformity em­
bodied in the proliferating personality tests given by business organiza­
tions. Whyte even appended a subversive chapter on "How to Cheat on 
Personality Tests" as his meager contribution to the preservation of per­
sonal dominion. Americans worried about "brain-washing," and 1950s 
science fiction movies were sometimes as concerned with loss of per­
sonal control, with invasion or infiltration by some alien force, as they 
were with the specter of atomic warfare. As the autonomy of the indi­
vidual seemed to shrink, psychology, for all its fascination, still did not 
offer unequivocal assurance of gaining dominion over self.37 
Millions of Americans, however, hopefully sought such assurance 
from a fusion of psychology and religion. A major element in postwar 
popular culture was the "cult of reassurance," promoted most effectively 
by the Presbyterian minister Norman Vincent Peale. An amalgam of 
psychology and religion, the cult gained its initial postwar impulse from 
Rabbi Joshua Liebman's prescriptions for the cure of inner tensions in 
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Peace of Mind (1946). Liebman's book topped the best-seller list in 1947 
and eventually sold a million copies. Peale advanced the movement's 
momentum with his best-selling A Guide to Confident Living (1949) and 
then with The Power of Positive Thinking (1952), which dominated the 
nonfiction best-seller charts from 1952 to 1955, soon surpassing two 
million copies.38 
Peale employed six psychiatrists and commanded radio and TV au­
diences in the millions. Although he had initially sought psychological 
knowledge for personal counseling, "Peak's deep attraction," as Don­
ald Meyer writes, was to mass counseling. The message was simple: peo­
ple's problems were individual. "Negative thinking," not technology, 
social forces, or institutional structures, was the cause of feelings of 
powerlessness and frustration. By using Peale's techniques, each fol­
lower could "become a more popular, esteemed and well-liked individ­
ual," gaining new energy and peace of mind. Through psychological 
self-manipulation, each could gain control over circumstances rather 
than submitting to them. "Positive thinking" accepted and reinforced 
the notion of classlessness. It proved another popular culture prescrip­
tion for the nagging sense of loss of dominion.39 
A popular culture of reassurance was not everybody's answer to 
powerlessness. It was true that certain consolidating tendencies—the 
influences of network television and the common language and repeti­
tious visual landscapes of national advertising, pop architecture, and 
restaurant and motel chains—worked to reinforce the "adjustment" 
theme of applied psychology. And it was true also that the "packaging" 
craze in popular culture, from shopping centers to entertainment 
"worlds" like Disneyland, helped push forward the process of homogen­
ization by offering convenience and relief from individual decision-
making. In fact, the whole Disney empire, from the "disneyfication" of 
children's classics to TV's Mickey Mouse Club and the Davy Crockett 
craze, strikingly epitomized the trend toward uniformity.40 But consoli­
dation in popular culture did not advance undisturbed. As regional, 
ethnic, and visible class divergences began to fade, new fissures ap­
peared. Some pursued the quest for dominion not through adjustment 
and reassurance but rather through excitement, diversity, and vicarious 
rebellion. 
The most obvious, and to contemporaries the most shocking, new 
breach in society was an apparently increasing division based on age. 
Juvenile delinquency had appeared to rise during World War II and 
afterward. The striking increase in disposable income and free time 
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among teen-agers in the late 1940s stamped adolescence as a social phe­
nomenon rather than simply a stage in individual development. "The 
brute fact of today," Dr. Robert Under warned a Los Angeles audience 
in 1954, "is that our youth is no longer in rebellion but in a condition of 
downright active and hostile mutiny.1' In "a profound and terrifying 
change," youth now acted out its "inner turmoil."41 
Psychological analyses of juveniles, both delinquent and normal, 
abounded. The film industry, reacting to the loss of its mass audience to 
television, began to produce specialized films for minority audiences— 
one of which was teen-agers. Radio followed the same pattern. Adver­
tisers soon recognized the existence of a massive teen-age market. Eu­
gene Gilbert built a large marketing business by providing advertisers 
with inside information on teen-age consumers. His trick was spectacu­
larly simple: employ teen-agers themselves to quiz other teen-agers 
about their wants and needs. Eventually Life confirmed the discovery of 
a teen-age market in an article entitled "A New $10 Billion Power: The 
U.S. Teen-age Consumer." Life personalized the story by featuring pic­
tures of the loot accumulated by "the businessman's dream of the ideal 
teen-ager," Suzie Slattery from (where else?) California.42 
Attempts by the media to explore the rebellious aspects of the teen­
age culture created new fissures in popular culture. In the movie Rebel 
without a Cause (1955), the plot and dialogue comprise a virtual text­
book of popular psychology. The police lieutenant is an amateur psy­
chologist; the hero's mother, a castrating female. The father's multiple 
complexes make him a complete buffoon. The hero's friend is a self-
destructive neurotic, abandoned by his parents; and the heroine's father 
panics at her emerging sexuality and treats her with alternating rage and 
condescension. Rebel without a Cause was a "lesson" movie for parents: 
be careful and understanding, or this (rebellion) could happen to you. 
But James Dean's portrayal of the teen-age hero, his most influential 
acting role, diverted attention to the style and mannerisms of the misun­
derstood "rebel." Youths made the movie theirs. Vicarious rebels 
adopted the James Dean image as an expression of contempt for the 
satiated and challengeless life of middle-aged suburban America.43 
The evolution of popular music revealed even more vividly the pro­
cess of disruption, the fraying of social nerves by age conflicts. Before 
the 1950s producers of popular music had largely ignored age differ­
ences, and the songs of adults and teen-agers were the same. As late as 
1951 Gallup polls on favorite vocalists showed little variation among 
age groups. Far more significantly, the pollsters did not record re­
sponses for persons under 21. Yet teen-agers were already a major buy­
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ing public for records, and the average age of purchasers continued to 
fall during the 1950s. With the rise of the 45 rpm record (cheap, un­
breakable, easy to transport and change) and the transformation of ra­
dio in the early 1950s, the weight of teen-age preferences tipped the 
scales toward diversity in this form of popular culture.44 
Even earlier, fragmentation had begun to appear within the popular 
music industry. A boycott by radio stations in the early 1940s had 
broken the monopoly of the "big three" record companies. Radio disc 
jockeys gained new power, and technological advances meant that pro­
duction of quality recordings was no longer confined to a handful of 
studios in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Independent compa­
nies, the primary producers of "race" and "hillbilly" music, gained new 
opportunities. Still, the resulting tremors in the industry were relatively 
minor. From 1946 to 1953 the six dominant recording companies— 
Decca, Columbia, Victor, Capitol, MGM, and Mercury—recorded all 
but 5 of the 163 records that sold over a million copies.45 
Radio, in reaction to the abrupt abduction of its general audience by 
TV, cast about for minority tastes to satisfy. One market for subcultural 
programming was teen-agers. Specialized radio stations now gave them 
a medium of their own. Some argue that teen-age audiences created 
"rock 'n' roll." Others explain that TV, that powerful consolidating 
force in popular culture, was also, inadvertently, the cause of this vehicle 
of dissent and fragmentation. Both are largely correct; together these 
two forces set the stage for a popular culture explosion.46 
By 1953 certain ingredients of rock 'n' roll had been fermenting for 
several years. Migrations out of the South had increased national famil­
iarity with "hillbilly" and black styles in music. In the late 1940s Bill­
board magazine, the arbiter of pop music, bolstered the respectability of 
both styles by rechristening the "hillbilly" category as "country and 
western" and "race music" as "rhythm and blues." Elements of each style 
began to appear in pop hits. Meanwhile, with the postwar demise of the 
big bands, the individual singer gained prominence. Frank Sinatra epit­
omized the trend, winning the adulation of young "bobby-soxers" in the 
early 1940s and sustaining his popularity by projecting qualities of 
sincerity and involvement. Meanwhile, country singers Roy Acuff and 
then Hank Williams won huge followings with their sincere, emotional 
styles.47 
Against the backdrop of a pallid, taken-for-granted prosperity and 
cold war perils about which youth could do little, a thirst arose among 
the young for forms of popular culture that would permit expressions of 
highly personalized emotion. Frankie Laine ("Jezebel," "Your Cheatin' 
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Heart," "I Believe") "sold Emotion with a capital E" even more 
explicitly than did Sinatra. In 1951 Johnnie Ray stirred up a riotous 
teen-age response and set new standards for emotion and involvement in 
his popular hit "Cry." Ray, unlike Sinatra, was neither smooth nor con­
trolled. He exposed an emotional vulnerability as he abandoned himself 
to the song's despair, "quivering, sobbing, crying and finally collapsing 
on the floor." Here were intimations not only of the impending rock 'n' 
roll performer as oracle of unconcealed emotion but also of the sensitive 
hero as victim.48 
It was in 1953 that Cleveland disc jockey Alan Freed, intrigued by his 
discovery that white adolescents were increasingly buying "rhythm and 
blues" records, initiated his "Moondog's Rock and Roll Party," playing 
records by black singers for a largely white teen-age radio audience. 
Billboardnoted Freed's success. Record companies rushed to find white 
performers to "cover" (copy) up-tempo, heavy beat, rhythm and blues 
hits. Bill Haley and His Comets made the national pop charts with 
"Crazy Man Crazy" in 1953. The next year Haley's cover of "Shake, 
Rattle and Roll" ranked in the top ten for twelve weeks, followed by an 
even longer run for "Rock around the Clock," the theme song from the 
popular film on juvenile delinquency Blackboard Jungle.49 
A mystique emerged that fused elements of Marlon Brando's role in 
The Wild One, James Dean's portrayal in Rebel without a Cause, J. D. 
Salinger's H olden Caulfield in Catcher in the Rye, the rebels of Black­
board Jungle, and the driving energy and aggressive sexuality of the new 
heroes of rock *n' roll into a single image. The mystique emphasized a 
hunger for authenticity and sensitivity. In emotional expressiveness it 
ranged from moody insecurity to fierce independence with nuances of 
sexuality, pain, and violence. Raucous, exhibitionist rock *n' roll singers 
disdained the "'cool" of James Dean, but both expressed a contempt for 
hypocrisy and conventionality and used body language to convey 
emotion. 
In 1956 the polarizing assault by rock 'n' roll on popular music (and 
on American culture generally) culminated. A black original, Little 
Richard's strident "Long Tall Sally," outsold Pat Boone's bland cover 
version. With his frantic movements and raucous shouts, Little Richard, 
in Charlie Gillett's words, was "coarse, uncultured, and uncontrolled, in 
every way hard for the musical establishment to take." The lines were 
being drawn largely on the basis of age, although the preference of many 
white teen-agers for "black" music added another dimension to the 
rift.so 
Critics of the new music and of the mixed-up, misunderstood hero 
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decried the new mystique. The tough, self-pitying "sad-bad-boy" figures 
represented an "apotheosis of the immature." Rock 'n' roll used a "jun­
gle strain" to provoke a "wave of adolescent riot." How could a prosper­
ous, middle-class nation find satisfaction in such moronic lyrics and 
"quivering adolescents"? Time compared rock V roll concerts to 
Hitler's mass meetings, and other critics denounced the new music as 
nauseating and degenerate, an appeal to "vulgarism and animality."51 
Could a consolidating popular culture even begin to bridge the gap sug­
gested by such reactions? 
Extreme views would remain irreconcilable. But 1955 elevated to 
stardom a versatile performer who brought the rock 'n' roll movement 
to a climax yet ultimately helped partially to reconcile rock with main­
stream popular culture. Elvis Presley, the "hillbilly cat," as Greil Marcus 
writes, "deeply absorbed black music, and transformed it. ." The 
style of his early singles was "rockabilly"—"the only style of early rock 
'n' roll that proved white boys could do it all—that they could be as 
strange, as exciting, as scary, and as free as the black men who were 
suddenly walking America's airwaves. "52 Even as Elvis moved up 
to RCA and national fame in 1955 and 1956 with "Heartbreak Hotel" 
and "You Ain't Nuthin' But a Hound Dog," he continued to evoke sex­
ualilty, exhibitionism, and a defiance of restraint. Elvis projected emo­
tional involvement; he encompassed the prized qualities of both tough­
ness and vulnerability. 
But Elvis not only fulfilled the image of frustrated, sensitive, rebel­
lious hero for the new teen-age generation; he was also "hellbent on the 
mainstream." By the end of the 1950s, he had achieved hits with gospel 
songs and sentimental ballads. Eventually, one of his best-selling al­
bums was "Blue Hawaii." His style encompassed schmaltz as well as 
rebellion, Las Vegas as well as Memphis.53 Along with Pat Boone, 
Bobby Darin, Bobby Rydell, Paul Anka, Ricky Nelson, and a host of 
new teen-age crooners, and with the added influence of Dick Clark's 
"American Bandstand" on TV, Elvis eased rock 'n' roll's way into the 
mainstream. The aura of challenge and threat in rock was overshad­
owed by the sentimentalities of teen-age love. By 1960 the popular mu­
sic industry was fragmented. The venerable and consensus-based 
"Your Hit Parade" had expired after a period of senility, spurred on by 
rock 'n' roll. More concerned with the style of performance than with the 
song itself, the new rock audience was bored by interpretations of hit 
rock numbers by "Hit Parade" regulars. But, thus far, the fissure created 
in American popular culture by rock 'n' roll and generational stress had 
proved to be a crevice rather than a chasm.54 
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Teen culture and rock 'n' roll, however, were not the only signs in the 
late 1950s of a possible countermarch in popular culture away from 
homogeneity toward segmentation. In reaction to the severe inroads of 
TV, movie-makers had sought specialized audiences that included intel­
lectuals as well as teen-agers. Radio had fully adopted specialty pro­
gramming. Gated, exclusive suburban developments gained in popular­
ity. Portents of a difficult future for the great mass-circulation, 
general-audience magazines began to appear, as both Life and Saturday 
Evening Post lost advertising.55 Despite the "whitewardly mobile" mes­
sages of middle-class black magazines like Ebony, inklings could be 
found of the eventual movement of blacks to a more protective, conserv­
ing attitude toward the distinctive qualities of their own culture. On top 
of everything, enclaves of "beatniks" now flaunted a life-style even more 
irreconcilable with mainstream popular culture than that associated 
with rock *n' roll. 
One prospect for popular culture at the end of the 1950s was fragmen­
tation, with increasing specialization in production and participation. 
But in one significant way, the consolidating process in American popu­
lar culture continued to move ahead. The history of modern popular 
culture is more characteristically an aspect of the history of business 
than an aspect of the histories of art, literature, music, or architecture. 
And the business interests that determined the available choices for 
most popular culture consumers had not been verging toward fragmen­
tation or diversity. The "popular culture establishment"—in the form of 
CBS, NBC, and ABC, or General Motors, Walt Disney Enterprises, 
MGM and Time-Life, or the J. Walter Thompson, Young and Rubi­
cam, and other great advertising agencies—certainly wielded a more 
extensive control over the range of products and images available to the 
public in 1960 than in 1945. These giants, like most of the small popular 
culture entrepreneurs, watched the sales figures, the Nielsen ratings, and 
the audience surveys and produced what would sell itself or sell the 
sponsor's goods. 
The tenor of the resulting popular culture was largely conservative 
and sustaining, as popular culture in any mass society is apt to be. If the 
problems of a society are embedded in its social structure and are insu­
lated from change by layers of ideological tradition, popular culture is 
an unlikely source of remedy. It is far more likely to serve needs for 
diversion and transitory compensation. Tail-finned automobiles, peace-
of-mind formulas, even fantasies of suburban sovereignty, pliant Play­
boy bunnies, or rock singers as emotional surrogates—all these prom­
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ised, but did not ultimately provide, the sense of control and meaningful 
activity that Americans sought. 
Beset by cold war fears and organizational complexities, Americans 
found solace in a popular culture that provided hopeful visions of an 
emerging classlessness and vicarious compensations for a hedged-in, 
manipulated feeling. Popular culture provided the fantasies, evasions, 
material artifacts, and vicarious experiences through which Americans 
tried to recapture a sense of dominion. 
Appendix: What Went Up, What Went Down 
A SELECTIVE STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF 
AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE, 1945-1960 
If popular culture is the description of the culture of most of the 
people, or at least of a great many people, statistical measures of usage 
and popularity should identify some of those artifacts that particularly 
merit discussion. The statistics in the following table suggest compari­
sons among noncomparable phenomena. A rough base line for compar­
ing relative degrees of increase or decrease is suggested by items 12 and 
13, the average yearly percentage of increase in gross national product 
and consumer price index. Because of the impressionistic intent of this 
compilation and the idiosyncratic selection involved, I have ignored 
some of the obvious problems arising from differences in years spanned 
by the data, occasional minor changes in methods of measurement dur­
ing the years spanned, and distortions arising from comparing rates of 
change in artifacts already well established in the culture with those for 
relatively new phenomena. 
A number of histories of popular culture in the 1945-60 era, some of 
them quite divergent in interpretation, might emerge from such sugges­
tive statistics. I have sketched one such account. The table both corrob­
orates some of my observations and provides a basis for other insights 
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PART TWO

Public Problems and Public Policy


Poverty and Welfare in America, 1945-1960 
James T. Patterson 
When Americans "rediscovered" poverty in the early 1960s, social 
scientists were appalled to realize how little they knew about it. The 
economist Kenneth Boulding lamented that knowledge of poverty was 
"scanty"; the statistician Herman Miller complained that it was "de­
plorable." Daniel Bell recalled, "When the poverty issue arose, nobody 
was really prepared, nobody had any data, nobody knew what to do."1 
Social scientists bemoaned not only the shortage of data on poverty 
but also the paucity of serious studies that might assist policy-makers in 
the field of welfare. Most graduates of schools of social work, one critic 
grumbled, "hardly knew how to go about posing and executing a re­
searchable problem." A sociologist complained later, "During the 
1940's, the 1950's, and the first few years of the 1960's, the topic of pov­
erty was virtually nonexistent in the sociological literature." Two stu­
dents of welfare concluded in 1963, "It is not known for certain how 
many [on relief] have the basic external and internal resources to be­
come self-sufficient in a short time with just a little temporary aid, how 
many when provided with a number of external socio-cultural and eco­
nomic resources can make a go of it, or how many, regardless of assist­
ance, will find it difficult to move into the mainstream."2 
This imperfect understanding of poverty reflected a benign neglect of 
scattered information gathered on the subject during the 1940s and 
1950s. If these years had been as prosperous as many contemporaries 
believed, this neglect would not have mattered much. But by the late 
1950s, critics perceived that a host of social problems remained, leaving 
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in their wake a poverty population of nearly 40 million people, and a 
group of "near poor" who numbered perhaps 15 million more. These 55 
million comprised about a fourth of the population. Most of them re­
ceived little help from a jerry-built welfare system that was less generous 
and comprehensive than those of Western Europe and that struck liber­
als as uniquely mean-spirited.3 
Any effort to understand this benign neglect of poverty and welfare 
inevitably concerns itself with several related questions. What were the 
dimensions of American poverty during those years? How well did the 
welfare system operate? Why was poverty neglected? And what was the 
impact on policy of attitudes toward the poor? Tentative answers to 
such questions can offer insights into larger concerns, for as R. H. Taw­
ney once observed, "There is no touchstone, except the treatment of 
childhood, which reveals the true character of social philosophy more 
clearly than the spirit in which it regards the misfortunes of those of its 
members who fall by the way."4 
Experts who later tried to measure the dimensions of American pov­
erty in the 1940s and 1950s agreed on some broad trends. The most 
striking of these trends was progress, rooted in economic growth, in the 
percentage of Americans with incomes above "poverty lines." One care­
ful study by Herman Miller employed contemporary definitions of min­
imum subsistence—life deemed compatible with "decency and health" 
—and found that the percentage of families in poverty had risen from 
about 40 percent in 1929 to 48 percent in 1935-36, and then fell 
steadily—to 33 percent in 1940, 27 percent in 1950, and 21 percent in 
1960. This was 39 million people in 1960, compared with 61 million in 
1935-36,44 million in 1940, and 41 million in 1950. James Tobin, one of 
President John F. Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers, reported 
even more striking gains: 
Percentage of Families with Annual Incomes Below $3,000 (1965 dollars) 
1896 67% 1950 30% 
1918 63% 1960 20% 
1935-36 51% 1965 17% 
Although other definitions of poverty arrive at slightly different figures, 
all authorities perceive considerable progress in the diminution of abso­
lute poverty between 1938 and 1941, steady gains against poverty during 
World War II, continuing, though much less spectacular, advances from 
1946 to 1956, and sluggish improvement from 1957 to I960.5 The key to 
the progress was not welfare—that was relatively insignificant—but 
economic growth. 
Poverty and Welfare in America \ 195 
These American poor of the 1940s and 1950s were staggeringly well 
off by world standards. The per capita income of Harlem ranked with 
the top five nations in the world. Blacks in Mississippi—among the 
poorest groups in the nation—had a median income in 1959 of $944, 
compared with a median for Puerto Ricans of $819; Puerto Rico then 
ranked in the top fourth of the world's nations in per capita income. In 
Harlan County, Kentucky, one of the country's poorest, two-thirds of 
the homes in 1960 were "substandard," and one-fourth lacked running 
water. Yet, 67 percent had TV, 42 percent had telephones, and 59 per­
cent had a car.6 
Most writers agree also that this progress in the 1940s and 1950s in the 
United States was part of a continuing secular trend that was to drop the 
incidence of absolute poverty, according to official definitions, to be­
tween 12 and 15 percent in the 1970s. All these gains, moreover, reflected 
contemporary standards of what people thought should be a subsistence 
level of living. In the postwar years these standards rose considerably, so 
people under the poverty line as defined in 1960 lived much better than 
had poor people in the past. If the relatively generous lines used in 1960 
are applied to measure poverty in earlier periods, the gains become strik­
ing. Use of a family poverty line of $3,800 (in 1960 dollars) results statis­
tically in proportions of poor families of 70 percent in 1929, 70 percent in 
1935-36, 53 percent in 1941, 34 percent in 1950, and 22 percent in 1960. 
This kind of reckoning admittedly ignores contemporary standards and 
expectations, but it reveals the great improvement in the standards of 
living enjoyed by poor and nonpoor alike since 1930. 
Scholars agree also on the maj or changes and continuities in the com­
position of the poor during these years. Far and away the most signifi­
cant change stemmed from the technological revolution affecting agri­
culture. In 1943 the mechanical cotton picker began its domineering 
history. It reduced the number of man-hours necessary to produce a bale 
of cotton from 160 to 25 and displaced perhaps 2.3 million family farm 
workers. Economic growth in the area absorbed only a fourth of these 
people. Many of the rest left the South, which experienced a net loss 
from interregional migration of 2.2 million in the 1940s and 1.4 million 
in the 1950s. 
Most of these migrants settled in cities, which became the main locus 
of poverty. By 1960 some 55 percent of the poor lived in the city, 30 
percent in small towns, only 15 percent on farms—as opposed to about 
50 percent who had done some farming in the mid-1930s. This northern­
ization and urbanization of poverty was a historic shift. By the mid­
1960s it helped make poverty visible again, and facilitated community 
organization and political pressure from the poor. 
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The main dimensions of poverty were otherwise fairly stable during 
the 1940s and 1950s. The incidence among small farmers was higher 
than among any other single occupational group, and twice that of non-
farmers. In 1963,43 percent of America's 3.1 million farm families lived 
in poverty, compared with 17 percent of the nation's 44 million nonfarm 
families. This was almost 5 million farm people, or one-seventh of the 
total poverty population. About half of these poor farm families lived in 
the South, which (as always in American history) had the highest inci­
dence of poverty. Indeed, 45 percent of poor families lived in the South. 
In Alabama and Mississippi 50 percent of these families earned less than 
$2,000 per year. About three-fourths of them were white in 1960—a 
larger percentage than in 1940, before the mass migration of blacks to 
the city.7 
Statistics reveal continuity in the composition of other groups espe­
cially susceptible to poverty—the aged, nonwhites, and members of 
broken families. In 1962 nearly 50 percent of aged families earned in­
comes less than the poverty line (set by the Council of Economic Advis­
ers at $3,000 for a family of four). So did 43 percent of nonwhite families 
and 47 percent of those that were female-headed. These percentages 
contrasted sharply with those measuring the poverty of families headed 
by persons aged 25 to 64 (13 percent), by whites (16 percent), and by 
males (15 percent). More alarming, these groups seemed more prone to 
poverty, relative to other groups, as time passed. In 1962, 33 percent of 
poor families in America were headed by people over 65, 22 percent by 
nonwhites, and 25 percent by females, compared with percentages of 20, 
18, and 16 respectively in 1947. This poverty among the aged and broken 
families with children represented an important statistic often over­
looked by opponents of welfare: more than one-third of people in all 
poor families, or 11 million people in 1963, were children, and almost 
half the poor were not in the labor market. Nearly 60 percent were 
younger than 18 or older than 65. For these very young and very old 
Americans (and for the disabled and nearly 3 million female heads of 
families with children under 6), public transfer payments were usually 
vital.8 
These figures did not mean that poverty was restricted only to spe­
cially disadvantaged groups. Some 40 percent of poor families in 1963 
were headed by able-bodied males aged 25 to 54. These were the working 
poor, 78 percent of them white. As ever, millions of poor family heads 
were white workingmen whose jobs paid so little that they could not rise 
above the line of poverty. 
Still, it was a fact that the proportion of the poor who were in specially 
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disadvantaged families rose in the 1940s and 1950s. That happened be­
cause economic growth nudged many of the white working poor over 
the poverty line. The increased proportion of the disadvantaged groups, 
and their concentration in accessible urban areas, helped expose poverty 
as a problem in 1960. So it was that Michael Harrington could claim at 
the time to discover a "new" hard-core poor made up of old people, 
female-headed households, and minority groups.9 
I n other ways writers attempting to describe poverty in the 1940s and 
1950s tended to disagree, often hotly. They argued, first, over what de­
fined a decent, healthful life, and therefore over poverty lines. Experts, 
indeed, distinguished between poverty lines facilitating "minimum sub­
sistence," "minimum adequacy," and "minimum comfort." One applica­
tion of these three definitions resulted in percentages of poor households 
of 11 percent, 26 percent, and 40 percent respectively for I960.10 
Attempting to still some of the debate, in the early 1960s the Social 
Security Administration adopted one system for measuring poverty. 
The SSA accepted the Department of Agriculture's "economy" food 
budget, and then multiplied it by three to get a minimum subsistence for 
families. Rounding figures off, the Council of Economic Advisers in 
1962 set a poverty line of $3,000 for families of four and $ 1,500 for single 
individuals. It was a line that experts admitted was low—about $8.40 
per day for a family of four—50 percent lower in fact than the "modest 
but adequate" budget used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for a city 
worker's family. For this and other reasons, debate over the location of 
the line continued. 
Debate mounted especially over the utility of any absolute measure of 
poverty. Critics of these measures observed that millions of "nonpoor" 
Americans lived, as the expert Mollie Orshansky put it in 1966, "with 
privation as their daily portion.1' Many of these—she numbered them 
then at 16 million in 1964, in addition to 34 million "poor"—slipped in 
and out of poverty. Living in a mass media age, they could not help but 
be aware of the growing gap that separated them from the middle 
classes. Experts who focused on this gap began by 1965 to insist that 
absolute poverty was but a small part of the broader problem of income 
maldistribution and relative deprivation." 
Experts hardly possessed the data even in the 1960s to settle another 
key question about poverty in the 1940s and 1950s: What percentage of 
poor people, however defined, were long-term and what percentage 
were borderline types who slipped in and out? Some analyses of this 
question used samples from the population on public assistance—an 
atypical minority of the poor—or measured the percentage of poor peo­
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pie in one year who climbed above the poverty line in the next. But in the 
1960s experts did not complete comprehensive studies of poverty popu­
lations over extended periods of time, or always ask hard questions of 
their data. Thus, early studies suggested that approximately 40 percent 
of parents who got relief under the Aid to Families of Dependent Chil­
dren (AFDC) program in 1960 had themselves been children in welfare 
families.12 A common conclusion from this widely cited finding was that 
40 percent of welfare families were multigeneration, "multi-problem" 
families—a "hard-core" poor living in an intransigent "culture of pov­
erty." Yet, when it is remembered that at least 35 percent of Americans 
received relief at some time in the 1930s, this statistic tells little. As the 
historian Stephan Thernstrom observed in 1965, "Those who are con­
vinced that poverty is increasingly being meted out in life sentences have 
yet to do the homework to substantiate the claim."13 
These disputes among experts since 1960 seem technical, even arcane. 
But they are relevant to any historical account of American poverty 
between 1945 and 1960, if only because they reveal the limited amounts 
of solid information available to that generation of welfare reformers. 
The disputes also expose another difficulty: historians concerned with 
postwar poverty must deal with what one expert has aptly called "cross­
sectional snapshots" instead of "longitudinal motion pictures" of Amer­
ican destitution.14 
What was the role of welfare policies in this diminution of American 
poverty in the 1940s and 1950s? 
The answer depends again on the frame of reference. By contrast to 
1930, before the dawning of the modern welfare state, public policies in 
1960 were staggeringly broad in coverage and generous in benefits. The 
number of people receiving benefits from the Old Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance program (OASDI) increased from 1.3 million in 
1945to 14.8millionin 1960. The number receiving aid from AFDC—by 
1960 the most important welfare program—increased from 701,000 to 3 
million during the same period. Average monthly payments per family 
from AFDC increased from $33 to $124 between 1940 and 1962, a hike 
of 77 percent in real purchasing power. Total social welfare expendi­
tures, including social insurance and public assistance (but excluding 
education and veterans benefits), were 1.8 percent of national income in 
1944-45, and 7 percent (the same level as in the depression year of 1935) 
by 1959-60. They represented in 1960 more than 40 percent of the total 
income of the poor.15 
Two social programs provided most of this aid between 1940 and 
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1960: old age and survivors insurance and public assistance, or "wel­
fare." Public assistance was either "categorical" or "general." Categori­
cal aid, funded by federal-state matching grants, went to four needy 
groups by 1960: the blind, the aged, the permanently and totally dis­
abled, and families with dependent children. General assistance, from 
state and local funds, went to needy people not otherwise covered. 
But neither social insurance nor welfare was comprehensive or gener­
ous enough to satisfy reformers in the 1940s and 1950s. Social Security, 
which paid a retired worker $69.60 a month in 1960, was insufficient in 
itself to remove people from poverty. Financed by regressive taxes on 
employee salaries and employee payrolls, it drained off potential pur­
chasing power. It supported many nonpoor as well as poor; about half 
of America's aged poor families got no coverage under Social Security 
in I960.16 
Reformers were especially alarmed at what they considered the in­
adequacy of welfare. Only a fifth to a sixth of the country's poor families 
in the 1950s got either categorical or general assistance. This was be­
tween 2.7 percent and 4 percent of the population between 1945 and 
1960. Money spent for public welfare regularly represented less than 1 
percent of the Gross National Product. Those who did receive aid were 
not to be envied. Of households on AFDC, 28 percent in 1960 lacked 
flush toilets and hot water, and 17 percent did without running water at 
all. Some 50 percent of these households relied entirely on AFDC pay­
ments, which averaged $30 per recipient and $ 115 per family per month 
in 1960. What they got depended on where they lived, for levels of aid 
varied widely. The same weaknesses characterized state-local general 
assistance. In 1959 twenty-three states provided no general assistance to 
poor families in which there lived a supposedly employable adult.17 
The condition in 1960 of AFDC families in New York City, which set 
its subsistence level budget at the unusually high level of $2,660 per year 
for a family of four, suggests the conditions under which welfare recip­
ients had to live if they expected welfare workers to certify them as in 
need. Such families were permitted to rent a small five-room flat. The 
living room might have two chairs, a mattress and springs on legs to 
serve as a couch, a drop-leaf table for eating, and two straight chairs. 
Linoleum, not rugs, was expected to cover the floors. There could be one 
or two lamps, but electricity was to be used carefully. The family could 
have a refrigerator and electric iron, and play the radio an hour a day— 
there was no provision for using TV. The weekly food budget allowed 
for stewing lamb, beef liver or heart, fillet of haddock, or perhaps a 
boned veal roast. No allocation existed for frozen foods, tobacco, beer, 
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or telephone calls. The clothing allowance provided for protection 
against the weather, but left no room for impulse buying or fashion, and 
barely coped with the problem of wear. A woman's coat was to last for 
five years. Breakage (say, of light bulbs) or spillage (of flour) meant that 
the family did without. This budget provided no "frills"—haircuts more 
than once a month, home permanents more than once a year, drugs 
other than aspirin, candy or ice cream for the children, movies, coffee 
for visitors. 
New York's standard of $2,660 offered more in real dollars than 
budgets used there in the mid-1930s. It was high compared with the 
average standard nationally of $2,150 per year in 1960, and well above 
the $1,600 defined as subsistence in the five least-generous states. Fami­
lies with outside income managed on it. But (as almost everywhere) the 
standard was below the $3,000 poverty line, and far below the $5,464 
that the Bureau of Labor Statistics considered the "minimum comfort" 
standard for a family of four in 1960. Moreover, these standards were 
goals that social workers thought should be reached, not sums paid by 
public authorities in practice. Most states could not or would not pay 
public clients the amount that their social agencies set for subsistence.18 
Reformers complained also that American welfare policies were less 
generous and comprehensive than were those of Western Europe. Ex­
perts cautiously agreed that the percentage of America's net national 
income spent on social insurance plus public assistance—about 7 per­
cent in 1960—suffered by comparison with percentages during the 1950s 
of 12 to 20 percent in Belgium, Austria, France, and West Germany. 
Although the level of American spending for these items was close to 
that in Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, it lagged well behind 
the performance of these nations, too, when public health care is defined 
as a social welfare item.19 
Advocates of improved social services in the United States lamented 
especially the spirit under which aid was given. In Western Europe ad­
ministrators tended to try to maximize coverage and minimize the 
stigma of accepting public aid; by contrast, American relief administra­
tors sought to cut expenses and exclude from the rolls all people consi­
dered able to care for themselves. As one expert complained, "The gen­
eral public does not know what you are talking about when you talk 
about professional competence and the need for better skills [in welfare 
administration]. A good administrator is one who can keep chisellers off 
the rolls—public welfare is as simple as that to them."20 
This spirit pervaded the AFDC program, where states developed in 
the 1940s and 1950s a range of regulations designed to evade federal 
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guidelines. Many states denied aid to families with "employable moth­
ers,'' dawdled in servicing applications, established lengthy residence 
requirements (usually a year or more), and intimidated prospective 
applicants—sometimes by stationing police outside relief offices. Irri­
tated officials in the Bureau of Public Assistance issued endless regula­
tions to force states to comply with federal guidelines: by the 1960s its 
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration was more than five 
inches thick. But this effort resulted mainly in heaps of paper work for 
caseworkers. In the absence of pressure from the poor themselves, who 
were ill-organized in the 1940s and 1950s, the bureau lacked the means 
and the will to engage in debilitating skirmishes with cost-conscious pol­
iticians in the states and localities.21 
States proved particularly adept at denying AFDC to children whose 
absent fathers were suspected of being able to provide support or of 
being in the vicinity. This concern of states, minor in the early 1940s, 
intensified with the increase in broken families—and therefore in the 
case load—in the late 1940s and 1950s. Alarmists began to fear that 
AFDC, originally intended to take care of "deserving" widows with 
children, was becoming a haven for "immoral" (increasingly black) 
"welfare mothers." As early as 1950 Congress passed an amendment 
mandating local welfare agencies to notify law enforcement officers 
whenever aid was granted to children whose father had deserted the 
family. States and towns, meanwhile, dispatched agents on "midnight 
raids" to welfare homes in order to catch men in the house. States relied 
especially on "suitable home" regulations aimed at denying aid to "un­
deserving" mothers. All such regulations required caseworkers to pry 
into the private lives of recipients. Arkansas cut off help to mothers 
engaged in a "nonstable, nonlegal union"; Oregon, to mothers who 
housed "Roger the lodgers"; Michigan, to families with "male board­
ers"; Texas, to "pseudo-common law marriages." To receive aid, some 
mothers had to sign affidavits like this one: 
I do hereby promise and agree that until such time as the following 
agreement is rescinded, I will not have any male callers coming to my home 
nor meeting me elsewhere under improper conditions. 
I also agree to raise my children to the best of my ability and will not know­
ingly contribute or be a contributing factor to their being shamed by my 
conduct. 1 understand that should I violate this agreement, the children will 
be taken from me. n 
When federal officials looked about for allies in their quest for better 
welfare, they found very few. In the 1930s they had been able to count on 
some activist social workers, but the return of better times in the 1940s 
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seemed to sap the reformist spirit in the profession. The majority of 
well-trained workers went into private charity employment, where they 
got better pay and the chance to apply their courses in psychiatrically 
oriented casework. These courses stressed rehabilitation of individuals 
and of families, not reform of public welfare. Conferences of social 
workers regularly featured sessions on such subjects as "Working with 
the Child in His Own Home," "The Hard to Reach Multiple Problem 
Families," "Managing a Case Load," and "Opportunities for Profes­
sional Social Work Training."23 Sessions on "public welfare" were less 
numerous, for many social workers continued to believe that public as­
sistance, as one worker explained, was "an albatross around the neck of 
social service." The dirty work of public welfare often fell by default to 
elected, nonprofessional town and county officials, whose goal was to 
control costs.24 
Those social work professionals and bureaucrats who did concern 
themselves with public welfare began mobilizing lobbies in the mid- and 
late 1950s. Among the most important of these was the Committee on 
Social Issues and Policies of the National Social Welfare Assembly 
(which was itself a holding company for a variety of social work organi­
zations). The leaders of this effort focused their efforts on HEW, where 
many of them worked or had close contacts. In the early 1960s, dealing 
with an administration sympathetic to new approaches to public wel­
fare, they lobbied successfully for welfare legislation. In the 1950s, how­
ever, they had to settle for modest changes in social security. They had to 
contend also with complacency among many of their colleagues in social 
work. These believed that economic progress was wiping out social in­
justice, leaving only individual problems. The director of the American 
Public Welfare Administration explained in 1957, "We expect the vol­
ume of public assistance cases to decrease in the future. As this happens, 
hopefully public welfare workers can begin to realize one of their major 
objectives, namely the opportunity to focus more attention on the pre­
ventive and rehabilitation aspects of their work."25 
Advocates of improved aid found equally little support from popular 
magazines in the 1940s and 1950s. Those few articles written on poverty 
tended to carry scare headlines and to fret about the cost of welfare. One 
headline read, "When It Pays to Play Pauper." Another proclaimed, 
"The Hillbillies Invade Chicago.1' A third, entitled "I Say Relief Is Ruin­
ing Families," publicized the views of a New York City domestic rela­
tions court judge who intoned, "The relief setsup is sapping the will to 
work encouraging cynicism, petty chiselling and bare-faced im­
morality." Another article, entitled "Welfare: Has It Become a Scan­
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dal?," complained that "relief without rehabilitation has spawned a vi­
cious circle in welfare, so that now a second generation of reliefers is 
maturing on welfare rolls." It cited as a "typical case" a 40-year-old man 
with 4 children and 29 grandchildren, all illegitimate. "The girls take 
their pregnancies as a matter of course. The home is like Grand Central 
Terminal. Members vanish and stay away five days at a time. All the 
girls should have been put in homes. It's a vicious circle.1' And 
another, "Detroit Cracks Down on Welfare Chiselers," was certain that 
"relief clients have thought this whole thing out carefully, weighing the 
advantages of being on relief against working for a living," and choosing 
welfare. "When perfectly executed, this consists of a person going off the 
aid-to-dependent children rolls upon reaching his twenty-first birthday, 
immediately establishing himself upon the relief rolls, and remaining 
there forever, if possible."26 
Readers of such pieces were probably less hardhearted than the au­
thors. Although public opinion on the subjects of poverty and welfare in 
the 1940s and 1950s is impossible to quantify, studies of polls suggest 
ambivalent feelings among middle-class Americans. When asked about 
"welfare" or "relief," people took the conservative line that public assis­
tance was wasteful and demoralizing. But when asked if the government 
should help those in "need," they responded affirmatively. Polls re­
vealed also that a majority of Americans supported a broadening of 
social security, which was widely (though inaccurately) perceived as a 
strictly insurance proposition. 
Still, advocates of more generous welfare were probably correct in 
concluding that most middle-class Americans distinguished between so­
cial security—a necessity—and public welfare—a wasteful handout. 
Congress, reflecting this distinction, contented itself with taking the 
simple way out: liberalizing social insurance, and otherwise maintaining 
a policy of benign neglect. It refused to mandate a national minimum of 
payments to force states to pay benefits up to their inadequate defini­
tions of need, or to involve the federal government in general assistance. 
In so doing, Congress reflected what was almost surely the dominant 
coolness among the middle classes toward welfare.27 
Congress reflected also a historically powerful aspiration of Ameri­
can reformers in the field: that poverty could ultimately be prevented. 
This goal emphasized "rehabilitation" of people, not income mainte­
nance. In employing such approaches in the 1950s, Congress discussed a 
variety of policies, including vocational rehabilitation, youth conserva­
tion work, and manpower training. Unsure of how to proceed (and anx­
ious to save funds), it placed ever greater emphasis on upgrading the 
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training of social workers—an upgrading that the social work profes­
sionals were happy to promote. In 1956 it passed an amendment to the 
Social Security Act authorizing federal matching money to those states 
that provided services—in addition to cash assistance—to relief clients. 
This "services'" approach became the Bible of HEW Secretary Abraham 
Ribicoff in 1961, and resulted in the much-heralded Public Welfare 
amendments of 1962. These expanded the federal authorization for ser­
vices, on the assumption that trained, professional caseworkers could 
rehabilitate the poor.28 President Kennedy hailed these amendments as 
"the most far-reaching revision of our public welfare program since it 
was enacted in 1935 a turning point in this nation's efforts to cope 
realistically and helpfully with these pressing problems."29 
This renewed stress on prevention had deep roots in the history of 
Western approaches to poverty. As in the past it was nourished by the 
ethic of self-reliance that characterized American attitudes toward wel­
fare. But Congress, despite the authorization of money for services, did 
not actually appropriate any before 1964. Moreover, no one satisfactor­
ily explained how rehabilitation through services could do much for the 
needy in the short run, or address broad economic inequalities. Few 
people explored such questions at the time. Prevention and rehabilita­
tion appealed to many liberals, who wanted the government to do some­
thing; to social work professionals, who saw in them a chance to upgrade 
their field of expertise; to bureaucrats in the Social Security Administra­
tion; and to conservatives, who wanted to cut the cost of cash assistance 
and cause dependency to wither away. The inadequacy of this approach 
had to be shown before still another, different orthodoxy—provision of 
economic opportunity—prevailed in the mid-1960s. But that is another 
story. 
Many explanations of the arrested state of American public welfare in 
the 1940s and 1950s have tended to stress impersonal forces. These ex­
planations include a psychological interpretation emphasizing the need 
of all societies to define poor people, among others, as deviants or 
scapegoats; an economic interpretation focusing on the desire of elites to 
force poor people off welfare into low-paying work; and a social inter­
pretation arguing that many approaches to welfare—almshouses in the 
early nineteenth century, Charity Organization Societies in the 1880s 
and 1890s, psychiatric casework in the 1920s and 1950s—were efforts at 
"social control" of potentially disorderly elements in American life.30 
Other grand theories emphasize the racism of America, the distinctive 
power of the work ethic and related attitudes, and the peculiarly Ameri­
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can faith in political decentralization. Together, these forces tended to 
abandon the poor to cost-conscious local elites.31 
Although these interpretations are useful, no single grand theory ac­
counts for middle-class opinions, which lent elites the crucial support 
they needed between 1940 and I960.32 A better way of exploring such 
attitudes is to see them in the context of the times. The dominant atti­
tudes of most middle-class Americans in the 1940s and 1950s grew natu­
rally from recent experiences and memories. Paramount among these 
experiences was the Great Depression of the 1930s. The hard times of 
the thirties hit a country in which charity workers had long distinguished 
between the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. Although the depres­
sion shook this set of ideas, it did not destroy them. Even those who had 
been forced to accept welfare in the depression years tended to blame 
themselves, not the system, and to look down on those who could not 
find work in 1940. Americans carried into the 1940s and 1950s the no­
tion of an undeserving poor and the related idea that prolonged welfare 
promoted dependency.33 
It followed that the government ought to prevent dependency, and 
thereby reduce the costly burdens of welfare. Experts believed that pre­
vention could be built into the system. Many state plans for unemploy­
ment insurance assumed that individual employers—faced with heavier 
taxation if they laid people off—could help prevent joblessness.34 Sim­
ilar thinking underlay New Deal relief, which was to be temporary. "It 
goes without saying," said Harry Hopkins, "that the plan which helps to 
make further relief unnecessary is the best and cheapest form of relief." 
Like most Americans, Hopkins thought that the government ought to 
prevent dependency, not provide long-run income maintenance.35 
These emphases on the deserving poor and on prevention coexisted 
with other perceptions of poverty that were strengthened in the 1930s. 
People were certain, first, that the problem was not so much poverty as 
unemployment. Unemployment, in turn, was cyclical and temporary. 
Give the men shovels for digging and the women (not too many) needles 
for sewing, but do not rely on the dole or concentrate on training people. 
With time the problem of unemployment—THE problem—would 
"wither away." Such a view, of course, made it easy to ignore the prede­
pression poor, whose plight stemmed from low income, not unem­
ployment. 
Domestic changes during World War II appeared to undermine some 
of these popular attitudes and to promote the idea of a welfare state. The 
war enhanced the political power of organized labor, which by then 
included some unskilled and low-wage workers; it promoted the spread 
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among economists of Keynesian notions concerning the role of fiscal 
policy in promoting growth; and it led Congress to approve generous 
veterans benefits affecting nearly one-half of the population. The war 
expanded the federal bureaucracy—even in the field of social welfare— 
and it accelerated the nationalization of politics. Perhaps the most sig­
nificant long-run outcome of the war was unprecedented prosperity. In 
such a society poverty was obviously an un-American anomaly, and 
leisure a goal as cherished as hard work had been in the heyday of indus­
trial growth. This affluence ultimately prompted great expectations 
among the poor as well as the nonpoor, and irresistible pressures on 
government to provide the good life. By the 1960s reformers were ready 
to believe that poverty could and must be abolished. 
These developments, however, were the long-run legacies of the war. 
In the short run it strengthened conservative popular attitudes toward 
public aid. In this sense the American experience was distinctive. Most 
Western European countries suffered appalling loss of life and property 
during the war. Their experience generated a sense of sacrifice and of 
common cause that immediately intensified demands for social service. 
England, France, Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries embarked 
on major expansions of social insurance programs in the 1940s and 
1950s.36 No such developments occurred in the United States, where 
only veterans—not the poor—were perceived to have sacrificed much. 
War instead enhanced the power of corporate groups, the military, and 
the conservative coalition in Congress, which scuttled New Deal relief 
agencies. Until the mid-1960s, when the long-range socioeconomic 
forces became compelling, conservative middle-class attitudes toward 
poverty and welfare dominated the scene. 
The prosperity engendered by war, moreover, gradually promoted 
among contemporaries an optimistic—indeed, fatuous—sense of na­
tional well-being. Complacent writers thought that the nation had shed 
its ethnic, racial, and class divisions. Even observers uncomfortable with 
what they perceived as the conformity and "other-directedness" of 
American life at the time, conceded that the old conflicts had subsided. 
And the cold war accentuated this stress on unity and classlessness. So­
cial scientists, indeed, labored diligently to contrast the class cleavage 
and rigidity of Soviety society with the mobility and opportunity avail­
able in America. As one sociologist put it for Life, "The saving grace of 
the American social system is that our social positions are not fixed 
artificially, as they are in the so-called "classless' society of Russia."37 
Writers easily identified the source of America's fortunate condition 
in the 1940s and 1950s. That source was economic growth. By the mid­
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1950s, younger Americans who had not lived as adults during the 1930s 
began to take prosperity and growth for granted. Economists, too, grew 
increasingly confident. By the 1950s many had been converted to 
Keynesian notions about the positive role of fiscal policy in promoting 
prosperity. These Keynesians were not complacent. They were nonethe­
less optimistic. Like many Americans in the 1940s and 1950s, they re­
joiced in the blessings of technical and financial aid that the Marshall 
Plan and Point 4 seemed to be bringing to poor people abroad. There, 
and at home, economic growth seemed to be the single greatest force 
guaranteeing the ultimate withering away of poverty.38 
This notion of "withering away" remained a dominant motif of think­
ing about poverty in the 1940s and early 1950s. It helped explain why 
even the reformers in the Social Security Administration paid little at­
tention to the Bureau of Public Assistance, their ugly and unwanted 
stepchild. A program for the poor, these experts continued to believe, 
was politically a poor program. The main goal should be to broaden the 
contributory social security programs. These would provide insurance, 
at no extra cost to taxpayers, against disability and old age. Meanwhile, 
economic growth would curb unemployment. And poverty would 
wither away.39 
Given the power of such optimistic attitudes in the 1940s and 1950s, it 
was not surprising that other perspectives toward poverty struggled in 
vain for a hearing. Of these, three offered overlapping insights that, if 
heeded, might have enhanced public understanding. These may be 
called the cultural, liberal, and structuralist views. 
The cultural perspective on poverty was the very antithesis of older 
views that there was a sodden "culture of poverty." It argued instead that 
various groups and social classes possessed distinctive, even admirable, 
cultural traditions that sustained them in crisis times. One who empha­
sized this view was the sociologist William F. Whyte, whose work influ­
enced many academics in the 1940s. Whyte labored especially to demol­
ish the notion that "social disorganization'' afflicted the slums. Not so, 
he argued. Groups that seemed disorganized and deviant in fact held to 
recognizable and useful values. 
Other writers echoed this focus on the distinctive cultural patterns of 
groups in American society. One was E. Wight Bakke, a discerning re­
searcher whose studies of jobless Americans in the 1930s revealed that 
working-class people cherished sturdy traditions. Bakke, like Whyte, 
did not romanticize these, but he thought them functional. Endowed 
with such values, which differed subtly from those of the middle classes, 
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the unemployed managed to cope fairly well even after prolonged peri­
ods out of work.40 
The studies of W. Lloyd Warner and his many followers also chal­
lenged indirectly the thesis that the lower classes lived in "social disor­
ganization." Applying techniques of cultural anthropology to small and 
middle-sized communities, Warner and others emphasized the persis­
tence of social classes in American life. Members of the different classes 
had different values: the poor were not would-be middle-class people in 
tattered clothing and ramshackle homes. Warner stressed that the 
values of lower-class people were functional, not deviant. As an asso­
ciate put it in 1951, "Behavior which middle-class teachers, clinicians, 
and psychiatrists often regard as 'delinquent' or 'hostile' or 'unmoti­
vated' in slum children is usually a perfectly realistic, adaptive, and—in 
slum life—socially acceptable response to reality.41 
Cultural anthropologists like Warner came under attack from some 
sociologists, who denounced both the community study approach and 
what they said was an unsystematic reliance on interviews. Cultural an­
thropologists, these critics complained, concentrated on the values and 
life-styles of people. This focus encouraged the notion that class—and 
poverty—was cultural instead of economic. Critics added that Warner 
defined social class according to the prestige and status that people en­
joyed in the eyes of others, and slighted more important matters involv­
ing income, wealth, and economic power. The true tests of class were 
economic, not cultural.4­
Although incisive, these critics were not so audible in the 1940s and 
1950s as those who simply denied the importance of social class. These 
writers were so sure of the ultimate homogenization of American society 
that they slighted ethnic and regional traditions and forgot that many 
lower-class people do not have, or gladly adopt, middle-class values. 
Working in an age of supposed consensus, these observers assumed the 
success of the melting pot and left the impression that there was such a 
thing as a culturally undifferentiated poor. Against this prevailing view, 
potentially useful arguments that stressed the persistence of class and 
cultural divisions made little headway in the 1940s and 1950s. 
A second insightful approach to poverty in the 1940s, the liberal view, 
came especially from the handful of social scientists, social workers, and 
bureaucrats who had been closely associated with New Deal welfare 
programs in the 1930s. Many of these people were familiar with statisti­
cal studies of unemployment and relief done by the Works Progress 
Administration, the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB), and 
other federal agencies in the 1930s. Unlike most Americans who thought 
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the economic revival of 1940-42 would solve the problem of destitution, 
they insisted that social insurance and welfare must remain important 
elements of public policy. 
No group was more persuaded of this continuing need than the 
NRPB. After substantial study it produced in December 1941 a report 
that resembled the much more widely publicized Beveridge Report in 
England in 1942. The NRPB observed frankly that "even in so-called 
'good' times a disturbingly large proportion of the population has a 
precarious existence as a result of inadequate or no private income." The 
Great Depression, it argued, was "different in degree and in kind" 
from previous depressions, in that unemployment had lasted longer, 
effectively severing many older workers—increasing as a percentage of 
total population—from the job market. 
The NRPB stressed also the existence of the large and growing 
number of families headed by unemployables—not only the aged but 
the sick, the disabled, and women with dependent children. Calculating 
conservatively, it foresaw a more or less permanent "public aid burden" 
of at least 3.25 million households. This was about 14 million people, or 
one-eighth of the population. To address this need, the government had 
to take from localities the burden of general assistance, to require states 
to liberalize residency and eligibility standards, to increase federal con­
tributions for various forms of categorical assistance, and to change the 
matching grant formulas for categorical aid so as to reflect regional 
needs and the fiscal capacity of the states. 
Although the NRPB actually underestimated the extent of need, its 
report was in every way a far-seeing document. It called in effect for a 
federally supported floor under income. President Roosevelt dallied 
with the report, waiting sixteen months before forwarding it to Con­
gress, but he ultimately reflected the NRPB's point of view in his "Eco­
nomic Bill of Rights" of January 1944. All citizens, he said, deserved 
useful and remunerative jobs; income to provide sufficient food, cloth­
ing, and recreation; decent lodgings; medical care; protection against 
the hazards of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; and a 
good education.43 
Another group of government-employed professionals was reaching 
equally liberal conclusions at about the same time. This was the leader­
ship of the Social Security Board. In the mid-1930s it had stressed that 
the Social Security program, based on employer and employee contri­
butions, must be a strictly business-like insurance operation. The gov­
ernment, far from dispensing welfare, was to be a piggy bank, storing 
contributions and paying them back with interest at age 65. By 1938, 
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however, an advisory council appointed to help the Social Security 
Board liberalize social insurance was beginning to discard this piggy 
bank concept and to favor, for example, support of the disabled at levels 
that would approximate the wages they earned in their best-paid years. 
Such a program, of course, would mean giving many disabled workers 
far more than they had contributed to the system. Private insurance 
executives, recognizing this lapse from the prevailing orthodoxy, op­
posed it. But the Social Security Board adopted the principle in 1941, 
and lobbied for it in Congress throughout the 1940s. 
This deviation from insurance principles appears unexciting in retro­
spect. But the change in perspective reflected a movement toward merg­
ing social security and welfare, and was so recognized by the planners 
who adopted it. As one participant put it, "We went through not just a 
political but sort of an intellectual and religious reformation. We began 
to come out with a perspective that none of us had when we first 
began doing these things. Between 1939 and 1942 we were changed 
persons."44 
This liberal outlook slowly found a place in public policy. As early as 
1939, Congress placed widows and survivors of covered workers under 
the old age insurance system, henceforth called Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI). Congress tied the old age benefit not to lifetime con­
tributions but to average earnings over a shorter covered period. The 
result was to establish minimum benefits related to need as well as to 
contributions—a departure in practice from the supposedly sacrosanct 
actuarial principles of social insurance. At the same time Congress in­
creased the federal contribution to aid to dependent children from one-
third to one-half. By 1964 it had increased the federal share to this and 
the other categorical assistance programs nine more times, so that 
Washington was providing nearly 60 percent of all money for public 
assistance—compared with 41 percent in 1945. 
Other amendments, especially in the 1950s, quietly added previously 
uncovered workers to the OASI system, and began to increase welfare 
benefits. In 1950 Congress rectified its original neglect of mothers of 
dependent children by offering them a "caretaker" grant. It set up a 
matching grant program for a new category, the permanently and to­
tally disabled. In 1956 it added disability insurance to social security, 
and in 1958 it adopted a partial sliding scale for assistance grants that 
resulted in more-generous federal contributions to states with low per 
capita income. Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1960 set up a 
matching grant program (Kerr-Mills) to provide medical care for the 
indigent aged. These and other changes did not supply the money or 
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involve the federal control that most reformers wanted. Still, these ad­
vances, especially in coverage under social insurance, broadened exist­
ing programs. In this sense the liberal approach gathered strength in the 
1940s and 1950s.45 
A structuralist approach represented a third useful line of thinking 
about poverty and welfare in the 1940s and 1950s. It resembled the lib­
eral view in that it assumed the long-term need for extensive public wel­
fare. Most of its practitioners were Keynesian liberals or democratic 
socialists. The structuralists concentrated more sharply, however, than 
did other liberals on what they perceived as the pronounced stratifica­
tion of capitalist society. More than other liberals, they worried about 
inequality, and they called for great increases in public assistance as well 
as for major initiatives to counter low wages and underemployment. 
The most visible structuralists were not social workers or government 
bureaucrats who looked for ways of improving the situation of individ­
uals, but social scientists and radical critics who took a broad and re­
formist view of the functional relationship between inequality and the 
social system. 
Among them was the sociologist Robert Merton, whose classic article 
on anomie in 1938 stressed that lower-class Americans began with main­
stream values, only to be set back by structural barriers blocking their 
economic opportunity. This approach greatly influenced later structur­
alist writings. Another was Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish social scientist 
whose American Dilemma (1944) stressed the barriers to economic op­
portunity confronted by American Negroes. Myrdal emphasized that 
poverty was a "vicious cycle" that created a deprived "underclass." An 
optimist, he believed that public policy could break the vicious cycle at 
any of several points. Smash the structural barriers and the underclass 
could rise above itself.46 
This structuralist approach had little impact on public policy in the 
1940s. The debate in 1946 over the Employment Act was virtually silent 
on structural unemployment. Within a few years, however, the situation 
began to change slightly. Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois championed 
the cause of aid to depressed areas.47 At the same time a congressional 
subcommittee headed by Senator John Sparkman of Alabama investi­
gated "low income families." Using a poverty line of $2,000, the sub­
committee found that 25 percent of families were poor in 1948 and 22 
percent in 1955. It highlighted demographic trends such as the aging of 
the population and the rise in broken families and documented the high 
incidence of poverty among such groups. It emphasized also the preva­
lence of low-wage work. Staff reports of the committee stressed the con­
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centration of income in the hands of a small percentage of families. 
These reports showed that millions of working families who were non-
poor in one year were poor in the next. Low income was clearly a prob­
lem that plagued far more families than a one-year snapshot of poverty 
could expose. 
The Sparkman committee's concern with "low income" was a signifi­
cant step toward a no-nonsense, quantitative definition of poverty. It 
was resolutely economic in emphasis; it eschewed crude and subjective 
stereotypes; it linked poverty to the flaws in the marketplace; it placed 
the poor within the context of what the committee perceived as a maldis­
tributed income structure; above all it suggested the desirability of poli­
cies placing a floor under income.48 If Congress as a whole had heeded 
the committee—which it did not—it would have found itself forced to 
deal with a range of public policies promoting not only Keynesian fiscal 
measures and post-Keynesian growth economics but also much-
expanded social services. Advocates of guaranteed minimum income in 
the 1960s and 1970s ultimately adopted the logic of this approach. 
In 1958 John Kenneth Galbraith published The Affluent Society, the 
liveliest summary of structuralist thinking to that time. Repeating Myr­
dal and others, Galbraith reminded readers that the country confronted 
a vicious cycle of poverty. This cycle involved insular poverty (depressed 
areas), as well as case poverty affecting families without employable 
breadwinners. Galbraith went so far as to call attention to the inequality 
in American society and therefore to question purely absolute defini­
tions of poverty. "People are poverty-stricken," he wrote, "when their 
income, even if adequate for survival, falls radically behind that of the 
community." This perspective took him beyond those Keynesians who 
hoped that counter-cyclical fiscal policy would promote economic prog­
ress. It led him to demand great increases in social services that would 
reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. In a hesitant way Gal­
braith anticipated the concern with egalitarianism that was to become a 
pronounced feature of social thought in the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Many reviewers noticed that Galbraith did not carry his arguments 
about poverty very far. His poverty line for families was $ 1,000 per year, 
a cutoff that placed only 8 percent of the population in poverty. Activists 
complained that the line should have been at least as high as $2,000, at 
which point poverty might have measured 25 percent. Other critics 
thought he should have stressed even more the inequality in American 
society, instead of talking about the "affluence'' and materialism of the 
middle classes.49 
Galbraith's structuralism was nonetheless ahead of the times. Even 
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then few people considered poverty and unemployment to be permanent 
problems, or wanted to believe that the economy was structurally un­
sound. This continuing optimism ensured that structuralist thinking 
had little impact on policy in the 1950s. One of President Kennedy's 
antipoverty warriors later regretted this: "I don't think any of us were 
using the term 'a structural approach'. We were not talking about 
changing the nature of the organization of the society. . That's 
probably the Achilles heel of what we were attempting to do, in that we 
did not have a more solid structural framework for what we were 
about."50 
Social problems of the late 1950s finally challenged the optimists who 
held to the withering away hypothesis. In particular the recession of 
1958-59 made people doubt the automatic character of economic 
growth. Worse, these problems increased the burdens of public assis­
tance. Between 1953 and 1961 the number of families receiving aid under 
the AFDC program increased from 543,000 to 921,000. In the face of 
such persistent need for public aid, a gradual though very slow reconsid­
eration of poverty and lower-class life developed in the mid- and late 
1950s. 
This reconsideration, however, pursued familiar lines of thought. 
Leading social thinkers continued to emphasize that levels of prestige 
and status, not deep-seated economic inequality, stratified American 
society. They largely ignored blacks, whose frustrations were shortly to 
explode. A prominent sociologist, Robert Nisbet, concluded in 1959 
that the United States was a consensual, largely egalitarian society. "As 
far as the bulk of Western society is concerned," he said, "and especially 
in the United States, the conception of class is largely obsolete."51 
Those sociologists who did try to describe the poor entered a swamp. 
One observer correctly complained in 1965, "Until recent time insight 
into the 'lower lower class' has moved little beyond the broad sweeping 
descriptions provided by students of stratification over twenty-five 
years ago."52 A common denominator of such academic discussion of 
the lower classes in the 1940s and 1950s was the idea that poor people 
belonged to "multiproblem families" that were "hard to reach" and psy­
chologically "troubled." This view virtually ignored the problem of low 
income and studiously avoided talking about poverty. One critic ob­
served acidly that this semantic mystification would soon result in des­
ignating poor people as "exceptional families."53 
A similar perspective emphasized that the poor were present-
minded—unable to "defer gratification." This view, an old one in Amer­
214 | Reshaping America 
ican thought, gained strength from the growing vogue among social 
scientists at the time for psychological explanations. In the same vein 
writers purported to show that the poor were apathetic, lacking in self-
confidence, ill-informed, socially disorganized, and sexually immoral— 
in short, denizens of a different, deviant culture.54 This perspective did 
not usually portray poor people as potentially violent or dangerous; that 
stereotype became common again only in the 1960s. But the focus on 
apathy and present-mindedness was no less stereotypical and stigmatiz­
ing. Distorting the work of Whyte and others, this approach did not 
attempt to define or to understand the cultural traditions of different 
kinds of poor people. It settled rather for an old-fashioned, psychologi­
cally reassuring conclusion that there was a culture of poverty. 
Ironically, it was a socialist of sorts, Michael Harrington, who unin­
tentionally popularized some of these notions. Harrington was a struc­
turalist. But like all activists, he wanted to dramatize his cause. He 
argued, therefore, that poverty was not only a "vicious cycle" but a "sep­
arate culture, another nation, with its own way of life. The poor are least 
capable of taking advantage of new opportunities, first to be struck 
down by social crisis."55 His argument showed how easy it was for struc­
turalists to employ very old and potentially stigmatizing notions about 
the poor. 
Such talk about a "culture of poverty" unintentionally obscured 
structural flaws in the economy, but that was, of course, one reason why 
it enjoyed some appeal. Those who wanted to believe the worst of the 
poor, or to spend as little money as possible on welfare, could be com­
forted by the thought that the poor, after all, were to blame for their 
plight. It was natural for such middle-class observers to conclude that 
there were only two logical responses to poverty. One was to do 
nothing—after all, something as deep-rooted as a culture is not easily 
changed. The other was to try over time to eradicate that culture by 
changing people instead of the system. Even those who were aware of 
structural problems sought ways to make poor people into productive 
citizens who would no longer be a drain on the public treasury. 
Senator Sparkman, while investigating low-income families, illus­
trated how liberal and structuralist premises could be bent to such pur­
poses. The goal, he said in 1955, was to find ways "to help the low-
income groups to help themselves.'7 HEW Secretary Marion Folsom 
concurred. "I believe strongly, he said, "that all our policies and pro­
grams should have one emphasis: prevention and elimination of need 
rather than the mere relief of need after it develops." For Folsom and 
other experts, the goal was not abolition of poverty but prevention of 
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dependency. In the 1950s, as throughout American history to that time, 
prevention was the basic alternative to costly welfare.56 Significant 
changes in emphasis, first to expansion of "opportunity,'' then to in­
come maintenance, awaited the much different era of the 1960s. 
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Education: Schools as Crucible in 
Cold War America 
Ronald Lora 
Few Americans knew in 1945 and 1946 that they were about to 
enter the most confusing and demanding years in the history of Ameri­
can education. To the informed, however, World War II had revealed 
weaknesses in the nation's schools that would prove intolerable in a 
protracted cultural and military conflict. Positive developments, too, 
would compel a fundamental reorientation of purpose and method: the 
United States was reaffirming its democratic commitment to educate all 
the nation's young people; student enrollment was increasing enor­
mously; and parents continued to utilize the schools as a means of pro­
pelling their children up the ladder of success. The cold war exacerbated 
existing problems and added others, particularly those involving de­
fense needs and the relationship between educational institutions and 
the federal government. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the im­
pact of the cold war on American education, with primary emphasis on 
the secondary schools.1 
The American public school system is a striking social invention. 
Never before had a nation employed an educational system to provide 
its children a more equal chance in life. But differing ideologies can 
quickly convert a free public school system into a battleground over 
objectives. Since the earliest days of the Republic, American education 
not only taught the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic but also 
attempted to Americanize millions of immigrants, inculcate the ideals of 
democracy and equality, create national unity, and facilitate the ad­
justment of a rural population to industrial and urban life. Early in this 
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century it was widely believed that public education could improve the 
efficiency of industrial society by creating a disciplined labor force and 
by channeling students into needed roles. Schools advanced the ideol­
ogy of private enterprise and served as guardians of health and morals. 
Long before the ill-fated life-adjustment movement, schools were to de­
velop vocational and homemaking skills, solve boy and girl problems, 
and provide recreation and entertainment. By the late 1940s growing 
numbers of parents and educators feared that since societal needs had 
changed, the schools no longer were providing children with the requi­
site skills and attitudes for either individual or national well-being. Crit­
ics said that education had become flabby, soft, attuned to life-
adjustment rather than life-enhancement. Many generations of 
Americans had assumed that when individual welfare was pursued, the 
social order itself was enhanced. The cold war, and especially the Soviet 
success with Sputnik, diminished somewhat the concern for individual 
goals and brought to the fore the claims of the nation. Defense needs 
coalesced with the pursuit of excellence to restructure American educa­
tion, a process that began in earnest in the 1950s and took more than a 
decade to consolidate. 
It should be emphasized for historical perspective that the cold war 
was the third grave crisis to hit American education in less than twenty 
years. The first, the long depression of the 1930s, had wreaked havoc on 
the nation's schools: it proved impossible for local communities to pro­
vide adequate staffing and classrooms; many teachers received irregular 
payments; the quality of instruction declined as vacancies sometimes 
were filled by accepting the lowest bidder. Throughout the decade ex­
penditures per pupil were lower than they had been in 1929, for the 
mechanisms facilitating adjustment to financial exigencies did not ex­
ist.2 Inequalities were ubiquitous, existing in expenditures per pupil; ex­
penditures on equipment, instructional materials, and health and wel­
fare services; teacher's salaries; the length of the school year; the 
percentage of pupils per age grouping in high school; and the value of 
school property. Variations on each of these items existed not only be­
tween states but within states, and were particularly marked in rural 
3areas.
World War II marked the second crisis for education. Its enormous 
impact on educational practices and on attitudes regarding appropriate 
relationships between education and the state was signalized by the 
many ways in which the schools served national needs from 1941 
through 1945.4 Depending on location, facilities, and defense needs, 
schools offered summer programs, provided round-the-clock use of vo­
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cational school equipment to train men and women for wartime produc­
tion, and retrained workers dislocated in the conversion of industrial 
plants to defense production. School programs emphasized health and 
physical fitness, and safety from war hazards. The Red Cross and civil 
defense groups utilized school facilities; war workers and servicemen in 
need of temporary housing sometimes did likewise. Operating out of 
school buildings, the federal government registered millions of men for 
Selective Service, sold $2 billion worth of war bonds and stamps, and 
distributed 415,000,000 ration books. School savings plans enlisted the 
participation of 25,000,000 students. Thus, for five years the public 
schools operated on a war footing, providing the nation with nearly 
every service that could be imagined.5 
The war also revealed serious deficiencies. As late as 1945-46, 50 
percent of elementary and secondary school teachers received less than 
$2,000 per year, 16 percent less than $1,200 per year. Consequently, 
teacher shortages were the most immediate consequence of war as more 
than 350,000 teachers left their profession forever—some to enter the 
services, most to work in wartime factories. Not only were insufficient 
numbers educated in mathematics, science, English, and history, but 
conceptual frameworks were years out of date, particularly in math and 
science. Millions of young men, moreover, were rejected for military 
service. The Selective Service revealed to a surprised public the sobering 
statistics: 676,000 men rejected for mental or educational deficiencies, a 
substantial minority of whom had completed less than five years of 
school, and 350,000 registrants for the draft who could not sign their 
names. Tens of thousands had to be taught basic literary skills after 
induction into the armed services. Table 1 details the reasons for the 
rejection of 4,458,000 eighteen- to thirty-seven-year-olds by the end of 
1944.6 




EOR Rt IK'TION Total White Negro Total White Negro 
Manifestly disqualifying 
defects 469,300 405,800 63,500 10.5 11.3 7.3 
Mental diseases 759,600 671,000 88,600 17.1 18.7 10.2 
Mental deficiency 620,100 340,700 279,400 13.9 9.5 32.1 
Physical defects 2,542,000 2,116,600 425,400 57.9 59.0 48.9 
Nonmedical 67,000 53,900 13,100 1.5 1.5 1.5 
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institutions was impossible. For the second time in a quarter-century, 
Americans were asked to accommodate even their most prized institu­
tions to the demands of war mobilization. Attitudes forged in the gruel­
ing experience of total war proved difficult to eradicate and continued 
into the postwar period with scarcely a hitch. They well may have ex­
pressed themselves in policy formation regardless of the specific Soviet 
threat that emerged. To believe otherwise is to deny the powerful legacy 
of war in our recent history and to ignore the important ways in which it 
has shaped social policy. 
At V-J Day educators believed that America faced an auspicious 
moment in the history of democracy. The armies of fascism had been 
routed, and the longing for freedom and independence stirred the souls 
of people everywhere. Although darkening clouds of other authoritar­
ian systems loomed on the horizon, political and educational leaders 
occasionally spoke as if an "American century" were at hand. The insti­
tutions of free public education, moreover, would contribute signifi­
cantly to this new and better world. 
This roseate vision soon collapsed in crisis. As the cold war grew in 
intensity and anxiety over the use of atomic weapons deepened, the 
world seemed ever less amenable to American ambitions: the two super­
powers could not agree on the shape of the postwar world; the Soviet 
Union subjected Eastern Europe to military control, exploded an A-
bomb in 1949 and an H-bomb four years later; populous China turned 
Communist. Spies had infiltrated American defense installations and 
the State Department, or so Americans read in the newspapers. When 
North Korean troops entered South Korea in June 1950, Americans 
surmised that the invasion prefigured Soviet and Communist expansion 
elsewhere in the world. Seven years later, with the launching of Sputnik, 
the event most immediately responsible for the revamping of American 
education, new fears arose, especially among conservative groups, that 
the United States was actually losing the cold war. 
Center-stage among American anxieties was Communism, more par­
ticularly the Soviet Union. The swift revival of traditional American 
hostility to Soviet Communism gave a decidedly negative tone to the 
postwar debate on education. How far could the educational system be 
used to solve noneducational problems and still retain its educational 
integrity? As one educator put it, is an educational system that tries to 
solve the problem of unemployment, or acts as an aid to agriculture, or 
as "a basic resource of national defense, something different from what 
it has been in the past?" Are the values and purposes of "a basic resource 
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of national defense" similar to those of an educational system that does 
not serve as such?7 Everywhere there emerged charges of Communist 
party subversion and questions about teacher loyalty. In a world that 
witnessed genocide, slave labor camps, the terrors of Gleichschaltung, 
and the subversions of fifth columnists, it is understandable that loyalty 
should have concerned Americans. But old beliefs and past associations, 
however innocent and long-repudiated, could, when pursued to unrea­
sonable lengths of inquiry, endanger lives. It was just, and obligatory, 
for civil libertarians to insist that the search for domestic subversives 
operate on the basis of evidence. One tragedy of the new age of suspicion 
was that self-anointed keepers of the nation's ideological health so often 
had no evidence, or had evidence of a very specious sort. 
For teachers the baptism of fire awaited 1948 when it became clear 
how vulnerable they were to the social and political forces shaping (and 
distorting) postwar society.8 Community-centered, the public schools 
depended on local taxes and were controlled by elected boards, making 
them extraordinarily sensitive to organized pressures. Not surprisingly, 
voter sentiments reflected the structure of the tax base and the economic 
conditions of the community. Superimposed on local problems were 
national and international issues. Groups made tense by expansive 
communism, military alliances, and racial integration could do little 
about the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court, the state legisla­
ture and judicial system, but they could vent effectively their frustrations 
on the schools. Bringing a deeply emotional bias, at once frenetic and 
poignant, to the questions of curriculum and educational policies, they 
made the schools centers of intense political debate and conflict. 
Among the signs that troubled times lay ahead for education was a 
pamphlet published by the House Committee on Un-American Activ­
ities (HCU A), "100 Things You Should Know about Communism and 
Education." Chaired by J. Parnell Thomas (N. J.) and energized by such 
red-baiting members as Karl E. Mundt (S.D.) and Richard M. Nixon 
(Calif.), the HCUA distributed hundreds of thousands of this pamphlet 
that linked national politics to subversives in the schools and included 
scurrilous propaganda simplicities like the following: 
Q. What is Communism? 
A. A conspiracy to conquer and rule the world by any means. 
Q. Is it aimed at me? 
A. Right between your eyes. 
Q. What do the Communists want? 
a. To rule your mind and your body from the cradle to the grave. 
b. Power; Communists all have a craze for power. 
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Q.	 How can I tell a Communist? 
A.	 A Communist will criticize the President of the United States of 
America, but not Stalin. 
Q.	 Are there many Communist fronts and fellow travelers in the 
United States school system? 
A.	 There are, and they are a deadly danger. 
Q.	 What's biting these people, anyhow? 
A.	 Here is at least one part of the answer given by John Hanna, a professor of 
Columbia University. "The girls' schools and women's colleges contain 
some of the most loyal disciples of Russia." "Teachers there are often frus­
trated females. They have gone through bitter struggles to attain their po­
sitions." "A political dogma based on hatred expresses their personal atti­
tudes." 
Q.	 You mean there are actually Communist schools in this country? 
A.	 Yes. 
Q.	 Do many of our teachers play the Communist game? 
A.	 Thefiles of our Committee show that the Communists have always found 
the teaching group the easiest touch of all the professional classes.9 
Thousands of copies were distributed to schools, a few of which used it 
as a sociology text. Such activities made the HCU A the first symbol of a 
new American witch hunt,10 soon termed McCarthyism. 
Professors were among the first to face the cold war inquisition. A 
significant test of academic freedom began in March 1948 at the Univer­
sity of Washington, where six tenured members of the faculty were 
charged with past or present membership in the Communist party. After 
a short but exceedingly rancorous struggle that featured savage denun­
ciation and the browbeating of professors, three of the accused were 
dismissed and three suspended. The issue debated was not whether they 
were Communists (several admitted as much), but whether they could 
be objective teachers. Yet dismissal and suspension came not because of 
their teaching records, which were good, but because they were judged 
heretics by an administration intolerant of their economic philoso­
phies." From the University of Washington, the testing of academic 
freedom spread to Oregon State College, the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Evansville College, the University of Kansas City, Rutgers 
University, and elsewhere.12 No complete count exists of teachers and 
professors who lost their jobs through dismissal, suspension, refusal to 
take loyalty oaths, or resignation following harrassment, but the 
number runs well into the thousands. The California Senate Un-
American Activities Committee announced in March 1953 that, in the 
previous ten months alone, more than a hundred California teachers 
and professors were dismissed or had resigned because of alleged Com­
munist activities.13 
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Meanwhile, the proximate event that caused public school adminis­
trators and teachers to shudder was the firing (forced resignation) of Dr. 
Willard E. Goslin, superintendent of schools in Pasadena, California. A 
leading advocate of progressive education, Goslin had a national repu­
tation, having been elected president of the American Association of 
School Administrators in 1948, the year he arrived in Pasadena. The 
immediate issue of a tax proposal facing the new superintendent was 
soon eclipsed by others of greater political consequence, including the 
purpose of school expenditures, alleged Communist party infiltration of 
the schools, and the candidacy of two socialists in the school board elec­
tion. When it became widely known in the community that Goslin had 
invited William Heard Kilpatrick, of Columbia Teachers College, to a 
teacher-training workshop, opponents mounted a campaign against 
progressive education, arguing that it was part of a plan to bring collec­
tivism to America. Additionally, desegregation formed a controversial 
part of the superintendent's plans for the Pasadena school system. With 
these emotional issues muddying the currents of discussion, few could 
have been surprised in 1950 when Pasadenians defeated the tax measure 
and called for Goslin's dismissal. 
Dissatisfied with general news accounts of the episode, the investiga­
tive reporter David Hulburd began asking questions. In early 1951 he 
published This Happened in Pasadena, which demonstrated the intense 
involvement of Allen Zoll's National Council for American Education, 
an outside organization concerned with alleged Communist infiltration 
of the schools. Zoll's organization supplied Goslin's opponents with 
pamphlets linking progressivism with crime, juvenile delinquency, and 
Communism. That kind of misinformation and unsupported allegation 
intensified emotions, spread suspicion, and, in the end, set neighbor 
against neighbor.14 
The intervention of organized, right-wing national groups in local 
matters represented a spreading phenomenon of cold war America. The 
most common assertions of rightist groups were that the schools har­
bored either Communists or Communist sympathizers, that they cost 
too much money, and that they failed to teach the three Rs properly. 
Two leading organizations were the Friends of the Public Schools of 
America and the aforementioned National Council for American Edu­
cation (NCAE). Allen Zoll, who served the NCAE as executive vice-
president, was a Fascist propagandist and head of American Patriots, 
an organization the U.S. attorney general named as subversive. The 
NCAE published a monthly bulletin, Educational Guardian, and a 
"Red-ucator" series that purported to reveal Communist party influ­
ences at numerous universities. Among the more famous NCAE pam­
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phlets were "How Red Are the Schools?", "The Commies Are after Your 
Kids," and "Progressive Education Increases Juvenile Delinquency."15 
Other influential groups included the American Education Associa­
tion, Church League of America, Conference of American Small Busi­
ness Organizations Committee on Education (sponsor of Educational 
Reviewer, a right-wing review of textbooks edited by Lucille Cardin 
Crain), and Employers Association of Chicago, publishers of "How Red 
Is the Little Red School House?" The Committee for Constitutional 
Government, opposed to welfare statism, collectivism, and Marxism in 
America, distributed thousands of copies of right-wing books such as 
John T. Flynn's The Roosevelt Myth (1948) and The Road Ahead: 
America's Creeping Revolution (1949) and cooperated with dozens of 
smaller organizations to warn Americans of spreading socialism. The 
National Economic Council, a nationalist-isolationist group headed by 
Merwin K. Hart and similar to the Committee for Constitutional Gov­
ernment, opposed immigration, public housing, TVA, the UN, civil 
rights measures, federal aid to education, and, like every group, Com­
munist influence in the schools. Groups effective in assorted local cam­
paigns were the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Sons of the 
American Revolution, the Anti-Communist League of America, De­
fenders of American Education, and the American Coalition of Pa­
triotic Societies. 
The rightist groups leading the bitter assault on the nation's schools 
also worked tenaciously to pass state loyalty oath statutes for teachers. 
Oath statutes passed during the 1920s and 1930s were reaffirmed after 
World War II, with laggard states adding new ones. By 1953 thirty-two 
states had passed loyalty oath legislation. Counting states not singling 
out teachers, the number rises to thirty-six, or 75 percent of the states. 
(Most statutes enacted after 1947, however, referred specifically to 
teachers.) In addition, twenty-six states expressly prohibited subver­
sives from teaching.l6 The belief that teachers were peculiarly vulnerable 
to the blandishments of radicals was one of the many unfounded suppo­
sitions of McCarthyism. 
Criticism of teacher loyalty and the curriculum spread to textbooks 
and supplementary reading materials. All over the land, boards of edu­
cation, citizen groups, and Parent-Teacher Associations examined read­
ing materials for indications of political and moral waywardness. In one 
case (frequently ridiculed, later), Robin Hood was removed from Indi­
ana school libraries on the conjecture that the story supported Commu­
nist party doctrine. In Los Angeles rightist pressure groups, supported 
by the Hearst press, succeeded in forcing the removal of UNESCO 
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materials from the classrooms. D. H. Lawrence's Studies in Classic 
American Literature proved unacceptable reading for Houston high­
schoolers; suspension awaited two teachers who read passages to 
students. 
The battle of the books that rocked Scarsdale, New York, betokened 
the irrational character of the subversive reading phenomenon. Scars­
dale was not a community likely to succumb to communist ideas. Ex­
tremely wealthy and heavily Republican, it was the home of numerous 
front-rank Manhattan executives. One Manhattan banker, long inter­
ested in Communist party front organizations, discovered in the school 
library ten books by Howard Fast and one by Anna Louise Strong, still 
favorites of leftist readers. That discovery, together with subsequent 
demands for the removal of various volumes, including novels, biogra­
phies, and texts, soon entangled the entire community of 14,500 people. 
School board meetings were further enlivened when the Reverend Wil­
liam C. Kernan joined the crusade to cleanse the libraries. Communism, 
he declared, was the antithesis of Christianity, and he saw it on the rise in 
the heavily conservative community. To one questioner who had asked 
what lay behind the house-cleaning crusade, he answered: "What's be­
hind this is to keep Communism out of the Scarsdale school system. It's 
already there and you don't know Communism when you see it."17 After 
the teachers themselves fell under suspicion of disloyalty, Scarsdale be­
came a community on fire, fueled by petition and counterpetition, and 
embittered by gratuitous charges and countercharges. 
Eventually, Scarsdale concluded that whatever the political and so­
cial preferences of the authors, exposure to books was a better risk than 
censorship. But it stood as a warning to other communities, such as Port 
Washington, New York; Denver, Colorado; Eugene, Oregon; Engle­
wood, New Jersey; Richland, Washington; Houston, Texas; Little 
Rock, Arkansas; and Lafayette, Indiana—many of which concluded 
otherwise. These cities were but a few of the communities that stood out 
in the nationwide anxiety over Communist infiltration of the schools 
and the textbook industry. Here again, nationwide organizations played 
an important role. Lucille Cardin Crain, secretary of the Conference of 
American Small Business Organizations Committee on Education, 
drew attention in her newsletter, Educational Reviewer, to books that 
undermined the free enterprise system or failed to criticize the Soviet 
economy and government. With Allen Zoll and hundreds of other active 
guardians of the American verities, she contributed to the dark shadow 
of suspicion and distrust that characterized McCarthyism. 
The numerous national groups, to be sure, reflected various concerns. 
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Some proclaimed economic freedom to be their goal; others, political 
liberty. Still others defended exclusive versions of Americanism. Yet, 
when reading the enormous literature, it is clear that variations were a 
matter of degree only; that though indeed fearful of Communist subver­
sion, the guardians of rectitude manipulated those fears to justify fierce 
attacks on social and economic experiments of which they disapproved, 
such as the New Deal, Wagner Act, TV A, UN, Social Security, and the 
progressive income tax.18 The literature reveals the hatred with which 
the Right viewed Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, a hatred by 
groups apprehensive of fundamental social change and willing to use the 
loyalty issue not only against subversives, who were seldom found, but 
against proponents of progressive education, liberals, welfare statists, 
intellectuals, and strikers.19 The genuine poignance of the situation, 
when it was that, may move us to empathy; but the confusion, anger, 
oppressive tactics, and willingness to tamper with the schools revealed 
an appalling readiness to sacrifice children's education to adult anxi­
eties. 
Not all the forces affecting education were ideological, however. 
Other powerful pressures for educational reform existed quite inde­
pendent of cold war matters. The public realized that the postwar baby 
boom necessitated new school construction and the hiring of more 
teachers, but it was unprepared for the spiraling numbers that ensued. 
Total school enrollment, virtually unchanged for twenty years, in the 
1950s expanded by 13 million pupils (table 2). Much of this increase 
came at the lower levels. Enrollment in kindergarten and grades one 
through eight, stable in the 1940s, jumped by more than 10 million in the 
1950s. The twentieth century provided no precedent for such growth, a 
veritable explosion that meant heavier financial burdens for states and 
local communities. After tripling in the 1940s, state revenues for public 
schools increased by another 166 percent in the following decade. Local 
revenues doubled in the 1940s, then in the 1950s nearly tripled (table 3). 
Expenditures per pupil enrolled in public schools leaped 370 percent 
from $92 in 1940 to $433 two decades later (table 2). 
Enrollment growth in higher education outstripped even that in the 
public schools, rising from 1.5 million in 1940 to 2.6 million in 1950 and 
to more than 3.2 million in 1960 (table 4). Measured as a percentage of 
population, ages 18-21, higher education enrollment rose from 15.6 
percent (1940) to 36.6 percent (1960). Expenditures burgeoned from 
$758 million in 1946 to $6.6 billion in 1960, a hefty 773 percent increase 
(table 4). The explosive growth of higher education during the late 1940s 
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TABLE 3 
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: REVENUE

BY SOURCE OF FUNDS, 192O-196021

(Dollar amounts in millions)

SCHOOL INTERMEDIATE AND 
YEAR TOTAL REVENUE 
FEDERAL STATE 
LOCAL SOURCES 
ENDING Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage 
1920 $ 970 $ 2 0.2 $ 160 16.5 $ 808 83.3 
1930 2,089 7 0.4 354 16.9 1,727 82.7 
1940 2,261 40 1.8 684 30.3 1,536 68.0 
1950 5,437 156 2.9 2,166 39.8 3,116 57.3 









(Dollar amounts in millions)

HIGHER EDUCATION 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES, CAPITAL ENROLLMENT AS PER­YEAR 
OUTLAY, AND INTEREST CENTAGE OF POPULATION, ENDING ENROLLMENT GRADUATES 
Total Public Private Age 18-21 
1920 $ 267 $ 116 $ 151 597,880 8.1 48,622 
1930 632 289 343 1,100,737 12.4 122,484 
1940 758 392 367 1,494,203 15.6 186,500 
1950 2,662 1,430 1,233 2,659,021 27.2 432,058 
1960 6,616 3,753 2,864 3,236,000 36.6 392,440 
of Rights (officially known as the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 
1944). Enacted by Congress without a dissenting vote and signed by 
President Roosevelt just two weeks after the Normandy invasion, the 
act reflected national concern over the welfare of veterans. Sponsors 
feared that returning GIs, having already sacrificed a normal civilian 
life, in addition would have to face unemployment. College-bound veter­
ans, therefore, were offered subsistence allowances and payments of tui­
tion fees and school supplies. The response far surpassed expectations. 
In the 1949-50 academic year, for example, higher education enrolled 
2,659,000 students, of whom veterans numbered 853,000, or nearly one-
third of the total enrollment. Overall, approximately 7,800,000 veterans 
went to school under the G.I. Bill at a cost to the government of $14.5 
billion. Inasmuch as the education provisions were part of a larger pro­
gram that included medical benefits, home and business loans, and help 
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in securing employment, the wartime act did not signal a special com­
mitment to the principle of federal aid for all deserving college stu­
dents.23 As an investment in democracy and jobs, as well as education, 
the G.I. Bill was one of the wisest wartime decisions of the U.S. govern­
ment.24 Yet it was a harbinger of later federal-collegiate relations in that 
higher education passively accepted a momentous program that the fed­
eral government had determined was in the national interest. 
The foregoing transformations helped generate a national debate 
over teacher shortages, school construction (which during hostilities 
had slowed to a virtual standstill), districting, and racial segregation.25 
The questions were as numerous as they were difficult. What kind of 
education was appropriate for masses of students? What constituted 
quality in mid-twentieth-century America? Now that a commitment to 
educate all had been made, could all potential students be reached? 
What about problem students? Gifted students? Should students be 
taught to resist communism or merely enabled to understand it, thereby 
betting that free choices would strengthen national loyalties? How 
should subject areas, having grown complex, be taught? It is little 
wonder that education became a major battleground in postwar Amer­
ica. The cold war created none of these problems but exacerbated all of 
them by providing an environment of anxiety coupled with a sense of 
national urgency that otherwise would have been absent. 
With the education question becoming a central problem of cold war 
America, educational organizations were forced to respond. The largest 
and most influential of the organizations, the National Education Asso­
ciation (NEA), took its stand in June 1949 when its Educational Policies 
Commission (chaired by John Norton of Columbia Teachers College 
and including such luminaries as James B. Conant and Dwight D. Ei­
senhower) published a remarkable fifty-four-page pamphlet entitled 
"American Education and International Tensions." The pamphlet re­
vealed the thinking of leading educators on communism, the cold war, 
and the relationship of education to both. The educators drew attention 
to major paradoxes of the cold war: the world was split asunder at the 
very time that science and technology had made the "world seem small 
and compact"; amid talk of peace went furious preparations for war. 
These formed the major realities around which educational policy must 
evolve, perhaps for the remainder of the century.26 
Despite its brevity the report sought balance. The major sources of 
fear were to be found in the new weaponry that threatened not only 
soldiers but entire populations, surging population growth, and world­
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wide economic dislocations. Vast, inequitable disparities of resources 
would in all probability "keep the world in a state of cold war for years to 
come." On the other hand, the educators saw reason for hope. Acknowl­
edging that nationalism, at its worst fanatical, irresponsible, and arro­
gant, would continue, they argued that it represented "the most massive 
achievement to date in widening the areas of law and unity." There was 
no inherent need to fear the dissolution of old empires and emergence of 
new nations as long as the developing nations avoided entanglement in 
great power rivalries. Technology could be a healing instrument for 
removing ancient causes of misery. Trade, transportation, and new de­
velopments in communications technology together with the vast net­
work of international machinery ranging from the United Nations to the 
Organization of American States were strong forces of interdependence 
uniting men and nations. Although the future would be shaped by the 
decisions of governments, "the prospect is that the present pattern of 
East-West tensions will continue indefinitely without armed conflict." 
On the educational matter most on the public mind—loyalty and sub­
version in the schools—little was said. The report's most significant rec­
ommendation was firm, however, and stated twice: "Members of the 
Communist Party of the United States should not be employed as 
teachers."27 
Approval was swift. President Truman endorsed the report the day 
after U.S. Commissioner of Education Earl McGrath presented it to 
him. A month later the eighty-seventh annual convention of the NEA, 
amid a tumultuous session in Boston, overwhelmingly endorsed the re­
port. There was little doubt that the NEA, never in its history a conspic­
uous champion of academic freedom, had made a peace offering to the 
anti-Communist critics of public education.28 
Two-and-a-half years later, the Educational Policies Commission 
and the American Council on Education, with funding from the Carne­
gie Corporation, published a second pamphlet, "Education and Na­
tional Security," describing the nature of American international obli­
gations and suggesting ways in which education at all levels could 
contribute to the national effort. It spoke of great stresses on American 
society during the recent hazardous years: political confusion and div­
ision, the expensive armaments program, failures in public and private 
morals, and increasing "sensuality and materialism." Worse, "America 
faces the problem of treason in a degree and manner unknown to our 
past experience and shocking to the assumptions by which we live." 
Because it appeared shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
report reflected a greater sense of urgency than its predecessor. It envis­
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aged a limitless war of words in which the United States should attempt 
to outstrip the propaganda techniques of the Communists: although not 
yet communicating the right ideas, "our film industry, our radio sys­
tems, the producers of image and idea in comic books and popular liter­
ature and magazines and newspapers have great inherent capacity." 
During the critical years in national security, it was incumbent on educa­
tors to see that schools serve as an instrument of national policy. It was 
necessary, particularly at the elementary and secondary levels, to estab­
lish good citizenship education programs. The schools must educate for 
moral and spiritual values, teach democracy, and increase devotion to 
public welfare. In particular, the schools would make "efficient produc­
ers" of the young, whom the fashioners of educational policy called a 
"resource" to be used by the government for national purposes.29 
Unlike its predecessor, "Education and National Security" accented 
the pivotal role of colleges and universities, whose students would serve 
as the "scouts, mapmakers, and guides" for the complex technological 
world being born. It cited with approval an earlier study by the Ameri­
can Council on Education that offered the federal government the use of 
campus physical plants, suggested ways to use manpower efficiently, 
and volunteered assistance in community civil defense programs.30 
Though committee members disguised the extent to which their pro­
gram would curtail individual freedom in curriculum selection, they did 
acknowledge that certain traditional rights enjoyed in academe must 
yield to the developing coordination of educational policies and military 
service. Colleges and universities were now obliged to lift "each student 
to his highest capacity to contribute to the nation's strength," meaning 
that they must train more students in medicine, the sciences, psychol­
ogy, statistics, and—to execute President Truman's Point Four Pro­
gram—agronomy, animal husbandry, geology, and the various branch­
es of engineering, particularly chemical, industrial, marine, mining, and 
sanitary. Nor was this all. They would contribute to the national defense 
by educating a major portion of the officer corps and by producing a 
young population that was unflinchingly anticommunist.31 
By the time of the Korean War, then, cold war tensions had enabled 
educators to include education in the canon of national security and to 
fashion it into a vital arm of the welfare-warfare state. The traditional 
focus of the schools on personal goals, even when related to industrial 
needs, shifted perceptibly to national goals. It should be remembered, 
too, that this new orientation was demanded in the first instance not by 
the political elite but by leading educators sensitive to public opinion 
and attuned to the interests of the modern security-minded state. The 
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enthusiastic public reception of their reports reassured them and en­
couraged their belief that further public displays of anticommunism 
would redound to the well-being of academic institutions. To teachers 
and other workers in education, it seemed that their leaders were playing 
a directing role in the cold war.32 
Although the American Council on Education and the powerful Na­
tional Education Association expressed the prevailing viewpoint, indi­
vidual educators disagreed that the first priority of education was to 
enhance national security. Although very much concerned about the 
health of the state, they stressed instead intellectual training and curricu­
lar reform. Their central criticism was of progressive education, a sub­
ject of endless confusion and controversy. Debated in literally countless 
speeches and essays in the first decade of the cold war, this philosophy 
had developed in opposition to educational methods dominant in late 
nineteenth-century America. As people moved into cities and factories, 
industrial methods and values heavily influenced the contemporary em­
phasis on drill, memorization, discipline, order, and moral didacticism. 
If modern industrial society required a literate public and skilled 
workers, then the education system would provide them. Although too 
much can be made of the fact, the regimentation required in the nation's 
factories and assembly lines sanctioned and hardened an already exist­
ing regimentation in the schools. 
Hoping to replace an educational philosophy so narrowly conceived, 
progressive educators encouraged children to develop according to their 
talents and along lines enabling them to adjust not only to factory rou­
tine but to all manner of life situations; hence, the "child-centered" 
school. Following the lead of John Dewey and Francis W. Parker,33 
educators and school administrators in the 1920s took up the new phi­
losophy and schooled themselves in personality formation, the psychol­
ogy of learning, the physical and mental health of children, and creative 
expression in the arts. Individual projects, exhibits, and field trips 
became the vehicles of such interests. As the twenties gave way to the 
thirties, economic breakdown evoked serious questions about the effi­
cacy of the social-economic order of the United States and caused heart­
ache and practical problems for education. Educators turned en masse 
to a more liberal progressivism that stressed the social responsibilities of 
the schools and emphasized the need for planning a new social order. 
Many teachers without necessarily intending to came to accept an acti­
vist role for the state. 
The social orientation of the progressive educators was short-lived, 
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however. As the economy slowly recovered and war clouds gathered 
over Europe, progressive educators veiled or even relinquished their re­
cently found social views in the interest of preserving the democratic 
way of life. The new emphases were political democracy, intergroup 
relations, intercultural education, and later, winning the war. Suffering 
psychological fatigue and a loss of cohesion, liberal progressivism 
dwindled in national influence and interest.34 
Following World War II, however, progressive education expe­
rienced a final burst of energy through the life-adjustment movement. 
This alternative to intellectual education originated in the Vocational 
Education Division of the United States Office of Education, which in 
1944 began a study of educational needs in the years ahead. At the final 
conference of the study, in May and June 1945, participants demanding 
a more realistic education for secondary school youth passed the follow­
ing resolution: 
It is the belief of this conference that, with the aid of this report in final 
form, the vocational school of a community will be able better to prepare 20 
percent of the youth of secondary-school age for entrance upon desirable 
skilled occupations; and that the high school will continue to prepare another 
20 percent for entrance to college. We do not believe that the remaining 60 
percent of our youth of secondary school age will receive the life-adjustment 
training they need and to which they are entitled as American citizens— 
unless and until the administrators of public education with the assistance of 
the vocational education leaders formulate a similar program for this group. 
A subsequent rewording of the resolution made clear that the educators 
meant to serve "an increasing number of youth for whom college prepa­
ration or training for skilled occupations is neither feasible nor appro­
priate."35 The trend to new courses in homemaking, health, commercial 
English, and auto mechanics that had emerged during the interwar years 
now reached new heights. Athletic programs proliferated. As schools 
came to teach everything the local community demanded, traditional 
fare such as history, grammar, and foreign languages suffered. 
Although the movement for life-adjustment education had its origins 
in the U.S. Office of Education, other groups and commissions provided 
support. For example, in 1944 the Educational Policies Commission, 
appointed by the NE A and the American Association of School Admin­
istrators, published a lengthy volume entitled Education for All Ameri­
can Youth. The word All was underlined, and readers immediately dis­
covered why, for the report accentuated the diversity of students 
attending school. Differences existed in intelligence and aptitude, occu­
pational interests and outlooks, availability of educational facilities, 
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types of communities, social and economic status, parental attitudes 
and cultural backgrounds, personal and avocational interests, and fi­
nally, mental health, emotional stability, and physical well-being.36 No 
single mode of education could adequately respond to the flourishing of 
American cultural pluralism. 
Chapter four of the report, written from the vantage point of a future 
historian surveying recent educational progress, celebrated the expan­
sion of services, particularly in vocational education: advanced schools 
had expanded the "restricted" vocational offering of yesterday—"metal 
trades, machine shop, auto mechanics, electrical trades, some of the 
building trades, business education, retail selling, and homemaking"— 
and now offered training in such fields as "air conditioning, refrigera­
tion, airplane construction, air transportation, housing construction, 
radio and television, and the manufacture of synthetic products." 
Nothing was said about the intellectual disciplines. Perhaps the anti-
intellectual educational climate of the times is best revealed by the fact 
that the Educational Policies Commission of the NEA worried not that 
intellectual education might suffer but rather that "civic competence 
and personal development" had been slighted.37 
The final chapter, entitled "The History That Must Be Written," dis­
cussed federal aid to education, state education associations, education 
officials, and the collection of information on occupational trends. Al­
though curriculum warranted just one paragraph, the overall thrust was 
clear. School curricula had focused too heavily on college preparatory 
courses. In the new era the claims of the majority not bound for college 
would direct curricular planning. " What affects the happiness and wel­
fare of the young people of our community is of direct and vital concern 
to our staff.'" That meant that the schools must concern themselves with 
the total, generally nonintellectual, experiences of the community. If the 
student had a poor home life, the school would countervail with social 
activities. If his health was poor, the school would undertake corrective 
measures. If the recreational life of the community was "mean and 
tawdry," the school would provide better programs and facilities.38 Thus 
was born the school as welfare institution; its primary function would 
not be intellectual growth. 
The commission's report, published by two of the nation's most pres­
tigious educational associations and expressing the views of prominent 
educators,39 reflected opinion forged in the experience of war. It enjoyed 
nationwide distribution, particularly among teachers and educational 
administrators, running through eight printings until May 1952, when a 
revised edition appeared.40 By that time James B. Conant had become 
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chairman, but little else had changed. The revised edition did not rec­
ommend substantial changes in the educational principles and school 
practices advocated in the original volume. 
It was this version of progressive education that came under scorching 
criticism in the postwar reappraisal of public education. Books, articles, 
and pamphlets proliferated, as did reprints of government study groups 
and commissions. Hollis Caswell, then dean of Columbia Teachers Col­
lege, remarked that never since the days of Horace Mann had such a 
widespread discussion of basic educational issues taken place. Denying 
the "plot theory" of extremists who detected socialist prejudices every­
where, he acknowledged that reform energies were strong, but that for 
the first time in two generations they were not of the progressive vari­
ety.41 In the first place, the new reformers criticized the lack of qualita­
tive standards. Having rigidly eschewed a dual school system—one for 
the socially privileged and another for those who were not—educators 
had eliminated traditional requirements and unnecessarily lowered 
standards in an attempt to meet the putative needs of students who 
themselves were unable to define needs. The second line of criticism 
dealt with teaching methods, stressing that the schools should cease ef­
forts to produce educated students through a slavish devotion to inter­
ests and to beget democrats by observing meetings of the town council. 
Rather, they should transmit the rudiments of civilization and prepare 
the mind to reason. 
This critique originated in three groups: academicians who opposed 
the power of professional educationists; intellectuals who had philosoph­
ical objections to the instrumentalist thrust of progressive education;42 
and popular writers who merged these themes with criticism that the 
schools were too collectivist. Early statements came in 1949 from Ber­
nard Iddings Bell (Crisis in Education) and Mortimer Smith (And 
Madly Teach), both arguing that American schools needed to stress 
basic subject matter, hard work, and greater discipline in order to return 
education to its historic role as moral and intellectual leader.43 
The restoration of the intellectual eminence of schooling soon found 
other advocates. The banner year was 1953, when four important books 
appeared, all critical of progressive education: Arthur Bestor's Educa­
tional Wastelands, Robert Hutchins's The Conflict in Education, Paul 
Woodring's Let's Talk Sense about Our Schools, and Albert Lynd's 
Quackery in the Public Schools. The following year brought Mortimer 
Smith's The Diminished Mind and Randall Jarrell's brilliant satire, Pic­
tures from an Institution.^ No volume on education during the first 
decade of the cold war generated more discussion than Bestor's Educa­
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tional Wastelands. To the analyses of earlier critics, the Illinois profes­
sor of history added historical perspective, up-to-date data, and a more 
sophisticated defense of the thesis that all students could profit from 
immersion in the basic academic disciplines. His bete noire was life-
adjustment education and its perpetrators—education professors, 
school administrators, and government education officials. This "inter­
locking public school directorate" (held up to savage review) monopo­
lized both the preparation of teachers and the process by which state 
laws supported the distended educational curriculums and require­
ments. The central purpose of education, the "deliberate cultivation of 
the ability to think," could be restored only by successfully challenging 
the directorate for the control of schooling and by providing sound 
training in the fundamental ways of thinking represented by history, 
science, mathematics, language, art, and other intellectual disciplines.45 
With like-minded critics of progressive education, including Morti­
mer Smith and James Koerner, Bestor in 1956 helped establish the 
Council for Basic Education, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. It 
defended the view that schools must concentrate on developing intellec­
tual skills in order to better transmit the intellectual and moral heritage 
of civilization. The council's statement of purpose read in part: "It insists 
that only by the maintenance of high academic standards can the ideal of 
democratic education be realized—the ideal of offering to all the chil­
dren of all the people of the United States not merely an opportunity to 
attend school, but the privilege of receiving there the soundest education 
that is offered any place in the world." Financed by foundation grants 
and membership dues, the council published the CBE Bulletin and sup­
ported research and publications that strengthened basic education.46 
Although Bestor, like Bell and Smith earlier, was interested mainly in 
the intellectual renewal of education, he nevertheless revealed his sensi­
tivity to cold war realities when he suggested that a literate population 
was necessary and vital to the health of the nation. This assertion was 
developed by Vice-Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who in dogged prose 
related the curricular reforms Bestor had in mind directly to the needs of 
national security. In a series of addresses beginning in 1956, the father of 
the Nautilus and the nuclear navy boldly charged that American educa­
tional institutions were endangering the security of the country, most 
notably by undervaluing intellectual competence, ignoring the creative 
expert, and stressing know-how subjects instead of solid learning and 
fundamental principles. Like Bestor, Smith, Lynd, and the Council on 
Basic Education, he scorned the "piddling problems" of life-adjustment 
education. Courses in the use of the camera, telephone, consumer credit, 
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and the techniques of being well-liked were worse than worthless, for 
they minimized the "vexing problem of mental inequalities," and in so 
doing, failed to develop potentialities and to produce professionals.47 
Rickover had the engineer's distaste for inefficiency and waste wher­
ever they were found—the waste of good farmland, forests, oil, clean 
rivers and lakes, and bright minds, "our most valuable national asset." 
Because "the man of the future on whom we shall depend more and 
more is the technical expert," the schools must replace shallow socializa­
tion courses with those that nurture intellect. "The only acceptable coin 
which buys an education is hard intellectual effort." He told Edward R. 
Murrow that education is "even more important than atomic power in 
the Navy, for if our people are not properly educated in accordance with 
the terrific requirements of this rapidly spiraling scientific and industrial 
civilization, we are bound to go down. The Russians apparently have 
recognized this." To obtain the needed number of scientists, engineers, 
mathematicians, and foreign language experts, Rickover proposed mon­
ey incentives for competent teachers and graduates in those areas, abil­
ity grouping, accelerated high schools, an extension of the school year 
from 180 to 210 days, and, like a growing number of other critics, an end 
to the power of professional educators.48 
Rickover shared with earlier critics a concern about anti-intellec­
tualism in America but differed from them in openly insisting upon what 
one historian of education has called "the sorting machine" function of 
public education: government utilization of the schools to channel stu­
dents into areas of training where their talents would best serve the in­
terests of society and the state.49 He differed also in the urgency with 
which he emphasized that the United States must never run second to 
the Soviet Union. "Russian engineering and scientific development con­
stitute a threat to our military power. There can be no second 
place in a contest with Russia and there will be no second chance if we 
lose." Thus, it was Russian scientific and technological progress that 
prompted Rickover to criticize American education. His somber mes­
sage was that "the future belongs to the best-educated nation"; his fore­
most objective was to make it ours.50 Despite Rickover's cold arrogance, 
growing numbers deemed his message appropriate as the 1950s wore on, 
especially as it held out the promise of victory in the long cold war strug­
gle. When Sputnik finally pierced the thick armor of American preten­
sions to superiority, Rickover looked very much like a prophet whose 
time had come. 
Less elitist in educational philosophy than Rickover, but in agree­
ment that the nation needed more mathematicians, scientists, and engi­
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neers, James B. Conant in early 1959 capped a decade of stormy educa­
tional criticism with a constructive report on the comprehensive high 
school. Funded by the Carnegie Corporation, this widely influential, 
national study of 103 high schools and 4 school systems began a month 
before Sputnik, after a half-year of planning. Convinced that university 
professors had been unduly harsh on American public education, Co­
nant defended the concept of the comprehensive high school, arguing 
that it could be made satisfactory "without any radical changes in the 
basic pattern."51 
Conant's message was blunt: the number one need of many states was 
to eliminate the small high school with its sharply limited program. Un­
less a school had a graduating class of at least a hundred students, it 
could not offer the diversified curriculum necessary to fulfill individual 
and national needs. By that criterion 17,000, or approximately 80 per­
cent, of the nation's senior high schools were too small. Millions of stu­
dents had no opportunity to study physics, a modern foreign language, 
or trigonometry. For example, only 12,000 of the 21,000 high schools 
offered a physics course, and some of those were of substandard quality. 
The high cost of educational facilities and adequate instruction meant 
that little would be achieved in the absence of school district reorganiza­
tion and consolidation. Larger schools would also facilitate more effi­
cient utilization of the inadequate numbers of competent teachers.52 
To enhance the intellectual foundation of the curriculum, the former 
president of Harvard University recommended that all pupils complete 
four years of English, three or four years of social studies (including two 
years of history), one senior course in American politics or government, 
one year of mathematics, and at least one year of science. For academi­
cally talented pupils, estimated at 15 percent of the student population 
and in whom Conant became increasingly interested as the study pro­
gressed, minimum standards were more rigorous: four years of mathe­
matics, four years of English, four years of one foreign language, three 
years of social studies, and three years of science.53 Wary of inflexible 
teaching programs that branded individuals for life, Conant called for 
ability grouping by subject matter, the possible undemocratic aspects of 
which would be countered by daily homeroom periods involving all stu­
dents in the rudiments of representative government. Thus did Conant, 
seeking intellectual quality, reach back to the Committee of Ten report 
(1894) and attempt to effect its basic program in a period of mass educa­
tion. The modern high school would challenge the best students with 
advanced work without segregating them into special schools. 
Uppermost in the mind of the former high commissioner to West 
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Germany was the cultural and military conflict with the Soviet Union. 
Fearing that American citizens were slow to understand the implica­
tions of nuclear weapons and Soviet imperialism for education, he 
warned frequently of a possible Soviet world conquest. Taken together, 
his educational writings, extending over many years, constitute a power­
ful statement of why a democratic industrial and military power must 
mobilize its educational institutions to serve foreign policy objectives. 
Concerned with the effective utilization of all student talents, Conant 
was especially bothered about "the loss to the nation" suffered when 
bright students avoided programs of solid study. For their own sake and 
for the "sake of the nation," the better students could be expected to do 
their homework.54 
Unlike most prophets, whose warnings of distant and calamitous 
events go unfulfilled, critics of education seemed vindicated when on 4 
October 1957 the Soviet Union thrust into orbit a man-made satellite. 
Most press accounts of Sputnik emphasized the miraculous scientific 
and technological advances of the Soviets and extolled the impressive 
educational system that lay behind them. American education, how­
ever, suffered a renewed barrage of criticism.55 It was a rare article that 
did not relate education to national goals; indeed, education and 
science, together with military weaponry, now constituted three of the 
main battlegrounds of the cold war. The first wave of suggestions ranged 
from curriculum reform to a complete overhaul of American university 
education, increased spending on schools, federal aid to education, im­
proved incentives for teachers and graduate students, and scholarships 
for talented students. Cultural criticism often emerged in the exhorta­
tion that the United States begin honoring its intellectuals and through 
ways unspecified revise its faltering spiritual heritage.56 Even I. F. Stone, 
not one to panic on East-West issues, wrote shortly after the Soviets 
orbited Sputnik II (3 November 1957) that the United States must revo­
lutionize its educational system "if our national pride is to be saved." But 
he added that the U.S.S.R. had an enormous weakness with its lack of 
individual freedom and political democracy, and that the outlook for 
the United States need not be bleak if it avoided an arms race and en­
couraged freedom at home.57 
The most popular post-Sputnik assault on education appeared in 
March and April 1958 when Life published a five-part series of picture 
essays entitled "Crisis in Education."58 Life depicted a crisis of over­
crowded buildings, overworked and "grossly underpaid" teachers, con­
fusion over what the schools should teach, a bewildering proliferation of 
246 | Reshaping America 
elective courses, ill-advised attempts by the schools to be all things to all 
people, and, most appalling, a startling deterioration of educational 
standards. Millions of readers learned that Alexei, a sixteen-year-old 
Soviet student, studied several hours each day, excelled in science, and 
was well-read both in Russian and English literature. Chess, concerts, 
and piano practice claimed his leisure time. A tenth-year student, he 
would enter the university the following year to study physics. Stephen, 
his American counterpart from Chicago, already in his eleventh year, 
would have to wait two years for college, yet upon entry would be no 
further advanced than Alexei. His school day was not taxing. After 
walking to school with his girl friend, he went to typing class and con­
tinued through a schedule that, however respectable, he did not take 
seriously. Underworked and lacking discipline, Stephen disregarded as­
signments and devoted most of his time and nearly all his considerable 
energies to extracurricular activities. 
Life's conclusion followed closely the views of the basic educationists: 
the United States was falling behind the Soviets, whose Spartan system 
was producing many students "better equipped than ours to cope with 
the technicalities of the Space Age." The editors agreed with the judg­
ment of novelist and education critic Sloan Wilson: "It is hard to deny 
that America's schools, which were supposed to reflect one of history's 
noblest dreams and to cultivate the nation's youthful minds, have de­
generated into a system for coddling and entertaining the mediocre." 
The way out was to remove "the debris left by 40 years of the progressive 
educationists," insist on a stiff academic curriculum for the college-
bound, require plenty of science and mathematics, eliminate trivial 
courses, throttle the power of teachers colleges, and shore up the quality 
of teaching.59 
The launching of Sputnik virtually ended the belief that the Soviets 
had merely stolen the A-bomb and the H-bomb and the jet airplane, and 
brought to decision-time the major reassessment of education that had 
begun a decade earlier. Eight months after the Russian launching, Con­
gress passed the National Defense Education Act (NDEA); President 
Eisenhower signed it on 2 September 1958. The act had three salient 
features. First, it was primarily a defense bill. Section 101 of the General 
Provisions declared that "the defense of this Nation depends upon the 
mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific prin­
ciples"; and later, national security interests require that "the Federal 
Government give assistance to education for programs which are impor­
tant to our defense." Accordingly, the act was specifically designed to 
"correct as rapidly as possible the existing imbalances in our educational 
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programs which have led to an insufficient proportion of our population 
educated in science, mathematics, and modern foreign languages and 
trained in technology." It provided grants to states for the acquisition of 
laboratory equipment and for the improvement of instruction in 
science, mathematics, and foreign languages. Generous graduate fel­
lowships awaited qualified students working in those areas.60 
Second, government funds were to be withheld from potential benefi­
ciaries who refused to sign a loyalty oath and file an affidavit with the 
Commissioner of Education. Section 1001 (0 read: 
No part of any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for expendi­
ture under authority of this Act shall be used to make payments or loans to 
any individual unless such individual (1) has executed and filed with the 
Commissioner an affidavit that he does not believe in, and is not a member of 
and does not support any organization that believes in or teaches the over­
throw of the United States Government by force or violence or by any illegal 
or unconstitutional methods, and (2) has taken and subscribed to an oath or 
affirmation in the following form: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and will sup­
port and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all its 
enemies, foreign and domestic."61 
Third, the NDEA was enacted by the government without significant 
advice from the schools and universities. During the first fifteen years of 
the cold war, in fact, little reciprocity existed between the federal gov­
ernment and educational institutions. Washington provided for its own 
needs; educational institutions served as passive fulfillers of those needs. 
In retrospect, it should not surprise us that each specialized act tied the 
schools ever closer to the federal government and contributed to the 
steady nationalization of the universities. Politicians had come to un­
derstand that in a complex, technical world, the institutions of learning 
could be converted into guarantors of the national security. By helping 
to convert a difference in technological priorities into a crisis of national 
defense, Sputnik had forced the federal government to respond. Per­
haps Robert Maynard Hutchins put it best in remarking that the NDEA 
was passed because of the technical achievements of the Soviet Union 
and by "assimilating education to the Cold War and calling an educa­
tion bill a defense bill."62 
Excepting defense-related activities, the federal government's role in 
education was comparatively small.63 Three obstacles stood in the way 
of a long-term, general federal aid program for education. The religious 
issue predominated during the Truman presidency as Catholic groups 
provided powerful opposition to all bills that did not include aid to pa­
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rochial schools. During the Eisenhower presidency, notably after the 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision, race became a deci­
sive factor as southern Democrats, fearful of the broader social implica­
tions of federal aid, aligned with conservative Republicans to defeat all 
federal aid bills. The Eisenhower administration stood as a third obsta­
cle to federal aid. Although Eisenhower in 1955 proposed a limited 
school-construction program, his heart was not in it. Three years later 
he withdrew his support.64 
The cold war produced results, however, in the form of specialized 
educational acts. By establishing the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), Congress in 1950 fulfilled the dream of Vannevar Bush, director 
of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World 
War II, who in the last months of the war called for just such an institu­
tion, arguing that basic scientific research had become a requisite com­
ponent of national security and economic well-being. Charged with the 
task of strengthening science by initiating and supporting basic research 
in the mathematical, physical, biological, and engineering sciences, the 
NSF developed summer institutes for science and mathematics teachers 
and established a system of undergraduate and graduate fellowships.65 
Later, with additional funding provided under the NDEA, it effectively 
promoted curricular reform. The NSF was a straw in the wind, for it 
reflected emerging federal interest in science when identified with na­
tional security and brought higher education into close contact with the 
federal government and monies. 
"Impacted Areas" legislation also cleared both houses in 1950 and 
became law when President Truman signed Public Law 815 and Public 
Law 874. The first provided school construction grants, and the second, 
school operating monies in areas where the presence of government per­
sonnel significantly increased school enrollment (primarily because of 
the expansion of defense activities following the outbreak of the Korean 
War) and where federal land purchases created a smaller tax base. After 
eight years $1.5 billion in federal funds, together with $350 million in 
local funds, permitted the construction of 42,562 classrooms serving an 
estimated 1,232,665 pupils. By the end of the 1950s, Congress had ap­
propriated $618,170,000 to cover operating costs.66 
At the close of fiscal year 1959, the U.S. government operated approx­
imately 440 educational programs costing $3.8 billion, a majority of 
which was spent for defense-related activities. Among the programs 
were military academies, primary and secondary schools abroad for the 
children of military and civilian personnel, in-service training of gov­
ernment employees, schools for Indian children, the National School 
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Lunch Program, and of course the Impacted Areas programs and those 
of the NSF and the NDEA. At the decade's end the federal government 
sponsored 155 junior division units of the U.S. Army's Reserve Officers 
Training Corps and the National Defense Cadet Corps in 338 schools.67 
In the vast majority of these programs, the goal of the federal govern­
ment was not to promote education; rather, the government responded 
to needs for trained personnel and acted in disjoined circumstances to 
meet emergencies and social or national crises. Without the political and 
military challenges posed by the Soviet Union, it is difficult to imagine 
that much of the aforementioned legislation would have been intro­
duced, much less passed. 
The reluctance of Congress to shoulder responsibility for the nation's 
schools was reflected in the proportionate sources of school revenues. 
The data demonstrate that though federal expenditures for education 
were increasing in the postwar years, the conspicuous reality was that 
local and state sources accounted for more than 95 percent of public 
school revenues (table 3). Partisans demanding a larger role for the fed­
eral government were on strong ground, for federal policies such as the 
G.I. Bill and student deferments made heavy demands on existing phys­
ical plants and faculty. Second, a momentous shift in taxing patterns 
had occurred: in 1900 approximately half of all tax revenues derived 
from local sources, but by the end of World War II approximately 85 
percent were collected by the federal government.68 This dramatic shift 
severely curtailed resources normally available to states and localities at 
the very time requests for funding multiplied. Third, the rising Gross 
National Product covered the cost of increased federal expenditures 
without appreciably altering the percentage of budgetary allocations to 
education. And fourth, appeals for increased federal aid to education 
could be made on the sound philosophical ground that because an en­
lightened citizenry is so essential to a democratic society, the federal 
government in the interest of self-preservation had a duty to support 
education. 
Although passage of a comprehensive federal education program 
would await Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, widespread intellectual 
criticism combined with the pressures of the cold war to produce sweep­
ing substantive and methodological innovations, concentrated first at 
the high school level, but spreading quickly to the elementary and higher 
educational levels. The conceptual apparatus in physics, biology, and 
even mathematics long had been outdated, partly because so little con­
tact existed between teachers in the schools and scientists working on 
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the frontiers of their disciplines. It was crucial to the reform movement 
that experts move to the forefront of curriculum revision. When they 
did, scientists and popularizers alike wrote of a "new" mathematics, a 
"new" physics, a "new" biology. New texts appeared, and with them new 
readings, educational materials, visual aids, laboratory experimenta­
tion, and testing programs. The twin essentials of the new curriculum 
were thought and discovery; hence, the stress on unifying concepts and 
on understanding those concepts within given structures of knowledge. 
As the steering committee of the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study 
put it: 
The writers seek to teach science as a way of thinking—as a method of 
seeking answers. To do this, they stress underlying concepts and understand­
ings. Student work is centered in the laboratory, where real problems are 
explored; open-ended experiments and other materials are used as the media 
for conveying an understanding of science. Through emphasis on basic con­
cepts in many varied ways, the student is given practice in drawing generali­
zations, in seeking relationships and in finding his own answers.69 
The reform movement had its greatest success in mathematics and in 
the physical sciences, which in recent decades had experienced explosive 
increases in knowledge. Funds from the NDEA provided more-
sophisticated science equipment for high schools. Science curricula be­
came better coordinated, more unified, and more sequential. First of the 
programs was the Physical Science Study Committee (PSSC), initiated 
by physicist Jerrold Zacharias of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology and supported by distinguished and politically influential scien­
tists, including Vannevar Bush, the person most responsible for the es­
tablishment of the NSF The new physics course for the high school was 
laboratory-centered, emphasizing the basic structure of physics and the 
need to understand rather than memorize concepts. In addition to a text 
covering the concepts of time, space, matter, motion, the behavior of 
light, the kinematics of waves, culminating in quantum theory, the 
PSSC developed a complete program of laboratory experiments, films, 
tests, and a teacher's guide. The program began on a limited basis in 
1957-58, with the first full-year physics course offered in 1960. By 
1963-64, 40 to 45 percent of all high school students in physics courses 
were participating in the program. Ample funds helped account for its 
early success. As in other programs of curricular revision in science, the 
NSF (the recipient of vastly increased appropriations in 1958) provided 
the financial support, which for the PSSC amounted to $6,000,000 by 
1961.™ 
Although curriculum reform in mathematics had been under way on 
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an ad hoc basis for a decade, the School Mathematics Study Group 
(SMSG) produced the most sophisticated and widely used of the several 
new programs. Sponsored by the American Mathematics Society, the 
group first convened four months after Sputnik. Again, the NSF un­
derwrote the project, paying out nearly $6,000,000 in the first five years. 
Written by professional mathematicians and mathematics educators, 
the new texts, prepared for each grade from kindergarten through high 
school, emphasized understanding the structure and basic properties of 
mathematics, and led students through progressively more difficult lev­
els of abstraction. For example, in laying the primary basis for the new 
mathematics, the text for grade four introduced set theory as a means of 
learning arithmetical and algebraic concepts. Elementary school chil­
dren then studied simple geometry. Points, lines, and plane figures were 
introduced. At the high school level, subject compartmentalization gave 
way to a fusion of algebra, geometry, and trigonometry in order to bet­
ter illuminate the unity and overall structure of mathematics.71 By the 
senior year, students were ready not only for polynomial, logarithmic, 
and trigonometric functions, but matrix algebra and systems of linear 
equations.72 
The PSSC and the SMSG were the two foremost programs in the new 
curriculum dating to the late 1950s, but sophisticated programs were 
also introduced in the life sciences and in chemistry, the most prominent 
being the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study, organized in 1959 and 
chaired by Bentley Glass; the Chemical Bond Approach Project; the 
Chemical Education Materials Study; and various elementary school 
science curriculums. These too were expensive: with the Biological 
Sciences Curriculum Study $6,500,000 in its first four years.73 
The teaching of English and modern foreign languages underwent 
serious reevaluation in the late 1950s and the 1960s, but neither enjoyed 
the coordination (and for English, the funding) common to similar ef­
forts in the natural sciences. The debate in English derived its impetus 
from dissatisfaction with the English curriculum, from contemporary 
demands for increased rigor in basic subject matter, and, to a lesser 
extent, from the developing science of linguistics. The major point that 
emerged was that English consisted of no more than three subjects: lan­
guage, literature, and composition. Studies of how they interacted and 
grew through time and use begot a new field of research. Fundamental 
change was slow in coming. Not until 1962 would a federally sponsored 
program in English appear. Project English, sponsored by the Coopera­
tive Research Program of the United States Office of Education, en­
listed the help of leading universities to develop new curriculum pro­
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grams that were sequential and cumulative from elementary through 
graduate school. Together they established university curriculum study 
centers, and arranged conferences and seminars to encourage research 
in the teaching of English.74 
Foreign language studies fared better, in large part because of funding 
provided under the terms of the NDEA. The Modern Language Associ­
ation had for several years worked hard to improve language instruc­
tion, but its inclusion in the NDEA reflected the nation's increasing re­
sponsibilities in world affairs and the conviction that foreign language 
expertise would enable the United States to compete more effectively 
with the Soviets in the developing world. Time had not yet dimmed 
memories of the shortage of competent translators during World War 
II. Section 603 of the NDEA authorized the appropriation of $8,000,000 
per year to establish centers for the teaching of modern foreign lan­
guages and to pay stipends to individuals taking advanced training in a 
modern foreign language. Section 611 authorized $7,250,000 for each of 
four years to operate institutes at colleges and universities offering ad­
vanced training in new teaching methods and instructional materials. 
The response was immediate and productive. The number of elementary 
students studying foreign languages increased tenfold in a decade; sec­
ondary school enrollment more than doubled. Instead of emphasizing 
reading and grammar, teachers employed new methods to develop oral 
competence in the early stages. Beginning language study in the third or 
fourth grade reflected conceptual advances in the nature of language 
and the learning process that were popularized in books such as Jerome 
Bruner's The Process of Education and Martin Mayer's The Schools.15 
Despite ample discussion in the social sciences, significant curriculum 
revisions on the order of those gracing science and mathematics were 
not forthcoming. Experimental projects were organized in geography 
and anthropology, but significant revision in those and other areas did 
not occur until the 1960s.76 Curricular reform in history consisted 
mainly of demands to include it in the curriculum. For example, in 1942 
only 18 percent of colleges and universities required students to take 
American history. By the 1949-50 school year, 34 percent did. Thirty-
nine states in 1948 required students to study American history before 
graduating from high school, and all but two states required instruction 
in the Constitution of the United States. The requirements were in­
tended to enable students to resist alien ideologies and to restore a basis 
not only for citizenship training but for moral and spiritual training that 
many supposed had been neglected in the school curriculum.77 Unfortu­
nately, substantive changes were meager. World history courses con­
tinued to give far too little attention to the non-Western world, despite 
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the rising importance of Asian, African, and South American countries. 
Rare indeed was the teacher who, however respectful of "the facts," also 
taught history as a way of learning. 
For the American school system, the years following World War II 
were difficult in the extreme. States and local communities found it im­
possible to keep up with exploding student enrollments and physical 
plant needs, let alone repair the damage brought about by fifteen years 
of neglect. Except when its interests were clearly at stake, Washington 
refused to increase its financial assistance to a level commensurate with 
its growing portion of public revenues. The knowledge explosion com­
plicated matters by requiring fundamental revision of the methods by 
which intellectual advance is attained. Most serious of all was the re­
pressive climate of McCarthyism. Although some may wish to believe 
otherwise, the issues of teacher loyalty and Communist party influence 
in the schools set many a community ablaze, a disheartening number of 
teachers found a cowering posture expedient, if not becoming, and 
books were removed from shelves and reading lists. The loyalty oaths of 
the day stand as mute testimony to events one would rather forget but 
dare not. 
Yet out of the maze and discord, significant results emerged. However 
inadequate in amount, classrooms were built and teachers' salaries im­
proved. The reappraisal of education, whether substantive or political in 
nature, laid the foundation for the curricular changes that followed. 
These reforms moved away from life-adjustment aims and were de­
signed to bring intellectual content and intellectual excitement to the 
academic curriculum. 
Of the various factors causally significant in effecting curriculum 
change, the cold war was the preeminent catalyst. It gained for educa­
tional critics an audience they would otherwise not have enjoyed, and it 
provided the political dynamic for change. This was particularly true 
after Sputnik. So frequently do we see references to the first Soviet satel­
lite that a danger exists of not taking it seriously. But Sputnik eliminated 
many psychological and political blocks to curriculum reform and to 
federal aid. With the National Science Foundation and the National 
Defense Education Act, the federal government accredited the instru­
mentalist views of Vannevar Bush, Admiral Rickover, and others that 
national survival depended on the mobilization of university science and 
technology. That the social sciences and the humanities were not sim­
ilarly exalted was a major failure, but that failure accurately reflected 
both the priorities and the fears of cold war America. 
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Cities, Suburbs, and Government Policy 
Mark I. Gelfand 
Viewed against the backdrop of the American urban experience, 
the significance of the 1945-60 period lies less in the character of com­
munity changes that occurred than in the velocity of those changes. In 
terms of form and structure, these fifteen years produced little that was 
unique, but by transmuting a well-defined trend into fact, the era pro­
duced a new America, one that both fulfilled and mocked the country's 
promise. 
The rate of change assumed such importance in this period because of 
the previous decade-and-a-half of lost opportunities. The Great Depres­
sion and World War II, whatever their effect on other aspects of Ameri­
can life, represented breaks with the previous patterns of physical and 
social development in the nation's metropolitan areas. The usual social 
trends and personal expectations no longer applied; whether out of 
work in the 1930s or on the war-plant assembly lines in the early 1940s, 
Americans felt they had little control over their lives. Much of the hectic 
pace of the post-1945 years can be ascribed to the widespread desire to 
get back to life as it was before 1929, and, to a remarkable extent, people 
succeeded. 
Government programs contributed to this rush to fill the vacuum 
created by deprivation and sacrifice. For more than half a century, pub­
lic authority had been gearing up to aid directly large segments of the 
population. Local government's service role had long enjoyed legiti­
macy, but it was not until the New Deal that the federal government 
acquired a similar place. World War II expanded Washington's influ­
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ence, if only temporarily, and with the cold war on, the federal govern­
ment remained active. Because of interest-group politics, these public 
programs reinforced the nearly universal desire to make up for lost time. 
Still, although the New Deal thrust the federal government into a new 
economic role, it was as a supporting player, rather than protagonist. 
The 1930s witnessed a broadening of federal regulatory power and wel­
fare responsibility, but generally the government continued to defer to 
the market. Free enterprise was not so much to be supervised by federal 
bureaucrats as to be made more profitable by the national government's 
spending and tax policies. 
The federal government also lacked middle vision. Officials saw the 
big picture—the economy as a whole—and its prominent component 
parts—business, labor, agriculture—but not how these elements were 
related below the macroeconomic level. Neither by political orientation 
nor bureaucratic structure was the federal government ready to promote 
sound living patterns. Because community development was of second­
ary, or even tertiary, concern in national politics, metropolitan expan­
sion after 1945 took off without federal recognition, even as it was being 
propelled by federal action. With the states content to maintain a hands-
off attitude, with the localities unable to contain the pressures around 
them, and with the federal government fueling the fires of growth, 
community-building in the postwar period differed from earlier eras 
only in speed and detail. As before, private decision-making and indi­
vidual self-interest largely determined the outcome. 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND HOME OWNERSHIP 
For centuries people flocked to the cities, lured by the economic and 
cultural opportunities they offered. But if the search for success and 
recreation drew people into cities, the predominant urban structure was 
not the factory or the store, the theater or the museum, but the residen­
tial unit. People not only worked and had fun in the city, they also lived 
there and accordingly built houses of all descriptions. By themselves 
these houses would have attracted few people to the cities, and, indeed, 
for many urban families poor housing was the worst feature of city life. 
Particularly in the post-World War II years, the inability of American 
cities to provide the housing their residents wanted would drive millions 
beyond the city boundaries. Housing, in fact, became the prime factor in 
the population upheaval in the nation's metropolitan areas. 
In a society that believed in free enterprise and popular government, 
the owning of property was blessed both economically and politically. 
Only by owning property could one enjoy profit, rent, and interest—the 
holy trinity of capitalism. Politically, property ownership was champi­
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oned as both giving to the individual certain safeguards against tyranni­
cal government and making him a more responsible member of the body 
politic. As long as the United States was agrarian, these virtues were 
protected by the widespread availability of farmland; but as the country 
turned to industry and millions were hired by large corporations, the 
urban home replaced the freehold farm as the symbol of individualism. 
If one could no longer operate his own business, then owning his home 
would give him a stake in the American system.1 
By the middle of the twentieth century, most Americans wanted to 
own their home—for both rational and irrational reasons.2 In an image-
conscious consumer society, owning one's home conferred immediate 
prestige as a visible symbol of upward mobility. After World War II, 
messages from every podium, pulpit, and medium of mass communica­
tion promised blue-collar workers automatic entry into the middle class 
with purchase of their own home.3 Status aside, there were also practical 
reasons for owning one's home. Families with more children required 
additional indoor space; as they grew older, more outdoor space. Usu­
ally, such space could be obtained only by buying a house.4 
The Great Depression and World War II had reinforced these feel­
ings. A decade of economic stagnation had denied millions membership 
in the middle class; although wartime prosperity gave financial success, 
the curbs on nonessential goods had prevented people from showing off 
their wealth. Once the war was over, Americans rushed to satisfy their 
long-denied wants and to impress their neighbors; consumers, their sav­
ings accounts bulging, could seriously consider getting their own home. 
Further, the nation's birthrate, which had reached an all-time low of 20 
births per 1,000 population in the mid-1930s, climbed sharply: from 
1950 through 1960 it stood at 24 births per 1,000. This "baby boom" 
brought a new demand for dwellings to house families with three to five 
children; for middle-class families such accommodations were to be 
found only in the sales market.5 
For reasons philosophical, psychological, and practical, many city 
residents were thus prepared to buy homes after 1945. Such sentiments 
had existed before 1930, but inadequate reservoirs of credit, steep initial 
costs of purchasing, and high interest rates on mortgages had prevented 
fulfillment. The federal government had moved, first under Herbert 
Hoover and then under Franklin D. Roosevelt, to lower these barriers. 
With the return of prosperity after 1945, then, thanks to the opening of 
new lending channels and the provision of federal home mortgage guar­
antees, owning a home became possible for many more American 
families. 
Although this depression-spawned governmental intervention into 
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the housing market drew social legitimacy by encouraging home owner­
ship, its primary goals were economic. The building material and con­
struction industries accounted for about 15 percent of the Gross Na­
tional Product, and the construction trades accounted for about 5 
percent of the labor force. Residential construction had been in a slump 
even before the 1929 stock market crash, and the subsequent deteriora­
tion of economic conditions had almost dried up new housing starts. 
Renewed home-building was one way of reversing the economic slide. 
Because the chosen instruments of recovery—greater availability of 
credit and mortgage insurance—did not involve direct federal financing 
or threaten government ownership, they enjoyed wide backing. Business 
would be aided, jobs created, and consumers able to get better housing. 
For the first time the nation had housing programs, but they were iso­
lated links in the chain of economic policy.6 
Basic economic concepts also had their effect on the housing pro­
grams. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the agency in 
charge of mortgage insurance, was under statutory instructions to fol­
low conventional business wisdom in issuing loan guarantees. Accord­
ingly, it backed sales rather than rentals on the argument that individu­
ally owned homes are better credit risks than rental units because a 
homeowner is purportedly a better guardian of property than an inves­
tor, who might skimp on maintenance. Similarly, the FHA believed its 
money was safer in sales housing because, whereas the supply of single-
family homes is closely tied to demand, rental housing is usually pro­
duced in advance of a demand that might not materialize. Furthermore, 
the law required the FHA to exercise much greater continuing regula­
tion over the rental projects the agency assisted than it did in the case of 
homes put up for sale. For this reason both the FHA and builders pre­
ferred the sales housing market.7 
Home ownership in the postwar period received a boost from another 
federal agency, the Veterans Administration (VA). Because it permitted 
veterans to buy a house on easy credit terms with, and this was very 
important, little or no down-payment, the VA housing program was 
"probably as effective an instrument for narrowing the market for new, 
family-sized rental units as was ever devised." Families actually found it 
cheaper to buy under the VA program than to rent and, for probably the 
first and only time in American history, apartment-renters had higher 
average incomes than home-buyers.8 
The outstanding characteristic of the housing picture in the second 
half of the 1940s was the critical shortage of dwellings. New housing 
construction had virtually ceased during the war, extending to nearly 
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two decades the drought in residential building. Compounding the 
supply problem was the massive demand brought on by a doubling of 
the rate of household formation. Marriages and children long deferred 
now proliferated, and there were not enough houses and apartments to 
absorb them. Estimates of the housing shortage in 1946-47 ranged from 
three to six million units.9 
Almost every city had its own housing horror stories. In New York a 
newly wed couple moved into the display window of a department store 
for two days, and the publicity brought them the offer of an apartment. 
In Chicago 250 streetcars were put on sale as potential homes. An ad in 
an Omaha newspaper read: "Big Ice Box, 7 by 17 feet, could be fixed up 
to live in." In San Francisco respectable, solid citizens were living in cars 
parked on city streets, using the restrooms in the public library, and 
cooking over wood fires in the park.10 
Direct federal efforts to deal with the housing shortage did little. After 
first lifting controls on building material allocations in October 1945 to 
spur residential construction, President Truman reimposed them in De­
cember when it became obvious that builders had no intention of put­
ting up homes in the medium price range. Before the winter of 1946 was 
over, a Veterans' Emergency Housing Program had been unveiled by 
the White House; using federal regulation, loans, and subsidies as tools, 
it set a goal of 2.7 million new homes within two years. But because of 
bureaucratic infighting, lack of organization within the building indus­
try, labor strife, and a conservative attack on big government, the pro­
gram resulted in very few homes and great loss of public support. When 
the president removed virtually all price controls following the Republi­
can sweep in the 1946 congressional elections, he, in effect, canceled the 
Veterans' Emergency Housing Program. The federal government was 
henceforth content to resume a passive sustaining role." 
HOME-BUILDING AND SUBURBIA 
With long-held beliefs and new government programs combining to 
assure that the answer to the housing shortage would be the construc­
tion of single-family, owner-occupied homes, the next question was 
where these dwellings would be built. Because speed was the prime con­
cern, this matter was settled largely by default. Siting would be deter­
mined by the ease with which the land could be readied; it was just com­
mon sense that vacant land was more desirable than land already 
occupied. This vacant land might be inside or outside the city, but for a 
variety of reasons, suburban areas gained the most. 
Although the situation varied from area to area, many central cities 
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no longer had much open land. Particularly in the older cities of the 
Northeast and the Midwest, a century or more of large population in­
flow had given most parts of the municipality a built-up appearance. 
Although many lots were still not improved and there was actually con­
siderable room left for construction, this filling-in process satisfied 
neither the economic nor psychological temper of the times. Few 
central-city sites lent themselves to the mass-production techniques re­
cently introduced to the housing field, and, ironically, the very existence 
in place of such utilities as sewers, gas lines, and roadways rendered city 
neighborhoods less attractive to builders experimenting with new con­
struction methods. Rather than conform to existing street layouts and 
strict housing codes, the new home-builders sought freedom on the 
cheaper, unregulated land in the suburbs.12 
If postwar home-builders liked suburbia because of its opportunities, 
home mortgage-granting institutions liked its security. Urban real es­
tate was a volatile investment, profitable but risky. Zoning offered some 
protection against changing land uses, but practically none against 
neighborhood decay and population movement. From the finance of­
ficers' viewpoint, the central city suffered from old age and diverse resi­
dency, which in combination created a climate of great uncertainty. In 
postwar America the central cities were seen as heading rapidly out of 
middle age toward decrepit dependency. Furthermore, blighted neigh­
borhoods signified not merely physical deterioration; they also demon­
strated the melting pot mistake. That racial and ethnic groups did not 
mix well was assumed by the financial community, itself a preserve of 
long-established families. To them, cities were inherently unstable be­
cause they tried to do what could not be done—bring various peoples 
together harmoniously. Such mixing, it was believed, had but two con­
sequences: the decline of both the human race and property values.13 
Given the chance, bankers would do for their business what they had 
already done for themselves in private life—leave the city. 
The suburbs, accordingly, grew; by 1910, the year of the first Decen­
nial Census to define "metropolitan district," 25 percent of the popula­
tion of such districts were living outside central city limits. Twenty years 
later, with the automobile widely accepted, it was 35 percent.14 The 
1920s were the first decade that the rate of suburban growth exceeded 
city growth. With its happy combination of city and country life, the 
suburb was considered a natural and positive development in residential 
patterns.15 
The early 1900s also witnessed the political encirclement of the central 
cities. Much of the population gain registered by the big cities in the 
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nineteenth century came by simply moving the city limits outward. After 
about 1910 this wave of annexation subsided nearly everywhere, mark­
ing the flowering of suburban political strength. Cities were no longer 
bordered by nondescript settlements that could be amalgamated with­
out difficulty; the upper-middle-class suburb of the early twentieth cen­
tury was strongly anti-urban. Their residents were affluent, articulate, 
and aroused, and exerted considerable political influence unrelated to 
their actual numbers. The split between central city and suburb was one 
of many fault lines in predepression America.16 
The depression and subsequent war affected the pace of metropolitan 
development, but not its direction. Suburban growth fell off in the 
1930s, but city growth rates dropped even more. Both experienced pop­
ulation growth as mobilization revived industries but, for logistic and 
security reasons, the federal government had war plants placed outside 
the central cities. This set the stage for even more rapid dispersal of 
population and jobs to the suburbs after the war.17 
In 1945, by every major indicator, America's suburban destiny 
seemed assured. Fifteen years of induced social solidarity had not weak­
ened the American preference for privacy; indeed, the twin crises of de­
pression and war had given it even greater appeal. As one young soldier-
turned-urban analyst later recalled, the consuming desire of veterans 
was to rediscover conditions of intimacy. Starting one's own family and 
finding one's own home became primary objectives.18 The strength of 
these feelings was reflected in the experience of William Levitt, head of 
one of the large suburban home-construction firms: 
We started to sell in March 1949. We advertised that beginning the next 
Monday we would accept deposits. Wednesday night they began camping 
out. It was bitterly cold; we set up a canteen. One of the women on the line 
was pregnant; we had to take her to the hospital to have her baby. That 
Monday night we closed, from seven-thirty to eleven o'clock, fourteen 
hundred contracts.19 
Federal home-financing policies also favored the suburbs. The FHA 
was no more a charitable institution than the local bank; each was moti­
vated by the drive to maximize profits.20 If the FHA hesitated to guaran­
tee mortgages on central-city housing, it was precisely because private 
lenders had already expressed doubts about the safety of such invest­
ments.21 In the absence of a directive from Congress to take risks, the 
FHA did what all bureaucracies do: it followed the flow of the market. 
The push to the suburbs seemed, and probably was, inevitable; the FHA 
merely facilitated the process.22 
For the federal authorities to reverse, or even to slow, the suburban 
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migration would have required a tremendous act of will. The constitu­
tional question of national power with respect to housing remained un­
settled. "Doubt as to how far federal legislation may reach out still acts 
as a restraining influence,'' observed housing expert Charles Abrams in 
1946. "It compels the shaping of a gradual policy in a field that does not 
lend itself to graduality."23 Political realities further limited government 
intervention. The scope of social engineering that "a plan for national 
urban land development" (Abrams's phrase) would have entailed was 
totally unfeasible. It required a consensus on ends and means that did 
not exist; the liberal state was still under challenge at the ballot box, and 
the concept of federal allocation of resources had been decisively re­
jected by Congress in 1943 when it abolished the National Resources 
Planning Board.24 Government was surely more active in the postwar 
years than it had been before 1930, but this activity remained confined, 
both as to range and depth. The FHA was helping to build houses, not 
communities. Where the houses were put was far less important than 
that they were built and the government investment secure. The public 
wanted the government to assist them in finding places to live; they did 
not expect it—indeed, did not want it—to tell them how to live.25 Sub­
urbia was essentially the handiwork of the economic and social market­
place; government merely confirmed its triumph. 
OUT OF THE MARKET: PUBLIC HOUSING 
The federal government's public housing program in the postwar pe­
riod was a dismal experience, and it demonstrated why politicians pre­
ferred to keep out of social policy-making. Few domestic issues con­
sumed as much of Congress's time as this effort to aid the poor, and none 
gave government officials so much heartache. Only one group really 
gained from the venture—investors in the tax-exempt, federally guaran­
teed bonds issued by local authorities.26 The intended beneficiaries, 
slum dwellers, were either not reached at all or supplied with a defective 
product. 
If most federal welfare programs were well disguised or indirect, pub­
lic housing was up front and exposed. Unlike the bulk of federal spend­
ing that assisted producer groups, public housing removed a part of the 
consuming population from the private housing market. This interfer­
ence with the mechanism of supply and demand earned the hostility of 
realtors, home-builders, and mortgage bankers. Almost from the start 
of public housing in 1938, these groups sought to replace it with a system 
of aid to private business. During World War II the program's oppo­
nents succeeded in virtually shutting it down, but when peace came, 
public housing's friends resumed the battle at home. 
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The political strength of public housing came not from a broad popu­
lar base but from the intensity of its few supporters. Among them only 
labor unions possessed real clout at election time; the other public hous­
ing lobbyists, local officials and socially conscious members of the mid­
dle and upper classes, were more adept at gaining publicity than in deliv­
ering votes. Since the expected recipients of this largesse were thought to 
be in the big cities, there was little incentive for congressmen from 
smaller communities to identify themselves with such a "socialistic" 
program. Only the unexpected results of the 1948 elections, combined 
with the active leadership of President Truman, gave public housing a 
boost in 1949, but even then it cleared the last legislative hurdle in the 
House of Representatives by the narrowest of margins, 209-204.27 
This victory turned out to be more symbolic than substantive. War 
once again, this time in Korea, provided the program's enemies with a 
pretext for reducing funds. Moreover, the change of administration in 
1953 deprived public housing of an executive branch willing to lobby on 
its behalf; the middle-of-the-road temper of the decade's political cul­
ture was generally inhospitable to programs that aided the lower classes. 
The result was that Congress, which in 1949 had authorized the con­
struction of 810,000 units over six years, cut back at almost every ses­
sion, so that only 322,000 new starts were actually funded from 1949 to 
1960. Thus, while the suburban-oriented FHA was gaining additional 
lending authority from the legislature, public housing was being starved. 
Public housing's poor standing in ideologically conscious and budget-
minded Washington was not surprising; more unexpected was its poor 
reception in the cities and among those it was supposed to help. Part of 
the problem at the local level was the federal government's tough spend­
ing restrictions. Because of congressional instructions that public hous­
ing not compete with the private sector, bureaucrats ruthlessly cut ex­
penses; doors would not be provided for closets, elevators would not 
stop at every floor, cinder blocks would be left exposed in corridors. 
Individually, none was significant, but the overall effect of hundreds of 
economies like these was to deny public housing those little comforts 
that make a rental apartment a home. Nor were adequate maintenance 
services supplied to keep the buildings in good repair. Federal regula­
tions excluding families with incomes over specified levels also contrib­
uted to the deterioration. Those able to improve their economic position 
had little incentive to keep up their apartments; many that stayed lacked 
the experience or tools to care for their surroundings. Many eligible 
families turned public housing down because of the low character of the 
projects' residents and the institutional quality of the projects' en­
vironment.28 
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But if penny-pinching detracted from its appeal, it was the social im­
plications of public housing that rendered it downright unpopular. The 
mixing of income groups in residential neighborhoods had been a com­
mon feature of American cities for decades; it was the result of the com­
plex interactions of shifting land uses, new modes of transportation, and 
economic mobility that accompanied urban growth. The well-to-do did 
not enjoy intermingling, but they could live with it, at least for a while; 
furthermore, the same impersonal market forces that had created the 
unhappy arrangement could also undo it. Public housing, however, was 
something else. The housing shortage that prompted private home-
builders to seek out vacant land in the suburbs also led municipal public 
housing agencies to favor undeveloped land within the city and for the 
same reasons of expediency, adaptability to new designs, and ready 
availability. Most was to be found in middle-class neighborhoods that 
vehemently resisted having public housing put into their midst; it was 
sure to overtax local services, change the character of the neighborhood, 
and lower property values. The only way this menace could be stopped 
was in the political arena. Experienced at battling on this terrain, the 
middle class had little trouble in pushing public housing and the poor 
back into the slums. 
Giving added dimension to this middle-class hostility was race. The 
distaste prosperous Americans felt for socialization across class lines 
was minor compared with the abhorrence with which white Americans 
of all classes regarded racial integration. In northern cities operators of 
the private housing market were as effective as any law might have been 
in keeping blacks within the ghettos. Their population growth required 
constant enlargement of these ghettos, but the pressures were generally 
relieved by realtors in an orderly way that allowed whites to find new 
preserves; the race riots in Detroit and other cities during World War II 
demonstrated the delicate nature of the neighborhood transition pro­
cess. Continuing postwar black migration to northern cities exacerbated 
the problem. In this tense atmosphere public housing resembled a bull in 
a china shop; because so many of the families eligible for public housing 
were black, any project in white areas was almost certain to breach the 
racial barricades. Accordingly, such neighborhoods mobilized politi­
cally and ensured that where public housing could not be blocked alto­
gether, it was sited in the ghettos.29 Eventually, tens of thousands of 
federally authorized public housing units went unclaimed by localities, 
and some high-rise projects were later torn down as public nuisances. 
By any standard public housing was a misfit. It challenged, rather 
than reinforced, the icons of status, privatism, and security. No one 
really believed in it—not its federal or local administrators, its propo­
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nents, or its clientele. Yet it survived. Staying alive was testimonial more 
to bureaucratic inertia than to any public sense of social obligation. 
Allowing public housing to continue an existence maintained the fiction 
that the poor were being helped. Public housing sharpened racial di­
visions, and, to an extent never seen before, the suburbs became a refuge 
for whites fleeing blacks.30 Thus did market take its revenge on the wel­
fare state. 
CHALLENGING THE MARKETPLACE: URBAN RENEWAL 
As the federal government's mortgage insurance programs buttressed 
decisions being made by the private sector, and as public housing sought 
to supplement free enterprise, so did urban renewal attempt to modify 
marketplace conditions. By giving central-city real estate an economic 
attractiveness it did not have on its own, Title I of the Housing Act of 
1949 tried to conserve the nation's investment in urban buildings and 
utilities. Not only did this recycling effort run counter to the American 
urban experience, it was also out of step with postwar America. 
When the proposals for urban renewal had begun taking shape in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, the emphasis was on planning. The depres­
sion had tarnished the image of the exploitive model of development; 
with the opportunities for future growth apparently limited, greater 
control of resources was required. The goal was to make cities both 
more efficient and more humane; they would be restructured to meet the 
demands of advanced technology, and there would be special attention 
to housing for the lower classes. It was also envisioned that this 
community-rebuilding program would show little respect for local polit­
ical boundaries; rehabilitation of the central city depended upon regu­
lating development in the outskirts.31 
By the time the urban renewal measure passed Congress in 1949, both 
the rationale for, and the design of, the program had been undermined. 
The postwar boom had reinvigorated faith in capitalism; government 
would be allowed to play only a secondary role in influencing urban 
growth. Planning was to be carried out in the narrowest of fashions, on a 
building-by-building basis, rather than in relation to the city as a whole. 
Controlled metropolitan development also went by the boards as the 
housing shortage was relieved by mass-produced housing in the sub­
urbs. Subdivision developers' profits and consumer satisfaction could 
not, and would not, wait for public authorities to get their affairs in 
order. Urban renewal had to operate in a more turbulent world than its 
liberal sponsors had foreseen and with fewer tools than they had be­
lieved necessary. 
Cooperation between government and private enterprise of the scope 
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that urban renewal entailed had not been seen in America since the hey­
day of canal and railroad building. Plenty of mistakes were committed, 
and much waste accompanied those earlier projects; but the social ben­
efits and private gains were so huge as to mask the errors ana corrup­
tion. Urban renewal, however, had the same problems without the off­
setting advantages; operating in advance of the marketplace was easier 
than functioning in the midst of one. 
Management and money were at the heart of its difficulties. Title I 
required the agreement of three partners: the federal government, the 
local government, and the private developer.32 Only the latter two could 
initiate projects, but authority for final approval rested at the national 
level. Cranking up this cumbersome administrative machinery would 
have been easier if all the participants had believed in it, but only local 
government truly wanted it to succeed. Private developers, who could 
see the suburbs siphoning off the central city's middle-class population, 
demanded greater rewards for risking their money in urban renewal. 
Federal bureaucrats also doubted the program's viability, and were 
under pressure to protect the government's money; they gave proposed 
projects long, hard scrutiny before granting approval. Only the local 
politicians had much to lose if urban renewal failed. Further decline of 
the inner core would hurt property assessments, lead to a deterioration 
in city services, and accelerate the movement to the suburbs. Those 
elected officials smart enough to grasp Title I's promise and adept 
enough to act as brokers between the developers and Washington 
gained political power and delayed their community's day of financial 
reckoning. 
Urban renewal also faced psychological obstacles. Although cities 
had been growing, people had been leaving the urban cores for decades; 
they were not mentally prepared, in the absence of some great crisis, to 
reverse their negative impressions of urban life. "Frustrated city 
planners," observed Fortune magazine in 1946, "can take comfort in the 
fact that nearly two-thirds of the people now in cities of over 100,000 
would rather live almost anywhere else."33 Large-scale projects impres­
sive enough to catch the imagination might hold some prospective emi­
grants and even lure back some earlier evacuees, but there was never 
enough money to have much effect. New shopping malls or civic centers 
would still be surrounded by old, decrepit neighborhoods. The Republi­
cans' attempt after 1954 to put the emphasis on rehabilitation as a way of 
making the funds go further may have been the right approach in the 
long run, but in the 1950s it made no sense as long as the suburbs re­
mained a less-expensive alternative. It was difficult to get excited about 
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fixing up a sixty-year-old brownstone when a new house with open 
space could be purchased with ease. 
Besides trying unsuccessfully to turn the metropolitan marketplace 
around, urban renewal also obscured the social ills of the metropolis. 
Title I focused on the physical structure of the central city and its tax 
base. By strengthening these foundations, it was believed the cities could 
be revived. If massive sums of urban renewal money had indeed been 
supplied, to implement what the 1960s would call a "Marshall Plan for 
the cities," perhaps the anticipated benefits would have been realized. 
The cities might have become so comfortable and pleasant that the mid­
dle class would have stayed. But the promise was not backed up by cash. 
New downtown complexes were built, but the schools declined, munici­
pal services shrank, and jobs continued to flow to the suburbs. Govern­
ment might have deluded itself and part of the citizenry into thinking 
that the cities were being saved, but the white middle class was getting 
out, leaving the city to the poor and the blacks. On an individual basis 
most people could grasp urban renewal's failure, but on the administra­




PUBLIC TRANSIT AND THE PRIVATE AUTOMOBILE

Urban life and form have always been heavily shaped by the prevail­
ing modes of transportation. First as trading centers and then as manu­
facturing locales, cities were concerned about accessibility, both exter­
nally and internally. The advent of rail vehicles in the nineteenth century 
not only enabled cities to trade on a national scale but also permitted 
their population to expand outward. With the coming of streetcars, 
people no longer had to live close to where they worked, and commuting 
became common in the American metropolis. By the close of the 1920s, 
another technological innovation challenged the streetcar's primacy: the 
automobile. Soon after 1945 the automobile was victorious. 
Many of public transit's postwar woes arose from its own weaknesses. 
Organized during the flush times of municipal corruption at the turn of 
the century, most transit companies were so heavily mortgaged that any 
operating profits were swallowed up by interest costs. This shaky finan­
cial base was not compensated for by wise management. Transit opera­
tors assumed that they had a captive market, and instead of trying, in the 
1920s, to adapt their product to meet the changing needs of customers, 
they cut service and raised fares whenever revenues declined. This all but 
assured further reductions in patronage, and the cycle was repeated. 
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The popular image of public transit as a private business further dam­
aged its competitive position. Following the Progressive era's crusade 
against municipal graft, transit companies often were required to pay 
high local taxes and were subjected to control by regulatory commis­
sions that sometimes refused to permit higher fares in inflationary peri­
ods. A little-noticed provision of the Public Utility Holding Company 
Act of 1935 may have also undermined the well-being of public transit. 
By forcing many power companies to divest themselves of their transit 
subsidiaries, the act denied some transit firms needed financial support 
and executive talent. Because of its bad reputation and because it was 
taken for granted by the 1940s, public transit received virtually no sup­
port from any level of government.35 
In contrast, the automobile had been a pampered child. If Americans 
had put up with public transit for lack of choice, they loved the car 
because it gave them privacy and greater control of their daily life. And 
Americans were willing to pay for this freedom through user taxes. Al­
most from the start, road-building was considered a public necessity 
that benefited the entire community. The enthusiasm with which locali­
ties improved streets in the 1920s meant serious trouble for public transit 
in that decade; depression and war gave transit operators a respite, but 
once peace and prosperity returned, transit's fall was rapid. Transit pa­
tronage in 1955 was but one-half of its wartime high, while automobile 
passenger miles doubled over the decade.36 
After the war all levels of government tried to meet the public's de­
mand for roads. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent annually by 
public agencies on highways, but it never seemed enough. As John Ken­
neth Galbraith noted in 1958:" Use of privately produced vehicles 
has, on occasion, got far out of line with the supply of the related public 
services. The result has been hideous road congestion, an annual massa­
cre of impressive proportions and chronic colitis in the cities."37 Yet even 
though federal highway policy has often been singled out as a major 
factor in the exodus from the city by making the suburbs more accessi­
ble, as in the case of the home mortgage guarantees, government actions 
seem to have reinforced, not mandated, decisions made in the private 
market. In the face of political pressures, the national government had 
little choice but to go along with consumers, who were spending billions 
for automobiles.38 
Legislative approval of the 41,000-mile, $37 billion Interstate High­
way System in 1956 revealed both the strength of those pressures and the 
lack of clear governmental policy. The highway lobby brought together 
automobile and tire manufacturers, oil companies, construction firms, 
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and motorist groups; and when they could agree on a financing mecha­
nism, legislative and executive approval was assured. Less settled was 
the question of where the roads were to be built: were they to come into 
central cities or bypass them? To the extent that the matter was dis­
cussed, which was minimal, legislators revealed little understanding of 
how this program might affect metropolitan areas. Just as the govern­
ment wanted homes built but did not particularly care where, so the 
government wanted roads, without regard to their social and economic 
consequences. The 1956 act came too late to influence community-
building in the immediate postwar period, but it helped extend the sub­
urban trend into the 1960s and beyond.39 
LOOKING TO WASHINGTON 
The postwar metropolitan migrations created pressures for wider fed­
eral aid for community development. Whether localities were gaining or 
losing population, their internal resources proved inadequate to cope 
with the resulting needs. New suburban areas experienced growth pains 
as expansion outran local government's ability to furnish such essential 
services as schools and sewers. Central cities, on the other hand, had 
their infrastructures in place, but discovered them increasingly expen­
sive to maintain as the character of their populace changed. Limited 
success in raising revenues and even less success at regional cooperation 
left but one practical option: national assistance. 
Both central cities and suburbs underwent alterations in order to 
maintain local autonomy. Realizing that modern manufacturing tech­
niques and the automobile had shifted the industrial advantage to the 
periphery, central cities began emphasizing the service sector as em­
ployer. New office buildings added to the tax rolls and provided white-
collar jobs, but because many of these workers were commuting from 
the suburbs, the gains were only marginal. Nothing municipal govern­
ment could do, it seemed, touched the deeper problem of getting jobs— 
and homes—for the unskilled.40 The suburbs, furthermore, discrimi­
nated in deciding which industries could move in. They kept out 
businesses that employed poorly educated people at low wages, or that 
polluted the environment. Such screening preserved neighborhood insu­
larity, but it retarded broadening of the tax base. 
Because they owed their fashionableness to exclusivity, postwar sub­
urbs, although demographically different from their early twentieth-
century antecedents, continued to oppose political amalgamation with 
the central cities. Indeed, the new members of the middle class were 
often more provincial than their upper-crust neighbors. The latter, be­
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cause of their family traditions and financial strength, persisted in trying 
to direct the city even after they left it; by mid-century they favored 
bringing the core and periphery together under a federative arrange­
ment. Not so with the more recent arrivals. The city was in their past 
and they wanted it kept that way. They saw no need to link up with the 
declining central city.41 If they could not make it alone, they would turn 
not to their neighbors for help but to the federal government. 
Throughout the 1950s the entire concept of federal assistance was 
gaining legitimacy. Ideologically the nation may have remained devoted 
to free enterprise, but in practice it found comfort in the New Deal's 
welfare state. Millions were enjoying Social Security, veterans were 
benefiting from the G.I. Bill, and government contracts were providing 
hundreds of thousands of jobs. Older communities were already getting 
help under the public housing and urban renewal programs, and it was 
not difficult to argue that those grants be expanded so that similar as­
sistance for schools, water, sanitation, and recreation would be ex­
tended to the suburbs. Here was a solution on which both the cities and 
suburbs could agree: let Uncle Sam foot the bill for the population ex­
plosion.42 It was a strange partnership, but one based on a common 
understanding. Federal money would only paste over the central city-
suburban cleavage, not heal it, and each recipient was to use the funds to 
improve its position with respect to its neighbors. The larger federal 
grants demanded by the late 1950s went to serve the same sort of paro­
chial goals that government programs had usually aided. 
POLITICS IN THE METROPOLITAN AGE 
The migrations of the 1940s and 1950s that sent local officials to 
Washington for federal assistance also left their mark on the nation's 
politics. The exodus of the white middle class to the suburbs and the 
influx of poor blacks to the northern cities somewhat affected party 
coalitions but did not radically alter the balance of power between the 
two major parties. They also put new pressures on the party system at 
both the local and national levels. 
In the central cities there appeared an efficiency movement reminis­
cent of the Progressive era. But unlike that effort, which had been ob­
sessed with the corruption and waste of the machine bosses, the postwar 
reform took aim at the physical obsolescence of the old core cities. If the 
cities were to survive, they would have to be rebuilt almost from the 
ground up. A new generation of political leaders appeared, shaped by 
their corporate and World War II organizational experiences. Stream­
lining municipal government to make it more decisive and responsive, 
and seeking out business cooperation, became the hallmarks of big-city 
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politics. Although the Democrats kept control of most of the nation's 
city halls, they were often allied with Republican-led chambers of com­
merce. Improvements in the central business district, not the promise of 
patronage, made the difference at elections. These new coalitions and 
programs did not demolish completely the traditional political appara­
tus, but the neighborhood focus of political campaigning steadily gave 
way to media-based appeals that stressed candidate rather than party.43 
Simultaneously, partisan identification assumed less importance in 
the suburbs. The old, upper-class enclaves had always had a refined 
Republican air about them, but the ideal was consensual, public-spirited 
politics. It was this model that the burgeoning postwar suburbs sought 
to emulate. Physically removed from the inner-city working-class 
neighborhoods that instilled party loyalty, usually Democratic, the 
middle-class migrants did not adopt the Republican label so much as 
they did a position of independence. Having come to the suburbs for 
private autonomy, the newcomers joined, not a party, but less formal 
and temporary groupings that took stands on issues. Local politics revolved 
around schools, zoning, and related aspects of community life; in this 
context the usual party tag had little meaning.44 
These trends in metropolitan politics created both problems and op­
portunities for presidential hopefuls. With many blacks moving to 
northern cities and voting there, Democratic candidates were caught 
between demands to promote racial equality and continuing loyalties to 
the rural South and northern ethnic neighborhoods. Out in the suburbs 
potential Democratic torchbearers could promise federal aid, but still 
had to assure that such assistance entailed neither higher federal taxes 
nor further federal intervention in local affairs. Meanwhile, the loosen­
ing of party ties that accompanied the move from inner city to suburb 
provided the Republicans with potential support from the upwardly 
mobile middle class, but designing a program that would attract these 
independents required as much juggling as was demanded of the Demo­
crats. To remain steadfast to the G.O.P. commitment to reduce federal 
spending without rejecting suburban pleas for help called for a heavy 
reliance on private enterprise. Greater private investment was also part 
of the Republican solution for central-city ills, but here the G.O.P.'s 
effort was something less than wholehearted; the big cities had been 
Democratic for so long that Republicans had all but written them off. 
The presidential contest of 1960 pitted two suburban-born candidates 
against one another. Although identified with Irish Boston, John F 
Kennedy had actually spent his childhood in such affluent suburbs as 
Brookline, Massachusetts, and Bronxville, New York. As the Demo­
cratic nominee, Kennedy pledged a program of aid that overwhelming 
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numbers of central-city whites and blacks, and a good share of the sub­
urban middle class as well, could support. In contrast, Richard Nixon, 
whose ill-defined roots were in the amorphous lower-middle-class sub­
urbs of Los Angeles, could not decide how to approach the issues posed 
by metropolitanization; he carried the suburbs, but not by enough to 
offset the majority Kennedy rolled up in the central cities.45 The geo­
graphical and racial polarization that Nixon would exploit eight years 
later was not completely in place in 1960. 
TOWARD "TWO SOCIETIES"46 
By 1960 the nation was well on the road to social polarization. 
Prosperity, advances in technology, private investment decisions, and 
government action had conspired to speed the decline of the central city 
and the rise of the suburbs, keeping the poor—particularly the black 
poor—in the city while encouraging the white middle class to move to 
the suburbs. There had been no conscious decision to create this divided 
society; rather the "invisible hand" of the marketplace had woven the 
independent judgments of countless producers, consumers, bureau­
crats, and politicians into a fabric that highlighted the contrasts in 
American life. Privatism, spiced by heavy doses of prejudice, was given a 
free hand and a free ride in affluent postwar America. A more socially 
conscious era would feel its effects. 
1. Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Cen­
tury City (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), pp. 116-17; Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Sub­
urbs: The Process of Growth in Boston. 1870-1900 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 8, 15. 
2. William L. Slayton and Richard Dewey, "Urban Redevelopment and the Urbanite," 
in The Future of Cities and Urban Redevelopment, ed. Coleman Woodbury (Chicago, 
1953), pp. 322-29; Nelson N. Foote et al., Housing Choices and Housing Constraints 
(New York, 1960), pp. 187-90. 
3. John P. Dean, Homeownership: Is It Sound? (New York, 1945); Charles Abrams, 
The Future of Housing (New York. 1946), pp. 36-54. Both Dean and Abrams criticized 
the propaganda blitz on behalf of home ownership. 
4. Peter H. Rossi, Why Families Move: A Study in the Social Psychology of Urban 
Residential Mobility (Glencoe, 111., 1955), pp. 177-80; Foote, Housing Choices, pp. 
190-96; Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners (New York, 1967), pp. 31-42; cf. Howard P. 
Chudacoff, Mobile Americans: Residential and Social Mobility in Omaha. 1880-1920 
(New York, 1972), pp. 158-59. 
5. Marion Clawson and Peter Hall, Planning and Urban Growth: An Anglo-American 
Comparison (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 88-89; John Morton Blum, V Was for Victory (New 
York, 1976), pp. 103-5. 
6. The most-detailed account of the early federal involvement in housing is William L. 
C. Wheaton, "The Evolution of Federal Housing Programs" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Chicago, 1953). 
Cities, Suburbs, and Government Policy | 279 
7. Louis Winnick, Rental Housing: Opportunities for Private Investment (New York, 
1958), p. 77. The FH A's one major effort during the postwar period to spur rental housing, 
the Section 608 program, was both successful in building new units and short-lived. Be­
cause 608 allowed developers to make huge profits with practically no investment, the 
program became enmeshed in scandal and was eliminated by Congress. Despite the FH A's 
withdrawal from the field, rental housing construction started to boom in the late 1950s; 
because of new population and employment patterns, such housing was in high demand: 
Robert Schafer, The Suburbanization of Multifamily Housing (Lexington, Mass., 1974). 
8. Winnick, Rental Housing, pp. 74-76. 
9. Clawson and Hall, Planning and Urban Growth, pp. 88-89. 
10. Joseph C. Goulden, The Best Years, 1945-1950 (New York, 1976), p. 133; Richard 
O. Davies, Housing Reform during the Truman Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), 
p. 41. 
11. Barton J. Bernstein, "Reluctance and Resistance: Wilson Wyatt and Veterans' 
Housing in the Truman Administration," Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 65 
(1967): 47-66. 
12. Barry Checkoway, "Large Builders, Federal Housing Programs, and Postwar Sub-
urbanization," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 4 (1980): 21-44. 
13. Calvin Bradford, "Financing Home Ownership: The Federal Role in Neighbor­
hood Decline," Urban Affairs Quarterly 14 (1978-79): 320-23. 
14. The 1930 figure is for the same cities that had achieved "metropolitan district" 
status in 1910; if all the cities that were centers of metropolitan districts in 1930 are in­
cluded, the figure is lower. 
15. Gregory H. Singleton, "The Genesis of Suburbia: A Complex of Historical 
Trends," in The Urbanization of the Suburbs, ed. Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden 
(Beverly Hills, Calif., 1973), pp. 29-50; Kenneth T. Jackson, "Urban Decentralization in 
the Nineteenth Century: A Statistical Inquiry," in The New Urban History, ed. Leo F. 
Schnore (Princeton, N.J., 1975), pp. 110-42; Joel Schwartz, "Evolution of the Suburbs," 
in Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma, ed. Philip C. Dolce (Garden City, N. Y., 
1976), pp. 1-36; Edwin C. Mills, "Urban Density Functions," Urban Studies 7 (February 
1970): 5-20; Blaine A. Brownell, The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930 (Baton Rouge, 
La., 1975), pp. 65-69. 
16. Kenneth T. Jackson, "Metropolitan Government versus Political Autonomy: Poli­
tics on the Crabgrass Frontier," in Cities in American History, ed. Kenneth T. Jackson and 
Stanley K. Schultz (New York, 1972), pp. 448-55; Jon C. Teaford, City and Suburb: The 
Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan America, 1850-1970 (Baltimore, 1979), pp. 
5-63, 76-104. 
17. John F. Kain, "The Distribution and Movement of Jobs and Industry," in The 
Metropolitan Enigma, ed. James Q. Wilson (Garden City, N. Y., 1970), pp. 5-12; Philip J. 
Funigiello, The Challenge to Urban Liberalism: Federal-City Relations during World 
War //(Knoxville, Tenn., 1978), pp. 10-11. 
18. Robert Wood, "Suburban Politics and Policies: Retrospect and Prospect," Publius 
5 (Winter 1975): 46. 
19. Quoted in Martin Mayer, The Builders (New York, 1978), p. 308. 
20. One urban analyst has observed that the FH A was "the most successful single busi­
ness ever launched." Because the FH A was so prudent in its loan guarantees and charged 
customers for its services, it actually made contributions to the federal treasury: George 
Sternlieb, "Housing, Urban Development, and Rehabilitation," South Atlantic Urban 
Studies I (1977): 42. 
21. Bradford, "Financing Home Ownership," p. 324. 
22. Gail D. Shelp and Ursula A. Guerrieri, "The Role of Federal Housing Programs in 
the Community Development Process," in U.S., Department of Housing and Urban De­
280 | Reshaping America 
velopment, Housing in the Seventies: Working Papers (Washington, D.C., 1976), pp. 
1583-84. In an unpublished paper Kenneth T. Jackson compiled an impressive set of 
figures demonstrating how the FH A's loan policies fostered abandonment of large parts of 
the central cities, but he concluded that "the Federal Housing Administration was not the 
sine qua non in the mushrooming of the suburbs": "The Spatial Dimensions of Social 
Control: Race, Ethnicity, and Government Housing Policy in the United States, 
1918-1968," p. 59. See also Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The 
Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration," Journal of 
Urban History 6 (1980): 419-52. 
23. Abrams, Future of Housing, p. 201. 
24. See Otis L. Graham, Jr., Toward a Planned Society (New York, 1976), pp. 52-58, 
79-98. 
25. This attitude was not confined to the average citizen; see the reminiscences of Na­
thaniel S. Keith, a former federal official and longtime advocate of federal housing aid: 
Politics and the Housing Crisis since 1930 (New York, 1973). 
26. The federal government paid the principal and interest on the long-term bonds 
localities issued to construct public housing projects; this subsidy allowed municipalities 
to charge rents within the means of low-income families. 
27. The political history of public housing in the postwar era is chronicled in Leonard 
Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty (New York, 1969). 
28. Peter Marris, "A Report on Urban Renewal in the United States," in The Urban 
Condition, ed. Leonard Duhl (New York, 1963), pp. 120-21; Chester Hartman, "The 
Limitations of Public Housing," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29 (No­
vember 1963): 284. 
29. The classic case study of the problems presented by site selection is Martin Meyer-
son and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest: The Case of 
Public Housing in Chicago (New York, 1955). 
30. Without question the FHA contributed to this division. Before 1950 the agency 
actively fostered residential segregation in the suburbs by encouraging the use of racially 
restrictive covenants; from 1950 until 1962 it took no positive steps in the development of 
open occupancy and integrated housing. Because of public housing's total reliance upon 
local initiative, suburbs were under no compulsion to put up public housing, and virtually 
none did. Because of racial and income discrimination, blacks were bottled up in the 
central cities. 
31. For the legislative background to Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, see Funigiello, 
Challenge to Urban Liberalism, pp. 217-45; and Mark I. Gelfand,/) Nation of Cities: The 
Federal Government and Urban America, 1933-1965 (New York, 1975), pp. 105-56. 
32. Urban renewal had the federal government put up two-thirds of the cost of "writing 
down" (i.e., the difference between the high prices local redevelopment agencies paid for 
blighted real estate and the lower prices at which they resold these parcels to private 
builders) the land values, which was believed necessary to make the properties attractive 
for redevelopment; the local government supplied the other one-third. With the exception 
of government office buildings, it was expected that private investors would finance the 
new construction on these sites. 
33. "The Fortune Survey," Fortune 33 (April 1946): 275. 
34. The literature on urban renewal is voluminous; James Q. Wilson, ed., Urban Renew­
al: The Record and the Controversy (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), remains the best starting 
place. 
35. George M. Smerk, Urban Mass Transportation: A Dozen Years of Federal Policy 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1974), pp. 12-13, 137; Stanley Mallach, "The Origins of the Decline 
of Urban Mass Transportation in the United States, 1890-1930," Urbanism Past and 
Present, no. 8 (Summer 1979), pp. 1-17. Also see Mark Foster, "City Planners and Urban 
Cities, Suburbs, and Government Policy | 281 
Transportation: The American Response, 1900-1940" Journal of Urban History 5 (May 
1979): 365-96. 
36. Paul Barrett, "Public Policy and Private Choice: Mass Transit and the Automobile 
in Chicago between the Wars," Business History Review 49 (Winter 1975): 473-97; David 
Owen Wise and Marguerite Duprie, "The Choice of the Automobile for Urban Passenger 
Transportation in Baltimore in the 1920s," South A tlantic Urban Studies 2 (1978): 153-79; 
Alan Altshuler, The Urban Transportation System: Politics and Policy Innovation (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 22-23. 
37. John Kenneth Galbraith, 77K- Affluent Society (Boston, 1958), p. 255. 
38. Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1941-1956 (Lawrence, Kans., 
1979). 
39. Gary T. Schwartz, "Urban Freeways and the Interstate System," Southern Califor­
nia Law Review 49 (March 1976): 466-513. 
40. See Hal Burton, The City Fights Back (New York, 1954); Kain, "Distribution and 
Movement of Jobs and Industry," pp. 12-31. 
41. Teaford, Cityand Suburb,pp. 175-80. In the central cities opposition to metropoli­
tan government was most intense in the black ghettos, which feared a diminution of black 
voting power by suburban amalgamation. 
42. "Cities Ask for More," Economist 194 (January I, 1960): 36; Proceedings of the 
First Urban County Congress (Washington, D.C., n.d. [1959]). 
43. Seymour Freedgood, "New Strength in City Hall," in The Editors of Fortune, The 
Exploding Metropolis (Garden City, N. Y., 1957), pp. 81-96; Robert H. Salisbury, "Urban 
Politics: The New Convergence of Power," Journal of Politics 26 (November 1964): 
775-97. 
44. Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics (Boston, 1959), pp. 
153-225; Frederic M. Wirt et al., On the City's Rim: Politics and Policy in Suburbia 
(Lexington, Mass., 1972), pp. 145-74. The "conversion" theory, which argued that Demo­
crats became Republicans when they moved from the central city to the suburbs, a popular 
concept in the 1950s (Fred I. Greenstein and Raymond H. Wolfinger, "The Suburbs and 
Shifting Party Loyalties," Public Opinion Quarterly 22 [Winter 1958-59]: 473-82), is ef­
fectively refuted in Wirt, On the City's Rim, pp. 81-100.) 
45. Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpre­
tation," Journal of Politics 27 (August 1965): 647-66. 
46. For use of this phrase, see U.S., National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
Report (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 1. 

Cops and Crooks: The War at Home 
Eugene J. Watts 
America emerged from World War II eager to continue the march 
of progress that only momentarily had been sidetracked by the great 
conflict. This sense seemed especially strong among law-enforcement 
officials and others involved in the movement to reform the urban po­
lice. After 1945 most plans designed to make the police more efficient 
and professional moved from blueprint to implementation. The suc­
cesses of police reform, however, appeared in the public mind only to 
keep pace with a mounting crime problem that rapidly reached crisis 
proportions. By the dawn of the sixties, in almost prophetic fashion, 
public perception would be matched by a skyrocketing increase in crime 
that clearly revealed the limits of police effectiveness. During that 
troubled decade Americans would search for new solutions to the crime 
problem and also would grapple with several unforeseen consequences 
of police reform. Yet, in the atmosphere of the immediate postwar pe­
riod, the pessimism that today permeates the administration of criminal 
justice would have seemed foreign. It was a time to put our crime-
fighting forces in shape and to win the war on crime. 
World War II, like other military conflicts, temporarily reduced the 
number of conventional crimes, but had deleterious effects on law en­
forcement. The urban police were forced to allocate a large share of their 
resources to those things—national security investigations, civilian de­
fense measures, prostitution, juvenile delinquency, and racial unrest— 
that threatened the war effort and domestic unity but were not 
previously a major part of their mission. Police adoption of new tech­
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nology, especially the radio and the automobile, was severely retarded 
by the armed services' demands for such equipment. Military service 
and wartime prosperity also drained off qualified applicants and officers 
already in the ranks. Thus, from 1940 to 1945, the numbers of police and 
their ratio to the population steadily declined. Many departments re­
laxed age requirements and postponed plans to raise other recruitment 
standards simply to fill vacancies. As inflation eroded the favorable po­
sition of police salaries compared with other occupations, police union­
ism underwent a revival that thoroughly alarmed administrators.1 
Thus, the war appeared to turn back the clock on the movement to 
reform the urban police that had gathered steam during the 1930s, but it 
proved to be a brief hiatus. The period from 1945 to 1960 witnessed 
more profound changes in the urban police than in any comparable 
period since their inception in the mid-nineteenth century. Several insti­
tutions and individuals were instrumental in promoting these changes. 
The FBI's high standards of recruitment and training, utilization of 
science and technology, insistence on honest and accurate record-
keeping, and adherence to a tough "law and order" approach to crime 
served as a model for police reform. Through its Police Training School, 
renamed the National Academy in 1945, the FBI indoctrinated hun­
dreds of local police officers. A new generation of reform-minded ad­
ministrators dominated the influential International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP). The proceedings of the IACP's annual meet­
ings, published as Police Yearbook, tirelessly recited the litany of re­
form. The Municipal Year Book of the International City Management 
Association performed a similar function, although the title of its sec­
tion, "Police Administration," anticipated a significant alteration in the 
reform message after the war. 
The bond between police administrators and academic advisers had 
remained strong during the war, even though several prominent police 
consultants momentarily turned their attention to the military effort. 
The growth of public administration as a specialty within political 
science was particularly important. At the close of the conflict, practi­
tioners, particularly those affiliated with the Institute for Public Admin­
istration in New York, resumed propagation of their message of man­
agerial efficiency in police surveys. Other academics, including an 
emerging cadre of criminologists within the discipline of sociology, 
transmitted their views in such publications as the Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology as well as in specialized studies of crime preven­
tion, traffic engineering, patrol allocation, community relations, and so 
on, commissioned by individual departments. 
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Experts on policing from within and without the law-enforcement 
community preached the gospel of professionalism, which promised to 
transform police work into a full-time career, free from political manip­
ulation, with a commitment to abstract ideals of public service and an 
organized body of scientific knowledge. As initially enunciated by Au­
gust Vollmer, the most prominent prewar reformer, later refined by 
Bruce Smith, and popularized by O. W. Wilson, professionalism had 
several tenets. Personnel reform, however, was paramount before the 
war. Vollmer and like-minded reformers underlined the need to recruit 
higher-caliber officers, to provide them with better training, and to guar­
antee them higher salaries, better fringe benefits, and adequate retire­
ment plans.2 
Although the premier postwar reformers, Bruce Smith and O. W. 
Wilson, continued to advocate these measures, they were much less con­
fident than Vollmer about attaining the true professional ideal in which 
characteristics of personnel are more important than those of the organ­
ization. Instead, they emphasized a sweeping internal reorganization 
and acceptance of advances in technology to achieve more effective con­
trol over the day-to-day activities of officers. Centralization of author­
ity, continuity in administration, simplification of chain of command, 
functional organization, bureaucratic regularity, independence from 
political interference, specialization, and improved communications 
and mobility became the watchwords.3 
Smith, working for the Institute for Public Administration, presented 
this view in surveys of municipal and state police agencies and, most 
clearly, in the 1949 revision of his monumental Police Systems in the 
United States (1940). Governmental Research Institutes allied with the 
Institute for Public Administration carried Smith's message to cities 
across the land. Even more influential was O. W. Wilson, a protege of 
Vollmer, police chief in Wichita from 1928 to 1939, and professor of 
police administration (in 1950 dean of the nation's first School of Crim­
inology) at the University of California, Berkeley, from 1939 to 1960. 
Wilson wrote several important studies of policing and compiled the 
section on police administration in the Municipal Year Book for 1936 to 
1943 and again from 1952 to 1960. His most significant work, Police 
Administration (1950), which combined the views of Vollmer and Smith 
with the scientific management approach of F W. Taylor, became the 
bible of professionalism. By the time of Smith's death in 1954, Wilson 
was the acknowledged prophet of police reform. Following the guidance 
of police reformers, as well as the internal logic of large organizations, 
police departments in the postwar period evolved from simple, decen­
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tralized, loosely controlled territorial organizations to complex, highly 
specialized, functionally arranged bureaucracies.4 
The recipe for reform after the war continued to include stricter en­
trance tests, higher qualifications, and improved training for recruits. 
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology reported an "upward 
trend in the quality of police personnel" in 1945, citing scores made by 
applicants in many departments on a newly developed intelligence ex­
amination, the Army Alpha Test. Most big-city police forces adopted 
this and other intelligence tests in the late 1940s, and several raised the 
passing score in the next decade. In consultation with psychologists, 
police supervisors developed police aptitude tests that further routinized 
police selection, lessened political patronage, and enshrined their con­
servative attitudes into regulations. Although the rate of innovation dif­
fered by departments, virtually all police forces streamlined their screen­
ing process, adopted medical examinations and physical requirements 
modeled on those of the armed services, and utilized more thorough 
character investigations. A handful of departments, including those in 
Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Pasadena, experimented with psychiat­
ric examinations. Most of these changes, however, appeared to be de­
signed to eliminate the obviously unfit rather than to secure superior 
personnel.5 
Police departments finally implemented long-standing requests of re­
formers to revise the qualifications of candidates for the force. Most 
important were age limits of twenty-one to thirty, a high school educa­
tion or its equivalent, and the end of local residence requirements. In 
1946 the California State Peace Officers' Association (composed of the 
state's chiefs of police) endorsed these suggestions, and police forces in 
California generally led the way in adopting them. In addition, police 
departments everywhere overwhelmingly selected recruits with military 
experience, a practice more in tune with a renewed emphasis on a mil­
itary model for policing than with the momentary postwar sentiment to 
reward returning heroes.6 
Recruitment of younger men, argued reformers, provided a better 
return on the investment in training, promoted the development of long-
term careers, fostered rank-and-file acceptance of military training and 
discipline, and eliminated "failures" in other occupations from consid­
eration. World War II marked a temporary interruption in the percepti­
ble trend toward selection of younger recruits that accelerated after the 
conflict. Several departments instituted "cadet" programs in the 1950s 
to attract recent high-school graduates not yet old enough to enter 
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commissioned ranks, and by 1960 most police forces largely recruited 
men in their early twenties.7 
Efforts to eliminate residence requirements met with more limited 
success. The potential to curtail political patronage provided the impe­
tus for, and resistance against, this alteration in several cities, such as 
Chicago, where as late as 1945 one thousand police positions were par­
celed out to ward committeemen. Reformers also pointed out that 
statewide or even national recruitment would provide a larger pool of 
applicants and thus permit departments to upgrade other standards 
without encountering difficulties in filling vacancies. The Dallas police 
had dropped its residence rule during the severe manpower shortage 
engendered by the war, and many forces began to reduce their require­
ment in the late 1940s for the same reason. Rank-and-file desires to 
move to the suburbs, however, provided the major reason for the com­
plete elimination of the rule among several big-city police forces during 
the 1950s, and only a handful of these, including Los Angeles, Saint 
Louis, San Francisco, and Oakland, actually conducted recruitment 
drives outside their cities.8 
Most large urban police forces and many medium-sized departments 
instituted some education requirement by the late 1940s. By 1960 most 
mandated at least a high-school diploma or its equivalent. The increase 
in high-school education among the general population made these 
changes feasible. Although several big-city departments stated a prefer­
ence for college-trained personnel, only a few were able to attract signif­
icant numbers of such recruits. The Los Angeles Police Department was 
exceptional, for more than one-third of its 4,500 officers in the late 1950s 
had attended or were attending college. Many took advantage of the 
specialized police training programs pioneered at several California 
schools, notably Berkeley, San Jose State, and Fresno State. By the 
mid-1950s twenty-two colleges and universities offered such programs, 
and several institutions outside California, including Michigan State 
University and Washington State University, enjoyed national reputa­
tions. From 1950 to 1959 these schools produced more than 1,800 BAs 
and 50 MAs in law enforcement or "criminalistics."9 
Stricter tests and higher standards eliminated the overwhelming ma­
jority of police candidates by the late 1950s. From 1956 to 1961 success 
rates for applicants decreased from 30 percent to 22 percent nationally, 
and many big-city police forces rejected 90 percent or more of their can­
didates. Black applicants appeared as the major casualties of reform in 
many cities, and their complaints presaged a major reaction to the pro­
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fessionalization of the police in the following decade. Most police forces 
mandated stricter requirements for women than men, and even those 
severely strapped to fill vacancies refused to hire females except in juve­
nile divisions. Police experiments with female traffic officers in the early 
1940s clearly were wartime expedients that were quickly discarded at the 
close of hostilities.10 
In addition to high elimination rates for applicants, several factors 
contributed to acute police recruitment problems at the end of the 1950s. 
Beginning in the 1930s, more officers had made police work their life­
time career (and fewer were dropped for political reasons) and thus 
reached retirement age by 1960. Moreover, most police forces had in­
creased in size in the postwar period. Despite a tremendous growth in 
population from 1945 to 1960, the ratio of police per 1,000 people in­
creased in all cities over 10,000 from 1.58 to 1.72, and in the largest cities 
from 2.11 to 2.78. Police departments also began to reduce the forty-
eight-hour work week in 1945. The forty-hour movement gathered 
steam in 1948 and became the popular mode by 1960. This change alone 
required departments to increase their force by approximately 17 per­
cent simply to maintain the same number of man-hours." 
The low prestige and relative decline in salaries of the police during 
the 1940s and 1950s limited options in recruitment. Although the police 
ranking on the North-Hatt occupational prestige scale rose eight points 
from 1947 to 1963, police officers still ranked only forty-seventh out of 
ninety occupations in the latter year. Many departments introduced 
substantially better fringe benefits—including free uniforms and 
equipment and life and health insurance—and won repeated pay raises 
for their members after 1945. The median entrance salary for patrolmen 
in all cities over 10,000 stood at $2,100 in 1945. Fifteen years later, re­
cruits in cities under 25,000 received $4,030 and their counterparts in the 
largest cities garnered $4,800. As a 1954 study by New York City's Pa­
trolmen's Benevolent Association revealed, however, other occupa­
tional groups fared even better. In 1960 police earned more than auto­
mobile mechanics, carpenters, and social workers, but less than 
electricians, plumbers, and teachers. Police supervisor salaries were 
higher, but four of five officers never rose above the rank of patrolman. 
As a consequence of relatively poor pay, a large number of police offi­
cers moonlighted, in most cases contrary to department rules.12 
Gains in salaries and benefits were at least partly the result of rank-
and-file unionization attempts. In the late 1930s the American Federa­
tion of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) revived 
police organization efforts that had been dormant since the disastrous 
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Boston police strike in 1919. By 1944 AFSCME claimed 5,000 police 
members in thirty-six police locals and in twenty-eight other municipal 
public employee locals. In addition, the Fraternal Order of Police 
(FOP), a national rank-and-file association whose local units sometimes 
sought to represent their members on issues of salaries and grievances, 
had 169 chapters linking 1,072 cities over 10,000 population. The IACP 
in 1944 published a major policy statement against unions, collective 
bargaining, the dues checkoff, and use of the strike (which all police 
unions and associations disavowed), calling police unions a threat to 
professionalism and impartial police service.13 
Individual departments mounted an all-out assault against police 
unions, although many became increasingly tolerant of other employee 
associations. After the Teamsters, AFSCME, and FOP tried to orga­
nize the Detroit police in 1944, the department high command agreed to 
the nonaffiliated Detroit Police Officer's Association as an acceptable 
way to regulate rank-and-file militance. Similarly, the New York Police 
Department firmly resisted an organization attempt by the Transport 
Workers Union in 1951, but gradually granted more influence to the 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association. These nonunion police associa­
tions, at least, were not linked to other labor groups and thus did not 
pose a threat to impartial police service in the event of strikes. Open 
harassment by police and city government officials destroyed nascent 
police unions immediately after the war in many other cities, including 
Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles. When these tactics failed, adminis­
trators turned to the courts. The key decisions involved police unions in 
Jackson, Mississippi, and in Saint Louis, in which the courts upheld the 
right of officials to fire officers for union activity. Many cities, however, 
granted pay raises and improvements in working conditions to an 
aroused rank and file.14 
These actions severely curtailed police unionization. An I ACP survey 
in 1947 of 77 cities over 100,000 population revealed that only ten had 
police unions. The AFSCME, which still claimed fifty-five locals, 
mostly in medium-sized and smaller communities, expanded its efforts 
in the early 1950s. The number of AFSCME locals rose to sixty-one in 
1951 and to sixty-five in 1959. Many of these unions, however, were 
transitory. Of fifty-five cities with police unions at the end of World War 
II, only eleven continued to exist in 1957. An announcement by Jimmy 
Hoffa in 1958 that the Teamsters Union would attempt to organize the 
nation's police, beginning with the New York Police Department, dealt 
a severe blow to the movement. Reaction was so swift and severe that 
Hoffa almost immediately withdrew his proposal. Police administrators 
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reiterated their tough position, and a Gallup poll revealed that 55 per­
cent of the public opposed police unions and only 27 percent supported 
them. Despite this climate the decade of the 1960s witnessed the success­
ful resurgence of police unionism, based on rank-and-file reaction to 
reform and to police administrators' policy toward black protest groups 
as much as on the desire for traditional labor union goals.15 
Improvements in training from 1945 to 1960 were even more impres­
sive than changes in recruitment. By the late 1940s virtually every big-
city police force had its own training school. Many, such as those in 
Saint Louis and Atlanta, were modeled on the FBI's National Academy. 
Most police forces extended the length of the training period and en­
riched their curriculum with human relations and criminology courses, 
but only a few departments presented good in-service training for men 
already in the ranks. Several states, notably California, Kansas, Michi­
gan, New Jersey, and Washington, inaugurated state-operated police 
training schools. In 1959 California, Missouri, and New York mandated 
establishment of statewide minimum training standards.16 
Even departments with modern police academies relied on several 
special institutions for advanced training, particularly for would-be in­
structors in their own schools. Most important was the National 
Academy, which from 1935 to 1960 trained 2,563 officers, including 29 
percent of the executive heads of all agencies still in service in 1959. The 
technical excellence of the National Academy evoked universal praise, 
but some critics complained that the FBI paid too much attention to the 
mainstays of traditional police curriculum—marksmanship, defensive 
tactics, and disarming methods. In contrast, human relations courses 
designed by social scientists were a major focus of the Southern Police 
Institute at the University of Louisville, which opened in 1951. Initially 
limited to southern police administrators, the institute quickly ex­
panded to embrace police officers from around the country. By 1960 it 
had graduated almost 500 officers from its long-term course and over 
300 from midwinter seminars. The Northwestern University Traffic In­
stitute, the Yale Bureau of Highway Safety, the University of Southern 
California's Delinquency Control Institute, and the University of Chi­
cago's Institute for Municipal Administration offered more specialized 
training. By 1955 the Northwestern Traffic Institute and several regional 
traffic centers designated by the IACP were certifying nearly 1,300 law-
enforcement officials annually.17 
The emergence of these institutes reflected the growing specialization 
in police work. Detective divisions generally had divided into special­
ized squads—homicide, vice, and so on—before the 1940s, but the sim­
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pie police organization in which the great majority of officers worked on 
patrol evolved into a much more complex structure after World War II. 
Greater attention to traffic regulation was only one example of this spe­
cialization, albeit the most onerous, for police departments faced stag­
gering problems with traffic control in the postwar era. Reserve or auxil­
iary units, personnel divisions, training staffs, special communications 
and record-keeping sections, and crime prevention units were the wave 
of the 1940s. Internal affairs bureaus designed to monitor activities of 
police officers, intelligence squads developed to keep tabs on organized 
crime, and canine corps imported from England to control crowds, de­
tect narcotics, and deter physical attack or flight by hoodlums, became 
the fashion of the fifties.18 
Specialization was a hotly debated topic throughout the 1950s. Op­
ponents argued that it provided a poor background for future supervi­
sors and created rivalries within the department. More important, it led 
to a lower proportion of officers assigned to patrol, the mainstay of 
police work. Proponents, led by O. W. Wilson, insisted that efficiency 
and effectiveness depended upon it, pointing to planning and research 
divisions as their favorite example. Appearing in the early 1950s, first in 
Oakland and then in Los Angeles, these divisions quickly spread to 
other large urban departments. They epitomized the new professional­
ism, for they relied heavily on technology, fostered relations with out­
side consultants, and provided a systematic basis to policing. Research 
and planning divisions assisted commanders with personnel manage­
ment, including the creation of efficiency ratings and written promotion 
examinations. By analyzing the percentage of calls answered in a reason­
able time and the number of people served per officer and per dollar, 
they aided administrators in quantitative analysis of police perfor­
mance. In several cities these divisions reorganized beats and reallocated 
patrol manpower on the basis of behavioral patterns such as the inci­
dence of crime rather than on arbitrary rules, thus lessening the impor­
tance of local experience and political considerations. From the per­
spective of patrol officers, however, such "professionalism" seemed to 
change their vocation from a skilled trade in which they exercised con­
siderable judgment to one resembling a combination of assembly-line 
work and bookkeeping.19 
Increased specialization led to a sizable increase in staff and other 
positions in the department, as many "modern" forces felt it was impera­
tive to hire criminalists, engineers, social workers, lawyers, public rela­
tions experts, and, particularly, statisticians. In 1958 Police magazine 
began a section entitled "Statistics for Police Efficiency" to keep abreast 
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of the application of statistical methods as a management tool and tech­
nique to cope with crime. This tendency dramatically increased the 
number of civilian employees on police forces, especially since police 
veterans successfully fought lateral entry at high-commissioned rank for 
outside experts. One of the reformers' major concerns—untangling the 
chain of command—therefore became more pressing in the postwar pe­
riod. The solution, paradoxically, was the creation of several additional 
senior commanders of functional units, such as patrol or detectives, who 
alone reported to the chief. Under older, territorial arrangements, each 
district commander controlled all activities in his area and had been 
directly responsible to the chief.20 
Reformers also successfully recommended elimination of many dis­
trict stations, thereby helping to sever the close connection between 
ward leaders and police captains in many cities. By the early 1950s, more­
over, most police forces were under control of a single administrator 
rather than a commission or civilian board. Indeed, reform won its great­
est successes in the managerial revolution based on the corporate model 
and in the partial disjunction between politics and the police, failing 
only to guarantee the tenure of police chiefs for good behavior. Al­
though William Parker in Los Angeles, Herbert Jenkins in Atlanta, and 
Jeremiah O'Connell in Saint Louis served long terms, very few other 
administrators at the end of the 1950s held their positions more than 
three or four years before being removed by a change in city 
administration.21 
An enthusiastic acceptance of science and technology, another com­
ponent of professionalism, encouraged specialization and bureaucrati­
zation. The American police exhibited the same fascination with 
gadgets and wonder drugs as the general public, who feasted on a diet of 
fact and fiction regarding the successes of the forensic sciences. By the 
1940s a host of experts in ballistics identification, serology, toxicology, 
and other areas applied their talents to crime-solving. Entrepreneurs 
eager to market their various wares advertised speedy improvements in 
police performance through journals and at the IACP national conven­
tion. Throughout the late 1950s Police carried such articles as "The Stri­
agraph: A New Police Science Instrument" and "Criminal Detective 
Devices Employing Photography." Not to be outdone, the more schol­
arly Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology added Police Science to 
its title and presented such articles as "The Helicopter—New York Po­
lice on Patrol" and "Introduction of Infra-Red Surveillance Devices in 
Police Services."22 
Police laboratories increased in number and sophistication in the 
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postwar period. The array of microscopes, spectograph equipment, and 
X-ray diffraction cameras produced better testimony on physical evi­
dence and strengthened the police claim to professionalism. Police read­
ily employed the polygraph to verify claims of suspects and, in a few 
departments, to aid in recruit selection and disciplinary proceedings. In 
1959 the Academy for Scientific Interrogation held its tenth annual sem­
inar in praise of the polygraph. Police used the moving picture camera 
and elaborate sound recording equipment to record criminal acts and 
statements of offenders, and utilized punch cards, mechanical tabulat­
ing devices, and microfilm in criminal identification as well as personnel 
administration. The slogan "Better living through chemistry" appealed 
to the police: by the late 1950s the drug Nalline, which produced reac­
tions in users of opium derivatives, was widely used to keep probation­
ers and parolees "clean" and to rid communities of narcotics addicts.23 
Some of these innovations may not have provided enough return to 
justify their considerable expense, but the wholesale utilization of the 
radio and automobile had a profound effect on policing. The number of 
police forces using the radio had increased from 4 to 2,000 during the 
1930s, underlining the issue of gross duplication of services within large 
urban areas that would later lead to proposals for metropolitan police 
forces. Not until the postwar period were two-way radios, which ended 
the isolation and independence of patrol officers, widely introduced into 
police work. By the mid-1950s several police forces employed radio 
transmissions and telephone lines to transmit photographs, finger­
prints, and sundry documents, as well as compact radios concealed in 
the pockets of officers. More important, the police assumed a reactive 
rather than active style of patrol as an increasingly demanding public 
used the telephone to call complaints to a central headquarters, which 
then dispatched officers to the scene. The resultant enhancement of so­
cial service and order-maintenance roles at the expense of law enforce­
ment activities was bitterly resented by the rank and file, who preferred 
"real" police work rather than dangerous domestic disputes and often 
frivolous complaints.24 
Widespread adoption of automobiles after the war gave the police the 
mobility to respond quickly to such calls as well as the capability to 
catch criminals in cars. Automobiles afforded officers protection from 
weather and fatigue, greater speed and ability to travel longer distances, 
increased facility to move prisoners and medical emergency cases, and, 
in combination with the radio, better safety. Automobiles also isolated 
officers from routine encounters with ordinary citizens in friendly situa­
tions, increasingly restricting police-public interaction to problematic 
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contacts. Every issue of the Municipal Year Book in the postwar period 
documented the increase in motorized patrol. Although 78 percent of all 
police forces still employed foot patrol on a limited basis in 1960, the 
venerable beat patrolman, with his intimate knowledge of his territory 
and many of its inhabitants, was rapidly appearing to become a relic of 
less-troubled times. So, too, was the motorcycle officer, for automobiles 
could be used for traffic regulation in all seasons and in all kinds of 
weather. To their chagrin, regular patrol officers also became charged 
with apprehending traffic violators, and many of their brethren in traffic 
units specialized in accident investigation and use of newly developed 
portable radar instruments.25 
O. W. Wilson's enthusiastic championing of the one-man patrol car 
earned him the especial enmity of the rank and file. Officers complained 
about difficulties in driving and observing their environment at the same 
time. Even with the radio, safety remained a problem in situations that 
demanded immediate action or when backup cars were also busy. These 
objections increasingly were outweighed by an appreciation for the one-
man car's greater economy—the department could cover a greater area 
with fewer men. From 1945 to 1960 the percentage of all cities over 
10,000 population using one-man cars exclusively rose from 18 to 26, 
and the percentage employing them together with two-man cars in­
creased from 34 to 64. The big-city police were slower than smaller 
communities to accept one-man patrol, especially on the busy night 
watch, but by the mid-1950s their reluctance began to recede. The pro­
portion of the largest cities using only two-man cars declined from 62 
percent after the war to 20 percent in the early 1960s.26 
Most of the new technological developments of the 1940s and 1950s 
were designed to fulfill a fourth tenet of police professionalism—an em­
phasis on aggressive crime-fighting. In the closing days of World War II, 
law-enforcement officials began to plan postwar crime prevention pro­
grams. They publicly worried about a tremendous increase in crime sim­
ilar to that following World War I, and in 1945 their prophecy appeared 
to be fulfilled. The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports recorded the highest 
increase in crimes—12.4 percent—since the advent of the national re­
porting system in 1930. Reporting on the figures, Newsweek commented 
that the "boomtime spirit had hit the nation's criminals no less than 
other parts of the population."27 
Crime, the more spectacular the better, was as newsworthy from 1945 
to 1960 as it had ever been. The classic psychotic outburst occurred in 
1949 when quiet, brooding Howard Unruh, a twenty-eight-year-old 
former artilleryman and devout Bible reader who lived with his mother 
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in East Camden, New York, shot and killed thirteen neighbors for their 
"derogatory remarks." That same year also witnessed the biggest cash 
holdup of all time, when eight men stole $1,219,000 from the Boston 
garage of Brinks, Inc. The prize for postwar teenage violence went in 
1953 to Fred Eugene McManus, an eighteen-year-old Marine who 
killed a college student for his car, picked up his younger sweetheart, 
and left a trail of four more dead before his capture in Iowa. The brutal 
kidnap-murder of six-year-old Bobby Greenlease in Kansas City, Mis­
souri, was probably the most shocking crime of the era. Carl Austin Hall 
and Bonnie Brown briefly enjoyed the largest ransom ever paid— 
$600,000—but died in Missouri's gas chamber in December 1953. The 
nation's newspapers, television, and radio had no shortage of material 
to startle, scare, and outrage the American audience.28 
Alarmed observers also pointed out that much crime went unreported 
and that police record-keeping procedures often underestimated the 
known amount of crime. Most Americans, however, believed that crime 
statistics at least accurately indicated trends in criminal behavior, and 
that the pattern was inexorably upward. In fact, the long-term trend in 
crime in the United States had been declining steadily since the late nine­
teenth century, with world wars producing in their aftermath only slight, 
short-run rises in the downward curve. The choice of 1945 as a bench­
mark, which appeared appropriate to most analysts, therefore led to an 
impression that was at best misleading.29 
The postwar increase in crime, moreover, was to some extent an arti­
fact of other developments, particularly the professionalization of the 
big-city police. The much greater magnitude of reported crime in the 
nation's largest cities throughout the era was partly the result of major 
urban police forces' adherence to higher standards of law enforcement 
and improvements in record-keeping. After prodding by the FBI, sev­
eral cities, including Saint Louis, Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, 
reported whopping increases in crime after revising their records sys­
tems. The FBI had refused to publish the crime statistics of the New 
York police in 1950 because they were so obviously doctored; in the next 
year reported robberies rose 400 percent and reported burglaries 
climbed 1,300 percent in New York. The FBI also helped many other 
local law-enforcement agencies improve their recording and reporting 
systems. As a result, crimes that previously went unrecorded began to be 
included in the national figures.30 
Uniform Crime Reports, however, contributed to serious misunder­
standings on the part of the press and public. Reliance upon census year 
population figures exaggerated crime rates (numbers of crimes per 
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100,000 population) in intercensus years. Furthermore, the Part One, 
"major crime," category of the Uniform Crime Reports actually com­
prised for the most part petty larcenies, culpable traffic fatalities, and 
teen-age "joyriding." Thus, the public received a distorted view of the 
magnitude of "serious" crime and especially the juvenile contribution to 
it. Recognizing these problems, in 1958 the FBI instituted important 
changes in the Uniform Crime Reports, utilizing annual estimates of 
population and eliminating larcenies under fifty dollars, manslaughter 
by negligence, joyriding, and statutory rape from the "major crime" 
category, which was renamed Index Crimes. Still, critics correctly con­
cluded that the United States had the least reliable crime data of all 
Western societies.31 
The FBI considered Index Crimes sufficiently serious and likely to be 
reported by citizens and recorded by police to furnish an indicator of the 
actual amount of crime—an untested, somewhat doubtful, but widely 
accepted assumption. Based on Index Crimes, the FBI reported in 1959 
that serious crime had increased 69 percent since 1950 and 128 percent 
since 1940, outracing population growth by a ratio of four to one. Anal­
ysis of the components of the index reveals a less-alarming picture. 
Crimes against persons remained remarkably stable from 1940 to 1960, 
and the trend in homicide and non-negligent manslaughter was clearly 
downward. Only in the largest cities did significant increases in aggra­
vated assault and forcible rape occur, and the latter figures dropped 
sharply after removal of statutory cases from the accounting. Not until 
the early 1960s did these four crimes begin a skyrocketing ascent to all-
time-high rates in the mid-1970s. In contrast, serious crimes against 
property started to climb earlier. Burglary and auto theft began to in­
crease in large and smaller cities after World War II, and larceny figures 
started to rise ten years later.32 
Many experts attributed the reported increase in crime in large part to 
the rising proportion of youth in the population, and some pointed with 
trepidation to future police problems that would result from the 1940s' 
baby boom. Great concern over juvenile delinquency surfaced as early 
as 1940, when J. Edgar Hoover laid the blame "at the doorstep of the 
American Home." Hoover's statement reflected a national obsession 
with juvenile crime that continued throughout the war. This obsession 
led O. W. Wilson and others to resurrect the long-standing belief among 
police reformers that suppression of juvenile delinquency was the most 
effective means of long-range crime prevention. More and more police 
departments created specialized crime prevention units intended to 
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"give adolescents a square deal instead of threatening them, clubbing 
them, and branding them as 'bums, liars, and punks. ' "33 
The popular police text Techniques of Law Enforcement in the 
Treatment of Juveniles (1944) summarized reform thinking. In addition 
to handling all young offenders, specialized police juvenile bureaus 
served as a liaison between the police and other community agencies 
such as child-guidance clinics and schools. More important, these di­
visions endeavored to discover and eradicate potential sources of delin­
quency through aggressive patrol. Policewomen were assigned a partic­
ularly important role in these crime prevention units, and, unlike male 
officers, often were expected to have some college training and expe­
rience in social work. By 1953 more than three hundred police forces had 
special juvenile divisions, double the number reported in a 1940 IACP 
survey; and the IACP exhorted departments without such units to 
create them if for no other reason than "keeping abreast of the times." In 
addition, many police forces provided recreational activities for youths, 
especially in Police Athletic Leagues, and included special courses on 
juvenile problems in their training programs.34 
Despite this development police interest in juvenile delinquency mo­
mentarily abated after the war, as arrests and court cases for youths 
dropped dramatically. In 1949 the Municipal Year Book announced 
that the "exaggerated" public attention to "the Juvenile Problem" had 
subsided to a "reasonable level." A 30 percent increase in juvenile arrests 
from 1948 to 1952 changed police opinion, and in 1953 some experts 
estimated that the police handled more than a million juveniles annu­
ally. Only one-quarter of these encounters reached juvenile court; the 
remainder were discharged by officers in "street corner courts.*' From 
1948 to 1960 juvenile arrests and court cases more than doubled while 
the population of young people increased by less than one-half. The 
arrests of juveniles rose six times as fast as those for older persons, and 
by 1958 nearly half of all people arrested were under the age of 
eighteen.35 
These startling figures were partly the result of improved record-
keeping and the creation of specialized juvenile bureaus. Arrest statistics 
for juveniles reported in the Uniform Crime Reports referred to total 
number of arrests rather than number of offenses. Since juveniles acted 
in groups far more than adults and, when arrested, were more likely to 
implicate accomplices, official figures overstated the known amount of 
juvenile crime. Proliferation of police crime prevention units in which 
specially trained officers more actively sought out actual and potential 
delinquents also led to an increase in the number of young people 
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brought into the criminal justice system. Juvenile crime tended to be 
highest in large cities with professional police forces.36 
Not all the increase in juvenile crime resulted from better reporting 
practices or increased police activity. By 1959 the fifteen-to-nineteen age 
group accounted for most robberies, burglaries, larcenies, auto thefts, 
stolen property, and weapons offenses. Moreover, "self-report" surveys 
among various cross-sections of American youth initiated by sociolo­
gists in 1946 revealed that many youths who never officially entered the 
criminal justice system had nonetheless repeatedly committed offenses. 
Awareness of this situation raised serious alarm among a public already 
convinced that the gyrations of Elvis Presley signified a tilt toward 
youthful degeneration. Movies like Blackboard Jungle, Rebel without a 
Cause, and The Wild Ones further dramatized a dangerous drift toward 
delinquency. Public apprehension swiftly led to official action.37 
Psychological explanations and prescriptions for delinquency were 
prevalent in the 1940s and 1950s. Psychologists and psychiatrists filled 
key positions in the juvenile justice system, focusing attention upon 
early identification programs for individual children and emphasizing 
specialized treatment for youths brought into the criminal justice net­
work. The National Mental Health Act in 1946, which required the Pub­
lic Health Service to sponsor and conduct research on delinquency, was 
a particular boon to psychologists.38 
By the mid-1950s a new group of specialists within sociology, called 
criminologists, began to supplant psychologists in the fight against de­
linquency. As criminologists studied the social pathology of the urban 
slum, the "delinquent subculture," and the structure of juvenile gangs, 
the environment reemerged as the center of concern. Academics now 
advocated altering the environment rather than removing the juvenile 
from it. The gradual shift in emphasis to the social setting was evident in 
1953, when a special Senate subcommittee held widely publicized hear­
ings on juvenile delinquency and the U.S. Children's Bureau and the 
IACP conducted a joint conference to facilitate a police-community 
crusade against youthful crime. The proposals of sociologists were more 
susceptible to government action than the individualized medical ap­
proach of psychologists, and criminologists eventually had an enor­
mous impact on public policy, manifested by the creation of the Presi­
dent's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and the 
passage by Congress of the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses 
Control Act in 1961.39 
A second, less serious but even more sensational, crime scare surfaced 
in the postwar period. Organized crime became a prominent feature of 
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American folklore, as the mythic "mob" and "Mafia" captured the imag­
ination of national politicians, pundits, and the public, if not that of the 
police. Organized crime was a reality, in the sense that individuals en­
gaged in illicit activities in order to make a profit. This was particularly 
obvious in gambling, a growth industry in the years following World 
War II. But the concept of a monolithic national crime syndicate, com­
posed solely of Italian-Americans whose principal method of operation 
was bloodshed, was more fanciful than real.40 
Many factors contributed to the popularization of the myth, includ­
ing a deep strain of nativism and a willingness to believe in alien conspir­
acies. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the mass media reinforced pub­
lic susceptibility to such notions. Readers who bought copies of Murder, 
Inc. and television viewers who watched "The Untouchables" were en­
tertained if not enlightened. Gangsters appeared as urban cowboys, at­
tired in silk suits and surrounded by all the trappings of the consumer 
society while still adhering to a frontier code of decisiveness, physical 
action, and loyalty to friends and family. Mobsters also evoked a Hora­
tio Alger image. Indeed, Columbia University sociologist Daniel Bell 
referred to organized crime in the early 1950s as "one of the queer 
ladders of social mobility in American life." Bell, however, pointed out 
that no real evidence existed for a nationwide syndicate and that the 
notion of a Mafia grossly distorted and exaggerated organized illegal 
enterprises.41 
Congress contributed to the popular concern and misconceptions re­
garding organized crime. Senator Estes Kefauver, of Tennessee, seeking 
to enhance his national popularity, secured the chairmanship of a spe­
cial Senate subcommittee in 1950 to investigate "the manner in which 
the facilities of interstate commerce are made a vehicle of organized 
crime." The Kefauver committee held hearings in most of the nation's 
large cities, focusing primarily on operations of racing-news wire ser­
vices. When the hearings moved to New York in March 1951, they were 
televised, thus bringing millions of viewers into contact with hoodlums 
and other characters. Television interest centered on Frank Costello, 
purported head of an organized crime family. Although the Kefauver 
committee failed to prove the existence of a nationwide syndicate that 
dominated bookmaking, it embraced the Mafia theory previously ex­
pounded by Harry Anslinger, head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 
Ironically, by the early 1950s Anslinger deemphasized this notion, citing 
instead a Communist party conspiracy behind the drug trade in order to 
win congressional support for the repressive Boggs Act of 1951, which 
included mandatory prison terms for offenders, and the even more puni­
tive Narcotics Control Act of 1956, which called for an increase in man­
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datory minimum prison sentences and, in some cases, the death 
penalty.42 
The Kefauver committee added little new information on organized 
crime, but for the first time assembled in one place evidence on illegal 
business activities collected by local law-enforcement agencies, which 
denied knowledge of any nationwide syndicate. The committee also un­
covered a pattern of corruption among local politicians, police, and 
gamblers and vice entrepreneurs that shocked the nation. In scores of 
cities grand jury investigations, legislative inquiries, and other revela­
tions led to ousters of chiefs and other high-ranking law-enforcement 
officials. The American Bar Association commissioned a study by Earle 
W. Garrett on police corruption because *'at no time in history has pub­
lic criticism of police service been as severe and as widespread as it is 
today." This was an exaggeration, and several police forces, especially in 
Berkeley, Cincinnati, Dallas, Detroit, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Mil­
waukee, and Saint Louis, had national reputations for honest, efficient, 
and progressive departments. Others, however, were notorious for cor­
ruption and inefficiency, especially those in New York and Chicago.43 
The New York Police Department suffered the most spectacular 
scandal of the 1950s. Harry Gross, a Brooklyn bookie, testified before 
the Kefauver committee that he had paid one million dollars annually to 
about one thousand officers of all ranks. The disclosure eventually led to 
the dismissal of forty-five officers, the hurried resignations of many oth­
ers, and the disciplining of nearly two hundred more. Captain Daniel 
Gilbert, of the Chicago Police Department, dubbed "the richest cop in 
the world, admitted before the Kefauver committee that he had 
amassed $360,000 in stock market speculations and bets placed at an 
illegal gambling operation in the heart of the city. At the end of the 
1950s, Chicago also endured the Summerdale scandal, which involved 
wholesale bribery and extortion by police officers. Mayor Richard Da­
ley ordered a large-scale shake-up of the force and persuaded O. W. 
Wilson to become police chief in 1961.44 
Sensational scandals, generally of police connivance in commercial­
ized vice, also rocked the police forces of Atlantic City, Cleveland, Mi­
ami, New Orleans, Oakland, Pittsburgh, and Tulsa during the 1950s. 
These exposes revealed a widespread cover-up among cops personally 
untainted by corruption and an almost neurotic belief among police that 
they were a persecuted minority and scapegoats for public ills. Police 
chiefs in New York and Chicago insisted that their departments were 
clean even in the face of convincing evidence of large-scale corruption. 
Police benevolent and fraternal associations exhibited the greatest sen­
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sitivity to public criticism. The Police Benevolent Association in New 
York referred to Bruce Smith's thoughtful survey as a "malicious 
smear." Strict adherence to the theory of the solitary "rotten apple," 
when congressional and local investigations were uncovering scandals 
by the bushel, did not reassure an apprehensive public.45 
The Kefauver committee left a path of political ruin in its wake, mak­
ing it, and Kefauver in particular, highly unpopular with many Demo­
cratic leaders on Capitol Hill. Congress rejected most of the committee's 
recommendations, including creation of a Federal Crime Commission to 
continue investigations and to suggest appropriate legislation. Critics of 
this proposal, such as Raymond Moley, considered it an unrealistic and 
unnecessary infringement on local law enforcement. Moley wrote a ser­
ies of articles for Newsweek which argued that federal legislation could 
not solve problems of gambling and local corruption. Instead, Moley 
advocated an increase in the number of state and municipal crime com­
missions that had been spawned by the Kefauver investigations. By 1953 
a dozen large-city commissions formed the National Association of Ci­
tizens' Crime Commissions, which, although never very successful, sup­
ported several local investigations throughout the 1950s.46 
Interest in organized crime shifted from gambling to labor union 
racketeering about the time of Marlon Brando's 1956 performance in 
On the Waterfront. As early as 1953, subcommittees in both houses of 
Congress investigated fraud in union welfare funds, and the chairman of 
the Senate subcommittee, John L. McClellan, of Arkansas, predicted 
additional investigations. In 1955, when Democrats took control of the 
Senate, McClellan became chairman of the Senate Permanent Sub­
committee on Investigations and began a study of improprieties in cloth­
ing procurement by the armed forces. Under McClellan and chief coun­
sel Robert F. Kennedy, the subcommittee found "East Coast gangsters'' 
involved in some unions. In 1957 the Senate Select Committee on Im­
proper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, with McClellan as 
chair and Kennedy as chief counsel, began its celebrated hearings. Em­
ploying the largest staff ever assembled on Capitol Hill, more than 100 
people, the McClellan committee called 1,525 sworn witnesses (343 of 
whom took the Fifth Amendment) in more than 500 open hearing ses­
sions conducted over a two-and-one-half-year period.47 
Among the first order of business for the committee was an investiga­
tion of a highly publicized 1957 meeting in Apalachin, New York, of 
seventy-five underworld figures, including Vito Genovese, Joe Bo­
nanno, Carlo Gambino, and others. Their specific ties with each other, 
however, remained a mystery until the revelations of Joseph Valachi in 
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1963 fixed attention on a criminal society he called "La Cosa Nostra." 
Initially, however, the McClellan committee concluded on very weak 
evidence that the 1957 meeting had occurred for some nefarious purpose 
largely because it lacked any other explanation. Robert Kennedy under­
lined the ominous fact that twenty-two of the participants were engaged 
in labor activities or labor-management relations.48 
Aside from this investigation, the McClellan committee directly ana­
lyzed the structure and leadership of labor unions. The committee con­
ducted especially extensive examinations of the Teamsters, eventually 
compiling a list of 107 union officials with various underworld connec­
tions. As a result the AFL-CIO expelled the Teamsters in 1957. The 
committee spent more time with Jimmy Hoffa—in eighteen interviews— 
than any other person. Hoffa was indicted in 1960 for using the mails to 
defraud the Teamsters in the Sun Valley Florida land-development pro­
ject. The investigations also toppled from command several other prom­
inent union leaders, including Dave Beck of the Teamsters, James Cross 
of the Bakers (also expelled from the AFL-CIO), and William Maloney 
from the Operating Engineers, as well as a large number of lesser offi­
cials. Throughout the hearings committee members and Robert Ken­
nedy acted on the belief that corruption resulted from evil leaders. The 
proper response, Kennedy argued in his book The Enemy Within 
(1960), was government action to protect the powerless rank and file. 
Indeed, the principal legislative outcome of the McClellan committee 
hearings was the passage in 1959 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act), which was designed pri­
marily to ensure democratic conditions within unions and to guarantee 
honest reporting on virtually all union activities, especially those involv­
ing the collection and expenditure of funds.49 
Independent of congressional investigations, the Department of Jus­
tice attempted to wage war on organized crime during the 1950s. J. Ed­
gar Hoover, who was deeply suspicious of other divisions of the Justice 
Department, used his considerable influence in Congress to sabotage 
the Organized Crime and Racketeering unit created in 1954. The FBI 
chief was momentarily overruled in 1958, when eighteen federal attor­
neys formed the Special Group on Organized Crime. Hoover quickly 
found an influential ally, however, after the special task force became 
embroiled in arguments with the McClellan committee staff. After 
Hoover called one investigation in New York a "fishing expedition," 
Robert Kennedy publicly lambasted the Justice Department for incom­
petence. Ironically, the Justice Department effort expanded enor­
mously in 1961 when Kennedy became attorney general.50 
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Despite all the publicity generated by congressional and Justice De­
partment investigations, the attack on organized crime during the 1950s 
was feeble. The FBI, which was best equipped to undertake the task, did 
virtually nothing, as Hoover insisted that national crime syndicates did 
not exist and that centralization of efforts against organized crime in the 
national government threatened the primacy of local law enforcement. 
Under intense pressure in 1957, Hoover created the Top Hoodlum Pro­
gram modeled on the FBI's most successful publicity device, the Ten 
Most Wanted List, started in 1950. He later established the Special In­
vestigative Division to monitor activities of underworld figures, mainly 
through wire-tapping, the FBI's favorite information-gathering tech­
nique.51 
An all-out effort against organized crime would have drained re­
sources from other FBI activities. Although Hoover always disclaimed 
any priorities for the bureau, he had one overriding obsession through­
out the postwar period. Television's popular "I Led Three Lives" pro­
gram, which dramatized the counterespionage exploits of Herbert Phil-
brick, more accurately indicated the interests and activities of the FBI 
than the later broadcast featuring Ephraim Zimbalist, Jr. Hoover's viru­
lent anti-Communism was well publicized throughout the 1940s and 
1950s in numerous speeches, essays, articles, and a book, Masters of 
Deceit (1958), published under his name but actually written by Fern 
Stukenbroeker. Hoover was not a learned man, and one tale whispered 
at FBI headquarters was that not only had Hoover not written the book, 
he had not even read it.52 
Hoover had become the hero of the American Civil Liberties Union in 
1924 when he had helped discontinue the FBI's investigations of domes­
tic radical political organizations; but at President Roosevelt's direc­
tion, he had resumed this practice in the late 1930s. The FBI had major 
jurisdiction over counterintelligence and counterespionage cases during 
the war, and so successfully infiltrated the Communist party of the 
United States of America that all major meetings were attended or re­
corded by FBI agents during the conflict. The FBI became a kind of 
ideological security force after the advent of the "'attorney general's list" 
and Truman's Federal Employee Loyalty Program, developing its own 
Security Index of persons to be detained under the Emergency Deten­
tion Act of 1950. The FBI received most of the eleven million dollars 
appropriated by Congress for loyalty programs, and by 1953 had ana­
lyzed more than four million sets of fingerprints and loyalty forms and 
investigated more than 20,000 federal employees. Loyalty investigations 
created the most havoc in the State Department, from which 425 people 
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were dismissed from 1947 to 1953 without much regard for due 
53 process.
President Eisenhower's Federal Employee Security Program, in­
itiated in 1953, led to an even broader interpretation of what constituted 
a security risk for government employment, and Hoover eagerly seized 
upon it to widen his net of investigations. A memorandum from Attor­
ney General Herbert Brownell in the next year gave the FBI even greater 
latitude in the use of wire-tapping than it previously had exercised. 
Throughout the 1950s, therefore, the FBI formed a solid anti-red block 
along with the House Committee on Un-American Activities. This 
preoccupation contributed to mistrust between the FBI and many local 
police forces, who felt that the bureau focused too much on such activi­
ties and other "cheap" victories, leaving more difficult areas of crime to 
them.54 
Although police departments in several larger cities during the 1950s 
maintained small, specialized antisubversive squads as well as intelli­
gence units to investigate organized crime, urban police concentrated 
upon other forms of crime-fighting. Indeed, many police administrators 
argued forcefully that the police should eliminate many other services 
unrelated to law enforcement because they drained manpower and 
funds from the primary mission of waging "war on crime." The foremost 
spokesman for this position during the 1950s was Chief William Parker, 
of the Los Angeles Police Department, which many reformers, includ­
ing O. W. Wilson, judged the nation's most professional police force. 
Parker argued that the police formed a "thin blue line" between civiliza­
tion and savagery, and he perfected the aggressive preventive patrol in 
which officers collared, questioned, and searched large numbers of 
"suspicious" persons on the street. The popular "Dragnet" television 
show, in which Detective Joe Friday endlessly searched for "just the 
facts," symbolized the Los Angeles police as relentlessly efficient 
crime-fighters.55 
Police and public alike seemed to appreciate this image, but it de­
flected attention from the facts that most police duties still involved 
noncriminal matters and, more important, that neither the police nor 
the FBI could do much to actually prevent crime. They enjoyed some 
success, however, in apprehending criminals. Clearance rates—crimes 
"solved" by arrests—remained high for offenses against persons through­
out the period from 1945 to 1960, ranging from about 90 percent for 
murder to 72 percent for rape, but were consistently lower for crimes 
against property, ranging from about two-fifths of robbery cases to less 
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than one-fourth for larcenies. Since many persons arrested by the police 
were quickly released because of insufficient evidence or later were dis­
missed by the courts for the same reason, the percentage of those ar­
rested who were later found guilty was markedly lower than the clear­
ance rate. Statistics at the end of the 1950s showed an improvement only 
in homicides, rising from 62 percent to 68 percent during the period, and 
declining, but only slightly and unevenly, in all other cases to figures of 
70 percent for larcenies, 67 percent for burglaries, 63 percent for robber­
ies, 62 percent for auto thefts, 52 percent for rapes, and 41 percent for 
aggravated assaults. The Municipal Year Book in 1960 suggested that 
"restrictions that have been imposed on the police by appellate deci­
sions'' may have explained this embarrassing decline, although in prac­
tice the police were little affected by "liberal" court rulings before the 
1960s.56 
Despite the professionalization of the police, crime continued to 
climb during the 1950s and would begin to soar in the next decade. 
Moreover, police professionalism had unintended, unanticipated, and 
unwelcome consequences. Attacked by police consultants as inferior in 
background and training, branded by national and local investigations 
as corrupt, caught in a downward spiral of salaries relative to other 
workers, denied rights of union organization, enraged by the introduc­
tion of one-man cars and voluminous paperwork, and forced to suc­
cumb to more efficient supervision, the rank and file drew the strings of 
their historic "blue curtain" ever tighter. In his 1950 dissertation sociol­
ogist William Westley first spotlighted a police subculture that increas­
ingly seemed paranoid, secretive, isolated, and defensive. As a result of 
its strong internal orientation, the police increasingly became removed 
from effective political supervision and control. Most citizens agreed 
with reformers that severance of the close connection between the police 
and partisan politics, especially the patronage system, was highly desir­
able, but during the 1960s some Americans would begin to question the 
extent to which the police should be independent of external supervi­
sion. One measure of the triumph of professionalism is that the major 
battles over this issue, centering around civilian review boards, were 
won by the police.57 
Police officials also recognized that reform, especially the independ­
ence and isolation of the police that it fostered, contributed to a loss of 
the very public understanding and cooperation that was essential for 
fighting crime and for securing substantial increases in the police 
budget. Gradual replacement of foot patrol officers with motorized pa­
trol, and the disappearance of the fixed beat altogether in a few cities, for 
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example, removed police from close contact with the citizenry. What 
was needed, argued many police administrators and consultants, was 
development of public relations programs. Indeed, one reformer wrote 
in 1949, "Policing, in striving to raise itself to the level of a profession, 
will succeed in doing so in direct proportion to the amount of public 
relations work that it conducts." The Public Relations Committee of the 
IACP reported in 1955 on ten points that "may be used as a guide in 
perfecting a stronger [public-relations] program," including the impor­
tant mission of explaining the inability of the police to stop the increase 
in crime. The committee assured the convention that "public under­
standing replaces misunderstanding when citizens know the limited 
budget, shortage of personnel, geographical area patrolled, and other 
problems of the department." This was disingenuous, since from 1945 
to 1960 police budgets had skyrocketed from $268,099,000 to 
$854,118,000, or from $4.17 to $ 14.42 per capita, as the number of offi­
cers had soared, geographical areas generally remained constant, and 
police had successfully eliminated several time-consuming chores. 
Throughout the 1950s police departments held community symposia 
and "open houses," and most major police forces printed glossy, 
professional-looking annual reports filled with photographs and self-
justifying statements aimed at city officials, newspapers, and business 
and citizen organizations. Public relations efforts had some effect. The 
portrayal of the police in the media changed from bumbling lower-
middle-class ethnics (mainly Irish) to purposeful and efficient middle-
class Americans, at least in part because of lobbying by the IACP, espe­
cially by its Radio and Television Committee formed in the mid-1950s.58 
Professionalism also meant playing by the rules rather than relying 
upon the discretion of individual officers, and few citizens punished for 
routine traffic violations or minor infractions of the law appreciated this 
aspect of reform. As one commentator noted in 1949, the "public is 
prone to look upon them [officers] as members of a machine rather than 
protector servants of the people." Uniform application of the law by 
highly centralized police departments, moreover, diminished police tol­
eration of activities that were considered inappropriate by the majority 
of citizens (and thus defined as illegal) but that were regarded as legiti­
mate or at least as harmless in various areas of the city. The resultant 
crackdown on such practices as crap-shooting in alleys contributed to 
friction between certain groups and the police. Adoption of aggressive 
crime prevention programs such as "stop-and-frisk" tactics further alie­
nated and embittered members of minority groups who were singled out 
because of their group's identification with high crime rates. Many 
blacks complained that they were caught in a vicious circle. Since the 
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climbing crime rate occurred almost entirely within the black commun­
ity, police became particularly attentive to black citizens, with the result 
that the black arrest and crime rate continued to spiral and the police 
became even more aggressive. To combat black frustration, a separate 
subset of public relations, generally called "police-community rela­
tions," grew in the postwar period.59 
The immediate cause of this program was a series of urban disorders 
in the early 1940s that reached a peak with the Detroit and Harlem race 
riots and the Los Angeles "'zoot suit" riot between Mexican-Americans 
and whites in 1943. The police-community relations movement that 
emerged after the riots brought together a few reform-minded police 
administrators, race relations specialists, and some elected officials, es­
pecially in California. Among police chiefs Joseph Kluchesky of Mil­
waukee was the leading figure. He lectured to the IACP convention in 
1945, served as a consultant to several big-city police forces, and au­
thored a training manual used by other police departments. Harvard 
psychologist Gordon W. Allport and University of Chicago sociologist 
Joseph Lohman reached an even wider audience of academics and po­
lice, and Lohman's The Police and Minority Groups (1947) became per­
haps the leading manual on the subject. The strongest police-
community relations program surfaced in California with the full 
support of Governor Earl Warren and the California Peace Officers' 
Association.60 
All these materials and programs emphasized the professional ideal of 
impartial police service to counter individual prejudice of officers. The 
techniques for handling urban disorders were based on the experience of 
the 1940s, in which white mobs often were encouraged by lack of deter­
mined police action. Thus, the police planned an early, vigorous show of 
force, including the speedy arrest of agitators, to quickly end such riots. 
During the 1960s the police would be forced to change these contingency 
plans, for they proved counter-productive in dispersing black mobs who 
viewed the police as a principal target. Finally, police departments were 
urged to establish formal contacts with black community leaders and to 
hire additional black police officers. During the 1950s the big-city police 
sent representatives to biracial commissions and created storefront cen­
ters in the black community to signify their greater attentiveness to 
black concerns. They were not, however, willing to halt their aggressive 
war on crime that often offended black citizens, and the success of re­
form made them more immune from political pressure that might have 
ameliorated this approach or at least forced stronger disciplinary ac­
tions against police who violated the professional code.61 
Most police forces also remained reluctant to hire large numbers of 
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black officers. Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma (1944) had 
noted the paucity of black police in the United States, particularly in the 
South. This situation improved noticeably by the late 1940s, and the 
trend continued throughout the 1950s. Still, by 1960 blacks formed only 
3.5 percent of the nation's police. Because of their dramatic increase in 
the urban population and resultant political strength, blacks doubtless 
would have made much greater gains under the more highly politicized 
arrangements that existed before World War II. Also, the reformers' 
insistence on stricter entrance examinations and qualifications ap­
peared to have a more adverse affect on black than on white 
candidates.62 
Despite the police-community relations movement, therefore, by 
1960 the stage was set for a serious confrontation between the police and 
the black community. The staggering crime increase that would begin in 
the early 1960s occurred mainly in the black community, to be met by 
the tough "law-and-order'' approach of professionalized, highly mobile 
police forces largely resistent to political pressure. Thus, as the police 
approached fulfillment of goals defined before 1945, they confronted a 
new set of problems that would soon explode into a national crisis. Ef­
forts to solve that crisis would lead to a reexamination of, and even 
reaction to, reform on the part of both blacks and white liberals on the 
one hand and rank-and-file police on the other. But in 1960, although 
the storm clouds gathered, most knowledgeable observers agreed that 
law-enforcement agencies had progressed a long way since World War 
II, and a few wistful souls felt they would one day win the war on crime. 
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The Government-Science Complex 
Kenneth M. Jones 
The relationship between the United States government and the 
American scientific community was drastically altered during World 
War II and the cold war. Before 1940 the government paid little atten­
tion to science, and most scientists were wary of what they regarded as 
political involvement. During World War II, however, the American 
scientific community was mobilized by the federal government in an 
enormously effective manner. Since penicillin, sulfa drugs, and the 
atomic bomb all seemed to be the fruit of this new relationship, most 
Americans were convinced that a continuation was essential. This con­
sensus was reflected in the rapidly rising level of expenditures for 
science. In 1940 only 0.8 percent of the federal budget was allocated for 
scientific research and development. The figure had doubled by the end 
ofthe war, and rose spectacularly thereafter. By 1960,10.1 percent of the 
federal budget was spent on research and development.1 As the govern­
ment's investment in research increased, so did its role in the nation's 
overall scientific development. Before the war, industry had provided 68 
percent of all money spent on science in the United States, whereas the 
government contributed only 20 percent. By the end of the war, the 
division was almost even—and by 1960 the prewar proportions had 
been reversed.2 
This rapid expansion of federal support meant that government deci­
sions played a significant role in shaping the direction of American 
scientific research. Despite the change the government did not develop a 
systematic policy designed to maximize science's ability to address a 
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broad range of national needs. Instead, science was supported through a 
decentralized structure that was dominated by national security con­
cerns. This situation resulted from three major factors: the cold war, 
popular conceptions of the requirements of scientific advance, and the 
response of the American scientific community. 
Even before the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
science's wartime achievements inspired proposals for continued go­
vernment support in peacetime. Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, agreed, but did not want his cen­
trally controlled, narrowly focused wartime agency to serve as the 
model. To guarantee consideration of an alternative approach, Bush 
prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt in November 1944 to re­
quest from him an analysis of the nation's postwar scientific needs. By 
July 1945 Bush had responded with a plan that gave scientists access to 
the public purse with minimal government control.3 
Immediately after the release of Science, the Endless Frontier—as 
Bush's report was entitled—Senator Warren Magnuson (D., Washing­
ton) introduced legislation to implement Bush's vision. Magnuson pro­
posed the creation of a "national science foundation" to support scient­
ists outside the government in basic research, provide fellowships, and 
"develop and promote" a national science policy. Magnuson's organiza­
tional structure guaranteed that scientists, rather than political appoin­
tees, would determine the policies of the agency.4 The Bush-Magnuson 
conception of the proper postwar relationship between science and go­
vernment was immediately challenged by Senator Harley Kilgore (D., 
West Virginia), who proposed a foundation broader in scope and less 
independent of public control. Kilgore envisioned a foundation that 
would coordinate all federal scientific activities and fund both basic and 
applied research in "fields of recognized public interest."5 Although 
there was little discussion of the rival proposals, the concept of a na­
tional science foundation received substantial public support in late July 
1945.6 
The use of the first atomic bombs in August 1945 sharply increased 
public awareness of science. Instead of serving man, scientific research 
seemed to have propelled the world into a new era. "Science now rules 
the roost and our lives," Business Week noted. "We went to bed Aug. 5 
in George Washington's time; we woke up on Aug. 6 the first citizens of a 
truly modern world."7 Americans were not only awed by the destructive 
power of the atomic bomb, but expected great benefits from cheap nu­
clear power. Otherwise sober commentators predicted the early devel­
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opment of atomic-powered cars, and speculated that atomic energy 
would become so cheap that it would be like "free air'' at the service 
station.8 
The military significance of the new force alone would have been suf­
ficient to necessitate government action, but eight of nine Americans 
also believed that federal controls were necessary to develop its peaceful 
benefits.9 As President Truman told the nation, atomic energy required 
"drastic" government action because it was "too revolutionary to con­
sider in the framework of old ideas."10 The release of atomic energy thus 
guaranteed that the government would accept new responsibility for at 
least one area of science after the war. 
The debate over the precise nature of this new responsibility began on 
3 October 1945, when the May-Johnson bill was introduced in Con­
gress." Although this measure gave control to a civilian atomic energy 
commission, it reflected the army's experience in the wartime Manhat­
tan Project. Most significantly, it stressed development of atomic ener­
gy's military uses and emphasized the need for strict security with regard 
to the "secret" of the bomb. Many scientists who had'worked on the 
Manhattan Project were appalled by what they regarded as a continua­
tion of wartime attitudes and an attempt to protect a secret that no 
longer existed. They insisted that the nation's future security—and 
mankind's survival—would be better served by efforts to achieve inter­
national control of atomic energy. These scientists and laymen who 
shared their views supported the proposal of Senator Brien McMahon 
(D., Connecticut), which largely excluded the armed forces, emphasized 
the peaceful potential of atomic energy, called for international control, 
and sought to promote scientific freedom rather than strict secrecy.12 
McMahon's bill received the support of President Truman, and ap­
peared to be headed for passage until February 1946, when the revela­
tion of a wartime Russian espionage ring in Canada and increasing dis­
trust of the Soviet Union caused the balance to swing back toward a 
more restrictive approach.13 
In the resulting Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the Atomic Energy 
Commission's sweeping powers were to be exercised by civilians, but the 
"paramount objective" of the commission was described as "assuring 
the common defense and security."14 The act emphasized secrecy, re­
stricting the dissemination of information, requiring an FBI investiga­
tion of scientists, and providing rigorous penalties for violation of secu­
rity regulations. 
While the government was accepting responsibility for the control of 
atomic energy, proposals for the creation of a national science founda­
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tion languished. Although the most immediate reason was continued 
disagreement between supporters of the Bush and Kilgore approaches, 
popular attitudes and the response of the American scientific commun­
ity were also important. Since many laymen regarded science as syn­
onymous with atomic energy, the need for "another1' scientific agency 
beyond the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) did not seem impera­
tive. The proposed foundation also failed to generate enthusiasm be­
cause the need for extensive basic research did not correspond with the 
lay public's perception of the requirements for scientific achievement. 
These views had been shaped largely by news accounts of the Manhattan 
Project, which implied that any specific goal could be realized simply 
with adequate organization and massive funding. The scientists' efforts 
to correct these misconceptions were hampered by their involvement in 
the battle over atomic energy legislation. Since most scientists regarded 
control of the new force as their highest priority, they were unwilling to 
risk their unanimity of public support by simultaneously battling for a 
particular science foundation bill. All these factors together prevented 
the strong push that might have overcome the Bush-Kilgore division.15 
Failure to establish a national science foundation immediately after 
the war facilitated the emergence of a pluralistic structure, as the federal 
investment in science was funneled through a variety of agencies, each 
made intelligible to the public by identification with a particular end. 
The most prominent of these agencies was the AEC, which gradually 
expanded its mandate to include the granting of fellowships and the 
support of some basic research that otherwise would have been funded 
by a national science foundation. The AEC's budget grew accordingly, 
rising from $84 million in its first full year (1948) to $121.1 million in 
1950.16 This growth was aided by the commission's identification with 
national defense, and by the dedicated support of its congressional over­
seers on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
In a similar manner the proposed foundation's responsibility for med­
ical research was largely assumed by the Public Health Service's Na­
tional Institutes of Health (NIH). The NIH grew rapidly in the late 1940s 
by adding a series of specific disease-oriented branches, such as the 
National Heart Institute and National Arthritis and Metabolic Diseases 
Institute. Congress was much more willing to support such specific 
agencies than it was to fund general medical or biological research. As 
one congressman later explained, "Nobody ever heard of a person dying 
from microbiology."17 The NIH's success in selling its work to Congress 
was reflected in a 600 percent increase in the agency's total appropria­
tions between 1947 and 1950.18 
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The proposed foundation's principal function—support of basic 
reseach—was assumed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) of the 
Department of the Navy. This agency was created by Congress in Au­
gust 1946 on the assumption that it would pursue scientific solutions to 
specific military problems. The administrators of the ONR did not, 
however, make military relevance their primary criteria for the distribu­
tion of funds, but instead sponsored projects of interest to scientists. 
This somewhat clandestine support for basic research filled the gap left 
by the absence of a national science foundation, but depended on the 
ONR's ability to defend such investments against those who demanded 
an emphasis on more immediate navy problems.19 In addition to the 
ONR, each of the service branches increased its research budget. As a 
result, by 1947 the armed forces spent thirty-eight times as much money 
on research and development as in 1937.20 
Proliferation of functionally defined science agencies caused some 
members of the Truman administration to seek other routes to the 
broad perspective and coordination that had been regarded as part of 
the proposed foundation's duties. This led first to the creation of the 
President's Scientific Research Board in 1946, and then to the Interde­
partmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development in 
1947. The latter was to "achieve balance among the several scientific 
activities of the Government, and the closing of gaps in the present pro­
grams."21 These organizations were largely ineffective, however, be­
cause they lacked prestige and could not allocate funds.22 
By the time the National Science Foundation (NSF) was created in 
May 1950, it was clear that it would be "only another pillar in the edifice 
of government science, rather than the capstone of the whole struc­
ture."23 Control of the more popular areas of scientific research had 
already been established. For example, the new agency was expressly 
forbidden to engage in military or atomic energy research without the 
consent of the secretary of defense or the AEC. The foundation did 
retain a Division of Medical Research, but since the NIH had already 
created separate Cancer and Heart institutes, the new agency was effec­
tively prevented from appealing to Congress for research funds in those 
popular areas. The NSF also lacked real authority to coordinate federal 
scientific efforts, as the 1950 act authorized it only to "encourage the 
pursuit of a national policy."24 
The actual functions of the NSF were essentially two: support of basic 
research, and the distribution of science scholarships. Even in these 
areas it did not play a central role, but rather supplemented the pro­
grams already established by the ONR and the AEC. The low status and 
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limited appeal of such an agency was soon revealed in its struggle for 
appropriations. In 1945 Vannevar Bush had recommended a "modest 
beginning" of $33.5 million for the first year, but he expected the mature 
foundation to have a budget of $122.5 million annually. President Tru­
man's recommendation for fiscal year 1952 (the first full year of the 
foundation's existence) was $14 million; Congress appropriated only 
$3.5 million.25 What had been envisioned as the nation's paramount 
scientific agency thus began its life with a weak mandate and an even 
weaker access to the public purse. 
In the years immediately after World War II, federal aid to science 
was thus channeled through a pluralistic system of goal-oriented agen­
cies. The specific objectives of the proliferating agencies were more eas­
ily understood by most laymen, and the approach conformed with the 
apparent requirements of scientific advance as revealed in the Manhat­
tan Project Applied research and development received priority, while 
the role of basic research was seldom acknowledged. This structure 
meant that in the midst of the cold war federally funded science would be 
overwhelmingly devoted to immediate national security needs. 
Although a unified scientific program did not emerge after World 
War II, American scientists achieved a significant role as advisers to 
government officials. The military sought help on new weapons and 
beginning in 1948 sponsored "Summer Studies," where scientists de­
voted their expertise to the analysis of specific technical and strategic 
problems. Of all roles played by scientists, their most significant post 
was the General Advisory Committee (GAC) of the Atomic Energy 
Commission. The ability of GAC members to influence policy, however, 
was tenuous. As advisers rather than representatives of an independent 
political entity, their authority rested on the willingness of laymen to 
listen. The limits of the committee's powers became obvious in 1949. 
On 23 September 1949 President Truman informed the American 
people that the Soviet Union had exploded a nuclear device; the Ameri­
can monopoly on the atomic bomb had ended much sooner than con­
ventional wisdom had predicted.26 Immediately after the Soviet atomic 
bomb was revealed, AEC member Lewis Strauss called for a major ef­
fort to create a much larger hydrogen, or "super," bomb. He insisted 
that such a "quantum jump" in the nation's destructive capacities would 
be the most effective response to the Soviet achievements.27 His enthusi­
asm was shared by a group of scientists, including Edward Teller and 
Ernest Lawrence. Teller had worked on the possibility of a hydrogen 
bomb during the war, and had subsequently served as a consultant to 
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those who were continuing studies in that area. The net result had not 
been very encouraging. As physicist Herbert York later noted, "Despite 
several years of thinking by some very bright people, no one then knew 
how to make a 'super.' "28 Although the project faced potentially insur­
mountable technical barriers, Strauss and the scientists were able to 
generate substantial support for an immediate, massive effort compara­
ble to the Manhattan Project. 
Reacting to this pressure, the AEC requested the GAC to make re­
commendations on the appropriate response to the Soviet achievement— 
including the possibility of a crash program to develop the hydrogen 
bomb. The GAC's report, delivered on 30 October 1949, urged increased 
production of fissionable material, development of tactical atomic weap­
ons, and testing of the boosting principle that would improve the effi­
ciency of a fission (atomic) explosion. The committee, however, mar­
shalled several arguments against a massive effort to achieve the 
hydrogen bomb. On a more technical level, they argued that a high-
priority effort was unwise because fundamental theoretical studies re­
lated to the hydrogen bomb were insufficiently advanced. There was, 
therefore, no assurance that even a concerted attack on the problem 
would be successful. Until more basic research and tests had been com­
pleted, a crash program might actually weaken the nation by diverting 
key materials and manpower from the atomic bomb program. The GAC 
also argued against the hydrogen bomb on moral grounds. Warning 
that the destructive power of the "super" made it a "weapon of geno­
cide," the scientists urged that the United States publicly renounce it. "In 
determining not to proceed to develop the super bomb," a majority of 
the GAC argued, "we see a unique opportunity of providing by example 
some limitations on the totality of war and thus of limiting the fear and 
arousing the hopes of mankind." If the Soviets failed to exercise similar 
self-restraint, GAC Chairman J. Robert Oppenheimer reminded the 
commission, the nation's atomic weapons would provide for "adequate 
reprisal."29 
The GAC's report was accepted by the commission on a thrce-to-two 
vote. Strauss led the minority, while AEC Chairman David Lilienthal 
emerged as the leading defender of the GAC position. President Tru­
man, however, disregarded both the AEC's recommendation and the 
views of what had been the government's most prestigious scientific 
body. On 31 January 1950 the president announced that he was direct­
ing the AEC to "continue its work on all forms of atomic weapons, 
including the so-called hydrogen or superbomb." Six weeks later Tru­
man ordered that the program be shifted from the somewhat ambiguous 
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"continue" to an all-out effort.30 The decision received overwhelming 
public support.31 
The president was inclined toward the hydrogen bomb for both per­
sonal and political reasons, but his decision was influenced by other 
factors as well. Most important was the division within the scientific 
community. With eminent scientists on both sides of the issue, President 
Truman was free to choose the politically more congenial advice offered 
by Edward Teller. Those who argued against the bomb were thought to 
prove the political naivete of most scientists. Typically, Joint Commit­
tee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) Chairman Brien McMahon dismissed the 
GAC's arguments against the hydrogen bomb "as simply an emotional 
reaction to a difficult situation."32 This attitude precluded a rational 
discussion of whether emphasis on the hydrogen bomb or expanding 
production of atomic weapons would best ensure national security. 
The decision to follow Teller rather than the GAC was also encour­
aged by lay assumptions about the requirements of scientific advance. 
Truman, members of the JCAE, and other laymen who insisted on pur­
suing the hydrogen bomb ignored the GAC's emphasis on the need for 
more basic research. They were able to do so because Teller's views cor­
responded with their assumption that government direction and money 
would produce results. Fortunately, a year after the crash program had 
been initiated, Teller and mathematician Stanislaw Ulam made the crit­
ical theoretical breakthrough.33 By June 1951 this concept had led to a 
new design that, in the words of J. Robert Oppenheimer, was "techni­
cally so sweet that you could not argue."34 The United States exploded 
the first fusion bomb on 1 November 1952 and tested a deliverable hy­
drogen bomb in the spring of 1954. Although the program was successful, 
the process did nothing to encourage lay understanding of the impor­
tance of basic research. Americans would continue to assume that the 
requisite scientific rabbits could be pulled out of the hat anytime the 
federal government chose to apply sufficient money and organization. 
Following the hydrogen bomb decision, scientists and scientific ad­
ministrators who were not fully committed to the pursuit of more and 
bigger weapons lost influence rapidly. Lilienthal resigned in February 
1950, and was replaced as AEC chairman by Strauss's ally Gordon 
Dean. Dean appointed several more pliable scientists to replace those 
who were leaving the GAC in 1950, and generally made it clear that he 
expected the committee to be more cooperative in the future.35 These 
changes were not sufficient, however, to convince the JCAE that the 
AEC could be trusted to pursue the military applications of atomic 
energy with sufficient zeal. The JCAE made clear its intention to exer­
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rise greater oversight in June 1951, when the members voted to end their 
longstanding refusal to accept top secret data on production rates and 
the weapons stockpile from the AEC. The JCAE also pressured the 
AEC to launch an all-out effort to at least double the nation's nuclear 
stockpile. After a substantial budget increase in January 1952, the AEC 
largely followed the JCAE's recommendation.36 
The AEC's declining influence was also apparent in the decision to 
create a second weapons laboratory to supplement the work done at Los 
Alamos. The impetus for a second laboratory was provided by Edward 
Teller, who insisted it was essential for the rapid development of hydro­
gen bombs. The AEC rejected Teller's request in December 1951 on the 
grounds that it would divide the nation's efforts, but Teller used per­
sonal contacts to reach Thomas Finletter, the secretary of the air force. 
In April 1952, at Finletter's urging, the National Security Council au­
thorized the creation of the second weapons laboratory at Livermore.37 
The process of narrowing the range of scientific advice and focusing 
the nation's scientific efforts on weapons continued during the Eisen­
hower administration. After the Republican victory in 1952, Gordon 
Dean resigned, which allowed the new president to appoint Lewis 
Strauss chairman of the AEC. During the next five years, Strauss used 
his position as head of the nation's paramount scientific agency—and his 
good personal relations with the president—to function as Eisenhower's 
scientific adviser.38 Like Teller, Strauss believed that the nation's scien­
tific resources should be devoted to improving our ability to inflict mas­
sive destruction on the Soviet Union through the use of large nuclear 
weapons. He also possessed a strong concern for secrecy and an intense 
distrust of the Soviets. As a result, he effectively blocked proposals for 
neutral observers at American nuclear tests and weakened Eisenhower's 
1953 Atoms for Peace proposal.39 Strauss's approach, which linked 
science almost exclusively with the development of offensive military 
power, was well received because it coincided with the needs of the Ei­
senhower administration and other politically powerful groups. 
The Strauss-Teller hegemony was also furthered by the general ab­
sence of dissent from within the scientific community. This was partly 
because the outbreak of the Korean conflict and the continued cold war 
had overcome most scientists' resistance to secrecy and weapons re­
search.40 More important, however, those who disagreed with Teller on 
how best to use science to achieve national security were frequently re­
luctant to speak out, particularly after Strauss and Teller played key 
roles in the Eisenhower administration's decision to withdraw J. Robert 
Oppenheimervs security clearance in 1954. 
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Although Strauss and Teller were largely able to fill the vacuum 
created by the demise of the GAC, the Science Advisory Committee of 
the Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC/ODM) constituted an alter­
native and potential rival. The primary impetus for the SAC/ODM 
came from the Bureau of the Budget. Worried by what he saw as un­
coordinated federal investment in science and the "adequacy of long-
term coverage,'' Budget Director F J. Lawton ordered William T. 
Golden to study the government's scientific organization.41 In De­
cember 1950 Golden recommended the appointment of a full-time scien­
tific adviser to the president and the creation of a president's science 
advisory committee. The scientific adviser was to stay informed of all 
research programs of military significance conducted by the govern­
ment, and "be available to give the president independent and compre­
hensive advice on scientific matters inside and outside the govern­
ment."42 
President Truman approved Golden's recommendations, but before 
they were implemented, two changes occurred that substantially altered 
the final result. First, the office of scientific adviser was downgraded to 
simply chairman of the science advisory committee. This was done at the 
insistence of Dr. Oliver Buckley, who agreed to assume the post only if it 
did not require aggressive leadership. The ability of the scientists to in­
fluence policy was further decreased by a second change that placed the 
science advisory committee under the jurisdiction of the director of the 
Office of Defense Mobilization. Although the committee retained the 
right to make recommendations directly to the president if its members 
saw fit, the new apparatus ensured that the agency would have limited 
impact.43 
The creation of SAC/ODM was officially announced by President 
Truman on 20 April 1951. Chairman Buckley was joined by ten other 
scientists from government service, universities, and industry. Buckley's 
cautious approach was immediately apparent in his admonition to his 
colleagues that their function was to "work with and through existing 
agencies; avoid fanfare and minimize public appearances."44 Very little 
was accomplished by May 1952, when Buckley was replaced by Califor­
nia Institute of Technology President Lee A. DuBridge. Although Du-
Bridge tried to provide more aggressive leadership, members of the SAC/ 
ODM were so dispirited by the fall of 1952 that they met to decide 
whether they should recommend discontinuance of their role. They de­
cided not to disband, but pleaded that they be allowed to report directly 
to the president or at least to the National Security Council.45 Their 
suggestion was rejected, and the SAC/ODM continued in relative ob­
scurity throughout the first year of the Eisenhower administration.46 
The Government-Science Complex \ 325 
Finally, in March 1954, the committee was given its first major oppor­
tunity to advise the president. When Eisenhower challenged the scien­
tists to find ways to reduce the danger of surprise attack on the United 
States, the SAC/ODM organized the Technical Capabilities Panel 
under Massachusetts Institute of Technology President James Killian.47 
Its report, presented to the National Security Council on 14 February 
1955, criticized the administration's massive-retaliation doctrine and of­
fered recommendations in five major areas. The scientists on the panel 
urged the National Security Council to give the intercontinental ballistic 
missile program the highest priority, investigate defenses against Soviet 
missiles, improve technological capacities for limited warfare, unify 
Department of Defense communications systems, and develop the U-2 
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.48 
These recommendations met with varying success, even though the 
president endorsed all but those in the area of limited war. Like limited 
warfare, the missile defense program found few friends within the gov­
ernment and was generally ignored. The intercontinental ballistic mis­
sile program was dramatically accelerated, but with separate efforts in 
each service rather than the unified approach favored by the panel. In­
terservice rivalries were also responsible for blocking the integration of 
defense communications until the end of the Eisenhower administra­
tion. Only the development of the U-2 went ahead smoothly, and that 
was largely because the president transferred responsibility to the Cen­
tral Intelligence Agency rather than leaving the program in the Defense 
Department.49 
The Technological Capabilities Panel's influence was limited because 
it did not have ongoing access to the president and was unable to aid in 
the implementation of the policies that he did accept.50 Furthermore, the 
group was unable to overcome Eisenhower's reliance on Strauss. When 
the president suggested that the panel continue its efforts with a study of 
a moratorium on nuclear tests, Strauss objected, and Eisenhower re­
tracted the offer.51 Finally, the panel's efforts were limited to a relatively 
narrow area, and therefore it could not address the larger questions of 
how science could best serve the nation. 
The organization that—theoretically—could have provided that ad­
vice was the NSF. Although watered down, the foundation had come 
into existence in 1950 with some authority to oversee federal science 
policy. That charge was, however, more than offset by the agency's small 
budget and the attitude of its first director, Alan T. Waterman, who 
insisted that his agency should stay clear of any supervisory or coordi­
nating role that would offend stronger agencies.52 This restricted view 
was not shared, however, by officials in the Bureau of the Budget. They 
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were determined that the NSF should play a substantial role in their 
efforts to supervise rapidly growing federal expenditures for science. 
Accordingly, in May 1952, Budget staffer William Carey pressured Wa­
terman to begin a program of evaluation and coordination. Waterman's 
response, according to Carey, was to "duck out of sight under the 
table."" 
With the advent of a new administration in 1953, Carey resumed his 
efforts, suggesting that President Eisenhower issue an executive order 
enhancing the foundation's coordinating power. Carey's proposed ex­
ecutive order also strengthened the NSF by asserting that it was the 
"primary agency for the support of basic scientific research."54 Water­
man reluctantly acquiesced, but AEC Chairman Strauss and others 
vehemently attacked NSF "encroachment."55 The final document, Ex­
ecutive Order 10521, was not what Carey had intended. It reiterated, but 
did not substantially increase, the foundation's ability to oversee the 
nation's scientific investment, and made it clear that other agencies 
would provide funds for the most popular areas of basic research.56 
The Budget Bureau eventually gave up on the NSF as a mechanism 
for the overall coordination of federal science policy. In the spring of 
1956, Budget Director Rowland Hughes wrote the president, "I think it 
is very doubtful if any thing like the type of supervision that I believe you 
had in mind can be effected through that group."57 Despite the best 
efforts of the Budget Bureau, the foundation thus failed to emerge as a 
significant factor in the formation of federal science policy. The conse­
quences of the foundation's weaknesses and the other developments in 
the government-science relationship were amply clear by the mid-1950s. 
A decade after World War II, the government-science complex fully 
reflected the impact of the cold war and the lay direction of science. 
Convinced that federal investment in science was good, Congress ap­
propriated more and more funds for research. In fiscal year 1946 federal 
research and development expenditures were $918 million, or 1.5 per­
cent of the total federal budget. By fiscal year 1956 the figures were 
$3,446 million, or 5.2 percent. This money was not distributed by a cen­
tral authority or according to an overall assessment of the nation's long-
term scientific needs. Instead, thirty-eight separate agencies sought 
funds for their own particular projects.58 Since their success depended 
upon congressional support, these agencies tended to promote goal-
oriented research that had an immediate and obvious bearing on na­
tional concerns. 
The NIH, with its popular and easily identifiable targets, was one of 
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TABLE 1 
FEDERAL EXPENDITURES POR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BY AGENCY





Agency FY 1940 FY 1948 FY 1953 FY 1958 FY 1961 
Agriculture Department 38.6% 5.3% 1 A'"c 2.5% 1.5% 
($28.4) ($40.7) ($55) ($126) ($143) 
Atomic Energy Commission 11% 10.6% 16.1% 9.3% 
($84) ($393) ($804) ($850) 
Defense Department 35.9% 70.1% 82% 73.4% 72.5% 
($26.4) ($534.2) ($3025) ($3664) ($6574) 
National Aeronautics 2.9% 3.9% 2.1% 1.7% 8.5% 
and Space Administration* ($2.2) ($29.8) ($79) ($89) ($777) 
National Institutes of Health 0.9% 2.2% 1% 3.2% 4.1% 
($0.7) ($16.9) ($37.5) ($160.2) ($375.4) 
National Science Foundation 0.05% 0.6% 0.9% 
($2) ($33) ($84) 
Other 21.3% 7.4% 2.5% 2.2% 2.8% 
($15.7) ($56.4) ($95.5) ($113.8) ($255.6) 
Total federal expenditure for 
research and development ($73.4) ($762) ($3687) ($4990) ($9059) 
* National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics prior to 1958 
the more successful participants in this situation. Public enthusiasm for 
medical research was spurred by rapid progress after World War II. 
Cortisone brought relief from crippling arthritis, and antibiotics such as 
streptomycin controlled over forty previously fatal diseases. When Dr. 
Jonas Salk's vaccine curtailed polio in 1955, public praise grew even 
louder.59 Although the NIH did not play a major role in these develop­
ments, it benefited from the general hope that organized medical re­
search would yield similar triumphs in other areas. With congressmen 
frequently suggesting new diseases to attack, the agency inaugurated or 
expanded research on arthritis, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, mental 
health, and tooth decay. These programs were so politically popular 
that Congress routinely raised the NIH budget above the amount re­
quested by the administration. By 1960 the agency spent approximately 
ten times as much on research as it had in 1950.60 
The NIH budget grew rapidly, but the clear relationship between 
science and national defense guaranteed that the military would domi­
nate the competition for federal research funds. As table 1 indicates, in 
fiscal year 1940 the armed forces controlled a smaller percentage of the 
federal government's research and development funds than did the De­
partment of Agriculture. During World War II, however, the military's 
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share escalated sharply, reaching more than 80 percent of the total. Al­
though overall military budgets were reduced and the army's wartime 
responsibility for atomic energy was transferred to the new Atomic 
Energy Commission, the Department of Defense still controlled 70.1 
percent of government's investment in research in 1948.62 After a slight 
drop before the Korean War, that percentage rose even higher in the 
1950s. Other agencies also funded scientific projects devoted to military 
ends. A Budget Bureau analysis of fiscal year 1953 classified all the Na­
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics' budget and 75 percent of 
the AEC's expenditures as military-related.63 If these amounts were 
added to the Department of Defense share for that year, the total de­
voted to military purposes was 92.1 percent. 
Given the cold war and lay assumptions, it was inevitable that most of 
the nation's scientific resources would be devoted to national defense 
and that occasional boondoggles like the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 
Project would occur.64 These were, however, decisions that could be 
reversed if and when the climate of opinion changed. The structure of 
federal support for science also affected the nation's research effort in 
more subtle ways that were less easily rectified. This was particularly 
true in the provision of funds for basic research and in the allocation of 
monies among the various sciences. 
One of Vannevar Bush's original arguments for federal support of 
science after World War II was that only the government could afford to 
fund essential basic research. Universities and private institutions could 
no longer supply the large sums necessary, and industry was reluctant 
to invest in work that did not have clear commercial potential. Although 
Bush did not specify what percentage of the federal research budget 
should be devoted to basic research, he insisted that substantial amounts 
were needed. In 1947 presidential adviser John Steelman urged a quad­
rupling of funds, explaining that "the support of basic research is the 
most important single element in the entire National Science Pro­
gram."65 If his suggestions had been followed, the percentage of federal 
research and development money allocated to basic research would 
have risen from approximately 8 percent in 1947 to between 17 and 20 
percent a decade later. 
During the mid-1950s the federal government's investment in basic 
research fell far below these expectations. For fiscal year 1954 the NSF 
estimated that only 6 percent of the total federal outlay for scientific 
activities went to basic research. Between fiscal year 1954 and fiscal year 
1958, the situation did not improve. While the overall federal investment 
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in science grew 1.7 times faster than the total federal budget, funds allo­
cated to basic research increased by a factor of 1.3. The dollar amount 
thus increased, but the percentage of federal investment in basic re­
search fell to slightly more than 3 percent of the total.66 Furthermore, 
more than 70 percent of the federal funds for basic research were dis­
tributed through defense-related agencies that were especially tempted 
to cut long-range basic research in favor of applied projects that prom­
ised a more immediate return.67 
Federal support for basic research lagged in part because of the pub­
lic's lack of understanding of its role in the scientific process. Believing 
that any scientific goal could be achieved within a short period of time if 
adequate resources were committed, Americans apparently did not see 
the value in a continuing program of basic research.68 Moreover, basic 
research could have little hope for success in a situation where various 
scientific agencies competed for appropriations by promising to fulfill 
the specific needs of laymen. 
A further indicator of the imbalance in federal support for research 
was the excessive concentration on certain areas of science. In fiscal 
years 1953-54, 90 percent of the federal government's total investment 
in research and development was in the physical sciences, with only 7 to 
8 percent going to the life sciences and the remainder for statistical col­
lection in the social sciences. Even within the physical sciences, there 
were serious imbalances, with the more glamorous physics getting 
nearly twice as much as chemistry.69 
By the mid-1950s the government-science relationship was character­
ized by a pluralistic structure that poured out substantial sums of money 
in response to various political stimuli. National security concerns were 
dominant, broad areas of science were inadequately supported, and 
there was little overall coordination of the federal investment. The exist­
ing structure and weakness of the science advisory process made it un­
likely that the situation would be rectified. Still, Americans assumed 
that the federal government's science policy had played a major role in 
creating what was believed to be unquestioned scientific supremacy. 
On 4 October 1957 the Soviet Union orbited Sputnik, the first man-
made satellite. This achievement, combined with the success of the even 
larger Sputnik II on 3 November, shattered the nation's technological 
complacency. The most alarming assessment came from Edward Teller, 
who warned a television audience that the United States had lost "a 
battle more important and greater than Pearl Harbor."70 Most Ameri­
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cans did not share Teller's apocalyptic view, but they were shocked and 
anxious that the nation recover its lost prestige. G. Mennen Williams, 
the Democratic governor of Michigan, put his concerns into doggerel: 




You tell the world it's a Commie sky,

And Uncle Sam's asleep.

You say on fairway and on rough,

The Kremlin knows it all,

We hope our golfer knows enough

To get us on the ball.71

The shock of Sputnik and the attendant political uproar led to wide­
spread efforts to improve the nation's ability to compete in the scientific 
sphere. Both Congress and the executive searched for immediate ways to 
narrow the Soviet lead, and for structures that would provide long-term 
solutions. The major consequences included an upgrading of scientific 
advice within the White House, creation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, reorganization of research within the De­
fense Department, and passage of the National Defense Education Act. 
Although these efforts altered the existing government-science relation­
ship, many of the old assumptions and problems remained. 
The Eisenhower administration's immediate response to Sputnik was 
to downplay the Soviet achievement and reassure Americans about the 
nation's security. On 9 October 1957 the president began by stressing 
that Sputnik did not indicate Soviet superiority in ballistic missile deliv­
ery capabilities. The United States, he explained, had chosen to separate 
its military missile and satellite programs, with the latter being devel­
oped more slowly as a purely scientific endeavor. Without such separa­
tion military security would have prevented the American satellite from 
becoming "a gift to the scientific community of the entire world."72 A 
continuation of the existing program, according to Eisenhower, would 
facilitate international cooperation and avoid the expense of competi­
tion in a nonessential area. 
Instead of beginning a major new satellite program, Eisenhower al­
tered the scientific advisory process within the White House. Eleven 
days after Sputnik, the president met with the S AC/ ODM for a confer­
ence that had been scheduled before the Soviet achievement. The earlier 
agenda was quickly discarded as the meeting turned into a general dis­
cussion of how to improve American science. Isador Rabi proposed 
establishing a scientific adviser to the president, and Eisenhower quickly 
seized on the idea.73 The president's receptiveness to this suggestion was 
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due in part to Sputnik, but also must be attributed to his growing sense 
of unease with the one-sidedness of the Strauss/Teller advice.74 On 7 
November the president announced that he had appointed James Kil­
lian to the new position of special assistant to the president for science 
and technology. The special assistant was to be aided by an expanded 
and upgraded SAC/ODM—renamed the President's Science Advisory 
Committee.75 
Although Eisenhower was content with these changes, some Ameri­
cans desired a more direct and dramatic response to Sputnik. Newsweek 
found a consensus for "some kind of new emphasis, a speed-up, perhaps 
even another Manhattan Project."76 While the White House delayed, 
Senate Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson responded to the 
public mood by having his Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub­
committee hold a series of hearings "to determine what steps can be 
taken to strengthen our position and restore the leadership we should 
have in technology."77 Johnson did not attack the president directly, but 
when the subcommittee's final report was issued in January 1958, it con­
tained repeated references to the nation's "complacency" and demanded 
immediate action in a number of areas.78 Meanwhile, the administra­
tion's approach—and the nation's confidence—suffered another set­
back in December when the Vanguard rocket carrying the first Ameri­
can satellite exploded on the launch pad. After "Flopnik" and the 
subcommittee's report, congressmen of both parties scrambled to intro­
duce measures for a major American program to meet the Soviet 
challenge.79 
By early 1958 President Eisenhower apparently recognized the inevit­
ability of some sort of expanded satellite program to counter the Soviet 
achievement. At the president's request Killian and other administra­
tion officials began to search for a solution that would meet the public 
clamor while avoiding excessive expenditures. Their recommendations, 
presented to the president on 5 March 1958, called for the creation of a 
"National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)" to direct 
civilian space programs. The new agency would absorb the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, thus saving money and providing 
NASA with an immediate structure. Although the line between military 
and civilian efforts was left imprecise, the implication was that the mil­
itary would be restricted to missiles and the new agency would control 
all satellites.80 After approval by the president, a bill embodying the 
report's recommendations was introduced in Congress on 14 April 1958. 
The administration's bill passed the House with relatively few 
changes, but in the Johnson-led Senate, it was a different story. Before 
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approving the measure, the Senate substantially altered it by enhancing 
the military's authority to develop its own satellite programs and alter­
ing NASA's organizational structure so that the agency would be more 
responsive to lay concerns. A new space council, composed of high-
ranking government officials, would define the nation's goals in space 
and instruct the director accordingly.82 No progress was made on recon­
ciling the House and Senate bills until a private meeting was held be­
tween Senator Johnson and the president on 7 July. Although Johnson 
conceded that NASA's director would be under immediate presidential 
control, he got Eisenhower to accept the space council and the other 
major Senate changes.83 Both houses then passed what was essentially 
the Senate version, and the bill was signed into law on 29 July 1958.84 
The administration also attempted to rationalize scientific research 
within the Department of Defense. Prior to the Soviet success, military 
missile programs had been fragmented and frequently overlapped. The 
interservice rivalries that had created this situation naturally intensified 
after Sputnik, as each branch tried to prove that its program should 
have priority. The three services lobbied heavily, bringing congressional 
and public pressure to bear wherever possible. The administration was 
not in a strong position to resist; the Soviet achievement had increased 
concerns about the nation's missile capabilities, and no one wanted to 
cancel a program that might in some eventuality prove helpful. The pre-
Sputnik chaos was therefore perpetuated during the last two months of 
1957 as the secretary of defense authorized the further development of 
three sets of overlapping missile programs.85 The result, according to 
one participant, was: 
We spent about twice as much money and we employed about twice as many 
people on these development programs as we should have. Furthermore, 
from the point of view of military security such excesses were harmful be­
cause they caused us to stretch our resources thinner than was really 
86 necessary.
In order to provide more effective supervision in the future, the secre­
tary of defense created the Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 
in February 1958, with the aim of ending the chaos in the military missile 
program. This largely temporary effort was expanded and given greater 
legitimacy when Congress accepted the administration's Defense Reor­
ganization Act in the fall of 1958. Included in that act was Killian's 
proposal for a director of defense research and engineering, who would 
occupy a position in the hierarchy equivalent to the service secretaries. 
The director would supervise ARPA and control all military research.87 
In addition to prompting new organizational structures for science, 
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Sputnik opened the way for expanded federal support of basic research 
and science education. Encouraged by his new scientific advisers, Eisen­
hower stressed the necessity of enhancing the nation's long-term scien­
tific capabilities: 
In the face of Soviet challenges, the security and continued well-being of the 
United States depend, as never before, on the extension of scientific knowl­
edge. Our technological progress requires a higher level of support for basic 
research. It also demands a growing supply of highly trained manpower— 
scientists, engineers, teachers, and technicians.KX 
To meet these needs, the president urged government agencies to in­
crease their expenditures for basic research, and specifically asked Con­
gress to double the NSF's research appropriations. Furthermore, he re­
quested a fivefold increase in the foundation's budget for fellowships 
and science education.89 
The president also recommended that the nation's scientific resources 
be strengthened through a "temporary" program of federal aid to educa­
tion, asking for a four-year program of approximately $146 million per 
year for college scholarships and matching grants to states for the im­
provement of science education.90 Although conservatives protested 
that Sputnik was allowing the "socialists" to sneak the federal camel into 
the tent of local control, congressional liberals joyously reshaped Eisen­
hower's proposal into the National Defense Education Act of 1958.9' By 
the time they were finished, the price of the program had doubled, and 
the more elitist scholarship provision had been transformed into loans 
based on need. Eisenhower signed the bill on 2 September 1958.92 
The post-Sputnik changes enhanced federal support of science, but 
some earlier difficulties remained. The National Defense Education Act 
improved the quality of science education in the United States, and 
marked the beginning of a large, continuing federal involvement in edu­
cation. The nation's long-term scientific wealth was also increased by 
larger appropriations for the NSF Following the president's recom­
mendations, Congress gave that agency $134 million in fiscal year 1959 
—an increase of 269 percent over the preceding year.93 The legislators 
proved more parsimonious in succeeding years, but the foundation's 
budget gradually edged upward. These increases, plus greater expendi­
tures by other agencies, caused the percentage of the total federal re­
search and development budget devoted to basic research to rise to 9 
percent by fiscal year 1961. Although this was a great improvement over 
the 3 percent before Sputnik, much of this money continued to be con­
trolled by agencies with relatively narrow scientific interests. The De­
fense Department, the AEC, and NASA still provided 64.2 percent of 
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the total spent on basic research. The NIH's parent—the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare—supplied another 16.6 percent, where­
as the NSF controlled only 9.3 percent.94 
The nation derived mixed benefits from the new missile and satellite 
programs. The Defense Reorganization Act—especially the creation of 
the office of director research and engineering—began to bring order to 
the multiplicity of military research projects. That control, however, 
was achieved with difficulty and suffered frequent lapses. For example, 
it took almost two years and presidential intervention to terminate the 
Army Ballistic Missile Agency, even though that unit was building a 
missile which was completely outside the army's assigned role.95 More 
significantly, since the NASA Act had not clearly limited military space 
activities, the military services continued to initiate new programs. The 
director of defense research and engineering blocked some of the more 
bizarre efforts, but the language of the NASA Act made it difficult to 
keep the Defense Department from developing its own satellite 
96 program.
The creation of NASA as a civilian agency prevented space explora­
tion from being inextricably linked with national security. The space 
agency, however, perpetuated other facets of the cold war government-
science relationship. Above all, it reflected and reinforced the Manhat­
tan Project idea that science could fulfill lay requirements if another 
agency was created, organization provided, and the requisite funds 
poured in. Like the AEC after World War II, NASA became the na­
tion's paramount scientific agency in the popular imagination and pros­
pered accordingly. 
The most significant post-Sputnik change was the improvement of 
the scientific advisory process within the White House. The special as­
sistant and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) pro­
vided the institutional structure for more sustained and diverse advice. 
The special assistant attended the meetings of various high-level policy-
making groups (including the National Security Council), and reported 
directly to the president on all matters pertaining to science. The two 
men who served successively as Eisenhower's special assistants—Killian 
and George Kistiakowsky—were relatively effective in this role because 
of good personal relations with the president. The upgraded and revived 
PSAC expanded the range of expertise immediately available and tried 
to ensure that the president would receive somewhat more diverse scien­
tific advice.97 
The new structure for providing scientific advice in the White House 
had substantial impact on the nuclear test-ban issue. For a variety of 
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reasons in 1957, President Eisenhower became concerned about dees­
calating the nuclear arms race. He was encouraged in this by a PSAC 
report that indicated that it was theoretically possible to monitor viola­
tions of a nuclear test ban treaty with some degree of accuracy. Eisen­
hower's subsequent efforts to work out an acceptable treaty with the 
Soviets met with intense opposition from Edward Teller, Lewis Strauss, 
and others.98 When those who had been the paramount purveyors of 
scientific advice prior to 1957 suggested ways the Soviets might evade 
effective monitoring, Eisenhower's new advisers found technical solu­
tions to the objections and sustained the president's commitment. Un­
fortunately, Kistiakowsky's most promising proposal for monitoring 
test-ban violations was a victim of the 1960 U-2 incident." 
In addition to advising the president directly on issues such as the test 
ban, Killian and Kistiakowsky saw their primary responsibility as bring­
ing some order to the nation's enormous investment in military and 
space research. They could claim a major victory for rationality with the 
transfer of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency to NASA, but problems 
remained. As Kistiakowsky ruefully acknowledged, the government 
was still supporting twenty-two separate space vehicle programs in 
1959, and the story was much the same in nonspace areas of military 
research.100 
Eisenhower's scientific advisers had somewhat greater success in con­
trolling NASA. Since Killian and Kistiakowsky wanted the space pro­
gram to fit into a balanced national scientific effort, they insisted that 
NASA goals be shaped by scientific objectives. This attitude reflected 
the president's views, but was in direct conflict with those of many con­
gressmen and "empire builders" at NASA. According to Kistiakowsky, 
the agency's leaders lacked legitimate scientific goals, but were very wil­
ling to exploit the cold war atmosphere so that they could build "expen­
sive equipment" and "feed the many hungry NASA mouths."101 Kistia­
kowsky's views did not win him many friends at the space agency, but his 
arguments often gave the Budget Bureau sufficient ammunition to trim 
NASA proposals. Most significantly, Eisenhower's scientific advisers 
accepted NASA plans for manned space flight, but adamantly opposed 
competition with the Soviets in manned space exploration. Kistia­
kowsky insisted that such an effort could be justified only as "a political 
rather than a scientific enterprise."102 His analysis was confirmed in 
1961, when President John F. Kennedy committed the nation to what 
would ultimately be a $30 billion lunar landing program. Kennedy 
acted—without consulting his scientific adviser—to shore up American 
prestige. 
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Although the major areas of federal scientific endeavor—the military 
and space—received the most attention, some time was also devoted to 
the broader problems of federal science policy. Both the special assist­
ants and the PSAC pushed to increase the funds supplied for basic re­
search through the NSF. Without these efforts it is doubtful that the 
foundation's budget would have increased as it did during the late 
1950s.103 Kistiakowsky also occasionally expressed outrage at the rela­
tive distribution of research funds within the government. An investiga­
tion of Defense Department budgets caused him to become "indignant 
on discovering that the cost of exclusively paper studies in industrial 
establishments on 'Strategic Defense of Cis-Lunar Space' and similar 
topics amounted to more dollars than all the funds available to the NSF 
for the support of research in chemistry."104 Despite such outbursts he 
generally insisted that the setting of research priorities was outside the 
scope of his office. 
The special assistants also attempted to promote the coordination of 
all scientific activities conducted by the federal government. The main 
vehicle for this was the Federal Council for Science and Technology, 
which was composed of representatives of each of the agencies with sub­
stantial research programs. Expectations were high when Eisenhower 
created the council in March 1959. Unfortunately, the entrenched power 
of the various agencies was too great for a coordinating body to over­
come, even with the support of the president's scientific adviser. The 
council's attempt to gather a five-year projection of research priorities 
from the various agencies foundered as the NIH, the Department of 
Defense, the AEC, and the Commerce Department all refused to coop­
erate. 105 Each agency was intent on preserving its own independence and 
its ability to tap funds through its congressional connections. 
The special assistants and the PSAC provided the president with a 
broader spectrum of scientific advice on a sustained basis. Still, the im­
pact of the new structure was understandably limited by the ongoing 
cold war, the absence of political pressure for a more balanced ap­
proach, and the entrenched status of various scientific agencies. In 
short, the new advisers were unable to transform federal support for 
science into a federal science policy. 
By the end of 1960, the government was spending 10.1 percent of the 
federal budget on scientific research and development—approximately 
ten times the proportion invested twenty years earlier. The rate of in­
crease had been especially sharp in the late 1950s, and would continue to 
rise during the first half of the next decade, reaching 15.6 percent by 
The Government-Science Complex \ 337 
1965.106 Although overall spending for science had increased in a rela­
tively steady manner, scientists had experienced substantial ups and 
downs in their relationship with political power. After 1957 they were 
once again in a position to offer advice on issues involving science. 
Although federal spending was generous and scientists resided in high 
places, the nation did not adopt a coherent science policy. Earlier devel­
opments had created a welter of scientific agencies that no presidential 
adviser could coordinate or control, and each sought to maintain itself 
by forging alliances with congressional committees and special interest 
groups. The most successful, of course, were those that could relate their 
scientific efforts to the cold war. By 1960 these agencies—the Depart­
ment of Defense, the AEC, and NASA—accounted for 90 percent of the 
total federal expenditures for science.107 The NIH was also highly suc­
cessful, downplaying basic research in the life sciences in favor of spe­
cific disease-related institutes. The result was some duplication, an im­
balance between various areas of science, and relative neglect of basic 
research. Without a balanced science policy that acknowledged the need 
for basic research in diverse fields, the nation was poorly prepared to 
turn its scientific resources to new areas as the intensity of the cold war 
waned. 
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The Presidency Triumphant: 
Congressional-Executive Relations, 1945-1960 
Gary W. Reichard 
The American presidency was in robust condition at the end of 
World War II.* The need for government intervention into the eco­
nomic affairs of the nation during the Great Depression, followed by the 
demands of all-out war, strengthened the executive branch and, perhaps 
more importantly, legitimized expansion of its powers. The war in par­
ticular led to the creation of a gigantic bureaucracy with direct connec­
tions to the White House. In these developments Congress was often a 
mere spectator, though occasionally it gave the process active assis­
tance. Passage of the first and second War Powers acts (1941 and 1942), 
for example, gave the president substantial freedom of action to enlarge 
and reshape the government "for the duration," though Congress tech­
nically retained the right to review or terminate the powers granted. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, occupying the White House for the twelve years 
spanning the depression and World War II, made the most of the oppor­
tunities presented him, and the public generally approved. 
By the time the war ended, some Americans expressed reservations 
about the power shift. The specter of totalitarianism produced a fear of 
unrestrained government and unlimited executive power. Among schol­
ars there developed a school of thought which maintained that the 
Constitution intended and imposed checks on arbitrary power; 
neo-constitutionalists like Edward S. Corwin, Charles A. Mcllwain, 
* The author wishes to thank the Graduate School and the College of Humanities of the 
Ohio State University, and the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, for grants in aid to 
support much of the research for this essay. 
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William Y. Elliott, and Carl J. Friedrich called for renewed emphasis on 
the separation and balancing of powers.1 What they feared most was a 
blurring of constitutional lines of authority. As Corwin wrote in the 
1945 edition of his influential text The President: Office and Powers, 
"The principle of the separation of powers as a barrier preventing the 
fusion of presidential and congressional power is today pretty shaky if it 
is not altogether defunct."2 
These concerns were reflected in public opinion. In April 1945, when 
Harry S. Truman succeeded Roosevelt, a national poll showed that 65 
percent of Americans thought Congress should enjoy increased impor­
tance and power in the future; only 16 percent disagreed. On the other 
hand, the ambiguity of the public mind was evident when people were 
asked a few months later whether Truman should press Congress more 
forcefully to carry out his recommendations: 52 percent agreed, and 
only 21 percent said no.3 Restiveness also appeared within Congress, as 
it had during the waning days of the New Deal. With the war over a 
strong movement emerged in support of reforming Congress to allow 
that body, as Congressman Jerry Voorhis put it, "to maintain its posi­
tion as a truly co-equal branch of government in full control of national 
legislation."4 
Partisan motives typically influenced these theoretical considera­
tions. Although Voorhis was a Democrat, it was the Republicans— 
frustrated after long years of Democratic presidential activism—who 
pressed most energetically for a greater congressional role. It was logical 
that members of the G.O.P., opposed to the activist policies espoused by 
Democratic New Dealers and internationalists, took up constitutional 
arguments in behalf of the separation of powers. Yet the stridency and 
partisan tone of their arguments in the immediate post-World War II 
era undermined their effectiveness, making them sound self-serving and 
narrowly political. 
Other factors also weakened the impact of neo-constitutionalist ar­
guments. One of them was the inability of Congress to win the people's 
affection. Marked by dispersion of power and internal discord, that 
body often appeared to be the "bickering branch."5 The ambivalent pub­
lic responses to pollsters' questions concerning Truman and Congress 
surely reflected such a popular perception in 1945. By way of contrast, 
whatever misgivings Americans may have had concerning the powers of 
the presidency, they seemed to regard the office as a source of stability 
and predictability, especially in threatening times. As the only represen­
tative of all the people, the president was seen as standing alone for the 
national interest.6 
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All in all, the outlook for the congressional-executive balance after 
the war was mixed. In the circumstances the most likely development 
seemed to be a new coordination, or collaboration, between the 
branches. Congressional historian George Galloway put the case for 
•'collaborationism" succinctly, asserting that "the doctrine of the separa­
tion of powers and the system of checks and balances have become a 
serious handicap" and that the Framers had never intended "that Con­
gress and the Executive should live as suspicious rivals in separate 
worlds." By 1947 even the neo-constitutionalist Corwin was recom­
mending "a better organization of the relationship of President and 
Congress," rather than a straight rollback of presidential powers. This 
view also had proponents in high public places. "There must be an inti­
mate relationship between the President and Congress," wrote Senator 
(soon to be Vice-President) Alben Barkley in 1948, "if our Government 
is to function according to our desires. "7 
The collaboration that prevailed in the postwar period did not pro­
duce the steadying balance expected by its advocates. President Tru­
man, insecure about his personal position but reverential toward the 
presidency as an institution, battled fiercely for the prerogatives of the 
office even while claiming to seek a true partnership with Congress.8 His 
successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, affected even greater deference to­
ward the legislative branch, but further expanded presidential author­
ity. Briefly, Congress launched an offensive of its own, but in the end the 
president emerged on top. 
When Truman became president, Congress was in the mood to assert 
itself but in a poor position to do so. As one perceptive observer re­
marked, the legislative branch needed first to modernize its machinery, 
especially its committee structures and procedures, before it could re­
gain its rightful influence. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
aimed to achieve this goal by expanding congressional oversight of ex­
ecutive agencies and their activities and improving the legislature's ac­
cess to information. Senator Robert LaFollette, Jr., a chief sponsor of 
the bill, originally included a provision for a joint legislative-executive 
council to close the "gap between the executive and legislative arms of 
the Government," which he felt had developed over the years.9 That 
provision did not pass, but the act streamlined the committee structure 
in both houses and established committees that corresponded to agen­
cies and jurisdictions in the executive branch, thus permitting more ef­
fective communication. Committees were also given full-fledged profes­
sional staffs and were formally charged with exercising "watchfulness'7 
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over agencies in the executive branch. In addition, all Senate commit­
tees and four in the House received subpoena powers.10 The assertive 
spirit behind the Reorganization Act also inspired the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946, which set statutory safeguards and guidelines for 
procedures in the bureaucracy.11 These innovations helped Congress, 
but represented no panacea; the bureaucracy's capacity to expand in size 
and complexity easily outstripped the ability of Congress to control it, 
and a number of the committees became more captive than captor of the 
agencies whose activities they monitored. 
Partisan motives were often intertwined with institutional objectives 
as Congress tried to counter growing presidential power in the imme­
diate postwar period. In March 1947, for example, it passed on to the 
states a constitutional amendment limiting the president to two terms. 
The measure enjoyed broad popular support, but it was also true that 
the Republican party had pressed for such an amendment in its 1940 and 
1944 platforms. The Republican-controlled House Judiciary Commit­
tee held only one day of hearings on it before sending it to the floor, and 
debate thereafter centered mainly on the record of Franklin Roosevelt. 
G.O.P. legislators voted unanimously in favor of the proposal, which 
was ratified as the Twenty-second Amendment in February 1951.12 
The most effective device employed by Congress to check executive 
power after World War II was the legislative veto. Although varying in 
detail, legislative vetoes usually required that specified executive plans 
for action be submitted to Congress before becoming operative, with 
Congress retaining the right to disapprove the proposed action. Disap­
proval could be by concurrent or simple resolution (neither of which 
required presidential signature) or even, if stipulated in the law, by ac­
tion of a standing congressional committee.13 Such procedures, though 
not strictly constitutional, could be effective. Corwin summed up the 
case for the legislative veto in 1947, writing that the line between inevita­
ble delegation of authority by Congress and outright abdication of its 
powers could only be maintained "by rendering the delegated powers 
recoverable without the consent of the delegate; and for this purpose the 
concurrent resolution seems to be an available mechanism, and the only 
one."14 
Congress clearly intended the legislative veto to be more than a theo­
retical power, disallowing twelve of Truman's forty-one proposed ad­
ministrative reorganization plans between 1949 and 1953 and extending 
the device to foreign policy measures too. Beginning with the Greek-
Turkish aid package in 1947, legislation affecting foreign aid, defense, 
trade, and stockpiling of strategic materials regularly included provi­
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sions for congressional disapproval. Between 1951 and 1960 every an­
nual foreign aid act included such a stipulation, as did the amendments 
to the Atomic Energy Act adopted in 1958. Presidents Truman and Ei­
senhower questioned the constitutionality of the legislative veto, and 
from time to time each penned vigorous veto messages protesting "en­
croachment" into executive functions. But political expediency tri­
umphed over constitutional niceties; when needing particular legisla­
tion, each signed measures including legislative veto provisions.15 
One of the most important ways in which Congress tried to increase 
its authority after 1945 was through investigation of executive branch 
activities—a function supposedly made easier by its revised committee 
structure. Both the number and scope of congressional investigations 
increased in the period after World War II, generated by partisan antag­
onism toward Truman and zealous bipartisan concern about internal 
security. A measure of the increase in investigatory activity was the ris­
ing budget for such probes. In 1940 the Senate had spent only $170,267 
for inquiries. This figure ballooned in the 1950s: the Eighty-third Con­
gress (1953-54) spent more than $5 million on investigations, the 
Eighty-sixth (1959-60) more than $11 million.16 
By his defensive and often acerbic responses to congressional inquir­
ies, President Truman worsened matters. His offhand comment about 
"red herrings" at the time of the Alger Hiss case, for example, predicta­
bly made Congress more intent on pursuing its anti-Communist investi­
gations. On the other hand, Truman devised some useful means of ward­
ing off what he viewed as excessively zealous congressional oversight 
activities. The practice of classifying documents, greatly expanded after 
World War II, was particularly effective. The words confidential, secret, 
and top secret stamped on executive documents served to keep them 
from a curious legislative branch. Truman went well beyond Roosevelt's 
practice of classifying only military documents; in 1951 he issued an 
executive order empowering all agencies to classify documents when 
necessary in the interest of "national security."17 
In response to congressional probes, Truman repeatedly invoked the 
right to executive secrecy, beginning in 1946 with an inquiry concerning 
the conduct of government cryptanalysts before the attack at Pearl 
Harbor. In defense of his actions, Truman later insisted that the presi­
dent's right to keep materials secret "has been recognized since the be­
ginnings of our Government. No President has ever complied 
with an order of the Legislative Branch directing the Executive Branch 
to produce confidential documents, the disclosure of which was consid­
ered by the President to be contrary to the public interest." In 1950 he 
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issued an executive order protecting "military secrets" from congres­
sional scrutiny; a second order a year later extended the veil of secrecy 
over nonmilitary agencies as well, authorizing any executive body to 
classify information if "necessary" for national security. This precedent 
was later taken up by Eisenhower, who in 1953 reasserted the president's 
right to classify materials. Although Eisenhower changed the criterion 
from "national security" to the supposedly narrower grounds of "na­
tional defense," he neither introduced checks on those doing the classify­
ing nor provided any scheme for ultimate declassification of sensitive 
materials.18 
Both Truman and Eisenhower employed executive privilege—a term 
coined during the Eisenhower years—to block congressional investiga­
tions. The Truman administration's most sweeping assertions of the 
right to conceal information after the fact came in the hearings con­
ducted by the combined Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations 
committees after the dismissal of General MacArthur from his Korean 
command in the spring of 1951. A sharp exchange on the issue of con­
cealment of information occurred when General Omar Bradley refused 
to divulge the nature of the advice he had given Truman while a member 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although Republicans on the joint commit­
tee strenuously objected to Bradley's action, Democrat Richard Russell, 
chairman of the panel, ruled he had the right to withhold the informa­
tion. After three days of heated partisan dispute over the constitutional 
question involved, the committee sustained Russell's ruling, signifi­
cantly advancing the cause of executive privilege. Certain Republicans 
on the committee suggested that Truman himself should testify, but the 
president refused. Even Senator Taft, who wanted Truman to comply, 
confessed that the Senate could not compel him to do so.19 
Even after leaving the White House, Truman maintained his right to 
withhold information. In November 1953, as a private citizen, he re­
fused to honor a subpoena to appear before the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities. "In spite of my personal willingness to cooper­
ate with your committee," he responded to the committee, "I feel con­
strained by my duty to the people of the United States to decline to 
comply with the subpoena." After presenting a mini-treatise on the 
precedents for his refusal, the former president asserted, "If the doctrine 
of separation of powers and the independence of the Presidency is to 
have any validity at all, it must be equally applicable to a President after 
his term of office has expired. "20 
This sort of resistance to congressional investigations, strongly rein­
forced by the later actions of Eisenhower, helped neutralize the impact 
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of such probes, despite the momentary political damage done to the 
Truman administration by Senator Joseph McCarthy's activities. It was 
clear by the time Harry Truman left office that Congress faced a very 
difficult task in attempting to increase its powers with respect to the 
executive branch. 
The Korean War proved to be an especially dramatic period in the 
history of congressional-executive relations. Truman's handling of the 
nation's military response and his use of emergency powers at home 
stimulated a fierce attack on the presidency. During the years 1950 to 
1953, Congress seriously challenged the president's powers as com­
mander-in-chief, supported imposing limits on his emergency powers, 
and attempted to alter permanently the executive's treaty-making 
power. In the end, however, these efforts failed. The legislative offen­
sive, based in large part on the Republicans' partisan objections to Tru­
man and his policies, resulted only in the elimination of Truman himself 
from the political picture. By mid-1953, with Eisenhower occupying the 
White House and the Korean conflict ended, the road^was clear for ex­
ecutive power to grow once again. 
Events of 1950-51 revived old suspicions in Congress about unilateral 
presidential actions in foreign affairs. Through early 1950 attacks by 
congressional Republicans on the administration's Asia policy centered 
on substantive matters. American entry into the Korean War altered the 
situation. Partisan motives remained important, but Truman's failure to 
ask Congress to authorize American military action left him vulnerable 
to criticism on purely constitutional grounds. Opposition rhetoric 
swiftly shifted in that direction. 
The constitutional issue surfaced almost immediately after American 
troops were dispatched to Korea in late June of 1950. Both Truman and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson rebuffed questions from Republican 
senators about the basis for American involvement by assuring them 
that all U.S. action was "pursuant to" a United Nations resolution, even 
though evidence suggested that Truman's decision predated U.N. ac­
tion. When Republican Senate Leader Kenneth Wherry pressed the 
president on the need to consult formally with Congress, the most he 
could get from Truman was the statement, "If there is any necessity for 
Congressional action, I will come to you. But I hope we can get these 
bandits in Korea suppressed without that."21 
In retrospect Truman erred in not requesting formal support from 
Congress. At least in the summer of 1950, Republicans would certainly 
have supported a resolution authorizing military action. Yet, apparently 
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influenced by Acheson, the president gave no serious thought to draft­
ing, or even requesting, a joint resolution.22 As the tide of war turned 
against the United States in late summer, Republicans in Congress 
vented their outrage on the constitutional issue. Senator Taft was typi­
cal, writing privately that "if the President could send troops to defend 
the Republic of Korea against outside aggression, he could send troops 
to any nation in the world. I do not believe there is any such con­
stitutional authority." Republicans raised the constitutional issue 
repeatedly—and with some success—in the 1950 elections. After the 
G.O.P. scored important gains in those elections, one journalist sug­
gested that Truman appoint a new secretary of state and begin regular 
consultations with prominent senators-elect, and a Republican con­
gressman advised the president to name General Eisenhower (not yet 
publicly identified with the G.O.P.) as "deputy president" to direct the 
mobilization effort.23 Congressional Republicans also attacked execu­
tive secrecy in diplomatic exchanges, proposing in early December a 
resolution to require President Truman to reveal the contents of his 
private talks with British Prime Minister Attlee that were then occur­
ring; in the middle of the same month, the Senate Republican Confer­
ence adopted a resolution calling for the dismissal of the secretary of 
state. 
The congressional offensive intensified in 1951 as a result of the so-
called Great Debate and the controversy surrounding Truman's firing of 
General Douglas MacArthur from command of the troops in Korea. 
The Great Debate, touched off by Truman's announced plans to send 
four American divisions to Europe as a part of a NATO defense force, 
produced several congressional proposals to tie the chief executive's 
hands in sending troops abroad. One resolution, offered by Republican 
Congressman Frederic Coudert, of New York, banned the use of future 
appropriations for sending American troops overseas unless Congress 
specifically approved such action. Another, proposed by Senator Ken­
neth Wherry (Nebraska), stated that no American troops could be sent 
to Europe "pending determination by Congress of a policy on that mat­
ter." After three months of intense dispute, the issue was put to rest but 
not resolved. The Senate passed two resolutions, one approving the 
sending of troops and the other requiring the president to consult before 
committing any additional forces. Neither resolution had statutory 
force, but it was significant that a number of Democrats supported the 
measure requiring further consultation. The rift was clearly more than 
partisan.24 
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Truman's dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951 exacerbated criti­
cisms of presidential high-handedness. In this instance, however, con­
gressional Democrats did not join Republicans in protesting the presi­
dent's actions, and after more than three months of hearings, the matter 
subsided. The fact that the war had stabilized in the meantime helped as 
much as anything to quiet Truman's critics. On reflection most Ameri­
cans seemed willing to accept that the president had the right to fire a 
general, even if they disagreed with this particular action. 
The issue of emergency presidential powers also roused sharp con­
troversy during the Korean War. Congress had questioned the proper 
extent of such powers both before and immediately after World War II, 
and the two branches had clashed openly over extension of the Office of 
Price Administration in 1946 (Congress won, and the OPA was abol­
ished). In the course of that conflict, Senator Taft had placed the issue in 
its strictly constitutional context, charging that Truman had "assumed 
to write a law for Congress [to continue OPA], although the Constitu­
tion of the United States gives the Congress power to state the condi­
tions on which price controls shall be continued."25 
Truman's expansive concept of his emergency powers was obvious. 
Although he had unsuccessfully vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, he 
several times used injunction powers granted by the law. Occasionally 
he tried to go considerably further, claiming the right to seize control of 
operations in key industries when they were threatened with work stop­
pages. In 1949 when Truman, relying on the opinion of his attorney 
general, Tom Clark, asserted that he had "inherent" authority to do 
anything necessary to protect the general welfare against looming 
strikes in the steel and coal industries, a large group in Congress was 
indignant. Speaking as usual for many of his colleagues, Taft pointed 
out that the injunction powers included in the Taft-Hartley Act ruled 
out executive seizure of any industry. Truman remained unconvinced— 
as later events would demonstrate. The question, concluded columnist 
Arthur Krock in 1949, was "in a disputed area of the laws."26 
Truman's insistence on the presidency's "inherent" powers caused 
him to ask for only limited mobilization authority during the Korean 
War. The crisis atmosphere in September 1950 led Congress to cooper­
ate; the Defense Production Act granted Truman all he wished and 
more. When the president declared a state of national emergency in De­
cember, he invoked a series of sweeping price and wage controls and 
established centralized machinery to deal with industrial priorities and 
allocation of raw materials—all without serious objection from Con­
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gress. By the spring of 1951, however, political backlash had set in. Con­
gress rebuffed Truman's efforts to get stronger anti-inflationary powers 
added to the 1950 act, and he had to accept a weak bill. 
The sharpest clash over emergency powers came in April 1952, when 
Truman seized the steel industry to avert a possible steelworkers' strike. 
Disdaining both the authority bestowed on him by the Taft-Hartley Act 
and a second possible statutory authorization for seizure, Section 18 of 
the Selective Service Act of 1948, he based his take-over on his "inherent 
powers" as commander-in-chief. Before both the District Court and the 
Supreme Court, the administration pressed the "inherent powers" ar­
gument, quoting Justice Holmes's dictum that "a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic." When District Judge David Pine objected that 
this rationale sounded like a resort to pure expediency, an administra­
tion spokesman had the bad judgment to reply that the court might call 
it that "but we say it is expediency backed by power." This ill-considered 
line of defense not only failed to persuade Judge Pine, who issued an 
injunction against the president's action, but alienated many of Tru­
man's supporters in Congress.27 When the Supreme Court upheld the 
District Court's ruling, Truman was forced to give in, to the delight of 
his critics. The strike itself was settled in late July. 
The steel seizure decision did not settle conclusively the issue of what 
"inherent" powers a president has because so many of the high court's 
justices filed opinions. Justice Black's opinion was to prove most useful 
as a precedent. He argued that presidential powers had to come from 
either legislation or the Constitution, and President Truman's sei­
zure of the mills was based on neither. The continuing uncertainty 
concerning lines of executive and congressional authority was under­
scored, however, by the widely cited opinion of Justice Jackson, 
who contended that there existed a "zone of twilight" where the two 
branches held, in effect, concurrent power; in this case, Jackson said, 
Congress had already spoken, through the Taft-Hartley Act, but the 
president had chosen to act in defiance of that law and his action was 
therefore unjustifiable.28 
Although the judiciary ultimately settled the issue, some observers 
saw the crisis as a conflict between the president and Congress. Despair­
ing of the likelihood of a Court-imposed solution in April 1952, Repub­
lican Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois asserted that if the president 
were to be blocked, "it must be done in that branch of the Government 
which James Monroe characterized as the very core and center of the 
Government of the United States, namely, the Congress." Writing after 
the crisis was ended, Edward Corwin took the same view. "The moral 
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from all this is plain," he wrote in 1953, "namely, that escape must be 
sought from 'presidential autocracy' by resort not to the judicial power, 
but to the legislative power—in other words, by resort to timely action 
by Congress. " Yet Congress accomplished little along these lines 
after the steel crisis passed. By 1960 serious observers noted "a growing 
tendency" for Congress to want to share with the president powers to 
terminate "emergency" situations, but such provisions were limited in 
their application. In fact, various presidential emergency powers— 
including those dating from the Korean War—remained on the books 
into the seventies, their existence unchallenged by the legislative 
branch.29 
Congressional critics of growing presidential power were heartened 
by the Court's action in the steel case, and in its immediate aftermath 
they pushed hard for the most significant limitation of executive power 
attempted in the cold war years: the Bricker amendment. For a time 
enactment of this measure to circumscribe the president's treaty-making 
power appeared likely. But the years 1952-53, while the amendment was 
under discussion, can be seen in retrospect as the high point of congres­
sional efforts to erode the powers of the presidency. Collapse of the 
amendment cause in early 1954 signaled the resumption of growth in 
executive power. 
The Bricker amendment aimed to ensure that all executive agree­
ments with other nations, like all treaties, would come before Congress 
for approval, and to prevent treaties from becoming operative as "do­
mestic law" unless Congress specifically approved. First introduced by 
Senator John W. Bricker (Ohio) in 1951, the measure was part of the 
Republican attack on Truman's handling of foreign policy and the Ko­
rean War, but it also represented a wider assault on the powers of the 
presidential office. This was certainly Bricker's intent. "The constitu­
tional power of Congress to determine American foreign policy is at 
stake," he had warned the Senate during the Great Debate. "It is our 
duty to preserve that power against presidential encroachment."30 
Shortly thereafter, he introduced the amendment. 
Bricker and his supporters had identified a genuine issue. By an­
nouncing policies first and then seeking legislative endorsement, Tru­
man had co-opted Republicans into "bipartisan" support of broad-
ranging foreign policy programs and secured a relatively free hand in 
conducting American foreign policy. By the 1950s the Senate's "advise 
and consent" function had shrunk to little more than its having a say as 
to whether a proposed treaty would be ratified. Foreign policy was in­
creasingly being conducted by resort to executive agreements— 
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completely outside the realm of congressional oversight. For this reason 
Congress required in 1950 that all executive agreements, as well as 
treaties, be compiled and published, but that was poor insurance that all 
such agreements would be discovered, let alone controlled, by 
Congress.31 
The Bricker amendment made no significant progress in Congress 
during the last months of the Truman administration, as Democratic 
leaders succeeded in bottling it up in committee. With the Republicans 
in control after the 1952 elections, the outlook changed; Bricker had 
sixty-three cosponsors when he reintroduced the measure in January 
1953, enough to guarantee passage in the Senate (a two-thirds vote was 
required). But amendment backers soon received a surprise. Despite 
Bricker's assurances that he had no intention of "hamstringing the Pres­
ident in the conduct of the Nation's foreign policy," and notwithstand­
ing the Republican platform's support for the amendment in 1952, Pres­
ident Eisenhower made known his opposition to it. Throughout 1953, as 
the administration negotiated with Bricker to make the wording of the 
proposed amendment more innocuous, both sides began to lose pa­
tience. In January 1954 Eisenhower exploded at a high-level strategy 
conference that the amendment was a "stupid, blind violation of [the] 
Constitution by stupid, blind isolationists." Wisely, he was more dis­
creet in public; in working to win congressional support for his view, the 
president avoided stressing the constitutional issue, emphasizing instead 
the need to retain maneuvering room in foreign policy because of the 
Soviet threat.32 
In February 1954, after a flurry of last-minute negotiations and floor 
amendments, a revised version of the Bricker amendment was defeated 
in the Senate by a single vote. Bricker reintroduced it in slightly altered 
form in 1955 and again in 1957, but Eisenhower remained opposed, and 
the amendment never again had a real chance of passage. Its defeat 
marked the beginning of a successful presidential offensive that, by the 
end of the decade, left the executive branch indisputably in control of 
foreign policy-making. 
Eisenhower's tactics in repelling the pro-Bricker amendment forces 
were consistent with his general approach to questions touching on the 
balance of power between Congress and the presidency. Always out­
wardly deferential, he fiercely resisted legislative intrusions when he felt 
them inappropriate—particularly in matters of foreign policy and na­
tional security. Yet in fighting off congressional interference, he avoided 
confrontational rhetoric, stressing instead the need for unity in the face 
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of cold war dangers. He also tried to avoid unnecessary day-to-day ten­
sions with Congress. Bricker's own willingness to support Eisenhower 
after defeat of his amendment testified to the success of Eisenhower's 
tactics. "Naturally, I was disappointed when the President opposed my 
proposed constitutional amendment," the Ohio Senator wrote a diehard 
supporter of the measure in 1956. "However, the President's 
treaty-making policy has conformed very closely to the objectives 
sought to be established in the amendment. President Eisenhower, un­
like his two immediate predecessors , has not abused the power. 
"
33
 Indeed, Eisenhower's tactics and personality—and not least, 
the fact that he was a Republican—helped disarm critics of presidential 
power, so many of whom were Republicans themselves. Yet defenders 
of congressional prerogative should have been concerned about the tide 
of events in the fifties. 
One area of activity in which the executive branch clearly established 
dominance in the 1950s was legislative planning. Here the Truman ad­
ministration had laid a sound foundation, instituting new machinery for 
legislative clearance that rapidly evolved into a tool for formulating leg­
islation. Under Truman the Bureau of the Budget took over the coordi­
nation of all agency proposals and established regular contact with both 
majority and minority members on most major congressional commit­
tees, involving the executive branch in the early stages of the bill-
drafting process. After election in his own right in 1948, Truman was 
especially aggressive in this respect, insisting that the bureau work up 
draft legislation to put his campaign promises into action.34 
Thereafter, the executive branch provided most major policy initia­
tives. President Eisenhower did not present a detailed program in 1953, 
but beginning the next year he issued annual comprehensive packages, 
specific in detail and well defined in substance.35 By 1960 the volume of 
administration-sponsored bills had escalated dramatically. At the same 
time, the evolution of a formal congressional liaison network in the 
White House, itself a reflection of the expanded legislative role of the 
executive branch, gave the president another powerful new tool to influ­
ence Congress. Eisenhower paid close personal attention to liaison, and 
his administration saw the creation of the first publicly acknowledged 
congressional liaison staff in the White House; although it did not grow 
beyond five before 1960, the precedent was set for a more elaborate 
operation to develop. However much Eisenhower may have preferred 
in theory to defer to Congress, he wholeheartedly accepted his expand­
ing role. "After all," he remarked during his second term, "the Consti­
tution puts the President square into the legislative business."36 
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President Eisenhower also carried forward Truman's practice of as­
serting authority by vigorous use of the veto. The volume of presidential 
vetoes from 1945 to 1960 was high: 250 by Truman, 181 by Eisenhower. 
Especially noteworthy was Eisenhower's frequent use of the pocket 
veto, which because it takes effect after congressional adjournment can­
not be overridden and must be countered by passage of a new bill. In his 
last budget messages, Eisenhower even called for institution of an item 
veto, which would have strengthened his hand in shaping legislative re­
sults, but Congress would not go that far.37 
In giving great emphasis (and a new name) to the executive branch's 
right to maintain secrecy, the Eisenhower administration further en­
hanced the powers of the presidency. When Attorney General William 
P. Rogers invented the term executive privilege in 1958, it had— 
according to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.—"the advantage of sounding 
like a very old term." Certainly Eisenhower had resorted to the practice 
many times by then, beginning in early 1953 with the so-called Bohlen 
case. When the Senate demanded to see secret FBI files concerning 
Charles E. Bohlen, Eisenhower's choice for ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, the president insisted that the materials be seen only by Senators 
Taft and John Sparkman. Assaults on the executive branch by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy and his followers in 1953 and 1954 only firmed the 
administration's resolve to resist pressures for disclosure of informa­
tion. In May 1954 Eisenhower issued a sweeping policy statement con­
cerning the privilege attaching to information from the executive 
branch. Addressing his comments to Secretary of Defense Charles E. 
Wilson, he ordered all members of the executive to withhold materials 
related to deliberative processes within the administration. An accom­
panying memorandum from Attorney General Herbert Brownell as­
serted, without citing any specific cases, that the courts had "uniformly 
held that the President and the heads of departments have an uncon­
trolled discretion to withhold information and papers in the pub­
lic interest." Between 1955 and 1960 the Eisenhower administration re­
fused information to Congress on the basis of executive privilege more 
than forty times.38 
In the face of Eisenhower's determination, attempts by Congress to 
limit executive privilege were ineffective. The president's position was 
well stated in his rebuff of an effort by Congress in 1959 to require regu­
lar information on decisions affecting the foreign aid program. "I have 
signed the bill," he wrote, 
on the express premise that the three amendments relating to disclosure 
are not intended to alter and cannot alter the recognized Constitutional duty 
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and power of the Executive with respect to disclosure of information, docu­
ments, and other materials. Indeed, any other construction of these amend­
ments would raise grave Constitutional questions under the Separation of 
Powers Doctrine.39 
The growing autonomy of the executive branch in the 1950s was re­
flected in the free reign given by Congress to the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). From its inception in 1947, the CIA had been shielded 
from congressional scrutiny. When it became more of a "cloak-and­
dagger'' operation and assumed greater importance in American foreign 
policy-making during the Eisenhower years, however, there was reason 
to question the agency's immunity to oversight. Once again, congres­
sional efforts got nowhere. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles 
successfully opposed a bipartisan proposal by Senators William Know-
land and Lyndon Johnson in 1955 to set up a "Cold War Strategy 
Board," which, in Eisenhower's view, threatened "to put Congress into 
doing the Executive's business."40 A more serious challenge came a year 
later, in the form of Senator Mike Mansfield's bill to establish a joint 
congressional committee on central intelligence. Mansfield presented 
the case for his bill in the starkest constitutional terms, predicting that 
without it "as time passes the Congress will become less of an equal 
branch under our Constitutional system." Wayne Morse, backing 
Mansfield, was even more outspoken, charging that the administration 
was intentionally keeping the people uninformed on foreign policy. 
"What is happening today, in connection with the trend toward gov­
ernment by secrecy in America," said Morse, "is that Congress has been 
standing by and has not been insisting upon exercising its power to 
check the executive branch of the Government in many fields including 
foreign policy." Morse may have been right, but Congress did not 
choose to exercise power in this instance either. Mansfield's bill (S. Con. 
Res. 2) went down to defeat, 59-27.41 Thereafter, the CIA went un­
checked. Eisenhower had won an important victory in terms of the 
congressional-executive balance. "In no way perhaps," concluded Ar­
thur Schlesinger in The Imperial Presidency, "did the old Whig more ef­
fectively deprive the Congress of a voice in foreign policy than by confid­
ing so much power to an agency so securely out of congressional 
reach. "«2 
Eisenhower's most significant innovation expanding presidential au­
tonomy was the "area resolution," which provided congressional au­
thorization for unspecified future executive actions in specific parts of 
the world. The Formosa Resolution of 1955 and the Middle East Reso­
lution of 1957, both drafted with firm guidance from the White House, 
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were the first instances of this new device. The genius of the area resolu­
tion was that one could see in it what one wanted, a fact that suited 
Eisenhower's purposes admirably, as it would those of later presidents. 
Contemporary observers, including many members of Congress, tended 
to view the resolutions as evidence of Eisenhower's belief that he had to 
ask Congress specifically for any powers not clearly granted to the pres­
ident in the Constitution; yet it is clear that Eisenhower saw the area 
resolution as a way to avert later congressional criticism if events should 
go awry. 
President Eisenhower's tactics in seeking the Formosa Resolution 
(authorization of future presidential action in the area of Formosa, as 
necessary, to counter Communist aggression) helped disarm, or at least 
confuse, Congress. Although he briefed congressional leaders before 
presenting his request in a special message in late January 1955, he did 
not seek their collective advice ahead of time. Rather, he acted as Tru­
man so often had, preparing an "essential" foreign policy request and 
then presenting it to Congress. Moreover, aware of the ambiguous con­
stitutional issue involved, Eisenhower delivered his request in most con­
ciliatory terms. In his special message he noted that he might already 
possess the powers in question, but promised that "the authority that 
may be accorded by Congress would be used only in situations which are 
recognizable as part of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against the 
main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores" (italics added).43 Secre­
tary of State Dulles was equally deferential in the executive hearings of 
the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, telling 
the members: 
There is at least doubt as to whether or not the President could, without 
Congressional authorization, take the kind of action which I am talking 
about. The area of authority as between the President and the Congress in 
these areas is admittedly a shady one. 
The legal position I think needs to be clarified so that there can be no 
doubt about it. Even if there was no doubt whatever about the legal position, 
even if it was perfectly clear that the President did have this authority, I 
believe it would be indispensable that the Congress should indicate its con­
currence in it as a matter of policy. 44 
Both Eisenhower's and Dulles's language showed awareness that the 
executive probably did not need a grant of authority such as the For­
mosa Resolution, yet the lesson of Truman's problems over Korea was 
on their minds. To co-opt Congress early could avert later criticism, at 
least on the constitutional issue. They also worked hard to avoid raising 
unnecessary partisan antagonisms. Dulles urged Republican congres­
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sional leaders not to "needle" Democrats by emphasizing the contrast 
between Eisenhower's "constitutional" procedure in this instance and 
Truman's earlier unilateral actions, and Eisenhower played down the 
significance of the resolution. He rejected a suggestion from G.O.P. for­
ces that he personally deliver a statement clarifying to Congress why a 
resolution was needed, holding that such an action on his part would 
"indicate a policy, purpose [and] possible action that is greater than we 
intend. " The request for a resolution, he believed, should be kept 
as routine as possible, so as not to arouse Democratic suspicions.45 
Congress responded largely as Eisenhower hoped. Only a small 
number of Senate Democrats opposed the resolution as a dangerous 
"blank check" (the most eloquent critic, Senator Morse, held that Con­
gress was "being asked in effect to underwrite by our approval not only 
all the words of the resolution, but all the meanings of the resolution to 
be found between the lines. ") By contrast, most members of Con­
gress, regardless of party, shared the belief that the resolution was in­
nocuous because unnecessary. Republican Congressman Walter Judd 
of Minnesota even feared that it "might be construed as setting a prece­
dent limiting the power the President has under the Constitution." To 
most, it was reassuring that Eisenhower had asked for their consent. As 
G.O.P. Representative Timothy Sheehan (Illinois) put it, "President Ei­
senhower has certainly shown consideration of Congress and his deep 
adherence to the principles of constitutional government. " 
Added Massachusetts Republican Congressman Laurence Curtis, "This 
is democracy at its best."46 In the end Congress endorsed the Formosa 
Resolution with only three dissenting votes in each house. Such cooper­
ation made an interesting counterpoint to the congressional hostility 
greeting Truman's deployment of forces to Europe four years earlier. 
In late 1956, in the wake of a dangerous crisis over Egyptian national­
ization of the Suez Canal and the threat of a wider conflict in the Middle 
East, the Eisenhower administration resolved to repeat the strategic 
coup it had scored with the Formosa Resolution. In early December the 
president authorized the State Department to draw up an area resolu­
tion for the Middle East for submission to the new Congress, scheduled 
to assemble in January 1957.47 Unlike the earlier Formosa Resolution, 
the new proposal included advance authorization for the president to 
grant unspecified amounts of economic aid to Middle Eastern govern­
ments, in addition to permitting use of American armed forces in the 
area. 
By 1957, however, congressional critics were more outspoken than in 
1955. The potential costliness of the economic "blank check" in the 
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Middle East Resolution bothered some fiscal conservatives, but the 
basic constitutional issue surrounding the president's power to commit 
troops abroad produced greater concern. Democrats, frustrated by Ei­
senhower's triumphant reelection in 1956 and aware of the need to build 
a foreign policy record of their own for 1960, were especially critical. "I 
would support a naked statement that we will come into the Middle East 
with all of our military might to aid any country that is attacked by the 
Communists," said Democrat Richard Russell of Georgia, speaking for 
many of his party colleagues. "But I do not propose to vote for any 
statement of national policy giving practically unlimited military and 
economic authority to the President in this case." Senator J. William 
Fulbright, an important Democratic spokesman on foreign policy mat­
ters, asserted that the resolution was unnecessary and dangerous. Ful­
bright rejected the claim that Eisenhower already had the powers being 
requested, an interpretation generally accepted at the time the Formosa 
Resolution was adopted. Rather, he argued, the president possessed 
"what is called among legal circles 'the emergency power of the Presi­
dent.' That is a procedure that he has followed in many cases, which 
requires him to come to the Congress for affirmance after he has acted in 
pursuance of emergency power." The senator concluded, "It would not, 
in my opinion, be a proper discharge of our duty as Senators to give him 
a blank check ahead of time and say, 'Whatever you do is all right.' "48 
But if opponents of the Middle East Resolution were more suspicious 
and vociferous than they had been in the case of the Formosa Resolu­
tion, their opposition proved ineffective. Administration tactics, as im­
plemented by Secretary of State Dulles, again produced success. In 
closed hearings on the proposal, Dulles undermined critics by down-
playing the novelty of the provisions for economic aid and accepting the 
right of Congress to share authority to terminate the resolution. The 
sharing of authority to terminate, he told the Senate Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services committees, was "a matter which would be fully 
discussable with the President"; such a provision was included in the 
resolution as adopted. Most effective of all was the secretary's invok­
ing of Eisenhower's personal prestige and credibility as a leader of the 
free world in the cold war, an image carefully nurtured by the president 
in his dealings with Congress since 1953. It was up to Congress, Dulles 
stated, "to decide whether or not they wish to respond, whether they 
prefer to take the responsibility of saying they know more about the 
conduct of foreign affairs than the President does. That is their right and 
privilege to do."49 
Ultimately the administration accepted an important (though not 
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decisive) change in wording, substituting for congressional "authoriza­
tion" of military force a general declaration that the United States stood 
"prepared to use armed forces" if the situation warranted. The battle 
basically won, Eisenhower and Dulles chose to follow the advice of Sen­
ate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, "to treat this as a victory. 
"
50
 In a real sense it was. By securing a second area resolution in the 
space of two years, Eisenhower had institutionalized the practice of co­
opting Congress in future, unspecified military actions. The importance 
of this, of course, would be apparent to all in the 1960s after passage of 
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. 
The growing frustration of congressional Democrats in the late 1950s 
led them, as it had led the Republicans almost a decade earlier, to try to 
increase their influence over foreign policy. Plans for an offensive 
against the executive branch were laid right after the presidential elec­
tion of 1956 as Adlai Stevenson, the defeated Democratic candidate, 
wrote to John Sparkman, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, asking for action. "I really don't believe Eisenhower would 
have been too hard to beat if he had been chopped up_a little before­
hand," wrote Stevenson. "I want so much to talk with you about mount­
ing a more effective opposition this time. I suspect it will be up to you 
and Fulbright and a few others on the Foreign Relations Committee to 
keep picking at them and make them answer some questions." Meetings 
between the committee Democrats, Stevenson, and other interested 
party strategists occurred over the next several months. The Soviets' 
surprise launching of Sputnik in late 1957 intensified the Democrats' 
commitment to conduct a full-scale examination of foreign policy by 
Congress. With Fulbright taking the lead, in August 1958 the Foreign 
Relations Committee authorized $300,000 for a broad reexamination of 
U.S. policy.51 
In conducting this review, which dragged on until June 1960, commit­
tee Democrats expressed varying opinions concerning their authority. 
Fulbright acknowledged that the president had the unarguable right to 
exercise daily leadership in foreign affairs, writing in 1958 that, "without 
intelligent and forceful leadership from the executive department the 
Senate cannot really initiate or administer effectively any policy." Yet 
once the review was under way, he offered a less-guarded view, observ­
ing that it was "difficult for a legislative committee to direct pol­
icy, but we will give it a try.1' Fulbright's committee colleague Wayne 
Morse more forcefully emphasized the right of Congress to take on the 
executive. With some passion Morse remarked in committee that "we 
do have a responsibility under our system as a major committee of the 
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Senate to keep ourselves informed along the lines of this broad policy. 
As a legislative committee, we have an independent duty here to 
make our own findings of fact and to appraise how our foreign policy is 
going, because we are the legislative check on that policy. " The 
Democratic Advisory Council, a policy-making arm of the party's na­
tional committee, also got into the act, issuing a statement outlining the 
institutional matter at stake in the Foreign Relations Committee review: 
No one questions the Constitutional authority of the President to com­
mand the armed forces of the United States and to conduct negotiations with 
foreign nations. . But there is much more to formulating and carrying 
out foreign policy than ordering troop movements and negotiating with for­
eign nations. There is the vast responsibility of determining our national pur­
poses and of providing the capacity and means for attaining them. Here the 
Legislative Branch has its own Constitutional tasks both in devising policy 
and in wisely exercising the power to grant legal authority for its execu­
tion. « 
Although it produced fifteen detailed reports between August 1959 
and June 1960, the Democrat-led Foreign Relations Committee suc­
ceeded no better in increasing congressional influence over foreign pol­
icy than had Republican critics earlier in the decade. Their failure did 
not stop Eisenhower from complaining to Henry Luce about what he 
believed were unfair constraints on his authority. "Except for my first 
two years in office," the president wrote in 1960, 
1 have had to deal with a Congress controlled by the opposition and whose 
partisan antagonism to the Executive Branch has often been blatantly dis­
played. The hope of doing something constructive for the nation, in spite of 
this kind of opposition, has required the use of methods calculated to attract 
cooperation, even though a natural impulse would have been to lash out at 
partisan charges and publicity-seeking demagogues." 
Eisenhower was correct in believing partisan resentments lay behind 
much of the congressional assertiveness he saw; that had been true in the 
Truman years as well. But he ignored the very real reasons that led legis­
lators to attack the executive branch once again: his success with "meth­
ods calculated to attract cooperation" had strengthened the presidential 
hand to an unprecedented degree. By 1960, no amount of partisan criti­
cism from Congress could alter that fact. 
Despite many indications after World War II that the congressional-
executive balance would shift in favor of the legislative branch, during 
the next decade and a half the reverse occurred. Building on its strong 
position at the end of the war, the presidency emerged after the Truman 
and Eisenhower years an even more powerful institution. By 1960 the 
The Presidency Triumphant \ 363 
"cult of the presidency" flourished as never before, as the chief executive 
engaged regularly in legislative planning and systematic liaison efforts 
with Congress and enjoyed nearly unchecked control of foreign policy. 
There were many reasons for this outcome—some institutional, some 
political, others related to personality. It was clear that the sheer size and 
unmanageability of the executive bureaucracy played an important part 
in developments; vastly expanded during depression and war, the execu­
tive branch proved too large for Congress to supervise or even monitor 
effectively. Also, the intermingling of partisan and institutional motives 
in congressional attempts to weaken the presidency undermined the 
credibility and force of those efforts. Republicans like Robert A. Taft 
who led the initial attacks on presidential authority in the Truman years 
were caught in obvious inconsistency when they argued for checks on 
presidential activism in foreign policy while enthusiastically supporting 
enlargement of executive power against organized labor (the Taft-
Hartley Act). Having employed the rhetoric and tactics of fervent anti­
communism in their drive to circumscribe President Truman's powers, 
moreover, G.O.P. legislators later found it impossible to deny President 
Eisenhower the Formosa and Middle East resolutions when he em­
ployed similar rhetoric and tactics in making his requests. By the same 
token, Democrats who had defended Truman against the Republicans' 
constitutionalist offensives in the early fifties were unconvincing when 
they decried the dangers of excessive presidential power near the end of 
Eisenhower's second term. Finally, the sharply divergent personalities 
of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower served to shield the 
growing power of the presidential office—Truman because in some 
ways he struck observers as personally limited and thus less a threat, 
Eisenhower because he succeeded in appearing to be thoroughly defer­
ential to Congress. 
The vast accretion of presidential power that occurred between 1945 
and 1960 produced no effective opposition, or even loud complaint. 
Perhaps it should be noted, however, that the cumulative impact of 
World War II and the cold war on American institutions was largely 
irreversible; the task of continuous vigilance in world affairs seemingly 
required a permanently enlarged, more autonomous presidency than 
ever before, a fact which even zealous defenders of congressional pre­
rogatives could not ignore. At the end of the Eisenhower era, Congress 
remained largely quiescent; the public continued to revere the office of 
president as it did the incumbent; and neo-constitutionalism had gone 
out of fashion among scholars, journalists, and other commentators. 
Leading students of American government such as Clinton Rossiter, 
James MacGregor Burns, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., all extolled 
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the virtues (and necessity) of an expanded presidency. Typical, if some­
what florid in language, was the description of the presidency offered by 
Theodore White in 1960: 
The President of the United States is more than an emblem. He is at once 
High Priest of our secular democracy and the Magistrate of its power. So vast 
is the nature of his power and so complicated its mechanics that he cannot, 
constitutionally, be brought to a table of negotiation and pinned down in 
detail. Nor can he be offended personally without suffering offense for 
all Americans. If the President chooses to bargain with foreign powers he can 
most wisely bargain through deputies. . . About the President there must 
always be an air of remoteness and distance to make majestic American 
54 power.
It could not have been predicted in 1945 that such views of the presi­
dential office would hold sway unchallenged a decade and a half later. 
Nor would it prove easy to reverse the trend after 1960; it took the twin 
reverberations of the Vietnam War and Watergate to produce any real 
reaction against the "imperial presidency" at all. Even then the move­
ment was incomplete. At the start of the 1980s, there is strong evidence 
to suggest that the reaction against the executive branch will be short-
lived, a temporary interruption in the development of the presidential 
government so dramatically advanced in the fifteen years after World 
War II. 
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Reflections on Politics, Policy, and Ideology 
Bernard Sternsher 
Since historical forces seldom synchronize with presidential terms, 
or decades, or decades-and-a-half, historians struggle with stubborn 
problems of periodization. In terms of party-systems analysis, which 
treats enduring patterns in voter behavior, the period 1945-60 becomes 
intelligible only within the framework of the New Deal party system that 
saw the Democratic party hold normal majority status from 1936 to 
1964. As one moves beyond examination of voter-behavior studies to 
discussion of broader political topics, one finds that the main themes in 
American foreign policy, political economy, and ideology from 1945 to 
1960 show the persistence of the New Deal party system during the 
Truman-Eisenhower years. 
Since 1960 research in historical voting behavior has revealed party 
systems, or striking stability over extended periods in percentages of the 
vote obtained by the major parties. The idea of party systems is tied in 
with the concept of normal majority status: short-term factors being 
equal, the presidential candidate of the party enjoying normal, or long-
term, majority status can expect to receive 53-54 percent of the two-
party vote. This status comprises quantitative and qualitative elements. 
The quantitative component is entailed in the expectation of a majority 
of the vote. The qualitative ingredient is party identification or party 
loyalty—voters' tendency to vote according to party preferences. Dur­
ing the third party, or Civil War, system, 1860-93, there was a competi­
tive situation: neither party enjoyed normal majority status. Under the 
fourth party, or Industrial, system, 1894-1932, the Republican party en­
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joyed normal majority status. In the era of the fifth party, or New Deal, 
system, 1936-64, the Democrats enjoyed normal majority status as the 
result of a realignment of the electorate in the 1930s. Since 1964 there 
has emerged a two-tier system: neither party has enjoyed normal major­
ity status at the presidential level, while the Democrats have continued 
to dominate at the subpresidential level1 (until 1980, when the Republi­
cans gained control of the Senate and received 50 percent of all votes 
cast for House candidates). The period 1945-60 thus falls between two 
transformations of the electorate—one in the 1930s and one in the 1960s 
and 1970s—and within the span of the New Deal party system. 
Just as the Republicans' normal majority status from 1894 to 1932 
was not overturned by Wilson's election in 1912, the result of a major-
party bolt, so the Democrats'normal majority status from 1936 to 1964 
was not eliminated by Eisenhower's victories. Many persons who voted 
for Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 continued to think of themselves as 
Democrats. This assertion is supported by the percentages for party 
identification: the Democrats led 53 to 36 in 1936, a differential of 17 
percentage points, and 42 to 18 in 1974, a differential of 24 percentage 
points, with this differential ranging from 15 to 27 in presidential elec­
tion years from 1940 to 1972. Eisenhower, moreover, ran ahead of his 
party, and the Democratic percentage of the vote in House elections 
actually showed a modest secular rise during his presidency, from 51 
percent in 1952 to 56 percent in I960.2 
One can also characterize the years 1945-60 in electoral terms by con­
sidering the typology of elections that party-systems analysts have devel­
oped. A "'critical" or "realigning" election is one in which a competitive 
system ends with the acquisition of normal majority status by a party, as 
in 1894, or one in which normal majority status passes from one party to 
another, as in 1936. Students of the New Deal realignment have long 
debated whether the critical election occurred in 1928, 1932, or 1936. 
Elsewhere I have argued that the election of 1936 exhibited both the 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics of a critical election: Roose­
velt received 62.4 percent of the two-party vote and enjoyed, for the first 
time, the support of the loyal, enduring Roosevelt coalition of partisan 
identifiers.3 In any event, the formation of the Roosevelt coalition at the 
presidential level by 1936 is generally agreed upon. It was composed of 
city dwellers, workers, ethnics, Catholics, Jews, blacks, intellectuals 
who favored increased governmental activity, and the Solid South (an 
individual voter, of course, could fall into more than one of these 
categories). 
The elections of 1940, 1944, and 1948 were "maintaining" elections in 
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which the basic partisan commitments resulting from the New Deal re­
alignment guided the vote. Eisenhower's triumphs in 1952 and 1956 
were "deviating" elections: "The outcome was different from that which 
would be predicted on the basis of party affiliation, but the implication 
was that once the short-term force that dominated these elections—the 
personal appeal of Eisenhower—faded, the system would return to 
normal." The election of 1960 was a "reinstating" election. With the 
popular Eisenhower on the sidelines, one would have expected the nor­
mal maj ority status of the Democratic party to reassert itself so that the 
Democratic candidate would receive 53 to 54 percent of the two-party 
vote. Kennedy fell short of this percentage because he suffered a net loss 
among voters supporting or opposing him on the grounds of his reli­
gion. To put it another way, a Protestant Democrat probably would 
have won by the expected margin in an election that was essentially 
devoid of policy-issue content.4 
Two additional approaches that political scientists use are helpful in 
characterizing the years 1945-60: analysis of the groups composing 
party coalitions and of voter traits. The authors of The Changing Amer­
ican Voter (1976) consider partisan identification, 1952-72, for eleven 
groups: White Protestant Southerners, White Native Southerners, High 
Status Native White Southerners, Low Status Native White South­
erners, Northern White Protestants, Higher Status Northern White 
Protestants, Lower Status Northern White Protestants, Northern 
Blacks, Southern Blacks, Jews, and Catholics. The point that is most 
relevant to our concern emerges when one divides their data into two 
periods: 1952-60 and 1960-72. The major changes in partisan identifica­
tion occurred in the 1960s, mainly among younger voters.5 
The most important analysis for our purposes is concerned with voter 
traits. The American Voter (1960) found voters of the 1950s only mod­
estly involved in politics, unsophisticated in their view of political mat­
ters, inconsistent across a broad range of issues (thereby reducing "the 
ability we would have to predict a person's position on one issue from his 
position [liberal or conservative] on another"), strongly committed on a 
long-term basis to one of the major parties, and relatively satisfied with 
the political system. All of this changed in the 1960s. New issues, more 
interest, a rise in the level of conceptualization, and increased issue con­
sistency were accompanied by declining partisanship and growing inde­
pendence, ticket-splitting, and alienation from parties. The next step 
was issue voting. Voters, of course, cannot vote issue positions unless 
they are given a choice—which is what Goldwater gave them in 1964. 
Nor are issue voting and party voting necessarily incompatible. They 
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were, in fact, harmonious in the 1930s, but issue voting in the 1960s 
militated against party voting because the new issues of that decade cut 
across the parties, especially the Democratic party, which was asso­
ciated with both the old economic liberalism and the new social-cultural 
liberalism and evoked contradictory responses within both the upper 
and lower socioeconomic status groups.6 
Examining issue consistency and issue voting, the authors of The 
Changing American Voter apply correlation analysis to answers— 
obtained in 1939, 1956-60, and 1964-72—to questions regarding five 
issues: social welfare, welfare for blacks, size of government, racial inte­
gration in schools, and the cold war. In the 1930s there was substantial 
issue coherence but only with respect to "the core issues of the New 
Deal—government control and regulation of the economy and govern­
ment commitment to welfare." In the Eisenhower years there was a low 
level of consistency in all areas and virtually no issue voting. After 1964 
there was moderate to high issue consistency across all issue areas and 
issue voting on multiple issues. During the Eisenhower years the New 
Deal issues had lost their salience (or entry into the daily life of individu­
als), but they had not been replaced by new issues that might affect older 
voters' partisanship or impede new voters' assumption of their parents' 
partisan commitments.7 
In the Eisenhower years the most important issues tended to be 
foreign-policy issues. Although these issues unified Americans around 
the president, but not his party, the traditional economic issues tended 
to reinforce party ties. The issues of Korea, Communism, and Corrup­
tion, denoted in the Republicans' 1952 campaign formula, "Ki C2," were 
short-lived. Eisenhower's victory, writes V. O. Key, Jr., "seems to have 
been at the bottom a victory that rested on a transient majority which 
could exist no longer than the issues around which it was built. On the 
great and continuing economic questions of domestic policy, a popular 
majority remained hostile to the Republican position—as it saw that 
position."8 In the 1960s the waning of older issues, the emergence of new 
salient issues, and a new generation of voters combined to loosen the 
grip of party commitments. In sum, with respect to issue consistency and 
issue voting, the Eisenhower years represented a low point between two 
higher points. Given this nadir and the persistence of the partisan ties 
formed in the 1930s, the authors of The American Voter might have 
entitled their study The American Voter in an Age of Inertia. 
Voters in the cold war era were still largely the children of the New 
Deal realignment, with one outstanding exception: early defectors 
among white southern Democrats. The demise of the Solid South is one 
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of the most written-about subjects in the field of voter behavior. In the 
1930s the South was more supportive of New Deal programs, with the 
exception of legislation helpful to trade unions, than any other section, 
but 1944 was the last time the South would be conclusively Democratic 
in presidential voting—69 percent. In 1948 Truman received 52 percent 
of the southern popular vote. The Democratic percentage was slightly 
lower in the next four elections and then plunged to about 35 percent in 
1968 and 29 percent in 1972. In 1976 southerner Jimmy Carter won 54 
percent of the vote in the South but only 45 percent of southern white 
Protestants' ballots. These Democratic losses have not been accompa­
nied by commensurate Republican gains in identifiers because Demo­
cratic defectors have moved mostly to Independence. From 1936 to 1974 
Democratic identifiers fell from 78 to 50 percent of the southern elector­
ate; Republican identifiers increased from 13 to 16 percent; Indepen­
dents rose from 8 to 33 percent. Republicans can nevertheless produce 
victories "with a fair degree of regularity," although their gains in local 
electoral contests have been more modest than in state and national 
elections.9 
Voters in general in the cold war era lived in a period of relative calm 
in American politics. The one potentially divisive issue, domestic Com­
munism, faded away during Eisenhower's first term, arid in four years 
the issue and ideological content of politics were substantially reduced. 
This reduction was evident in several measurements of voter behavior. 
From 1940 to 1960 the middle class grew in numbers, but the possibility 
that this development might cause class division was not realized. With 
growing affluence and the entry of many Americans into the middle 
class, some observers advanced a "conversion" thesis: attainment of 
middle-class status meant a shift to Republicanism. But survey data 
show that the Democratic party did not suffer with the growth of the 
middle class. In 1944 the general public voted 51 percent for Democratic 
congressional candidates, the professional-managerial stratum 32 per­
cent; in 1956 the corresponding figures were 51 percent and 47 percent. 
And the same pattern held in partisan identification. There was also a 
sizable decline in status polarization between the middle and working 
classes, apparent in a decrease in the differential between these two 
groups over policy issues. The percentage-point differential in their re­
spective attitudes toward unions, government regulation of business, 
and social welfare programs fell from 30-40 in the years 1936 to 1948 to 
almost zero by the late 1950s.10 
Analyses of voter behavior in presidential elections in the cold war era 
also indicated lessening divergence between Protestants and Catholics 
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and between high and low socioeconomic status (SES) groups. In the 
years 1940-60 non-southern white Protestants voted about one-third 
Democratic, and non-southern white Catholics about two-thirds Dem­
ocratic. Percentage point differentials in Democratic presidential vot­
ing, however, show that the two groups were closest in the Eisenhower 
years. Catholics voted 31 percentage points more Democratic than Prot­
estants in 1940, 30 in 1944, 24 in 1948, 22 in 1952, 17 in 1956, and 40 in 
1960, with the division waning again after 1960. The Eisenhower years 
also saw a decline in differentials in pro-Democratic presidential voting 
between low and high SES whites outside the South. The low SES group 
voted 33 percentage points more Democratic than the high SES group 
in 1936,33 in 1940,24 in 1944,38 in 1948,20 in 1952,12 in 1956, and 25 
in 1960. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Charles D. Hadley believe that if 
similar data were available for the years before 1936, "it is likely that the 
uniqueness of the Roosevelt-Truman elections would have been even 
more dramatically evident." The period 1936-48 represents the high-
water mark of class saliency in voter behavior. Given declining salience 
of issues generally, it is unlikely that any president could have kept alive 
the degree of class differences in the presidential voting of 1936-48 in the 
1950s. Certainly Eisenhower made no such attempt. He did not package 
issues in such a way as to offer voters a clear choice. On the contrary, he 
presented "a political image above the issues," and his "leadership style 
was such as to mute whatever issues did exist."11 
The reference here to relative political calmness is not intended to 
connote acceptance of the designation of the 1950s in general as Ameri­
ca's "placid" decade. Herbert S. Parmet, in his important study of the 
Eisenhower presidency, declares, "It was not, as some have maintained, 
a 'placid' decade. No years that contained McCarthy and McCarthyism, 
a war in Korea, constant fear of other conflicts and atomic annihilation, 
and spreading racial violence could be so described." Expressing a sim­
ilar view, Lynn Waldeland states that the decade was "not only the age 
of the grandfatherly Eisenhower but that of the communist-hunting 
McCarthy, the age of Sputnik and brinkmanship, the Cold War and 
bomb shelters, James Dean and Elvis Presley, Charles Starkweather 
and other rebels without causes, and, over it all, the ominous sight of a 
mushroom-shaped cloud." Waldeland also specifies the insights of 
novelist Wright Morris and the favorable response to J. D. Salinger's 
defeatism as indicative of the discontent that would become evident to 
all in the 1960s. Anthony O. Edmonds sees the decade as "fraught with 
anxiety, discontent, and even rebellion against established norms" in at 
least three areas: popular music, the civil rights movement, and the 
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"beat" generation's culture and literature reveal "something quite differ­
ent from the conformity and apathy generally ascribed to the period."12 
How, then, can one reconcile anxiety, discontent, and rebellion with 
conformity and apathy or placidity? The answer lies in distinguishing 
between ideological conformity and behavioral conformity, between the 
majority and minorities, and between outer appearances and inner per­
sonal realities. Unsettling factors associated with the cold war resulted 
in a rallying around the American Way that was transmuted into con­
siderable ideological conformity on the part of the majority. How this 
development related to behavioral conformity—The Organization Man 
and the "other directed" Americans13—scholars have by no means as­
certained with any precision. It is also appropriate to note that the dis­
senters or nonconformists—admirers of Elvis Presley and James Dean 
and other heroes of the rebellious lifestyle, devotees of rock-and-roll 
music, civil rights activists, the "beats" and readers of beat literature, 
Salinger's stories, and Morris's novels—were minorities within minori­
ties, youthful or black. Finally, ideological and behavioral conformity 
and the placidity associated with them may have concealed as much as 
they revealed. Joseph F. Trimmer sees them as products of internal 
psycho-emotional needs deriving from a threatening external world. 
The 1950s were marked by "the desire on the part of many Americans to 
find tranquility at any price. The trauma of world and national events 
produced a kind of'future shock,' a desire to retreat from the world of 
crisis, conflict, and public commitment to a world of security, stability 
and noninvolvement." Americans engaged in this withdrawal, Trimmer 
asserts, not as individuals but as conformists: "Instead of arguing for 
creative tension between individual and community, the philosophy of 
the decade seemed to suggest the necessary acceptance of a bad world 
where adjustment to the system provided at least for the solace of 
security."14 
Whether Trimmer is correct in his linkage of outer conformity to 
inner uncertainty remains for historians to determine, as does the rela­
tionship in the 1950s between Americans' psycho-emotional state and 
their political behavior. Of particular interest here is that the data cited 
above showing shrinking differentials between Catholics and Protes­
tants and between middle and lower and upper and lower SES groups in 
partisan voting and in positions on policy issues indicate Eisenhower's 
numbing effect on the electorate. 
Political scientists' depiction of the electorate having been considered, 
it seems opportune to delineate at least three major historical themes 
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that, like the New Deal party system, transcended the years 1945-60 and 
provided a context for voter inertia in the 1950s: the bipartisan policy of 
containment, 1947-65; a widespread desire for retention without expan­
sion of the New Deal, 1936-64; and consensus on the American Way, 
free enterprise and democracy, and its promotion through the New 
Economics or the Keynesian trade-off between unemployment and in­
flation, 1955-65. 
There were some strains in the Grand Alliance during World War II, 
and this tension persisted after the Allied victory. By the winter of 1946, 
Washington accepted the containment view: the United States "should 
devote itself to preventing the expansion of Communism, awaiting the 
day when a new, less dogmatic, and more tractable generation had risen 
to power in Russia." The containment view became containment policy 
in Iran in December 1946 and in Greece and Turkey with the pro­
nouncement of the Truman Doctrine three months later. Under Truman 
and Eisenhower the United States committed itself to defend—in addi­
tion to Europe and South Korea—Japan, Formosa, South Vietnam, 
most independent states in Southeast Asia, Middle Eastern states on the 
southern border of the Soviet Union, and, under the Eisenhower Doc­
trine, all Middle Eastern nations. The landing of American troops in 
Lebanon in July 1958 and American support of United Nations inter­
vention in the Congo in July 1960 demonstrated that the American gov­
ernment was determined to prevent the spread of Communism in all 
parts of the world. There were limits—the United States accepted a 
compromise in Laos and refrained from dispatching troops against Cas­
tro in Cuba—but they were few, as was evident in the risking of nuclear 
war in the Cuban missile crisis, the stern warning to Peking when the 
Chinese crossed the Indian border in 1962, the sending of Marines to 
Santo Domingo in 1965, and the deployment, beginning in early 1965, 
of 500,000 troops to Vietnam.15 
The New Left, or Open Door, interpretation attributes the globaliza­
tion of containment to the needs of the American capitalist economy for 
overseas markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities. This 
thesis, however, does not explain the nation's involvement in Vietnam, 
one of the very largest overseas commitments of men and resources in 
American history. There were no resources in Vietnam that "could 
tempt an ITT or Exxon, in the pursuit of exploitative profit, to lean on 
Congress or propagandize the American public to start the war or to 
continue it," and Lyndon Johnson's economic advisers informed him at 
the time that the surge of 1965 in defense spending imperiled the steady 
progress then being made toward full employment with reasonable price 
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stability. More persuasive is the view of Ernest R. May, who relates the 
universalism of American views and policies to "the spirit of uplift, the 
mood of the secular missionary, the mission civilisatrice." In the first 
phase of containment, the United States opposed the Soviet Union's 
imperial expansion over adjacent nations, but a second stage soon devel­
oped "when it became the American aim to resist the spread of an alien 
ideology." This objective arose from "'a vision, with deep historical 
roots, of a world in which all men would enjoy political, economic, and 
social institutions similar to those in the United States." The Russians, 
for their part, followed a parallel path marked by ever widening com­
mitments combined with ideological zeal and the desire to remake the 
world in their own image.16 
The theme of containment is illustrated by certain aspects of the Tru­
man and Eisenhower presidencies. Truman's pronouncement of the 
Truman Doctrine in March 1947 ended two years of indecisiveness in 
which he struggled to get on top of his job while his approval rating in 
Gallup polls declined—to 32 percent in October 1946—and the Repub­
licans captured control of both houses of Congress in November 1946. 
His proclamation also initiated the age of containment, as toughness 
became the hallmark of his cold war diplomacy. The Berlin blockade 
crisis resulted in a decision by Thomas E. Dewey, in July 1948, to refrain 
from criticizing Truman's foreign policy. Meanwhile, Truman benefited 
in the election from his careful handling of the blockade—"a tough pol­
icy that stopped short of war." The long-run consequence of Dewey's 
removal of foreign policy from the campaign, and of bipartisanship, 
Robert A. Divine laments, was the silencing for two decades of signifi­
cant dissent on foreign policy.17 
Divine means dissent that generated substantial popular support. 
Truman's foreign policy met with dissent from individuals on the right 
like Senator Robert A. Taft and on the left like Senator Glen H. Taylor, 
Senator Claude Pepper, and Henry A. Wallace; the latter's supporters 
accounted for 2.4 percent of the total popular vote in the presidential 
election of 1948. A recent study of public opinion concludes that the 
American people did not clamor for the tough policy Truman laid down 
in March 1947. On the other hand, another inquiry holds that Soviet 
behavior, anti-Soviet images in the press, and private organizations' 
anti-Communist campaigns by themselves generated anti-Communist 
attitudes among Americans, and that presidential rhetoric struck a re­
sponsive chord. Still another investigation, correlating public opinion 
polls with measurements of international tensions, shows that those 
who expected a major war within fifty years increased from 59 percent in 
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early 1944 to 80 percent in early 1946, that those who expected a major 
war within twenty-five years increased from 29 percent in early 1944 to 
68 percent in early 1946 (registering 59, 63, 66, and 64 percent in polls 
conducted through late 1946—before the Truman Doctrine address).18 
At any rate, the American people did not object to Truman's foreign-
policy stance, and they approved of Eisenhower's pursuit of the con­
tainment policy without involving the nation in armed conflict. 
Nor did politicians provide substantial dissent from the containment 
policy after Eisenhower became president. The Democrats, striving to 
establish their anti-Communist credentials, abdicated the scrutinizing 
parliamentary role of the loyal opposition, while Eisenhower, as Gary 
W. Reichard's roll-call analysis of the Eighty-third Congress (1953-54) 
shows, transformed his party in the field of foreign policy. The high 
degree of Republican support he enjoyed in this area represented a wa­
tershed within the GOP since many of his supporters had previously 
held nationalist or noncommital views.19 
Stopping short of war, Eisenhower enjoyed wide room for maneuver, 
leaving "a Cuban invasion force and four hundred advisors in Vietnam 
for his successor to deploy [while] the CIA's department of dirty 
tricks helped rearrange the governments of Iran, Guatemala, Egypt, and 
Laos." He also "encircled the Soviet Union and China with a network of 
air bases, sponsored geographical pacts designed to 'contain' commu­
nism, urged the 'liberation' of Eastern Europe, and endorsed the stra­
tegy of nuclear 'massive retaliation.' " But it should be noted, as Fred I. 
Greenstein has pointed out, that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 
was assigned "the 'get tough' side of foreign policy enunciation, thus 
placating the fervently anti-Communist wing of the Republican Party. 
Meanwhile, amiable Ike made gestures toward peace and international 
humanitarianism—for example Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, and 
Summitry at Geneva." As John Lewis Gaddis observes, the Eisenhower-
Dulles strategy, misleadingly labeled "'massive retaliation,'' was much 
more subtle than a blunt threat to obliterate Moscow or Peking. Its 
main objective was deterrence, to be attained by rendering the enemy 
uncertain as to the United States response, which might be conven­
tional, nuclear, economic, diplomatic, or none at all. As to the Atoms 
for Peace and Open Skies proposals, Thomas F. Soapes concludes that 
they were much more than gestures; they were aspects of a definite stra­
tegy of attaining, through small steps, gradual mitigation of the nuclear 
arms race and reduction of "tensions, fears, and suspicions that, in the 
minds of many, justified that arms race." This strategy was flawed but 
not a failure as the superpowers "began to move, however slowly, away 
from nuclear confrontation and toward negotiation."20 
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During the years 1950-52 one finds general agreement that opposi­
tion to Communism abroad and at home was the nation's first item of 
business, and that Truman, whose leadership was the Republicans' main 
target, was not effective in dealing with either Russians or subversives. 
The stage was set for McCarthyism, actually part of a broader loyalty 
hysteria that created an atmosphere fostering Republican success at the 
polls. In 1950 the GOP gained 28 seats in the House and 5 in the Senate. 
In 1952 Truman's approval rating plunged to 26 percent while the Re­
publicans devised their campaign slogan of "Korea, Communism, and 
Corruption." This formula covered three of the four leading issues (the 
other was inflation) identified by respondents in a Roper poll of August 
1952 as the most important for the next administration to deal with. 
Another August poll showed that a solid majority of voters believed the 
Republican party was more likely to be effective in dealing with the 
issues judged most important. None of the four leading issues Roper's 
respondents specified (or, for that matter, none of the six additional 
issues they mentioned) involved repudiation of containment or of the 
welfare state. A majority of the electorate wanted tjiem placed under 
new management. As Key puts it, "All the questions the voter faced in 
1952 were bundled up in the question whether he approved of Mr. 
Truman."2' 
A second longer-run theme or development that antedated Truman's 
administration and postdated Eisenhower's was the majority's prefer­
ence for retention without expansion of the New Deal. Within two years 
of Roosevelt's overwhelming triumph at the polls in 1936, William E. 
Leuchtenburg notes, the president sustained a series of defeats that pre­
cluded a new era of reform. After passage of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (wages-and-hours law) in June 1938, there was a "politics of dead 
center [in which] almost no innovative domestic legislation was 
adopted for the next quarter of a century"—until the enactment of Lyn­
don Johnson's Great Society legislation in 1964-65—with liberals lack­
ing the leverage in Congress to overcome a bipartisan conservative coa­
lition that had emerged in the fall of 1937. Thus the years 1945-60 fell 
within an era between agendas, which was satisfactory to the majority of 
voters. Middle-of-the-road government, Leuchtenburg states, was in 
harmony with the becalmed spirit of the fifties.22 
The theme of retention without expansion of the New Deal does not 
exactly coincide chronologically with the era between agendas. In one of 
the earliest election polls ever taken, a Roper poll of October 1936 con­
cerning attitudes toward Roosevelt's reelection, 33 percent of the re­
spondents judged his reelection essential for the good of the country, 
and 26 percent felt "he may have made mistakes, but no one else can do 
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as much good." The cross-tabulation of the answers to a second ques­
tion by the answers respondents gave to the first question revealed that 5 
percent of the 33 percent who considered Roosevelt's reelection essential 
also thought that he would become more radical in a second term, 8 
percent thought he would become more liberal, 17 percent thought he 
would become more conservative, and 59 percent thought he would 
"remain as has been." The corresponding percentages for the 26 percent 
(first question) who judged Roosevelt the best man despite mistakes 
were almost identical. According to Elmo Roper, these polls show that 
"people in general did not expect him [FDR] to lead the nation very 
much farther to the left, nor did they want him to." In giving Roosevelt a 
second term, the people were "expressing preference for, if not precisely 
more of the same, as much as they had been getting, or possibly a little 
less." Key concurs: "By 1936 the innovative period of the New Deal had 
pretty well run its course, and in that year the voters responded with a 
resounding ratification of the new thrust of governmental policy."23 
Other observers of American politics see the theme of retention without 
expansion of the New Deal persisting beyond 1936.24 
The theme of retention without expansion of the New Deal can be 
illustrated by reference to aspects of the Truman and Eisenhower pre­
sidencies. In the campaign of 1948, Truman adopted an effective nega­
tive tactic. Taft-Hartley, for example, was "probably more valuable to 
the President as a law, passed over his veto, than as a bill which had died 
in Congress or had been weakened through compromise." Truman 
flayed the Eightieth Congress, whose efforts to emasculate the New Deal 
he had restrained. "Under the circumstances," writes one of his harshest 
critics, "no president could have done more." Although the Republican 
threat to the New Deal in 1947-48 may have been for the most part 
rhetorical rather than actual, that Truman perceived it as ominous is 
apparent in his use of executive reorganization to protect certain New 
Deal measures from reactionary efforts at repeal. After his triumph over 
Dewey, Truman presented to the Congress a long list of proposals con­
cerning domestic policy (the Fair Deal), but many of them were not 
accomplished. Truman's greatest achievement in domestic affairs may 
have been the preservation of the New Deal.25 
As president, Eisenhower, in word and deed, was definitely not a Re­
publican New Dealer. He wanted, as he later wrote, to make it clear that 
"we would not simply be a continuation of the New Deal and the Fair 
Deal, either in purpose or execution." This intention, however, was not 
readily apparent in Eisenhower's 1952 campaign as he played the artful 
dodger on domestic issues. Dean Albertson finds the crusade campaign 
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vague about dissolving the New Deal welfare program, and a Roper poll 
of December 1952 registered this imprecision. The respondents were 
more uncertain about what Eisenhower would do with the New Deal 
than they were about his probable course of action with respect to seven 
of eight other matters. Therefore, it cannot be argued persuasively that 
Eisenhower was elected to dismantle the New Deal. The mandate for the 
Republicans in 1952 was essentially negative; the voters did not want 
Korea, Communism, and Corruption.26 
Reichard shows that in each of three areas of domestic policy—fiscal 
and economic policy, welfare policy, and power and resources develop­
ment policy—at least 80 percent of the Republicans in each house took 
the president's position at least 60 percent of the time. This substantial 
support was due to Republican legislators' loyalty to the administration, 
Eisenhower's leadership—personal diplomacy, meetings and liaison 
with Republican Congressmen, the use of patronage, selective cam­
paigning, and compromise—and, above all, ideological agreement: Ei­
senhower's domestic programs diverged little from what most Republi­
cans in Congress would approve of as public policy. Eisenhower's 
announced "Middle Way" and Arthur Larson's "New Republicanism" 
were less reality than rhetoric. That there was no transformation of the 
Republican party in domestic policy cannot be ascribed to Eisenhower's 
failure as a leader. He did not want to effect such a transformation. To 
be sure, Eisenhower's continuation of limited public housing, Social Se­
curity, and other such programs and his commitment to full use of fed­
eral strength if depression threatened "did in a general way represent the 
official entry of the Republican party into the New Deal 'political or­
bit.' " But Social Security and TV A, for example, were accepted as ac­
complished facts. Twentieth-century political and economic realities 
made inevitable acquiescence by conservatives to some aspects of the 
New Deal. That acquiescence was more submission than assent, as was 
made evident by Eisenhower's limited countercyclical response to the 
relatively severe recession of 1957-58 and by the relative decline in fed­
eral welfare-type expenditures, other than Social Security, as a percent­
age of national income: 5.3 percent in calendar 1952 and 4.3 percent in 
fiscal 1960. "Where the classical budgetary principles impinged on the 
welfare state, they were deliberately or inadvertently inimical to it."27 
Just as Eisenhower was not elected to dismantle the New Deal, the 
Democrats' gains in the elections of 1954, when they won control of both 
houses, did not signify a resolute rejection of his program; and his per­
sonal status, if not enhanced, remained intact. True, his approval rating 
in the Gallup poll had fallen from 70 in August 1954 to 57 after the 
382 | Reshaping America 
elections in November, but it rose to 69 in January 1955, 71 in March, 
and 79 in August before dropping slightly to 75 in December.28 
A third relevant theme that was only partly contained within the pe­
riod 1945-60 was the consensus characterizing the years 1955-64. The 
term consensus has been applied to both intellectuals and Americans in 
general in a considerable body of literature. In regard to intellectuals, 
whole volumes have been devoted to consensus historiography, sociol­
ogy, and political thought. In a social and cultural history of the fifties, 
Douglas T. Miller and Marion Nowak devote a chapter to "Intellectu­
als: The Conservative Contraction." Intellectuals in government, busi­
ness, and the universities were obsessed by the effort to comprehend, 
and account for, America's virtues. Since the main problems in Ameri­
can society had been solved by the New Deal, there was no need, intellec­
tuals held, for ideology. Maj or innovations in society were unnecessary, 
and such minor changes as were called for could be effected through 
bargaining among politicians representing "competing yet not incom­
patible power groups or interest blocs (business, labor, farmers, mil­
itary, and so forth)" with their elite leaderships. Scholars who criticized 
American society were usually apologetic, and most intellectuals 
shunned causes. The prevailing intellectual climate was "profoundly 
conservative. Proclaiming an end to ideology, intellectuals held dogmat­
ically to an ideological pluralism, capitalism, anti-communism, and 
elitism."29 
An important aspect of consensus had to do with economics and polit­
ical economy. Describing "The Ideology of the Liberal Consensus" in 
America in Our Time (1976), Godfrey Hodgson writes of the period 
from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties: "Whether you look at the writings 
of intellectuals or at the positions taken by practical politicians or at the 
data on public opinion, it is impossible not to be struck by the degree to 
which the majority of Americans in those years accepted the same sys­
tem of assumptions." The assumptions on which consensus was built 
amounted to an intellectual system, which Hodgson boils down to these 
maxims: 
1.	 The American free-enterprise system is democratic, creates abun­
dance, and has a revolutionary potential for social justice. 
2.	 Economic growth renders social conflict over resources between 
classes obsolete. 
3.	 American society is in the process of abolishing social class. 
4.	 Like industrial problems, social problems can be solved through 
programs designed by government enlightened by social science. 
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5.	 The main threat to this beneficent system comes from com­
munism. 
6.	 It is the duty and destiny of the United States to bring the good 
tidings of the free enterprise system to the rest of the world. 
This broad consensus "fragmented," Hodgson believes, after 1965, and 
dissolved altogether by 1968.30 
Underlying the liberal consensus was the confidence of the New Eco­
nomics, culminating in the sixties in economists' assertions of their abil­
ity to "fine tune" the economy. This self-assurance can be viewed as 
marking the last phase of a theme going back to 1938. In the spring of 
that year, Roosevelt, after a protracted period of indecision, resumed 
deficit spending to combat the recession that had begun in the fall of 
1937. This decision foreshadowed policy in the post-World War II era: 
except during the Korean War and the years 1971-73, when President 
Nixon adopted a four-phase wage-and-price-control plan, for forty 
years both Democratic and Republican administrations formulated 
economic policies within the framework of the Keynesian trade-off be­
tween unemployment and inflation. Only in the seventies did the effec­
tiveness of the Keynesian formula come under serious scrutiny.31 
As Eisenhower regretfully and permanently lost the opportunity to 
work with a Congress controlled by his own party, the nation entered 
the first part of the consensus era. Eric F Goldman's phrase the "Eisen­
hower Equilibrium" denotes Americans' assumption that both Russia 
as a great power and the New Deal were here to stay. In international 
affairs the United States continued to follow the path suggested by the 
concepts of containment and coexistence. In economic affairs Eisen­
hower showed greater concern with inflation than unemployment, in­
curring three recessions (1953-54, 1957-58, and 1960-61) and an annual 
average rate of economic growth of just 2.9 percent. Real Gross Na­
tional Product increased at an annual average rate of 4.7 percent from 
1950 to 1955 and 2.25 percent from 1955 to 1959.32 
Despite economic difficulties and the Democrats' retention of control 
of both the House and the Senate in 1956, Eisenhower's popularity re­
mained high. Some historians nevertheless designate the years 1958-60 
as a distinct, nonconsensual period, and others discern in the last three 
years of Eisenhower's presidency a feeling among Americans of drift, of 
lack of national purpose. Ronald Steel, for example, credits Eisenhower 
with rescuing the nation from deep, immobilizing division and restoring 
it to sanity, "but what was relaxation for four years turned into paralysis 
when stretched into eight." Historians often cite Kennedy's victory in 
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1960, after his campaign stressing the need to get America moving again, 
as confirmation of Americans' concern over national drift.33 
The years 1958-60 may nonetheless be treated as part of the consen­
sual period. Although some publicists lamented want of a sense of na­
tional purpose in 1960, most Americans seemed satisfied with the cen­
trist politics of the past generation. Politicians had recognized this 
contentment in 1956. The Democratic presidential candidate, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, boasted of his party's conservatism and, with the exception 
of his mild opposition to continued bomb testing, the positions he took 
on most issues were similar to Eisenhower's. In 1960 both major parties 
chose presidential candidates who had been associated with the prudent 
politics of the 1950s.34 
Meanwhile, although in 1956 Eisenhower had become the first presi­
dent since Zachary Taylor to be elected without his party carrying at 
least one house of Congress, it is generally assumed that if there had 
been no Twenty-second Amendment and he had chosen to run, he 
would have won again. As it turned out, Kennedy's triumph by 0.2 per­
cent of the vote, accompanied by a Republican gain of twenty-one seats 
in the House and the loss of only three in the Senate, was not a mandate 
to get America moving again. Nor did this outcome reflect an electorate 
equally divided between movers and nonmovers, for none of the studies 
of voter behavior in 1960 cites the quest for national purpose as a causal 
factor.35 The consensus era had a few more years to run. 
Eisenhower's effect on the electorate, as noted above, was that of a 
cooling agent, and it is widely held by historians, including those who 
liked Ike for one term but not for two, that in 1953 the nation needed a 
Prestone President. Thus Parmet affirms, "To label him a great or good 
or even a weak President misses the point. He was merely necessary.'' 
This fulfillment of Americans' need, William L. O'Neill states, was "no 
small thing." Under Eisenhower's "benign guidance the feverish witch-
hunts and polemics of the McCarthy era gave way to something like 
business as usual if the country cannot have progress, at least it 
deserves stability, as under Eisenhower. After 1965 there was precious 
little of either."36 
The coincidence of Eisenhower's feat and the abiding dominance of 
the New Deal party system suggests several facts about the period 
1945-60. The source of the persistence of the 1930s alignment was, 
through the election of 1948, ideological disagreement over the New 
Deal. The continuation after the ideologically climactic Truman-Dewey 
contest of widespread support for, or acceptance of, containment, the 
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welfare state, and the New Economics, and the inertial perpetuation of 
Democratic prevalence in partisan identification and in voting below 
the presidential level together indicate that the considerable discontent 
and discord in American life and politics during Truman's second term 
and the decline of dissatisfaction and division in the Eisenhower era can 
be attributed to clashes not over ideology and policy but over govern­
mental management or, more precisely, the identity of the managers, 
especially the president. 
One can thus submit that the fate of a policy can depend, at least in 
part, on who proposes or sponsors it. Irwin Ross conjectures that Dew­
ey would not have changed the direction of American foreign policy and 
might have secured passage of more liberal domestic legislation than 
Truman did because he could be more persuasive with Republicans in 
Congress. Ross states with certainty that the McCarthy crusade, which 
Truman's loyalty program failed to prevent, would not have developed 
if Dewey had been elected. In addition, it is a commonplace that the 
settlement Eisenhower obtained in Korea would have^been unaccept­
able coming from Truman.37 
One can only speculate as to whether and to what extent Dewey, if he 
had been so inclined, could have overcome the general lack of interest in 
expanding the New Deal. It is clear that Truman's proposals to enlarge 
the New Deal did not elicit majority approval, but Eisenhower's policy 
of retention without extension did. That being the case, it is tempting to 
conclude that Truman, in proposing the Fair Deal, defied the limita­
tions imposed by the times and suffered politically, and Eisenhower, in 
shunning the Fair Deal, accepted these limitations and prospered politi­
cally. But such a judgment would fly in the face of data cited above. The 
very loss of salience of the New Deal issues that accounted for the ab­
sence of popular clamor for more welfare statism meant that Truman's 
recommendation of the Fair Deal generated indifference rather than 
hostility. It may have been that his offering the Fair Deal was more or 
less inevitable given his consistent espousal of the urban liberalism of the 
presidential Democratic party, as well as his perception of a real Repub­
lican threat to dismantle the New Deal. One can also argue that a by-
product of his efforts for post-New Deal programs was to put the New 
Deal out of the realm of political debate. But these exertions do not 
appear to be the reason for the decline of Truman's public standing. 
Truman's identity entailed a legacy from Roosevelt, an inheritance 
embracing the politics of dead center and the accumulation of frustra­
tions, aggravated by Truman's victory in 1948, that inevitably developed 
in the Republican party, especially its right wing, when the Democrats 
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won five successive presidential elections, the last four over "me-too" 
candidates, and in Congress after years of strong executive leadership in 
depression and war. Further frustration arose among Americans with 
the Korean War. Above all, it was probably McCarthyism as "a move­
ment of revenge" (to borrow Alonzo L. Hamby's phrase) with anti-
Rooseveltian roots that created an atmosphere which prevented a ra­
tional response to Truman's proposals and policies. Consequently, the 
identity of the manager and all that it symbolized both hampered his 
performance and rendered it irrelevant to public assessments of his pres­
idency. In other words, Truman found himself in a situation in which it 
would have been virtually impossible for him to win substantial public 
approval regardless of his traits and capabilities and no matter what he 
did or tried to do.38 
Truman's disadvantage was Eisenhower's opportunity, but one can­
not assume that any Republican president would inevitably have ex­
ploited this favorable circumstance the way Eisenhower did. His 
achievement, no small thing, was not the accomplishment of an inno­
cent or inactive leader. Political scientists' inquiries and public-opinion 
polls suggest that too much can be made of the grandfatherly Eisen­
hower either as attractive candidate or presidential performer. Al­
though his appeal transcended social boundaries, it did not lie in cha­
risma but in the impression he conveyed to voters of integrity, sincerity, 
and competence. Eisenhower sustained this impression through his style 
of executive leadership, creating conditions conducive to placidity, es­
pecially seven-and-one-half years of peace. He "avoided the potential 
erosion of support," Greenstein writes, "that even a national icon would 
have experienced if his performance in office had seemed disastrous to 
the general public." Greenstein holds that Eisenhower's skills were un­
derestimated because, as an aspect of his skills, he wanted them to be. 
"There can be little question," Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., stated in 1979, 
"that Eisenhower was a much abler man than his critics, this writer in­
cluded, supposed in the 1950's." Without meaning to imply that consid­
eration of the presidency is a shortcut to full understanding of a given 
period, and eschewing the ranking of presidents, one can gain through 
contemplation of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations some 
sense of Americans' yearning after 1948 for relief from disquiet.39 
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